[...] As the richest man in Ukraine, worth an estimated $33 billion, and a prime backer of the Moscow-leaning Regions Party headed by Victor Yanukovych, Akhmetov has more than his fair share of influence in Ukraine. We have been told many times that he is a pragmatic businessman who cares deeply for Ukraine and actively helps the country through charity. We have been told that he is a close friend and ally of Ukraine's pro-Western president, Victor Yushchenko, and supports Western integration.

Yet the facts tell a different story.

On August 15, in the heat of bloody Russian-Georgian military standoff, the Donetsk City Council controlled by the Regions Party took sides with Russia by adopting a resolution condemning the "aggression of Georgia's leadership" against South Ossetia.

While Akhmetov has himself been silent on this issue, the party he exerts so much influence over is taking sides with the Kremlin. Such a position is not helpful to Ukraine, which, in Crimea, might be the next target of Moscow's attempts to stir up secessionist sentiment.

Could the Regions Party once again, as in Orange Revolution days, fuel separatist tensions in Ukraine? Are these politicians playing to their electorate or acting as part of a Kremlin plan? Does Akhmetov support this? Will his television channel again be used as a mouthpiece for separatist movements in Ukraine? These are valid questions, since Akhmetov has yet to show he is acting in Ukraine's best interests.

Akhmetov must make his position clear. If his position on such a crucial issue differs from that of the Regions Party, then he has no place in this party. He should stay out of politics or join a pro-Ukrainian party. If not, then he is exacerbating Ukraine's problems. Finally, Yushchenko should reconsider his relations with Akhmetov and end the fighting with Tymoshenko, whom he has accused in recent days of siding with the Kremlin. The threat does not appear to be Tymoshenko, who has -- contrary to claims by Yushchenko's administration -- expressed solidarity with Georgia. From our vantage point, the greater danger is posed by Akhmetov.

Complete article: http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/editorial/29444/

Ukraine's government, comprising the allies from the Orange Revolution, is poised to collapse after the prime minister, Yuliya Tymoshenko, allied with the opposition to strip the presidency of its powers. It isnot clear whether Ms Tymoshenko has done this to pressure the president to back her policies, to boost her power as an alternative to seeking the presidency herself, or to trigger her departure from government ahead of tough economic times-and with an eye on the 2010 presidential election. The coalition could yet be saved, or a new one established; failing that, a parliamentary election must be held. With politic altensions high in the wake of Russia's attack on Georgia, the timing could hardly be worse.

Falling out

On September 2nd the pro-presidential Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defence (OU-PSD) voted to leave its coalition with the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (YTB), bringing the "Orange" government, which was only formed in late 2007 following an early parliamentary election, to the verge of collapse.

Amid an increasingly acrimonious conflict between the president, Viktor Yushchenko, and the prime minister, Yuliya Tymoshenko, the break-up of the coalition government has long been on the cards, especially after the loss of its slim two-seat majority in June. [...] Then, on September 1st, the YTB formed an ad hoc alliance with the main opposition party, the Party of Regions (PoR), to push through parliament a number of measures that weaken the president. These include measures that limit the president's influence over the government and facilitate the process of impeachment. Mr. Yushchenko has denounced the move as amounting to a "constitutional coup d'etat".

Although the coalition's latest troubles are not unexpected, the trigger for them-the YTB's temporary alliance with the PoR on weakening the presidency-was. Ms Tymoshenko's attempt to weaken the presidency puts into question the widespread assumption that she is preparing to contest the presidential election due in early 2010. If the post of prime minister becomes the pre-eminent one in Ukrainian politics, Ms Tymoshenko would presumably want to keep her current job rather than seek the presidency.

Ms Tymoshenko's move can be interpreted in one of three ways. First, she is indeed seeking to make the prime minister Ukraine's most powerful political figure in order to advance her political ambitions. This, however, would surely bring to an end the Orange coalition, and she has no guarantees that she would be able to continue as prime minister either by forming a coalition with the PoR or as a result of fresh elections.

Second, Ms Tymoshenko has supported the legislation as a tactic in her power struggle with Mr Yushchenko, presumably on the calculation that this will force the president to back government policies he has until now opposed, for instance on the acceleration of privatisation--that initiative is crucial if Ms Tymoshenko is to pay for some of her populist spending programmes. Once a deal is done on policy co-operation, the YTB would not seek to override a presidential veto of the legislation to weaken the presidency.

Third, the prime minister has provoked a crisis in order to move into opposition, to help her prepare for the 2010 presidential election.Ukraine's economy is slowing dramatically, inflation remains very highat 26.9% year on year in July, and it is probable that gas import prices will double from the start of 2009; if so, this would amount to aneight-fold increase since 2005. [...]

Awful timing

Ukraine's latest political turmoil comes at a crucial time for thecountry. In the wake of the Georgia-Russia conflict, Ukraine's perception of insecurity is at the highest level in at least a decade. Relations with Russia are fraught and there are fears that Ukraine's territorial integrity might come into question. Continued political uncertainty in Ukraine will make it more difficult for the US and its allies to support Ukraine through closer NATO ties; already this was looking very difficult, given the reservations of Germany and other European states about the risk of closer NATO-Ukraine ties provoking Russia. Efforts to boost stability in Ukraine via EU engagement could also be stymied.

On the economic front, investor sentiment has worsened on fears that Russia might seek to stoke separatist sentiment in the Crimea. Very high inflation and a widening current-account deficit already present key risks to macro economic stability. These will increase substantially if Ukraine is unable to negotiate a staged transition towards the gas price paid by EU customers, and must instead pay the full rate from the start of 2009. Its chances of success, already fairly slim, will probably narrow further if Ukraine is without a government, or rather is being run by a caretaker administration, when negotiations are held.

Ways out

There are several possible outcomes to the current turmoil. First, the coalition could regroup. The OU-PSD has 10 days in which to reverse its decision to leave the coalition, leaving scope for intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations. Publicly, the YTB has said that it seesno alternative to the current coalition. Any such agreement on continuing with the coalition would be likely to require concessions from both sides: the presidential administration has demanded that the coalition adopt a unified position on the Georgia crisis, and that the YTB not side once again with the PoR to override Mr Yushchenko's anticipated veto of the legislation to weaken the presidency. The YTBfor its part is demanding backing for its key policies and has accused the presidential administration of systematically sabotaging the government's activities.

Alternatively, if the Orange parties do not manage to save their coalition, Ukraine's political parties will have 30 days in which to form an alternative coalition. Until recently, the only viable alternative coalition had appeared to be one between the OU-PSD and the PoR--an outcome that is believed to be favoured both by the presidential administration and the liberal wing of the PoR led by Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest businessman. However, the recent co-operation between the YTB and the PoR has raised the possibility of a more formal alliance between these two parties. On balance, the Economist Intelligence Unit continues to believe that a formal alliance between the YTB and the PoRis unlikely, even though their positions on Russia appear to be moving closer. In particular, it would be a risky venture for Ms Tymoshenko politically, given that she has based much of her appeal on her strident opposition to the PoR and its links with big business. A coalition between OU-PSD and the PoR, meanwhile, still looks doubtful: Mr Yushchenko could lose at least half of his party if he did a deal with the PoR leader, Viktor Yanukovych.

The final possibility is another early election, which Mr Yushchenko will have the right to call should an alternative coalition not emerge within 30 days of the official break-up of the existing coalition. Giventhe economic and political challenges now facing Ukraine, the distraction of an election would be the worst outcome. And the election itself could take an unexpected turn, given the highly sensitive state of relations with Russia.

Complete article:
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12070335

Another pre-emptive threat by Washington

Last week as McCain made his speech to the Republican faithful, Vice President Dick Cheney visited Ukraine and unconditionally pledged America's support against any attempt by Moscow to corrupt, much less invade, that giant.

This is hardly popular stuff in a war-embattled America where billions are spent each month in an unnecessary occupation of Iraq.

But another entanglement may loom. The United States (under Clinton) signed an iron-clad agreement in 1994 with Ukraine, Britain (under John Major) and Russia (Boris Yeltsin). The Ukrainians back then got these three to guarantee its sovereignty as the quid pro quo for Ukraine's agreement to dismantle and hand over its entire arsenal of nuclear weapons and missiles to Russia.

The United States is on the hook for Ukraine

In essence, Washington is guarantor to Ukraine's sovereignty, unlike Georgia's, which was punished by Russia for an incursion, invaded temporarily and two of its breakaway provinces acquired.

Cheney's visit was important given concerns that Moscow-style shenanigans are underway in Crimea, a Ukrainian province with a large Russian population and some oil. Separatism is being seeded there among Russian ethnics as was the case with Georgia's two breakaway provinces.

Canadian lawyer Bob Onyschuk of Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP advised Ukraine at the time of the landmark agreement in 1994. (He is shown here on the right and is also a founder of the Canadian-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce board of which I'm a director.)

"I was closely involved as an advisor and this was the first thing [former Ukrainian President Leonid] Kuchma did after the elections in 1994," said Onyschuk, who established the world's first law office in Kyiv shortly after Ukraine declared its independence in 1991.

The background

"Ukraine, as the 3rd largest nuclear power in the world, came out of the Soviet Union and had ICBM missiles and big SS24s, the most deadly of the Soviet arsenal of weapons and they were all aimed at Europe's capital cities and other targets," he said. "The debate among Ukrainians, after 1991, was whether Ukraine should give them up or what else they would want to do with them."

But immediately after independence in 1991, Ukraine took the precautionary action of changing the "codes" to these missiles so that none of the western capitals were targeted.

Even so, the debate lingered amid fears that the nuclear weapons -- and Ukraine's large standing army -- were needed as a last line of defense should Russia ever before aggressive again.

"That's why we kept them. Kuchma brokered a deal with the US, UK and got Russia to go along with it. The deal was we will unilaterally disarm ourselves, give all the nuclear weapons back to Russia but the only basis upon which we were doing that is if we got guarantees from the three major nuclear powers -- Russia, U.S. and Great Britain," he said. "We were only worried about Russia."

"The fact that the agreement has the signatures of four presidents, including UK's John Major, Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin and Kuchma -- was good enough. Ukraine knew that if Russia didn't keep up its part of the bargain, which they knew they might not after Yeltsin left because they never keep their word to anything, that they would have the backstop of the U.S. and Britain. That was and is what Ukraine relies on," he said.

Cheney's visit underscored Washington's commitment as guarantor to the agreement and the Vice President said so.

The deal is far-reaching

Onyschuk said that this agreement is also written, and should, protect Ukraine from the kind of economic, energy and political harassment that Moscow has undertaken in recent years. This has included stopping the flow of gas, to exacting high payments and to electoral fraud which sparked the Orange Revolution.

"Russia can't even pressure Ukraine economically and Ukraine should play this card," added Onyschuk.

The slippage in Russia into a KGB-controlled nation-state is worrisome to all its neighbors.

"Brandishing this agreement is one thing but what will the Russians do? Will they honor their word?"

Excerpts
The agreement welcomes Ukraine into the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. It was signed in Budapest on December 5, 1994 and here are some excerpts:

1. the three guarantors "reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine."
    
2. "reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense"
    
3. "reaffirm their commitment to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind."

The Party of Regions expelled National Security and Defense Council (NRBO) Secretary Raisa Bohatyryova from the party's senior decision-making body, the Political Council, and from the party itself on September 1. Until being appointed NRBO secretary in December 2007, Bohatyryova had been the leader of the Regions parliamentary faction.

The surprise decision quickly followed Bohatyryova's support for Georgian territorial integrity and NATO membership during a luncheon held three days before at Washington's Metropolitan Club by the U.S.-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC). Bohatyryova was on an official visit to the United States from August 24 to 30.

Bohatyryova's remarks were in response to two questions posed by Jamestown and by Arieh Cohen of the Heritage Foundation. Asked whether she supported President Viktor Yushchenko's support for Georgia's territorial integrity or that of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych in support of South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence, she answered that Yanukovych's position did not reflect the party's position and gave her strong support to Yushchenko.

Bohatyryova praised Yushchenko for attempting to unite politicians and Ukraine and criticized other political leaders for putting their personal interests above national ones. She added, "they frequently use foreign challenges for their party and electoral plans despite the risks of a threat to national security," an oblique reference to Yanukovych and his stance on NATO (Ukrainian News Agency, August 31).

Bohatyryova ridiculed Regions' official view on NATO as one that was in favor of NATO membership when the party was in power and against it when it was in opposition. She never raised the question of a referendum on NATO, a persistent Regions demand.

Citing the Kosovo precedent, Yanukovych has supported the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Two days after Bohatyryova�s remarks the Crimean branch of Regions appealed to the parliamentary faction to do the same (www.partyofregions.org.ua, August 26; www.prava.com.ua, August 28). The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MZS) described Yanukovych's call as "harming the national interests of Ukraine," "provocative," "irresponsible," and "unpleasant" (www.mfa.gov.ua, August 29).

In a statement issued by the Regions faction, it did not support Yanukovych and the Crimean branch�s call for Ukraine to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Instead, the statement blamed the authorities for not staying neutral and dragging Ukraine into the conflict by supporting Georgia and unleashing a "massive anti-Russian propaganda campaign" (www.rada.kiev.ua, August 26).

The Regions faction demanded a return to good relations with Russia, constitutional changes that would transform Ukraine into a non-bloc (neutral) country, and a referendum on NATO membership. Regions� call for the creation of a temporary parliamentary commission to investigative the delivery of weapons to Georgia and the participation of Ukrainians on the Georgian side echoed claims made by Russia about Ukraine�s alleged involvement in the conflict.

Ukrainian politicians and the media have pointed out that arms deliveries to Georgia began under Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Eduard Shevardnadze, not under Yushchenko and Mikheil Saakashvili. Ukraine also supplied arms to Georgia during Yanukovych's government from 2002 to 2004.

Bohatyryova�s expulsion from Regions was propelled by Yanukovych's anger that she had belittled his position as leader. Bohatyryova cited senior Regions leaders who condemned Russia's occupation of Georgian territory and said that Yanukovych's call for recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a "personal viewpoint" that did not reflect the collective leadership of the party.

Deputy Regions faction leader Oleksandr Yefremov disagreed, claiming that Yanukovych�s position was the outcome of a "consolidated point of view of the Political Council of Regions. It was not the viewpoint of one person" (www.pravda.com.ua, September 1).

Asked during the USUBC luncheon whether she would be advising her U.S. contacts of Ukraine�s support for a NATO MAP, she said, "There is a need to state loudly not only [its] importance but a rise of a threatening situation if a Membership Action Plan is not given to Ukraine" (www.pravda.com.ua, September 1). Bohatyryova�s backing for Yushchenko's strong support for a NATO MAP is at odds with Yanukovych's opposition to a MAP.

Since the crisis Ukrainian polls have shown a reversal of the downward trend in support for NATO membership that arose following the invasion of Iraq and anti-NATO media campaigns during Yanukovych's 2002-2004 government and the 2004 elections (www.pravda.com.ua, September 1). Support for NATO membership has risen back to a pre-Iraqi invasion level of one third, while opposition to it has declined.

Bohatyryova stated unequivocally that the Black Sea Fleet would have to withdraw by 2017 and that the constitution forbade foreign bases, whether Russian or otherwise (a pointed reference to NATO or American bases). Supporting Russia's stance, Regions has raised the question of extending the lease beyond 2017, even though this flatly contradicts Regions' support for Ukraine's neutrality, a status that rules out foreign bases.

Regions has split over the Georgian crisis and indirectly over NATO. Crimean Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) leader Leonid Grach, an ally of the pro-Yanukovych faction in the Crimean parliament, has criticized Regions for its lack of a consolidated position on Georgia (Ukrainian News Agency, September 1).

Yanukovych's support for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is unpopular as support for the country's territorial integrity is as high in eastern as it is in western Ukraine. With many Ukrainians and Western observers looking to the Crimea as Russia's possible next target, the pro-independence stance of Yanukovych and Regions will be unpopular and will be used, as it already has been by the MZS, to question their patriotism (see EDM, August 12).

The Georgian conflict has exposed long simmering divisions in Regions between its virulent anti-orange ideological wing headed by Yanukovych, to which many former KPU voters defected, and a pragmatic wing dominated by big business with which Bohatyryova is aligned. The split may significantly harm Yanukovych's chances ahead of the January 2010 presidential elections and open up eastern Ukraine to further advances by the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc in the 2007 pre-term elections. Bohatyryova's expulsion from Regions could be followed by Regions defectors to the president's newly created United Center party (see EDM, July 28).

In addition to Russian actions and threats, this issue has heated up in recent days because of calls by senior Ukrainian officials for Russia to begin preparing to move its fleet out of Sevastopol by or possibly even before 2017, statements that most Russian politicians have refused to take seriously and most military analysts say would be very difficult.

Today, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodomyr Ogryzko said that Moscow must begin thinking about moving both men and materiel from Sevastopol now because regardless of what some may think, Kyiv will honor its agreement with Moscow but "in any case after 2017, the Russian fleet will not be on our territory (news.mail.ru/politics/1960873).

[...] And if Ukraine makes the decision not to have such bases, the foreign minister continued, "no one, including Russia can influence our decision. "If in Moscow, they do not yet understand this, that governments live according to such rules throughout the world, then this is Russia's problem" and not Ukraine's.

But recent Russian behavior in Georgia and Moscow's reactions to Kyiv's positions on this and other issues has convinced many Ukrainians that Russia's problem in this regard is becoming a problem for their country because of the danger that Moscow will try to destabilize its neighbor to ensure its continued control of Sevastopol or even seek to seize Crimea.

Those concerns have been exacerbated by three new developments: suggestions by some officials that Timoshenko should be charged with treason, a statement by a Crimean Tatar leader and Ukrainian parliamentarian that Moscow has many levers to use in Crimea, and an assessment by Ukrainian military analysts of what Moscow is already doing.

The first of these, charges that opposition leader Yuliya Timoshenko should be investigated for possible treason on behalf of Russia, has already been extensively discussed, with some analysts arguing that this scandal by itself represents an effort by Moscow to destabilize and discredit the Ukrainian government.

But the second and third deserve more attention. Today, Mustafa Dzhemilyev, who is both the leader of the Crimean Tatars and a deputy in the Ukrainian parliament, said that he is convinced that the large number of Crimeans who have dual citizenship with Russia by itself points to a possible South Ossetian scenario for that peninsula (www.vlasti.net/news/20236).

[...] Moreover, Ukrainian officials must focus on the activities of pro-Russian organizations whose statements and activities are exacerbating interethnic tensions and creating the conditions for a Russian move. And Dzhemilyev said, Kyiv should insist that the Black Sea Fleet leave Sevastopol long before the 2017 date established by agreement.

The third event was the release, also today, of a report by the Kyiv Center for Research on the Army, Conversion and Disarmament, which argued that "Russia has created in the Crimea all the preconditions" for a military operation to keep control of Sevastopol, detach Crimea from Ukraine, and weaken the rest of the country as well (www.nr2.ru/kiev/192334.html).

"For the achievement of these goals, Russia doesn't need a major military conflict with Ukraine," the center's analysts said. Instead, "it is sufficient to destabilize the situation in a single Crimean region" through the use of precisely targeted operations using "the forces of the Russian special services and particular units of the Black Sea Fleet."

Moreover, they continued, Moscow will build on "to the maximum extent possible" the pro-Russian segments of the population and the pro-Russian social and political organizations that Moscow and its friends in Ukraine have been promoting ever since Ukraine gained its independence in 1991.

The center's analysts suggested that the first stage of such a conflict might consist of "actions directed at the sharpening of relations between personnel of the Black Sea Fleet and representatives of Ukrainian authority in nearby areas," possibly by means of "a provocation" taking the form of a supposed Ukrainian attack on the fleet.

After that happens, according to the center's scenario, "the pro-Russian population will rise to the defense of the Russian personnel" and then there "will begin clashes with the law enforcement bodies of Ukraine." That in turn will lead both countries to increase their military presence in Crimea, at which time Moscow will raise the issue of Ukraine's right to Crimea.

Kyiv would then appeal to the West, the center said, but its analysts argued that Ukraine would not be any more successful in attracting anything more from Western countries than verbal support. And consequently, Russia could then "swallow" Crimea at its leisure, confident that Ukraine by itself would not be able to block its moves.

The center's director added that he does not believe that Moscow is likely to follow such a scenario, but he added that "Russia has already created all the necessary conditions for its realization," including official statements questioning Ukraine's right to control Crimea, ramping up anti-Ukrainian feelings among Russians, and "also dominating Ukraine's information space."

[...] Political scientist Viktor Nebozhenko said that Ukraine was entering a dangerous period because both Russian and Georgian "hawks" might seek to stage provocations in Sevastopol in order to achieve their goals elsewhere, a view echoed by the Ukrainian Diplomatic Academy's Aleksandr Paliy, who said Russia has constantly been staging provocations in Ukraine.

But Vadim Karasev, a political scientist, said that Ukraine is in fact in a good position to counter any Russian moves of this kind. If it blocks the formation of "unrecognized formations" and "separatist groups" prepared to help Russia and if it adopts "a new regional policy" to ensure that Crimea develops, then Moscow will have a much harder time in pursuing its goals.

But "the main thing," Karasev said, is for Ukraine "not to do anything stupid" that Moscow would then exploit.

Complete article:
http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/08/window-on-eurasia-ukrainians-discuss.html

Taras Kuzio
 

The official protest by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on September 11 over the allegedly "unfriendly" attitudes of the Ukrainian authorities to Russia was met by a stern response on the same day by Ukraine's Foreign Ministry (www.mfa.gov.ua). Russia's MFA protested about President Viktor Yushchenko's support for Georgia, including supplying "heavy military hardware"; Ukraine's drive to join NATO "against the will of the Ukrainian people"; "attempts by the Ukrainian authorities to reconsider our common history in an anti-Russian spirit"; and the standard complaint about official hostility to the Russian language.

Ukraine's response pointed to Russia's inability, despite nearly two decades of Ukrainian independence, to accept Ukraine as an "independent state." Ukraine's MFA also described Ukraine as "under no circumstances belonging to the so-called 'privileged interests' of any country."

The Russian protest also complained about the "practice of banning Russian deputies and eminent politicians from entering Ukraine." The following day Russian Duma deputy Viktor Vodolatsky was refused entry into Ukraine to attend a coordinating council meeting of Cossack Hetmans (leaders) from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Moldova's Trans-Dniestr region. The week before, Russian political technologist Sergei Markov was refused entry into Ukraine.

Russia has retaliated by creating a long list of Ukrainian politicians and businessmen banned from entering Russia. It includes the head of NUNS Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, Petro Yushchenko (the president's brother and a NUNS deputy), the governors of Kyiv and Kharkiv, BYuT head of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, heads of the armaments company Ukrspetsexport, and others (www.korrespondent.com.ua, September 15).

Ukraine's MFA warned 'that attempts by Russia to destabilize the situation in Ukraine through fifth columnists who for some reason position themselves as the 'healthy political forces of the country' have no prospects." The accusations and the very tone of the exchange are at odds with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's assurances that "Crimea is not disputable territory" (German ARD television, August 29).

Leon Aron of the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute warned in The Wall Street Journal (September 10) that "Russia's Next Target Could Be Ukraine." The Moscow city council is providing $34 million in support of "compatriots" abroad.

Aron warns of a scenario in which Russia takes control over-night of the port of Sevastopol, which might be "impossible to reverse without a large-scale war." The EU's unwillingness to deal with Russia's new assertiveness since August 8 has demonstrated the vacuous nature of its European Common Foreign and Security Policy. If the EU has permitted Russia to get away with de facto annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, why would it react any differently to a Russian annexation of the Crimea?

The September 9 EU-Ukraine summit threw "away a golden opportunity to stabilize [Ukraine's] eastern frontier and encourage political and economic reform in Kyiv" (Financial Times, September 10). The EU "foolishly ducked a chance to throw the country a political and economic lifeline" (The Economist, September 11).

Two arguments why West European states, such as Germany, Italy, and France, have not supported NATO or EU enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia do not stand up. First, Germany, Italy, and France do not support either NATO or EU enlargement, although it is only the former that is usually considered likely to "antagonize" Russia. Second, energy links to Russia are not a factor in appeasing Russia. France, Italy, and Germany are only reliant for 26 percent, 30 percent, and 39 percent, respectively, of their gas imports from Russia. Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, which support NATO and EU enlargement to Ukraine, import respectively 61 percent, 84 percent, 94 percent, and 100 percent of their gas from Russia.

Ukrainian authorities have become highly sensitive to the threat of a Russian policy of destabilization since the Kremlin invasion of Georgia. One particular area of concern is the issuing of Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens in the light of Russia's pretext of coming to the "defense" of Russian citizens in the two frozen conflicts where Russia had illegally distributed passports.

Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs Volodymyr Ohryzko said that Ukraine's repeated protests to the Russian consulate in Simferopol over its distributing of passports continue to be ignored. Ohryzko announced that the Security Service, prosecutor�s office, Interior Ministry, and MFA were now investigating the problem (www.mfa.gov.ua, September 6). Ukraine's Ambassador to Slovakia Inna Ohnivets, who previously worked on this issue, told of repeated Ukrainian demands to the Russian Consulate in the Crimea to halt the practice (www.bbc.co.uk/Ukrainian, August 28).

A week after Ohryzko's comments, 34 inhabitants of Sevastopol who maintain dual citizenship had their Ukrainian citizenship withdrawn. Further investigations have located 1,595 inhabitants of Sevastopol, primarily serving on the Black Sea Fleet, who have dual citizenship, which is banned by Ukrainian law (www.pravda.com.ua, September 13).

Both political forces in the Orange coalition have raised the issue of the distribution of Russian passports as a threat to Ukrainian security. Our Ukraine-Self Defense deputy Volodymyr Stretovych warned that increasing the number of Russian citizens in the Crimea would give Russia, as in Georgia, a pretext to come to the "defense" of its citizens (www.nuns.com.ua, August 13, 15). Deputy Nuns faction leader Borys Tarasiuk described the distribution of passports as Russia's "secret aggression against Ukrainian citizens." Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc deputies have drawn up a draft law making the obtaining of dual citizenship a criminal offence (www.pravda.com.ua, September 9).

The problem Ukrainian authorities are faced with is that they do not have concrete data on the number of Russian passports distributed in the Crimea. During Leonid Kuchma's decade in office from 1994 to 2004 the Ukrainian authorities turned a blind eye to the illegal practice. Estimates of the number of Russian passport holders in the Crimea range from a low of 6,000 (Newsweek, August 23) to 100,000 (Los Angeles Times, August 25).

Consequently, the EU is ignoring the fact that the consequences for European security of Russian destabilization in the Crimea would be far more severe than that of Russia's invasion of Georgia.

22.09.08. Ukraine: A region supports Russia's recognition of two areas

Local lawmakers in the Crimean Peninsula, which is mostly Russian-speaking, called for the Ukrainian Parliament to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two Georgian separatist provinces that are supported by Russia. Many European officials are concerned that the Crimea could be the next flash point for tension with Russia because of the large proportion of Russians who live there and because Russia's Black Sea Fleet is based in the southern Ukrainian port of Sevastopol. The resolution by the local Crimean assembly, which was approved by 79 of the body's 90 deputies, came amid a political crisis in Ukraine that was provoked by the conflict in Georgia and by tensions within Ukraine's pro-Western coalition government.