Dansk-Ukrainsk Selskab

Begge de fyrede ministre var trofaste støtter for Ukraines pro-vestlige præsident Viktor Jushenko. Udenrigsministeren regnes som arkitekten bag præsidentens politik om at føre Ukraine tættere på både EU og NATO.

Prorussere stemte ministre ud
Men et flertal af pro-russiske medlemmer af parlamentet stemte de to ned af deres ministertaburetter.

Parlamentet og regeringslederen har i længere tid været på kant med præsident Jushenko.

Præsidenten siger, at fyringen af de to ministre er et forsøg på at destabilisere Ukraine.

01.12.06. Magtkamp mellem Jusjtjenko og Janukovytj over fyret udenrigsminister

Den fyrede provestlige udenrigsminister Borys Tarasyuk mener, at parlamentets afskedigelse af ham vil få en indflydelse på premierminister Viktor Janukovytjs besøg i USA. "Uden at sætte mit lys under en skæppe, kan jeg rolig sige, at det gør det", sagde Tarasyuk ifølge UNIAN.

Premierminister Viktor Janukovytj mener, at det ukrainske parlament var i sin gode ret til at afskedige Tarasyuk. På spørgsmålet om, hvordan han forholder sig til præsident Viktor Jusjtjenkos udtalelse om, at han ikke vil skille sig af med Tarasyuk, sagde Janukovytj:

"Præsidenten har ret til at give sin mening til kende og forfægte den. Parlamentet har også ret til at træffe beslutninger".

Ifølge Janukovytj kan man ikke i regeringen have en minister, som åbent tilkendegiver, at han er i opposition og ikke sørger for at afstemme sine handlinger med regeringen og regeringschefen.

Janukovytj understregede, at Tarasyuk efter hans mening har gjort Ukraine til grin overfor det internationale samfund. UP.

14.12.06. Jusjtjenko fastholder Tarasyuk som udenrigsminister

Præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko vil ikke acceptere parlamentets resolution om afskedigelsen af Borys Tarasyuk som udenrigsminister.

"Denne fyring er retsstridig, og jeg accepterer den ikke", sagde Jusjtjenko på en pressekonference i dag.

Han understregede, at det er ham som præsident, der har retten til at indstille udenrigsministeren til afskedigelse.

"Enhver juridisk ekspert kan fortælle jer, at når det er præsidenten, der indstiller udenrigsministerkandidaten til parlamentet, så er det også præsidenten, der tager initiativ til afskedigelsen af denne minister", fremhævede det ukrainske statsoverhoved.

Jusjtjenko vil insistere på, at Tarasyuk fortsat skal stå i spidsen for det ukrainske udenrigsministerium.

"Borys Ivanovytj Tarasyuk arbejder som udenrigsminister. Det er præsidentens fundamentale og grundlæggende holdning i denne sag. Jeg har afvist premierministerens initiativ, som gik ud på at udskifte ham", sagde præsidenten.

Ukraines parlament Verkhovna Rada vedtog den 1. december en resolution, som afskedigede Tarasyuk som udenrigsminister. Men distriktsretten i Kievs Shevtjenko-distrikt suspenderede parlamentets beslutning, hvorefter præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko underskrev et dekret om, at Tarasyuk fortsat fungerer som udenrigsminister. UP.

15.12.06. Stalinist famine still haunts modern Ukraine

ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published December 3, 2006

By Natasha Lisova

KYIV -- If a black flag waved in the air above a Ukrainian village in 1933, Ukrainians would know that every single resident was dead and their emaciated bodies were waiting to be collected.

This former Soviet republic on Nov. 25 marked the 73rd anniversary of the Great Famine -- a tragedy orchestrated by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin that continues to haunt and divide the nation of 47 million.

Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and most members of the nation's 450-member parliament want the deaths of an estimated 10 million of their countrymen recognized as genocide, but Russia has warned Kyiv against using that term to describe the mass starvation.

During the height of the famine, 33,000 people died of hunger every day. Cases of cannibalism were widespread as desperation deepened. Parents ate their children, and adult children ate elderly parents.

"Cats were eaten, dogs were eaten, then people started eating each other," Anna Vasilieva, 85, told the Associated Press.

She said her younger brother, Oleksiy, once returned home and told her he had just seen their neighbor eat a boiled hand.

"He told me, 'I also want to eat an arm; I want to eat fingers,' " said Mrs. Vasilieva.

Stalin provoked the famine in a campaign to force peasants to give up their private farms and join collectives. Authorities collectivized agriculture throughout the Soviet Union, but farmers in Ukraine -- then the breadbasket of the USSR -- fiercely resisted collectivization and bore the brunt of the man-made disaster.

Historians say the overwhelming majority of deaths in the famine occurred in Ukraine, which lost one-third of its population.

Authorities ordered each village to provide the state with a quota of grain, but the demands typically exceeded crop yields. As village after village failed to meet the requirements, they were put on a blacklist. The government seized all food from blacklisted villages, but residents were prohibited from leaving -- effectively condemning them to starvation.

During the Soviet era, the mass starvation of a nation with some of the world's richest farmland was a closely guarded state secret, but information trickled out over the years and in 2003, Ukraine declassified more than 1,000 files documenting it.

Ten nations, including the United States, have recognized the Great Famine as an act of genocide, defined as the deliberate and systematic destruction of a racial, political, or cultural group. Genocide is a crime under international law.

Russia, the legal successor to the Soviet Union, argues that the orchestrated famine did not specifically target Ukrainians but also other peoples in the Soviet agricultural belt, including Russians and Kazakhs.

It has been reluctant to probe too deeply into the crimes of the Soviet era. Many former Soviet officials still hold positions of power in Russia, as they do throughout the former Soviet Union.

Lawmakers loyal to Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, an ally of the Kremlin, sought to have the word "genocide" stripped from a bill on the famine, which is known here as "Holodomor," meaning "death by hunger."

Instead, they proposed calling the famine a tragedy. Ukraine's communists also strongly oppose declaring the famine a genocide.

But Ukraine's parliament adopted a bill recognizing the famine as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people -- a vote seen as a victory for Mr. Yushchenko, the pro-Western president.

The bill passed by a vote of 233-1 in the 450-seat legislature. Many lawmakers chose not to vote, choosing silence on a highly divisive issue.

"It is a belated move, but it is our obligation to remember," said lawmaker Borys Bespaliy, a Yushchenko ally. "Those who do not remember do not have a future."

The recognition opens the door to potential legal consequences, including compensation for famine victims and recognition of the famine by the United Nations as genocide against the Ukrainian people.

During the worst days of the famine, corpses lay on city streets waiting for police to take them. Many parents abandoned their children at railway stations, hoping police would pick them up and take them to orphanages, where there was food.

Many villages simply ceased to be populated. Authorities confiscated whatever grain they found.

"They even took food from pots and pans, looking for it everywhere," said Dmytro Kalenyk, 88, one of only two of the 14 members of his family to survive. In 1992, Mr. Kalenyk became the head of an association to investigate the famine in Ukraine.

Taking a grain of wheat from a field could result in a death sentence. Anyone who resisted the confiscation of food could be sent to prison in Siberia. In the first five months of 1933, 55,000 people were sent to Siberia and 2,100, including women and children, were shot.

Stalin never admitted publicly that the famine had occurred. When one of Ukraine's political leaders complained to him and asked for help, Stalin accused him of "creating fairy tales of hunger" and advised him to resign from the Communist Party and to write children's books "for fools."

20.12.06. Jusjtjenko-bagmand investerer stort i Rusland

Seskaberne "Bohdan" og "Ukravto" er begyndt at opføre en bilfabrik i Rusland, som skal producere 165.000 biler om året.

Under en ceremoni i forbindelse med påbegyndelsen af byggeriet sagde industriminister Anatolij Holovko:

"Vi er overbevist om, at der om tre år vil være en moderne virksomhed her. Det er en bekræftelse af, at de to brødrefolk altid vil være sammen, og at byggeriet af fabrikken vil være et bidrag til den russiske økonomi".

Medlem af fraktionen "Vores Ukraine" Petro Poroshenko, som også var til stede under ceremonien, understregede, at "Ukraine hermed har noget man kan fremvise, når præsident Vladimir Putin kommer på besøg".

Det er første gang bilfabrikkerne i Zaporizja og Luhansk (ZAZ og LuAZ) invisterer i Rusland - og der er tale om den største ukrainske investering i den russiske økonomi", sagde han.

Ifølge projektet er det planen, at fabrikkens produktionskapacitet vil være 165 personbiler, 6.000 busser og 60.000 dieselmotorer til lastbiler om året, oplyser UNIAN. I alt vil byggeriet af fabrikken beløbe sig til over 700.000 millioner dollars.

Selskaberne "Bohdan" og "Ukravto" har i Rusland stiftet selskaberne "Forenede transportteknologier", som skal stå for byggeriet.

Som bekendt indgår selskabet "Bohdan" i gruppen "Ukrprominvest", som har tilknytning til Petro Poroshenkos far - Oleksij Poroshenko. UP.

22.12.06. Udenrigsminister i håndgemæng i regeringsbygningen

Udenrigsminister Borys Tarasyuk kan ikke få lov til at komme ind til regeringsmøderne i regeringsbygningen.

I onsdags ankom han til regeringsmødet i følge med sin personlige livvagt og parlamentsmedlem fra "Vores Ukraine" Mykola Katerynchuk, men sikkerhedsvagterne i regeringsbygningerne forhindrede Tarasyuk i at komme igennem metaldetektoren. I stedet fulgte sikkerhedsvagterne og tre deputerede fra "Regionernes Parti" ministeren ind i et tilstødende lokale.

Nogle minutter senere lykkedes det for Tarasyuk og Katerynchuk at bryde igennem metaldetektor-rammen, men inden de var nået hen til mødesalen, blev de stoppet af sikkerhedsvagterne, hvorpå der opstod håndgemæng.

Kort tid efter forlod Tarasyuk, Katerynchuk og to andre deputerede fra "Vores Ukraine" regeringsbygningen. UP.

29.12.06. Ukraine upgraded into Intensified Dialogue on Membership

by Taras Kuzio

Georgia's better performance compared to Ukraine has been in two areas where progress has been limited in Ukraine: improving the rule of law and battling corruption

NATO's summit in Riga was the first since 1999 for which no invitations were sent to aspirant countries. At NATO's 1999 and 2004 summits, the alliance enlarged by three, then an additional seven countries.

The Riga summit was to have been Ukraine's summit with an invitation to a Membership Action Plan (MAP), followed by an invitation to join in 2008 and membership in 2010. This fast-track strategy collapsed after President Viktor Yushchenko failed to support an Orange coalition following the March elections.

Personal conflict with former Orange ally Yulia Tymoshenko, and preventing her returning to head the government, prevailed over national interests. As former premier Yuriy Yekhanurov recently admitted in an interview in Ukrayinska Pravda, President Yushchenko instructed him following the March elections to conduct negotiations with the anti-Orange Party of Regions on the formation of a Grand Coalition. Yushchenko typically was indecisive and could not choose between an Orange and a Grand coalition. In the end, neither coalition came about, and Ukraine got the worst outcome, the Anti-Crisis coalition, which ended hopes that Riga would be 'Ukraine's summit.'

NATO's 2008 summit was set to be an enlargement summit, with invitations followed by membership in 2010. Optimistically, this timetable is now only possible for the three west Balkan states: Croatia, Albania and Macedonia, who are in NATO's MAP. Georgia and Ukraine were upgraded into Intensified Dialogue on Membership Issues in 2005-2006. When they will enter MAP is still unclear.

NATO's summit in Riga showed to what degree Georgia has rapidly moved ahead of Ukraine in its drive to join NATO, even though it joined Intensified Dialogue a year later than Ukraine. Both President George W. Bush and Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed Georgia ahead of Ukraine in the drive to reach NATO membership.

President Bush said, "We will continue to support Georgia's desire to become a NATO ally." As to Ukraine, Bush said, "As democracy takes hold in Ukraine, and its leaders pursue vital reforms, NATO membership will be open to the Ukrainian people if they choose it." In other words, the Bush administration understands that Georgians want NATO membership, while Ukrainians are ambivalent.

Senator Lugar described Georgia as a "superb role model for the region." Georgia should be invited into a MAP and invited to join NATO, Lugar said. Regarding Ukraine, Lugar acknowledged Ukraine's desire to "move more slowly toward NATO membership" and only when ready, "for Ukraine to join NATO." Senator Lugar's comments took into account the creation of the Anti-Crisis Coalition and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych's statements on Ukraine not being ready for a MAP during Yanukovych's September visit to NATO headquarters.

The Bush administration has been able to compare the Ukrainian and Georgian governments following their visits to Washington during the last few months. The Georgian delegation came out looking a lot better, a senior official told me. They all spoke English and with one voice. They knew what they wanted from the US (support for territorial integrity, NATO membership) and outlined detailed plans for their country's energy security.

Georgian officials in Riga remain optimistic that they will receive a MAP in spring 2007. Whether one year in a MAP would be sufficient for Georgia to be included in NATO's 2008 invitations to membership remains an open question.

Undoubtedly the Georgian leadership, both in government and in opposition, will attempt to reach this optimistic target. Discussions in Riga showed to what degree the Georgian leadership that emerged from the Rose Revolution of late 2003 has been more successful in breaking with the past and pursuing radical reform, when compared to Ukraine.

Both countries have pursued democratic reforms since their democratic revolutions. Georgia's better performance compared to Ukraine has been in two areas where progress has been limited in Ukraine: improving the rule of law and battling corruption.

President Viktor Yushchenko recently wrote in the Washington Post that, "on my watch, the corruption that has historically emanated from the president's office ceased." Nevertheless, accusations of corruption surrounding the president's close allies (the so-called Liubi Druzi or Dear Friends) have repeatedly surfaced since the September 2005 crisis when presidential secretariat head Oleksandr Zinchenko resigned. There are also unanswered questions surrounding corruption related to the president's family, including the president's brother, allegedly involved in the non-transparent gas transportation intermediary RosUkrenergo.

Yushchenko has repeatedly defended Ukraine's dealings with RosUkrenergo, most recently in a September interview with Adrian Karatnycky, president of the Orange Circle, a US NGO. In an effort to balance against the Party of Regions' Systems Capital Management, Yushchenko has also aligned himself with the Donbass Industrial Union (DIU) and with Viktor Pinchuk, thereby tying himself closer to oligarchs. The DIU and Pinchuk's protege, Valeriy Khoroshkovsky, now control senior positions in the NSDC.

A US perception of more progress on reforms in Georgia, compared to in Ukraine, are because of four factors.

First, the political will to break with the past is greater at the presidential level in Georgia than in Ukraine.

Second, the Rose Revolution coalition has remained united. This is different to the Orange coalition, which Yushchenko himself dissolved in the September 2005 crisis, and after the March elections, when he chose a two-track negotiating strategy for a parliamentary coalition, rather than choosing to reunite Orange.

Third, Georgia as a nation is not divided in its foreign orientation. Ukraine as a nation is regionally divided in its foreign orientation between Ukrainophones and Russophones. The Party of Regions dominates Russophone Ukraine.

Fourth, Georgia's political leadership has united the country in the face of a credible Russian external threat and in pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration. In Ukraine, support for NATO membership hovers at 20 percent, while NATO membership has 70 percent cross-party and regional support in Georgia.

In Ukraine, as the Razumkov Center's National Security and Defence (no.9, 2006) shows, support for NATO membership has declined from 32 percent in June 2002 to 17.2 percent in October 2006. Ironically, this decline in support took place after Ukraine declared its intention to seek NATO membership in July 2002.

The invasion of Iraq by a US-led coalition and anti-Americanism in the 2004 elections are to blame for this decline in support. From 38.3 to 47.3 percent of Ukrainians in two polls conducted by Freedom House in 2005-2006 believe wrongly that NATO started the war in Iraq. Ironically, it was the first Viktor Yanukovych government that sent troops to Iraq in 2003, and Viktor Yushchenko who brought them home in late 2005.

NATO therefore has two unpalatable choices. It can lower the barriers for Georgia by inviting it into membership after only a year in MAP (2007-2008). Or, it can keep the invitation to Georgia hanging on internal developments in Ukraine deciding when the country will be ready to be invited into MAP.

Georgia is more reliant on a successful Ukraine bid to enter MAP than the other way round. But, NATO is in a quandary, as it is unable to formulate a policy to Ukraine when the country de facto has no foreign policy. In addition, its relationship between domestic and foreign policy issues is contradictory.

Yushchenko pointed out in the Washington Post that the Ukrainian law on national security, "promotes participation and membership in pan-European and regional systems of collective security," referring to the EU and NATO. It is also the case that the reformed constitution gives the president exclusive competence over foreign and defense policy.

These two factors are derailed by three realities of Ukrainian politics. First, a commitment to NATO membership: Georgia sent nine individuals to the Riga summit, including the parliamentary speaker, National Bank chief, ambassadors and a deputy foreign minister. They were present throughout the meetings organized by the German Marshall Fund around the NATO summit.

Ukraine sent only three. Ukraine's representatives included only one official, Oleh Rybachuk, former head of the presidential secretariat and now a presidential adviser. Not a single Ukrainian political leader attended the Riga summit. The only talk on Ukraine given in Riga was by me, a non-Ukrainian citizen.

Second, conflict among Ukraine's elite couples with mixed signals sent to the West. On the eve of Yanukovych's visit to the US on December 4-6, his Party of Regions supported the unconstitutional removal of the foreign minister. During the week prior to Yanukovych's US visit, the president cancelled the visit and then, after reaching agreement, approved it.

These signals followed on the heels of Yanukovych's remarks in NATO on the need to adopt a 'pragmatic' approach to NATO and EU membership, which were reminiscent of the Kuchma era. Following Brussels, a parliamentary resolution backed the prime minister's 'Euro-pragmatism.'

Third, the leadership of the National Security and Defense Council is dominated by Industrial Union of Donbass and individuals close to Pinchuk (Interpipe). Both of these business groups support Ukraine's membership in the WTO and EU -- but not NATO (Pinchuk is head of the pro-EU, Yalta European Strategy). In a July opinion editorial in the International Herald Tribune, Pinchuk wrote, 'the majority of Ukrainians do not support Ukraine joining NATO. It would be more divisive than uniting: the benefits are not clear, but the risks are.'

Fourth, the domestic political environment is not conducive to moving forward on NATO membership. Until the next election cycle in 2009-2011, Ukraine has a weak president with little political will.

Following NATO's Riga summit, Georgia looks set to speed up its drive to join NATO, while Ukraine's position continues to be ambivalent. The US and NATO's support for Georgian membership is unequivocal, while they are having difficulty in formulating a clear strategy to Ukraine since Yankovych returned to government.

10.01.07. EU swings focus onto ex-Soviet neighbours

By Andrew Rettman

EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS -- Brussels' new neighbourhood policy will try and get ex-Soviet states to catch up with Mediterranean rim countries in terms of pro-EU reforms - but the policy is not up to the job, one of the EU's biggest neighbours, Ukraine, says.

The new-look "European Neighbourhood Policy" (ENP) will see the EU boost its role in eastern issues such as conflict resolution in Georgia and Moldova by getting involved for the first time in multilateral foreign ministers' meetings of nearby post-Soviet states.

The EU wants to join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council as an observer to take part in regular talks between countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Russia and Turkey.

Under the ENP, it also wants to set-up new "regular or ad-hoc" meetings with the foreign ministers of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Belarus, if Minsk decides to take pro-democracy steps.

In 2007 to 2013, the ENP will spend 32 percent more cash - ?12 billion in total - than in the previous EU budget period, splitting spending on a ?3.34/per capita basis for the southern ENP states and ?3.64/per capita for the eastern countries.

But Brussels will continue to treat Mediterranean and eastern European states the same way in terms of political status (zero recognition of anybody's EU accession hopes) and opportunities for deeper trade integration (the EU is keen to create free trade zones with all ENP states).

The ENP embraces 10 countries in the Mediterranean region - where multilateral talks with the EU began in 1995 in the Barcelona process format - and six ex-Soviet states that currently talk to the EU on a bilateral basis only, with Russia not part of the ENP scheme.

Unveiling the re-vamped ENP in Brussels on Monday (4 December) the European Commission said Morocco, Jordan and Ukraine have been the fastest reformers over the past 18 months, while Algeria, Libya, Syria and Belarus lag in the group having all but opted out.

East now, south later

"Germany is now making a focus on the east," external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner said on Brussels' thrust to boost the eastern wing of the ENP in line with the upcoming German EU presidency's policy priorities.

"But the Portuguese presidency [in July 2007] will make a focus on the south, so it's very balanced...the south does not have to fear anything [in terms of losing EU aid]," she added, with the per capita weighting still seeing most ENP cash go south in net terms.

The new eastern European foreign ministers' meetings "should mean a more active EU role for conflict resolution in the region," Ms Ferrero-Waldner explained, adding that Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has expressed "interest" in her idea.

But she warned the new EU role will be limited to "reinforcing trust and creating the right climate" for rapprochement between, say, Russia, Georgia and Georgian separatists, rather than anything more radical, such as sending EU border monitors to Georgia.

Ukraine underwhelmed

Ukraine's ambassador to the EU, Roman Shpek, criticised Brussels' neighbourhood vision however, saying "the ENP is de-facto positioned as an alternative to enlargement [and as] such contradicts the EU membership aspirations of Ukraine."

"Ukraine cannot accept to be treated in the same way as non-European countries," he stated, adding that in the past the EU has "cherry-picked" the kind of reforms that suit its interests, such as energy, while letting others, such as visas or aviation, stagnate.

"Failing to [address these issues] will see the revised ENP lose credibility in the eyes of Ukrainian society as well as weight in our relations," the ambassador warned, at a time when the new Russia-friendly Ukraine government is exploring various foreign policy ideas.

'Not so sexy'

Meanwhile Georgia, which has recently pushed the EU to send border monitors and to become a formal negotiating partner in UN-led conflict resolution talks with Russia, took a more sanguine approach to the commission's plans.

"We welcome any new EU role in conflict resolution - this could add value. But we will have to wait and see the details and it should not exclude other possibilities [for EU engagement]," Georgia's EU ambassador, Salome Samadashvili, said.

Defending the ENP's stress on long-term political reform instead of direct solutions to urgent problems - such as Ukraine's post-revolutionary future or the Georgia-Russia dispute - Ms Ferrero-Waldner said "Maybe it doesn't sound so sexy, but don't underestimate it."

10.01.07. Are early elections an option for Yushchenko?

By Pavel Korduban

Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko may opt for an early parliamentary election in order to reverse the 2004-2006 constitutional reforms. Reversing the amendments, which diminished presidential authority and made it possible for Yushchenko's rivals to quickly return to power, is probably impossible without controlling two-thirds of the 450-seat parliament. Yushchenko's allies are in the minority in the legislature, and o nly a new election may bring them back to power.

Ardent oppositionist Yulia Tymoshenko has been urging an early election since last summer, when she lost the battle for the post of prime minister to Viktor Yanukovych. Yushchenko initially was not enthusiastic about such an option. But, after losing his loyal cabinet ministers one-by-one and Yanukovych kept ignoring his orders, Yushchenko apparently started to seriously consider this option.

Yushchenko has been evasive on an early election in his speeches, but two of his allies, former interior minister Yuriy Lutsenko and MP Mykola Katerynchuk, are less coy. Both have launched political movements with an obvious eye to an early election, even if they ostentatiously refuse to call the new groups "parties." However, it may be too late for them to run for parliament if an election is called in 2007, as only parties more than a year old are allowed to run. Most probably, Katerynchuk's a nd Lutsenko's movements are aimed at helping Yushchenko's People's Union-Our Ukraine (NSNU) drum up popular support for the idea of an early election and possibly to build bridges to Tymoshenko.

Of the two, at least Lutsenko works in concert with Tymoshenko. She and Lutsenko met on December 11 to discuss "bringing together the democratic forces in an attempt to unite them for an early parliamentary poll," Tymoshenko told a briefing on the same day. She made it clear that Lutsenko was not going to join her party, but she urged "maximum unification" of the parties pushing for an early election.

Speaking in an interview with Kommersant, Tymoshenko explained the logic behind their plan. Yushchenko, she said, has not put up with the fact that his authority was curtailed by the constitutional changes. "An early election is a lesser evil," she said. "Dissolving parliament, we should immediately offer a new constitution to the country." She continued, "Now it would be useless to unite our efforts with Viktor Yushchenko in this direction. We need 300 votes [in parliament], which we do not have."

Katerynchuk, who resigned as NSNU's executive committee head in November, on December 15 presided over the first meeting of the "European Platform for Ukraine" movement. European Platform's declared aim is to unite Ukraine around the idea of joining the European Union, Katerynchuk said in an interview with Den on December 27. He predicted that the country's economic situation will deteriorate to a point where it will be "uncontrollable," prompting a crisis situation in spring 2007, when Yanu kovych will go and Yushchenko should call an early election.

Lutsenko announced the launch of the "Civil Movement for People's Self-Defense" on December 20. Like Katerynchuk, Lutsenko did not say much about ideology, but he was straightforward about the goal -- a popular "march of justice" in the spring to urge cabinet dismissal and parliament dissolution. "This movement of the people," he said, "should help the president realize the theoretical possibility of dissolving parliament, which may arise when relevant petitions are considered by the Constitutio nal Court."

Yushchenko's allies and Tymoshenko believe that the Constitutional Court should confirm that there are formal grounds for Yushchenko to dissolve parliament. Tymoshenko told Kommersant that a certain petition was forwarded to the Constitutional Court, so if the court agrees with Tymoshenko, "There will be more than enough grounds" for parliament dissolution. She, however, refused to give details of the petition. Katerynchuk, talking to Den, was more candid. According to him, the formal grounds fo r parliamentary dissolution are the following: Yanukovych's cabinet was formed not within 60 days after the parliamentary election in April, as the constitution requires, but on the 62nd day, and the cabinet worked for more than 60 days without an emergencies minister last fall.

The head of the presidential secretariat, Viktor Baloha, told Kommersant on December 18 that an early parliamentary election is possible in either 2007 or 2008. However, he said that there are currently no legal grounds for such a move. "Such grounds may arise," he added enigmatically.

Recent opinion polls have shown that the public is not ready to embrace the idea of parliamentary dissolution, and that if an early election takes place, the balance of forces may not change in favor of Yushchenko. A poll held in mid-December by the Kyiv-based Public Opinion Foundation showed that only 28% of Ukrainians are in favor of an early parliamentary election. And polls held by three Ukrainian pollsters independently in December showed that Yanukovych's Party of Regions would win an earl y election with 28-32% of popular support, followed by Tymoshenko's bloc with 17-22%, and Yushchenko's Our Ukraine with 7-14%. These figures are very close to the results of the April 2006 election.

10.01.07. Juridisk tovtrækkeri om afskedigelsen af udenrigsministeren

Lederen af "Vores Ukraine"s parlamentsgruppe, Vjatjeslav Kyrylenko, mener, at den konflikt, som er opstået omkring udenrigsministerposten, kun kan løses, hvis regeringen anerkender, at præsidenten har eneret til at udpege en række ministre. I en kommentar til pressen i anledning af endnu en retskendelse i den uendelige sag om chefen for udenrigsministeriet, Borys Tarasyuk, mindede Kyrylenko om præsidentens dekret om, at Tarasyuk kan fortsætte med at fungere som udenrigsminister, og at hele verden anerkender Borys Tarasyuk som Ukraines udenrigsminister, oplyser Liga.

"Kun Janukovytjs regering vil ikke anerkende ham. Og det skader Ukraines omdømme i udlandet", siger lederen af "Vores Ukraines" fraktion.

I en kommentar til Appelrettens beslutning i Tarasyuk-sagen, oplyser Kyrylenko, at en appelinstans' beslutning altid kan kæres.

Kyrylenko tror, at den juridiske proces kommer til at trække meget ud: "Dem, som tog initiativ til Tarsyuks afskedigelse, burde have tænkt på, at de på en demonstrativ måde har blandet sig i præsidentens forfatningsmæssige beføjelser, og at denne situation ikke løser sig uden en konflikt".

Som bekendt ophævede appelretten i Kiev den 4. januar 2007 Shevtjenko-distriktrettens tidligere beslutning om at suspendere parlamentets beslutning om at afskedige Tarasyuk som udenrigsminister. UP.

10.01.07. Meningsmåling: Fortsat stor beundring for Khmelnytskyj

I perioden fra 2002 til 2006 er der ikke sket nogen nævneværdig ændring i de ukrainske borgeres bedømmelse af Ukraines historiske og politiske personligheder. Direktøren for Institut for Politik og ledende medlem af Julia Tymoshenkos fraktion i parlamentet, Mykola Tomenko, præsenterede undersøgelsen på en pressekonference i Kiev i dag.

Ifølge Tomenko har 70% af de adspurgte givet en positiv vurdering af Bohdan Khmelnytskyj som historisk person, mens hele 60% er kommet med en ligeledes positiv vurdering af den russiske tsar Peter den Store (Peter den I). Læs mere om disse personligheder og Ukraines historie her.

For så vidt angår Sovjetperioden (1920-1991) forbliver den ukrainskfødte sovjetiske generalsekretær (1964-1982) Leonid Brezhnev den mest populære sovjetleder, idet 52% af de adspurgte (mod 53% i 2002) vurderer ham positivt. Samtidig har kun 29% vurderet den sidste sovjetleder (1985-1991) Mikhail Gorbatjov positivt.

Ifølge Tomenko forholder næsten halvdelen af de adspurgte sig positivt til Ukraines første præsident (1917-1918) Mykhajlo Hrushevskyj (49%) og dissidentlederen Vjatjeslav Tjornovil (47%).

Samtidig har hver fjerde ukrainer intet kendskab til den ukrainske hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyj (1918-1920), hver syvende har aldrig hørt om Mykhajlo Hrushevskyj, mens hver tiende aldrig har hørt om nationalistlederen (1917-1920) Simon Petljura.

Et overvejende negativt billede har ukrainerne åbenbart af deres to seneste ledere, nemlig det uafhængige Ukraines første præsident Leonid Kravtjuk (1991-1994), som 57% har en negativ vurdering af, og Leonid Kutjma (1994-2005) med 71%.

I undersøgelsen understreges det, at de unges holdning til de historiske og politiske personligheder kun i ubetydelig grad adskiller sig fra den ældre generations vurdering. Således er Khmelnytskyj og Peter den Store også favoritter i aldersgruppen 18-29 år med henholdsvis 71% (mod 70% for alle aldersgrupper) og 58% (mod 60% for alle aldersgrupper).

Derimod har de unge en noget mere positiv vurdering af Hrushevskyj med 55% (mod 49% for alle aldersgrupper), hetman Mazepa (der gjorde oprør mod Peter den Store) med 41% og Petljura med 25%, og samtidig en mere negativ holdning til de tre første sovjetledere Vladimir Lenin (1920-1924), Josef Stalin (1924-1953) og Nikita Khrustjov (1953-1964).

I de østligste Donetsk og Luhansk regioner har kun 6% af de adspurgte en positiv holdning til nationalistlederen Stepan Bandera, 30% ser positivt på Hrushevskyj, 17% - på Mazepa (mod 62% i Vestukraine), 16% - Skoropadskyj, 39% - Tjornovil (mod kun 18% i 2002).

I de 5 vestligste af Ukraines regioner ser kun 24% positivt på Brezhnev, 12% - på Lenin (mod 51% i Østukraine) og 28% - på Khrustjov (mod 38% i Østurkaine).

Undersøgelsen blev gennemført af "Den ukrainske demokratiske kreds" for Institut for Politik sammen med selskabet "Ukraine sociology service" 12 til 22 december 2006. 4998 personer over 18 år deltog. Undersøgelsens formål var at finde ud af, hvad borgerne mener om historiske handlinger, politiske personligheder og perspektiverne for landets udvikling.

En del af undersøgelsen var en kopi af en lignende undersøgelse fra december 2002, hvilket giver mulighed for at sammenligne data og udlede dynamikken i den ukrainske befolknings holdninger til emnet. UNIAN. UP.

13.01.07. Parlamentet tilføjer Jusjtjenko et alvorligt nederlag

Ukraines parlament har overtrumfet præsident Jusjtjenkos veto mod en ny lov om regeringen, 366 deputerede stemte for loven - 185 fra "Regionernes parti", 121 fra Julia Tymoshenkos blok, 31 socialister, 21 kommunister og 8 løsgængere.

Alene Jusjtjenkos egen fraktion "Vores Ukraine" afholdt sig fra at stemme for loven. "Vores Ukraine" havde ellers forlangt, at lovforslaget blev taget af dagsordenen grundet påståede overtrædelser af forretningsordenen. Fraktionen gik derfor op og begyndte at blokere talerstolen.

På trods af blokaden satte parlamentsformand Oleksandr Moroz præsidentens ændringsforslag til afstemning, men samtlige 42 lovforslag blev stemt ned. UP.

Jusjtjenko meddelte straks, at loven var forfatningsstridig, og at han derfor ville indklage den for forfatningsdomstolen.

Et af den nye lovs hovedelementer er, at præsidenten indenfor en 15 dages frist skal indstille den af parlamentsflertallet foreslåede premierministerkandidat. Hvis præsidenten ikke overholder denne frist, kan flertalskoalitionen selv indstille deres kandidat til premierministerposten. Et andet vigtigt punkt i den nye lov er, at præsidenten reelt mister kontrollen med udnævnelsen af udenrigsministeren og forsvarsministeren. Præsidenten har kun 15 dage til at forelægge parlamentet sine to kandidater til disse poster. Overskrider han denne frist, er det flertalskoalitionen, der udpeger de to ministre (i den forbindelse bør det fremhæves, at præsidentens ret til at udpege udenrigs- og forsvarsministeren er nedfældet i forfatningen). Ifølge den nye lov mister præsidenten også muligheden for at øve indflydelse på regeringens arbejde: regeringens program skal fra nu af godkendes af en parlamentsresolution og ikke af en lov, som præsidenten kan nedlægge veto imod. Desuden er præsidenten blevet frataget muligheden for at afskedige regeringen eller for at udnævne vice-ministre. Samtlige stillinger indenfor regeringen bliver besat efter indstilling fra regeringen selv eller enkelte ministre.

Den væsentligste begrænsning af præsidentens magt ligger imidlertid i beslutningen om, at præsidentens forordninger, dekreter m.v. fra nu af skal kontrasigneres af premierministeren og den ressortminister, der har ansvaret for deres implementering, og kan sendes tilbage til præsidenten med angivelse af årsagerne til den manglende kontrasignering (ifølge forfatningen gælder kravet om kontrasignering kun i forhold til de af præsidentens forordninger og dekreter, som er udstedt indenfor rammerne af klart fastlagte beføjelser uden muligheden for at returnere den til præsidenten).

Udover disse punkter indeholder den nye lov om regeringen en hel række bestemmelser, som på den ene eller den anden måde indskrænker præsidentens magt. Alt i alt vil gennemførelsen og efterlevelsen af denne lov føre til, at præsidenten bliver frataget muligheden for at øve indflydelse på den udøvende magt i form af regeringen. Podrobnosti.

17.01.07. Førende Janukovytj-støtte dræbt under jagtulykke

Folkedeputeret fra Regionernes parti Jevhen Kushanrjov afgik ved døden kl. 13.45 i eftermiddags. Det oplyste talskvinden for Regionernes parti i parlamentet, Anna Herman.

Kushnarjov døde af hjertestop på intensiv-afdelingen på Izjumskyj-hospitalet i Kharkiv, efter at lægerne forgæves havde forsøgt at genoplive ham operativt.

Sundhedsministerens pressesekretær bekræftede Kushnarjovs død, og ifølge hende havde man gjort alt for at redde Kushnarjov, men forgæves.

Tirsdag den 17. januar blev parlamentsmedlemmet hårdt såret i forbindelse med en jagtudflugt. Kushnarjov blev kort efter bragt ind til Kharkivs centrale hospital med et skudsår i mavens leverregion med et efterfølgende stort blodtab. Udover leveren var også nyrerne og tarmen blevet ramt. Under operationen, som varede tirsdag fra kl. 17:00 til 22:00 fik Kushnarjov fjernet en nyre, mens det ikke lykkedes at standse blodtabet fra leveren.

Jevhen Kushnarjov døde i en alder af 56 år (han var født den 29. januar 1951 i Kharkiv). Efter at han i 1973 var færdiguddannet ved Kharkivs bygningsindustrielle institut, arbejdede han på en fabrik for jernbetonkonstruktioner som partiaktivist. I 1989 gik han i spidsen for Kommunistpartiets demokratiske platform i Kharkiv. I 1994 blev Kushnarjov valgt til Kharkivs borgmester. Fra december 1996 til november 1998 var han leder af Ukraines præsidentadministration. I 1995 blev han leder af den folkedemokratiske sammenslutning "Nyt Ukraine", og i 1996 var han en af stifterne af det folkedemokratiske parti. Fra 2000 til 2004 var Kushnarjov guvernør for Kharkiv-regionen. I december 2004 stiftede han det politiske parti "Nyt demokrati". I november 2005 besluttede dette parti at slutte sig sammen med Regionernes parti. Fra den 3. december 2005 var Kushnarjov medlem af Regionernes partis forretningsudvalg og leder af dets valgkamp. I parlamentet var han næstformand for Regionernes fraktion. Podrobnosti.ua.

18.01.07. Ukraine's domestic and foreign prospects for 2007

By Taras Kuzio

Ukraine's domestic and foreign prospects in 2007 depend upon the resolution of the political and constitutional crisis that began in 2006. Failure to resolve this ongoing crisis will lead to stagnation and a possible retreat from some of the gains of the Orange Revolution (see review of 2006 by Yulia Tymoshenko in "Zerkalo Tyzhnia", December 30, 2006).

This year will see the continuation of the Viktor Yanukovych government and the anti-crisis parliamentary coalition. The coalition's Achilles heel is the Socialist Party (SPU), which has little possibility of being elected to the next parliament as long as it continues to remain in the coalition. The Yanukovych government's first 150 days have been widely criticized inside Ukraine for a lack of strategy, disinterest in reforms, no transparency, and the return of discredited personnel from the Leonid Kuchma era.

This year will also see growing demands for the Constitutional Court to reverse the infamous constitutional reforms, which transferred some presidential powers to parliament. U.S. Judge Bohdan Futey, a long-time adviser on legal reform in Ukraine, told /Ukrayinska pravda/ (January 9) that Ukraine's constitutional reforms could be considered "illegitimate." The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, which has consistently opposed the reforms, and Our Ukraine will support their reversal.

The constitutional reforms could be abolished through a national referendum this year, as the Constitutional Court mandated in a November 2006 ruling. The Party of Regions has threatened to add two additional questions to any referendum, such as supporting the elevation of Russian to a second state language and on Ukraine's membership of NATO (/Ukrayinska pravda/, January 2, 4).

The Tymoshenko Bloc has been consistent in its demand for early parliamentary elections, although leading deputy Mykola Tomenko is skeptical that this will take place in 2007 (/Ukrayinska pravda/, January 1). Starting this fall, the opposition will therefore begin to prepare for the October 2009 presidential elections. President Viktor Yushchenko will increasingly be seen as a lame-duck president, and that the main election contest in 2009 will therefore be between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko.

This year will also see the growth of a united opposition to the anti-crisis coalition that will build a protest movement similar to that which emerged during the Kuchmagate crisis. Then and now, the main opposition force is the Tymoshenko Bloc, with the difference being that it now has the second-largest parliamentary faction.

The Tymoshenko Bloc has been strengthened by an alliance with the Reforms and Order Party. The opposition coalition will be augmented by defectors from Our Ukraine grouped around Mykola Katerynchuk's European Platform for Ukraine and SPU defector Yuriy Lutsenko's Civil Movement for People's Self-Defense ("Ukrayinska pravda", January 2).

In the foreign policy domain, Ukraine's 2007 prospects look poor. The domestic crisis and the failure to re-establish an Orange coalition following the March 2006 parliamentary elections has led to a de facto return of multi-vectorism in Ukraine's foreign policy (/Ukrayinska pravda/, January 2). Multi-vectorism is a product of different foreign policy orientations espoused by the president and prime minister. One anticipated foreign policy success is Ukraine's entry into the WTO ahead of Russia, which will give Kyiv added leverage in its trade and energy negotiations with Moscow.

In addition, the EU has offered to begin negotiations with Ukraine on a free trade area following its WTO membership. These negotiations will begin in the second half of 2007, but they are unlikely to be concluded until the first half of 2008. Ukraine will also negotiate a visa-free regime with the EU.

This year will be the last of the ten-year Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Ukraine. An Enhanced Agreement and European Neighborhood Policy-Plus (ENP+) will replace the PCA. However, neither of these two formulations, like the PCA, offers future EU membership for Ukraine.

These developments will strengthen the European vector in Ukraine's foreign policy and, coupled with an increasingly more belligerent Russia, will make the CIS Single Economic Space less attractive for Ukraine's elites.

The greatest disappointment in 2007 will be in Ukraine's relations with NATO. Ukraine's opportunity of being invited into a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at NATO's November 2006 Riga summit was squandered by the inability of President Yushchenko and Our Ukraine to place national interests above personal conflicts with Tymoshenko.

Ukraine's recent cooperation with NATO is at a higher level than that under Kuchma, as Ukraine was invited in 2005 to join the Intensified Dialogue on Membership. Nevertheless, Ukraine is continuing the Kuchma-era policy of intensive cooperation with NATO while not seeking membership. NATO membership will not return to the domestic agenda until the country's next election cycle (in 2009-2011) is completed.

Intensive cooperation with NATO could be undermined if Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko is removed, as the anti-crisis coalition has threatened following its unconstitutional dismissal of Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk in November 2006. Hrytsenko is the only Orange minister left in the Yanukovych government, and his support for Ukraine's NATO membership is at odds with that of the anti-crisis coalition and government.

18.01.07. Ukraine's constitutional crisis drags on

By Taras Kuzio

2007 will be a year of stagnation if Ukraine fails to cancel the political reforms

Ukraine in 2007 will not move ahead if it cannot resolve its constitutional crisis. As we have seen in 2006, the constitutional question influences domestic politics (relations between parliament and the president), economics (relations between the government and the president) and foreign policy (as most glaringly seen in parliament's dismissal of the foreign minister ) in Ukraine.

The answer as to what should be done over the constitutional crisis is a complicated one that has many nuances.

In comparative perspective with other post-communist countries, Ukraine's move from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary-presidential system is good for its democratization. The 27 post-communist states can be readily divided into parliamentary systems which have progressed in democratization and presidential systems that have regressed into autocracy.

The first group is based in central-eastern Europe and the Baltic states -countries that have joined the EU and NATO. The second group is in the CIS, most of whom have no intention of joining the EU or NATO.

A good argument could therefore be made that if a CIS state has a strategic objective of joining the EU and NATO, then it should follow the path of central-eastern Europe and reform its political system from a presidential to a parliamentary one. Only three countries in the CIS desire to join the EU -- Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia -- while only two seek to join NATO -- Ukraine and Georgia.

Moldova is the only CIS state with a full parliamentary system, where parliament elects the president. Ukraine has a parliamentary-presidential system with separate elections for parliament and the president.

Following the Orange Revolution, Ukraine moved from a presidential to a parliamentary system. Georgia, on the other hand, moved toward a super-presidential system after its Rose Revolution, the opposite direction to that undertaken in Ukraine. Although there have been some criticisms of the autocratic style of President Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgia is progressing better than Ukraine.

Although a move to parliamentarism in central-eastern Europe has proven to be beneficial, the same may not be the case for Ukraine. Simply put, the circumstances of countries in central-eastern Europe and those in the CIS ('path dependence' in political science jargon) are very different. Georgia's path of presidential-led reforms may be more suited to CIS states.

Although some central-eastern Europe countries had autocratic leaders, such as Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, they pale in comparison to autocrats in Russia and the CIS. Meciar accepted the victory of his democratic opponents in 1998, while Tudjman died in 1999, paving the way for the victory of the opposition a year later. Although Tudjman was guilty of some war crimes, these pale compared to the deaths of 100,000 people in Russia's brutal war in Chechnya.

Ukraine's Orange leaders therefore faced a far different opponent, the likes of whom did not exist in central-eastern Europe or the Baltic states. In Georgia the opposition remains weak and fractured within the New Rights-Industrialists and Democratic Front factions in parliament. There is no possibility of a return to power by political forces loyal to former President Eduard Shevardnadze or his autocratic Ajarian ally Ruslan Abashidze. The opposition in Ukraine was initially dispirited, but rebounded to win the 2006 elections.

The Rose Revolution coalition continues to be united. In fact, the two main parties in the National Movement-Democratic Front (EM-DP) united into the United National Movement. Contrast this with the split in the Orange camp only nine months into the administration of President Viktor Yushchenko. Only the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko remains true to the Orange ideals. Yushchenko betrayed them in September 2005, and after the 2006 elections, when he negotiated with the Party of Regions and the Socialists, betrayed them in July 2006, when the Socialists defected to the Anti-Crisis coalition.

A major difference between Georgia and Ukraine has also been in the type of leader who came to power. In effect, the radical wing of the Georgian Rose Revolution won the presidency; in other words, the equivalent of Yulia Tymoshenko winning in Ukraine.

The Tymoshenko Bloc has been consistently against constitutional reforms and voted against them in December 2004. Our Ukraine's stance, on the other hand, has been contradictory and opportunistic: In December 2004, they voted in favor of them and today they call for the abolition of constitutional reforms.

If Ukraine's 'Saakashvili' (i.e. Tymoshenko) had been elected president in 2004, there would be fewer demands today for the abolishment of constitutional reforms. Unlike Yushchenko, Tymoshenko would find sufficient political will, self-confidence and ability to exercise power to be a successful counterweight to Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.

Saakashvili's performance in Georgia shows three factors absent in Ukraine. First, it brought to power a highly motivated and, in the words of Georgia's leading analyst Ghia Nodia, "impatient" group of younger politicians. Nodia points to Saakashvili's "massive energy" in pushing forward reforms. Similar energy has been absent from the Yushchenko administration.

Second, Saakashvili defines himself in opposition to his predecessor Shevardnadze, whom he constantly criticizes. In Ukraine, former President Leonid Kuchma is only a negative 'other' for Tymoshenko, but not for Yushchenko, who has never once criticized Kuchma after he was elected. Orange voters expected at the minimum a moral denunciation of the Kuchma regime, or at a maximum his trial for abuse of office. They received neither and have as a consequence defected en masse to Tymoshenko.

Third, Saakashvili has self-confidence in his policies and actions both domestically and abroad. The same is not true of Yushchenko, particularly in the energy sector. Even Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka seems more determined to stand up for his country's national interests in his dealings with Russia than Yushchenko did in the January 2006 gas crisis.

Constitutional reforms have proven to be flawed for a host of reasons outlined above. They were rushed through parliament in the Dec. 8, 2004 'packet' without widespread public discussion, national referendum or removal of its weaknesses.

The Constitutional Court has every ground to consider constitutional reforms "illegal," according to U.S. Judge Bohdan Futey, a longtime adviser to Ukraine on legal questions. Without this step, 2007 will be one of stagnation for Ukraine that could lead to the gains of the Orange Revolution being slowly removed.

18.01.07. Over 60% Ukrainians positively view Soviet Period -- survey

KYIV. Jan 10. (Interfax) - Over 60% Ukrainians have a favorable view of the period of national history tied to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, according to a survey by the Ukrainian Democratic Circle institute jointly with Ukraine Sociology Service.

The results of the December 2006 survey were presented at a press conference in Kyiv by the Institute director, People's Deputy Nikolay Tomenko, and sociologist Sergei Makeyev on Wednesday.

Sixty-three percent of respondents have a positive view of the entire Soviet period, when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's breakup was viewed negatively by 54% overall, including by 81% in the eastern regions and 21% in the western regions.

The number of respondents supporting political union with Russia decreased in 2006 to 59% compared with 65% in 2002.

The survey polled 4,998 respondents in Western, Central, Eastern, South-Eastern Ukraine and Kyiv on December 12-22, 2006. The margin of error is 2%.

19.01.07. Janukovytj og 30.000 andre tog afsked med Kushnarjov

Premierminister Viktor Janukovytj betegnede parlamentsmedlem Jevhen Kushnarjovs død som et "uerstatteligt tab" for hele landet.

Under en mindehøjtidelighed på Kharkivs kirkegård nr. 2, hvor Kushnarjov ligger begravet, sagde Janukovytj, at Kushnarjovs død er "et uerstatteligt tab i vores land".

"I dag tager ikke kun Kharkiv-regionen, men også resten af Ukraine afsked med en prominent politiker", sagde Janukovytj og tilføjede, at en sådan person ikke kan erstattes".

Janukovytj fremhævede, at han blev venner med Kushnarjov, da de to arbejdede sammen. "Vi holdt meget af ham", tilføjede han.

Ifølge ham mistede Kushnarjov livet "på grund af en tåbelig tilfældighed". Han udtrykte sin medfølelse med Kushnarjovs familie og pårørende. "Han vil altid være iblandt os, og vi vil huske ham", sagde Janukovytj.

Kharkivs borgmester Mykhajlo Dobkin sagde i sin tale, at han er sikker på, at mindet om Kushnarjov vil blive foreviget i byen. Afskedsceremonien med Kushnarjov i Kharkiv sluttede kl. 12.

Langt fra alle de besøgende kunne være i forhallen i Kharkivs akademiske teater, hvor Kusharjov i tre timer lå på lit de parade.

Politiet kom ikke med noget tal på, hvor mange personer, der deltog i afskedsceremonien, men ifølge forskellige oplysninger var der hen ved 30.000 personer.

Køen af mennesker, som var kommet for at tage afsked med Kushnarjov, var flere kilometer lang. De personer, som nåede hen til teaterbygningen inden ceremoniens afslutning, gav deres medbragte blomster til politifolkene, så de kunne give dem videre i salen.

I afskedsceremonien deltog udover Janukovytj og Dobkin minister for ekstraordinære situationer, Nestor Shufrytj, justitsminister Oleksandr Lavrynovytj, transport- og kommunikationsminister Mykola Rudkovskyj, brændstof- og energiminister Jurij Bojko.

Desuden deltog 1. vice-premierminister Mykola Azarov, sundhedsminister Jurij Poljatjenko, ex-præsident Leonid Kutjma, parlamentsformand Oleksandr Moroz, Kievs borgmester Leonid Tjernovetskij og parlamentsmedlemmerne fra Julia Tymoshenkos blok Oleksandr Feldman og Andrij Shevtjenko.

Regionernes parti var repræsenteret ved Rinat Akhmetov, Taras Tjornovil, Anna Herman, Volodymyr Sivkovytj, Serhij Kivalov. Fra "Vores Ukraine" deltog Petro Poroshenko. Ukrajinski novyny, Interfaks-Ukrajina.

19.01.07. Regeringen stopper finansieringen af udenrigsministeriet

Ukraines statskasse stopper finansieringen af Ukraines udenrigsministerium.

Ifølge "Ukrajinska pravdas" kilder kan ministeriet ikke længere afholde løbende udgifter, betale indskud til internationale organisationer og betjene udenlandske delegationer.

Udenrigsministeriet kan heller ikke finansiere sine repræsentationer i udlandet, betale huslejen og udbetale løn til medarbejderne ved dets repræsentationer i udlandet.

Ifølge kilden er blokeringen af udenrigsministeriet en udløber af den konfliktsituation, som er opstået omkring afskedigelsen af udenrigsminister Borys Tarasyuk.

Lige nu forsøger udenrigsministeriets medarbejdere med alle midler at finde en løsning på den opståede situation.

Kilden hævder, at blokeringen af udenrigsministeriets finanser truer med at forværre Ukraines omdømme i udlandet.

Som bekendt hører den ukrainske statskasse under finansministeriet. UP.

22.01.07. Intet nyt i forhold til EU-medlemskabsperspektivet

EU's udenrigsministreråd har besluttet, at den nye styrkede aftale med Ukraine ikke skal operere med en konkret fremtidig udvikling af de bilaterale forbindelser. Samtidig påpeger ministrene, at EU anerkende Ukraines europæiske aspirationer tilbage i 2005, oplyser UNIAN.

Desuden hedder det i konklusionerne, at EU vil fortsætte med at yde støtte til de politiske og økonomiske reformer i Ukraine, som tager sigte på at styrke demokrati, stabilitet og gennemskuelighed i landet, og vil desuden gerne styrke sine forpligtelser i denne retning i en ny aftale.

Ifølge dokumentet skal den nye aftale som mål have at rykke forbindelserne samt den økonomiske og politiske integration tættere på. I en kommentar til ministerrådets beslutning siger repræsentant for EU-kommissionen Emma Udvin, at beslutningen er "et skridt fremad i vores relationer".

Hun præciserede, at der i den nye aftale ikke vil være nogen omtale af muligheden af et ukrainsk EU-medlemskab, men heller ikke noget om, at noget sådant er umuligt. Udvin kunne ikke komme med en konkret dato for indledningen af forhandlingerne, men sagde, at det vil afhænge af begge parters parathed.

Inden ministerrådsmødet sagde udenrigskommissær Benita Ferrero Waldner, at den nye aftale "vil gå ud over rammerne" af de allerede eksisterende bilaterale dokumenter, oplyser Interfaks-Ukrajina.

"Vi vil gerne åbne muligheden for at skabe en frihandelszone og udbygge vores samarbejde i energisektoren. Derfor er det vigtigt for os at begynde disse forhandlinger", sagde hun.

"Jeg vil tro, at de vil gøre det muligt at styrke reformprocessen i Ukraine og afslutte det, som bør gøres. Jeg vil tro, at det også vil være et vigtigt signal for Ukraines borgere", tilføjede Ferrero-Waldner. UP.

24.01.07. Opblødning i striden om udenrigsministeriet

Viceudenrigsministrene Andrij Veselovskyj og Mykola Majmeskul skal fremover ståfor administrationen af offentlige midler i udenrigsministeriet, oplyser Ukraines finansministerium. Første vice-premierminister Mykola Azarov har truffet en beslutning herom efter at have bekræftet de to viceministres underskrifter.

Således vil finansieringen af udenrigsministeriets apparat og de diplomatiske repræsentationer i udlandet ske efter finansloven.

I en kommentar til Azarovs ord om, at man ikke vil finansiere udenrigsminister Borys Tarasyuks udlandsrejser, siger næstformand for præsident Jusjtjenkos sekretariat Oleksandr Tjalyj, at han håber, at man vil finde en optimal løsning i denne sag.

Som tidligere omtalt, kom det den 18. januar frem, at den ukrainske statskasse har blokeret udenrigsministeriets konti.

I mandags sagde udenrigsminister Borys Tarasyuk, at premierminister Viktor Janukovytj har pålagt statskassen at genåbne finansieringen af udenrigsministeriet.

Første vice-premierminister Mykola Azarov har forklaret den manglende finansiering med, at der ikke er nogen legitimt udnævnt udenrigsminister og derfor ingen legitime underskrifter, som er nødvendige for at genåbne finansieringen af udenrigsministeriet. UP.

26.01.07. Kompromis på vej i magtkampen mellem Jusjtjenko og regeringskoalitionen

Repræsentanter for den ukrainske regeringskoalition er parat til indrømmelser overfor præsident Jusjtjenko i form af fjernelsen af nogle af punkterne i loven om regeringen. Det meddelte parlamentsformand Oleksandr Moroz til pressen tidligere på dagen.

Ifølge parlamentsformanden er koalitionens repræsentanter parate til at fjerne formuleringen "såfremt præsidenten ikke opfylder sine forpligtelser" fra det punkt, som omhandler koalitionens ret til at udnævne premierministeren udenom præsidenten, hvis denne ikke har forelagt parlamentet regeringens kandidat til posten.

Moroz understregede, at parlamentsflertallet er parat til at rette formuleringen i de punkter, hvor der er tale om udnævnelsen af forsvarsministeren og udenrigsministeren. "På forhånd må man forstå, at præsidenten altid vil overholde forfatningen til punkt og prikke, og derfor er disse formuleringen overflødige", fremhævede han.

Parlamentsformanden tror, at et sådant kompromis vil bidrage til at fjerne diskussionen om "hvorvidt præsidenten kan afvise premierministerens kandidatur, som koalitionen foreslår ham – det kan han ikke ifølge forfatningen".

Ifølge Moroz er koalitionen parat til at garantere præsidenten retten til egenhændigt at udnævne lederne af de regionale statsadministrationer og deres stedfortrædere.

Blandt de af præsidentens indvendinger, som koalitionen ikke kan gå med til, er ifølge Moroz, at vice-ministrene skal udnævnes efter forudgående afstemning med præsidenten.

"Sagen er, at denne regel ikke er nævnt i forfatningen. Man kan ikke nedfælde alle de beføjelser som ikke er nævnt i forfatningen i en lov", forklarede han.

Ifølge parlamentsformanden vil parlamentsflertallet ikke gå med til præsidentens indvendinger omkring kontrasignaturen.

Moroz fremhævede, at der i dag kun er 1/3 af kontrasignatur-emnerne tilbage i forhold til lovens oprindelige version, og understregede, at repræsentanterne for den udøvende magt, som har ansvaret for udførelsen af dette eller hint af præsidentens dekreter, især hvis det er forbundet med finansielle udgifter, skal bære hele ansvaret for muligheden af dets udførelse.

Tidligere har Moroz sagt, at hvis parlamentsformanden og præsidenten ikke opnår noget kompromis, vil loven om regeringen blive offentliggjort på fredag. Liga. UP.