02.06.06. Eksperter: Jusjtjenko blev forgiftet med dioxin

Den internationale retsmedicinske kommission bestående af ukrainske, amerikanske, tyske og japanske eksperter har bekræftet, at præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko blev forgiftet med dioxin.

"Informationen vedrørende forgiftningens tidspunkt, sted og metode udgør en efterforskningsmæssig hemmelighed og må ikke offentliggøres i henhold til den ukrainske retsplejelovs § 121", hedder det i meddelelsen.

Ekspertisen blev gennemført af sundhedsministeriets departement for retsmedicinsk analyse indenfor rammerne af den straffesag om attentatet mod Jusjtjenko, som den øverste anklagemyndighed er i gang med at efterforske.

"På baggrund af eksperternes konklusion kan man udlede, at Jusjtjenko blev udsat for et overlagt forsøg på forgiftning", hedder det i meddelelsen. UP

05.06.06. Rekordhøj modstand mod NATO i den ukrainske befolkning

Ukrainernes holdning til NATO er blevet forværret efter de to seneste valg, hvor NATO-tematikken er blevet udnyttet af politikkerne. Det sagde den videnskabelige leder af fonden "Demokratiske initiativer" Iryna Bekeshkina på en pressekonference i Kiev i dag.

Hvor det i 2000 var 33,5% af befolkningen, som var imod Ukraines indtræden i NATO, var tallet i 2004 på 30%, lige efter valget i starten af 2005 var modstanden allerede var oppe på 50,4%, og efter parlamentsvalget i foråret 2006 voksede modstanden til 64,4%. I dag er der 52% flere modstandere end tilhængere af Ukraines indtræden i NATO.

Bekeshkina mener, at fjendskabet overfor NATO ikke kun findes i det sydlige og østlige Ukraine, men også på Krim. Ifølge hende er antallet af modstandere af NATO selv i det vestlige Ukraine større end antallet af tilhængere; nemlig 38% mod 32%.

I det centrale Ukraine går 57% imod NATO, mens kun 15% er for.

Selv hvis man ser på den orange koalition, ser det ikke for godt ud for tilhængerne af Ukraines medlemskab af NATO.

Blandt socialisternes tilhængere går 61% imod NATO, mens 12% er for. Blandt "Vores Ukraines" vælgere er hele 40% imod, mens 29% er for. Noget lignende ses blandt tilhængerne af Julia Tymoshenko, hvor 41% af vælgerne er imod et NATO-medlemskab, mens 24% er for.

Hvis man ser på det vælgerkorps, som i 2004 stemte på Jusjtjenko, er 43% modstandere af NATO, mens 24% er tilhængere.

Regionernes Partis vælgere er langt overvejende imod et NATO-medlemsskab (90% er imod, mens 2% er for). Blandt tilhængerne af Det kommunistiske parti er 52% imod, mens 1% er for.

Samtidig mener ekspert ved Det nationale institut for international sikkerhedspolitik Jevhen Zherebetskyj, at der i forhold til NATO er en "fordummende folkeagitation" i gang, mens massemedierne spiller rollen som masseagitationsmedier, der er ude på at "hjernevaske" befolkningen. Liga

06.06.06. Krims parlament erklærer Krim for "NATO-fri zone"

Byrådet i Sevastopol på Krim har vedtaget en appel til præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko, hvori man anmoder ham om at tage initiativ til et forbud mod NATO-skibes besøg i byen. 59 ud af de 62 tilstedeværende medlemmer af byrådet stemte for. Appellen blev også rettet til Ukraines parlament og den fungerende premierminister Jurij Jekhanurov.

De deputerede opfordrer blandt andet til et forbud mod en mulig NATO-øvelse i byen Sevastopol.

"Idet vi giver udtryk for Sevastopol-indbyggernes vilje, afviser vi hermed at give tilladelse til at bruge byens infrastruktur til at huse og forsyne NATO's militær og flåde", hedder det i appellen.

Desuden forlanger byrådet, at der afholdes en landsdækkende ukrainsk folkeafstemning om det ukrainske folks holdning til en indtræden i NATO.

"Vi mener, at tilstedeværelsen af NATO-repræsentanter fremkalder en politisk spænding og en negativ reaktion fra indbyggernes side. Vi protesterer mod disse forfatningsstridige handlinger", hedder det i appellen.

Som tidligere omtalt har Krims parlament Den øverste Sovjet vedtaget en resolution, som erklærer Krim for NATO-frit område.

Ifølge parlamentets deputerede udgør Ukraines forsvarsministeriums ageren i forbindelse med afholdelsen af det internationale flådeøvelse "Sea Breeze 2006" uden forudgående tilladelse fra Ukraines parlament en trussel mod grundlaget for den forfatningsmæssige orden i Ukraine og landets neutrale status.

Krims Øverste Sovjet forlanger et stop for ulovlig indtrængen af amerikanske og NATO-tropper samt logistik og militærudstyr på ukrainsk territorium, indtil der foreligger en beslutning fra Ukraines parlament 

Desuden forlanger Krims Sovjet en afblæsning af militærøvelsen "Sea Breeze 2006".

I byen Feodosija på Krim blokerede repræsentanter for partier og samfundsorganisationer den 29. maj for aflæsningen af et amerikansk lastskib, som efter deres opfattelse var et skalkeskjul for en mulig indsættelse af amerikanske tropper på et militært øvelsesterræn 25 kilometer fra Feodosija, hvor de skulle deltage i NATO-militærøvelsen. Podrobnosti. Ukrajinski Novyny. 

09.06.06. Weak authority emboldens anti-NATO protests in Ukraine

By Vladimir Socor
Friday, June 2, 2006

The post-election crisis of Ukrainian state institutions may undermine President Viktor Yushchenko's and the Orange forces' goal to bring Ukraine into NATO during their term of office. Amid a growing deficit of effective governance, pro-Russia groups find unprecedented leeway to frustrate Kyiv's policies on this and other issues affecting Ukraine's overall orientation.

The Verkhovna Rada has not yet managed to vote the legally required approval of the entry of troops -- in this case, from the United States and other NATO countries -- for the planned joint exercises in Ukraine. Exercise preparations were planned in advance and were due to have started in the Crimea by late May. However, with Yushchenko seemingly content to delay the parliament's opening long after the March elections, and a twice-released caretaker government lacking authority, anti-NATO political forces feel tempted to try interfering with the holding of exercises.

Anti-NATO protests have been underway in the Crimean port of Feodosiya since May 27 and turned into a round-the-clock, open-ended rally in the port on June 1. Protesters aim to disrupt preparations for Sea Breeze-2006, a major naval and ground-force exercise. On May 27 the U.S. transport ship, Advantage, brought military equipment and personnel to Feodosiya to prepare that exercise. The ship was unable to unload the equipment or land the technical personnel during three days amid local protests. Led by the Party of Regions and leftist pro-Russia groups, protesters claimed that the preparations were unlawful in the absence of parliamentary approval for the exercise. On May 30, the equipment -- including arms and ammunition, Humvees and other military vehicles, container-type structures, and construction materials -- was finally ashore, but the accompanying technical personnel had to turn back with the ship. Pickets blocked all exits from the port to prevent the equipment from being moved to its destination at the Staryy Krym training range.

By June 1 the rally had swelled with delegations from eastern and southern cities of Ukraine and Communist veterans joining the local Russian nationalist youth organization Proryv. At least two Russian Duma deputies arrived that day and made inflammatory remarks, instantly broadcast by Russia's state television to drum up support for the action (Russian TV Channel One, June 1).

While Ukrainian marines are securing the equipment in the port against misappropriation, the presidential plenipotentiary representative in the Crimea, Henadiy Moskal, failed to persuade the protesters to lift the blockade. As seen in televised footage, Moskal had to promise that the equipment would be turned over to the Ukrainian state and the Feodosiya municipality, if the parliament in Kyiv does not authorize the holding of this year's Sea Breeze exercise (Inter TV [Kyiv], Center TV [Moscow], May 30).

An emboldened Feodosiya municipal council -- dominated by the Party of Regions -- has adopted a decision that declares the city a "NATO-free zone," banning access by ships and personnel from NATO countries. Although the council has no jurisdiction on such issues, its decision perturbs the atmosphere around the planned exercises and creates political complications in Kyiv. The Feodosiya decision follows a pattern that has emerged in recent weeks in eastern and southern Ukraine on language issues, whereby oblast and city councils grant official status to the Russian language, although they have no jurisdiction on this matter. Such extralegal decisions indicate that those local councils sense weakness in the central authorities.

Ukraine's Defense and Foreign Affairs ministries have responded belatedly with statements that the Advantage is a commercial vessel, not a naval one, therefore not requiring legislative consent to enter Ukraine (if so, that distinction does not address the military equipment and personnel aboard the U.S. vessel). The ministries' statements point out that joint exercises with NATO countries enhance the Ukrainian forces' readiness, interoperability with NATO allies, and opportunities to participate in international operations; and that some of the equipment shipped in and infrastructure created for the exercises is handed over to Ukrainian forces afterward. Thus, according to these ministries, anti-NATO protesters are "politicking" against Ukrainian interests while ignoring the Russian Black Sea Fleet's unlawful use of many land tracts and facilities in the Crimea (Interfax-Ukraine, May 29-31).

The U.S.-led Sea Breeze-2006, involving personnel from 17 NATO member and partner countries, is the largest of several annual exercises scheduled to be held, mostly in the Crimea, between June and September of this year. The other annual exercises include Cossack Steppe (Ukrainian-Polish-British), Tight Knot (Ukrainian-British), and Combined Effort (Ukrainian-U.S.).

Responding to the Feodosiya situation, a May 31 statement by NATO Headquarters in Brussels points out that Sea Breeze is not a NATO exercise, but rather a Ukrainian-U.S. exercise in which NATO countries participate; and that delivery of equipment is a bilateral U.S.-Ukrainian matter, in which NATO as such is not involved. While impeccably accurate for a Western audience, those distinctions will only sound like defensive casuistry to anti-NATO groups in Ukraine, where propaganda from Moscow and local misconception traditionally paints any Western forces with the broad black brush as "Natovtsy." For its part, official Kyiv correctly links the exercises with NATO and the goal to strengthen Ukraine's relations with the alliance. Meanwhile, the public approval rating of NATO in Ukraine is said to be steadily declining (Kyiv Post, May 18).

This situation underscores the urgent need for an information campaign about NATO for the Ukrainian public. However, driven by short-term electoral calculations, Orange leaders (with the notable exception of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Rukh party leader Borys Tarasyuk) have avoided addressing the public forthrightly on this unpopular issue. Without an early start to a public information campaign, the Orange leadership's goal for Ukraine to be invited into NATO by 2010 cannot be successful -- and might even become moot if Yushchenko is swayed into opting for a coalition government with the Party of Regions.

18.06.06. Koalitionsforhandlinger fortsætter i morgen

Deltagerne i forhandlingerne om dannelsen af en demokratisk koalition har afstemt flertallet af de spørgsmål, som der var uenighed omkring, oplyste repræsentant for Socialistpartiet Josif Vinskij i søndags til pressen efter forhandlingerne mellem "Vores Ukraine", Julia Tymoshenkos Blok og SPU.

Ifølge Vinskij vil dagens forhandlingsrunde blive videreført i morgen mandag. Han kunne desuden oplyse, at man på dagens møder har formået at afstemme flertallet af stridspunkterne, men at man endnu ikke er nået frem til fordelingen af ministerposter.

Ifølge Vinskijs prognose vil det pågældende spørgsmål blive drøftet i morgen.

På UNIANs opfordring til at præcisere, hvilke punkter det var lykkedes at nå til enighed om, sagde han: "Når vi har underskrevet aftalen, få I det at vide". Podrobnosti. UNIAN

19.06.06. Koalitionsforhandlinger ventes afsluttet tirsdag

Ikke senere end på tirsdag den 20. juni er det nødvendigt at nå frem til en eller anden beslutning om dannelsen af en koalition, meddelte en af lederne af "Vores Ukraine", Petro Poroshenko i et interview med den ukrainske presse søndag eftermiddag.

Ifølge Poroshenko er den orange koalition ved at være godt på vej efter dagens forhandlinger. Hans bud er, at man i dag vil færdiggøre drøftelsen af programdelen i koalitionsaftalen mellem blokken "Vores Ukraine", BJuT og SPU, og at det ikke kan udelukkes, at man allerede vil gå over til fordelingen af ansvarsområderne.

Ifølge Poroshenko bør man ikke udskyde stridspunkterne mellem de politiske partnere i koalitionen til senere.

Journalisterne tog interviewet med Poroshenko nogle få skridt fra det sted, hvor Regionernes Parti har sit hovedkvarter; nemlig på Lypska-gaden i Kiev, hvor konsultationerne finder sted. Samtidig understregede Poroshenko, at han ikke deltager i forhandlingerne, men blot bor i den pågældende gade. Tidligere var det kommet frem, at Poroshenko bor på Hrushevskyj-gaden i nærheden af Marijinskyj-parken. Podrobnosti, UNIAN.

20.06.06. Jusjtjenko splittet mellem Kutjma-fløjen og de orange partier

Taras Kuzio
Kyiv Post.
16 June 2006

To understand Viktor Yushchenko's inability to become master of his own
house, one has to unpack the myths that were created around him when he
was prime minister in 2000-2001 and a presidential candidate in 2004

Four out of five political forces in the Ukrainian parliament have
described the political situation in Ukraine as a deep crisis. Only the
pro-presidential Our Ukraine bloc seems to believe there is no crisis in
Ukraine.

At the root of this crisis is not the dragging out of coalition talks or
even constitutional reform, but President Viktor Yushchenko’s leadership
style and political culture. Many Ukrainians feel there is no
‘hospodar’, or master, in the house.

To understand Yushchenko’s inability to become master of his house, one
has to unpack the myths that were created around him when he was prime
minister in 2000-2001 and presidential candidate in 2004. Yushchenko has
never felt comfortable as an opposition politician.

Between 1994 and 2001, Yushchenko was a loyal government servant under
President Leonid Kuchma, first as chairman of the National Bank and then
as premier. This is not unusual in the post-Soviet world, as many
national democrats also served in government before becoming
oppositionists. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili served under
former President Eduard Saakashvili, whom he removed from power in the
November 2003 Rose Revolution.

What is surprising in Yushchenko’s case is his unwillingness to become a
true oppositionist to the very last. The Yushchenko government was
removed in April 2001 at Kuchma’s instigation after a Communist-centrist
vote of no confidence. Nevertheless, Yushchenko and the Our Ukraine bloc
he established for the March 2002 elections continued to believe that
Kuchma would anoint him as his successor.

Yushchenko’s and Our Ukraine’s faith in Kuchma anointing him only fell
by the wayside in November 2002, nearly two years after he was removed
as premier. The reason for the disappointment was the appointment of the
Donetsk governor Viktor Yanukovych as prime minister.

The appointment of Yanukovych was a tactical move by the then head of
the presidential administration, Viktor Medvedchuk, to thwart an Our
Ukraine-Donetsk alliance in the 2004 presidential elections. The
Kuchma-Medvedchuk strategy was to ensure that Yushchenko and Yanukovych
became foes, and if the elections were annulled, that either Kuchma
could run again (as the Constitutional Court had permitted) or then
National Bank head Serhiy Tyhipko would run in new elections in 2005.

Yushchenko’s and Our Ukraine’s stance also was revealed during the
Kuchmagate crisis. As premier, Yushchenko never backed the protests and
did not stand up for his first deputy premier, Yulia Tymoshenko, when
she was arrested in January 2001. Yushchenko also signed a letter,
alongside Kuchma and Rada speaker Ivan Plyushch, condemning the
protestors as ‘fascists’. Even after the failure to obtain Kuchma’s
anointment to be successor, Our Ukraine didn’t play a role in the
anti-Kuchma protests. The Arise Ukraine! Protests of 2002-2003 were
again dominated by the Socialists and Tymoshenko’s BYuT.

The national democrats, who later united in Our Ukraine, were similar to
Yushchenko in their inability to move into the opposition. They never
supported calls for Kuchma’s impeachment, as they stuck to the view that
the president is the head of state and his fall could lead to Ukraine
losing its independence.

Yushchenko and Our Ukraine therefore only demanded the removal of the
heads of law enforcement agencies, which Kuchma agreed to. They
preserved the view of the president as the ‘good Tsar’.

All the blame for Ukraine’s ills was directed by Yushchenko and Our
Ukraine at Medvedchuk, whom they sought to remove as deputy speaker in
December 2001 in revenge for firing Yushchenko as premier (Medvedchuk’s
bloc not being elected into the 2006 parliament was a bonus). Charges of
organizing the April 2004 fraudulent Mukachevo elections and then the
poisoning of Yushchenko have also bypassed Kuchma and been blamed on
Medvedchuk.

Yushchenko’s and the national democrats’ statist position was at odds
with the Socialists and BYuT. It was these forces that constituted
Ukraine’s only real opposition.

If Prime Minister Yushchenko and the national democrats had backed the
BYuT-SPU opposition during Kuchmagate it is unlikely that Kuchma would
have remained in office. De facto, the national democrats kept Kuchma in
power for three more years.

Yushchenko and the business wing of Our Ukraine were always closer in
politics to the â€?softliners’ in the Kuchma administration, the so-called
moderate centrists, than to the SPU and BYuT. Leading Our Ukraine
businessmen and Yushchenko always had more in common with former speaker
Volodymyr Lytvyn, the Agrarians and People’s Democratic Party (NDP) than
with the opposition.

The only national democratic exception during the Kuchmagate protests
and since the Orange Revolution was the Reforms and Order Party (R&O),
which was divided. Some R&P members backed the protests while others
refused. This was repeated during the 2006 elections, when the R&P again
adopted a middle ground between the Orange opposition (BYuT) and Our
Ukraine.

Comparing the configuration of Our Ukraine in 2002 and 2006 reveals
these divisions. In 2002, Our Ukraine was a far broader national
democratic coalition that included R&P and Yuriy Kostenko’s Ukrainian
People’s Party (UNP). In other words, it included both successor wings
of Rukh, one which was the UNP.

In 2006, most national democratic parties had fled Our Ukraine. The UNP
and R&P created their own blocs, as both were unhappy with Yushchenko’s
policies and the dominant influence of centrist businessmen.

In 2002, Our Ukraine had a more evenly balanced mix of national
democrats and businessmen united on a statist and reformist platform. By
2006, the only national democratic party left in Our Ukraine was Rukh.

Our Ukraine was never anti-Kuchma, unlike the SPU and BYuT. Yushchenko
could not go against Kuchma, whom he once described as a father figure.

It should therefore come as no surprise that after coming to power,
Yushchenko was never able to initiate proceedings against Kuchma. The
Orange Revolutionâ€?s slogan â€?bandits to prison’, which Yushchenko
repeatedly used himself during the 2004 presidential campaign,
undoubtedly included Kuchma as one of the aforementioned â€?bandits’.

After coming to power, Yushchenko never once morally condemned the
Kuchma era and Kuchma’s role in it. This, coupled with the lack of
criminal charges, would suggest that Kuchma was granted immunity during
roundtable negotiations during the Orange Revolution.

Prosecutor Svyatoslav Piskun became the guarantor of this pact, and no
charges were leveled against Kuchma or his senior elites. There is no
other explainable reason why Piskun was kept in his position until
October 2005 when the president had a right to dismiss him 10 months
earlier. Piskun even escaped Yushchenko’s removal of the Tymoshenko
government a month earlier.

This leads us to two conclusions.

First, Yushchenko and the business wing of Our Ukraine have always been
closer to pro-Kuchma centrists than to the anti-Kuchma opposition (BYuT,
SPU). Our Ukraine business leaders are pulled towards what they sought
in 2001-2002, an alliance with the Party of Regions. Our Ukraine leader
Yuriy Yekhanurov is more at home with the ‘national bourgeoisie’ in the
Party of Regions than with the remainder of the Orange coalition (BYuT
and SPU).

Second, it should come as no surprise that â€?bandits to prison’ was not
acted upon. The lack of action in this arena has instead enabled the
Party of Regions to come first by a wide margin, pushed Our Ukraine to
third place, disillusioned many Orange supporters and damaged the
concept of equality for all before the law.

Taras Kuzio is a visiting professor at George Washington University,
Washington D.C.

20.06.06. Forhandlingsleder regner med en koalitionsaftale i morgen

Lederen af "Vores Ukraine"s fraktion, Roman Bezsmertnyj, udtalte i dag til pressen, at en koalitionsaftale efter al sandsynlighed vil blive underskrevet på onsdag. Bezsmertnyj understregede, at parlamentsmedlemmer kl. 16:00 vil erklære mødet i parlamentet for åben for straks derefter at udsætte mødet til på onsdag.

Ifølge Bezsmertnyj agter lederne af de politiske partier at bruge tiden til at afholde yderligere møder omkring dannelsen af en parlamentarisk koalition.

På spørgsmålet om, hvorfor processen trækker så meget ud, svarede Bezsmertnyj: "vi har brug for at finde svaret på en række spørgsmål".

Ifølge ham mangler man at finde et endegyldigt kompromis i forhold til et medlemskab af NATO, den politiske reform samt udviklingen af det lokale selvstyre.

Bezsmertnyj kunne i øvrigt bekræfte, at "Vores Ukraine" fortsætter forhandlingerne med Regionernes Parti. "Der foregår hele tiden forhandlinger og møder med andre politiske partier", sagde Bezsmertnyj. UP. Liga.

22.06.06. Fordelingen af ministerposterne i orange regering på plads

Julia Tymoshenkos Blok, "Vores Ukraine" og Socialistpartiet er nået frem til fordelingen af de ledende poster i den kommende regering, oplyste en velunderrettet kilde i dag til internetavisen UP.

Julia Tymoshenkos Blok får følgende poster:

- premierministerposten, 

- 1. næstformand for parlamentet

- landbrugsminister

- økonomiminister

- energi- og brændselsminister

- kulindustriminister

- byggeri- og arkitekturminister

- kulturminister

- katastrofeminister

- sundhedsminister

- finansminister

- formanden for den statslige ejendomsfond

- formanden for statskomiteen for Tv- og radio

Blokken "Vores Ukraine" får følgende poster:

- formanden for parlamentet

- vice-premierminister med ansvar for regionalpolitikken

- beskæftigelsesminister

- industriminister

- ungdoms- og sportsminister

- indenrigsminister

- justitsminister

- formanden for konkurrencestyrelsen

Det socialistiske Parti opnår følgende ministerposter.

- 1. vice-premierminister

- miljøminister

- undervisningsminister

- transport- og kommunikationsminister

- ombudsmanden

Desuden får "Vores Ukraine" ifølge UP's kilde formandsposterne i finansudvalget og finans- og bankudvalget i parlamentet. Alt i alt skal "Vores Ukraine" have formandskabet for 7 af parlamentets stående udvalg. Samtidig får Socialistpartiet formandskabet i energiudvalget, økonomiudvalget og udenrigsudvalget.

Det forventes, at Julia Tymoshenkos Blok får formandsposten i 11 af parlamentets udvalg. UP.

23.06.06. Den orange koalition er officielt på plads

I dag meddelte fungerende formand for det ukrainske parlament, Adam Martynjuk, at der nu officielt er blevet stiftet en koalition bestående af tre fraktioner. Koalitionsaftalen er blevet underskrevet af 239 deputerede fra Julia Tymoshenkos Blok, SPU og "Vores Ukraine". UP.

23.06.06. Ny regering fanget i gas-pine

Regeringens to ideologiske hovedmodstandere, premierminister Julia Tymoshenko (damen med fletningen) og Roman Zvarytj fra "Vores Ukraine" (den skaldede mand med siden til kameraet) ser ud til at være uenige fra starten.

25.06.06. Ingen medlemskabsinvitation fra NATO i år

Ukraine skal ikke regne med at få en invitation til at blive medlem af NATO på efterårets topmøde i den nordatlantiske alliance.

Det meddelte NATOs generalsekretær Jaap de Hoop Scheffer i et interview med den polske avis Dziennik, som blev bragt i lørdags.

Ifølge Scheffer er kandidatlandene, som udover Ukraine tæller Georgien og balkanlandene, endnu ikke klar til at slutte sig til alliancen.

Samtidig sagde generalsekretæren, at disse lande vil få et positivt signal under topmødet i Riga.

Scheffer gentog, at NATOs døre er åbne for Ukraine, men at det er det ukrainske folk, der skal træffe beslutningen. Deutsche Welle.

28.06.06. Sea Breeze 2006: the campaign to promote NATO is being lost

ICPS Newsletter bulletin
# 325, 19 June 2006
Jun 19, 2006

An ambiguous situation over the lack of legislation to permit the conducting of the Sea Breeze 2006 military exercises in Ukraine became the excuse for a widespread campaign against joining NATO. Although NATO has no direct relationship to these exercises and Ukraine has so far been acting in accordance to existing legislation, the Yekhanurov Government once more failed to explain its position effectively to voters and to explain what was going on.

The Sea Breeze exercises are not a NATO event. They are a joint Ukrainian-American training series that involved both NATO countries and countries that do not belong to the Alliance. The Sea Breeze exercises have been held annually since 1997. From that first year, Russia has participated in these exercises as an observer. The efforts of such parties as the Progressive Socialists and the Communists to link these exercises with NATO have no legal basis and are pure politics.

Unfortunately, neither the press nor the Government was able to objectively present the situation and the real motives of the organizers of the protests. In the public mind, these exercises have now begun to be clearly associated with NATO.

The Ukrainian Government has been acting completely within the law. The Verkhovna Rada needs to pass a law only for the actual carrying out of the exercises and not for the preparations for those exercises. On the reasonable assumption that the VR would approve such a bill, the Defense Ministry began preparing for the exercises with its international partners, which included the delivery by the American merchant transporter Advantage of military and civilian property for this purpose. On the ship were representatives of the US Department of Defense.

According to the Law On the procedure for admitting and the conditions for the stay of military divisions of the Armed Forces of other countries on the territory of Ukraine, the agreement of the Verkhovna Rada is needed only in the event that divisions of the Armed Forces of another state are being landed on Ukrainian territory. Since representatives of the US DOD hardly qualify as a "military division," the ship's cargo was not ammunition for such a division, and the vessel was not a military one, the Border Service of Ukraine, according to prior agreement, had every reason to admit this ship into a Ukrainian port without the say so of the Verkhovna Rada. The fact remains that the Government and Defense Ministry miscalculated the importance of providing complete advance information on this issue. The media took this silence as indicating that they doubted the legitimacy of their own steps.

This scandal has led to even greater unconstructive political competition. Much of the press failed to understand the situation properly and too often published conflicting and incorrect information. Those factions that are determined to oppose the Government, the Party of the Regions and the Communist Party, took advantage of the situation to score political points and to underscore the ineffectiveness of the current Administration. PR demonstrated to the president just how important its presence might be in resolving regional issues. The CPU yet again pressed home its anti-NATO position. The Government showed its complete inability to work effectively with the public and to inform voters of its position. The partners in a potential Orange coalition were unable to ensure that the Verkhovna Rada made the necessary decision in time. This provides additional reason to doubt in their future ability to resolve foreign policy issues.

These events showed just how totally ineffective the Government is in promoting the idea of NATO among Ukrainians. What is more, the situation was completely taken advantage of by those domestic political forces that are against Ukraine's integration with NATO and by Russia. The main impact of these events was to damage Ukraine's international image and to shake the faith of its foreign partners in the power of the Ukrainian Government to effectively continue on the course of Euro-Atlantic integration. As a result of this scandal, public support for joining NATO, which was already relatively low, sank even lower. Given the likelihood that there will be a referendum on the issue of joining the North Atlantic Alliance, Ukraine's government has suffered a serious blow.

28.06.06. How will renewed 'orange' government be run?

June 27, 2006

By Jan Maksymiuk

The three allies of the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine -- the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine, and the Socialist Party -- decided on June 22 to recreate their ruling coalition, which existed for eight months in 2005. The renewed Orange coalition, however, comes into being under new rules of the political game determined by a constitutional reform that took effect at the beginning of 2006.

Yuliya Tymoshenko, leader of the eponymous political bloc, was fond of asserting during the parliamentary election campaign earlier this year that voting for the Verkhovna Rada on March 26 would decide who would actually govern Ukraine over the next five years. In this way she was highlighting the new, enhanced powers of the parliament and the cabinet of ministers vis-a-vis the presidency, which are a result of the constitutional changes made during the peak of the Orange Revolution in December 2004.

Would Tymoshenko repeat that assertion now, after her party has rejoined the ruling coalition and she personally is poised to become prime minister once again? Perhaps yes, but arguably with less confidence -- this because her coalition partners from Our Ukraine have made a considerable effort during the nearly three months of coalition talks in order to install an elaborate system of checks and balances to prevent her from gaining too much power.

A coalition deal signed on June 22 provides for the distribution of election spoils between the Orange allies on a broadly proportional basis. This means that the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (129 seats) should get 53 percent of government posts, Our Ukraine (81 seats) 33 percent, and the Socialist Party (33 seats) 14 percent.

But this arithmetic does not apply to some major state posts that the constitution defines as a presidential quota. In particular, the president has the right to appoint the foreign minister, the defense minister, the prosecutor-general, the head of the Security Service, the head of the National Bank, and all regional governors. It should be expected that these appointments will be made by President Viktor Yushchenko mostly from the ranks of the pro-presidential Our Ukraine.

Moreover, presidential prerogatives include appointing half the members of the National Radio and Television Council, the National Bank Council, and the Constitutional Court. The president also has veto powers on legislation, which can be overturned by no fewer than 300 votes in the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada. Thus, even after the 2004 shift from the presidential to parliamentary form of governance in Ukraine, President Yushchenko appears to have more political clout than most of his counterparts in Central Europe.

According to unconfirmed media reports, the June 22 coalition deal allocates the post of prime minister and nine ministerial portfolios to the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc. Our Ukraine is to take the posts of parliamentary speaker and deputy prime minister as well as five ministerial portfolios. The Socialist Party will have to satisfy itself with the post of first deputy prime minister and three ministerial portfolios.

The posts of heads of parliamentary committees are distributed among the coalition partners under a similar proportional scheme, but an adopted system of checks and balances assures that Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party control those committees that deal with the spheres of cabinet activities under the control of ministers from the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc.

The Orange coalition deal also includes a chapter called "The Regulations of the Coalition's Activities," which sets internal rules and procedures for arriving at coordinated decisions.

According to these rules, every coalition partner has the power of veto over proposed legislation, and consensus is needed for submitting a draft bill or resolution to the Verkhovna Rada.

The main programmatic issues -- mapping out principal foreign and domestic policies and drafting the cabinet's program of action -- are to be tackled by the General Assembly of the Coalition, which consists of all 243 lawmakers from the three Orange parties. The General Assembly of the Coalition adopts resolutions by voting: a decision is deemed passed if it is supported by more than 50 percent of lawmakers in each coalition party.

On a daily basis, the work of the coalition is coordinated by the nine-member Coalition Council, which is made up of three lawmakers from each coalition party.

There are also rules obliging the coalition to consult on issues of special importance with the three top state officials: the president, the prime minister, and the parliamentary speaker.

In particular, the coalition, through its council, has to hold mandatory consultations with the president regarding the determination of foreign and domestic policies and a program of socioeconomic development. The same applies to submitting the candidacy of a prime minister for parliamentary approval.

The prime minister is restricted in his/her actions by a requirement to hold mandatory consultations with the Coalition Council regarding the nomination of cabinet and other officials whom the constitution assigns to his/her sphere of authority. A similar requirement applies to cabinet dismissals.

In other words, for the first time in Ukraine's 15 years of independence, the Ukrainian political elite have agreed on a set of rules that can make running the government in the country a fairly transparent and civilized business. This circumstance, coupled with the constitutional reform that distributes political clout among the power branches more evenly, may be seen as an indisputable gain of the Orange Revolution.

However, the upsetting part of all this is that people intending to run a new government in Ukraine are essentially the same people who split in September 2005 among mutual accusations of corruption and/or encroaching upon each other's prerogatives.

Our Ukraine's proposal that Petro Poroshenko, Tymoshenko's fiercest enemy in the 2005 feud within the then-Orange coalition, take the post of parliamentary speaker seems to be an ill-advised "parliamentary check" on Tymoshenko as the head of the cabinet. There is a great likelihood that the former rivalry between these two might start anew, plunging the new coalition once again into recriminations and quarreling.

Incidentally, representatives of the opposition Party of Regions predict that precisely because of the incompatibility of such individuals as Tymoshenko and Poroshenko, the new Orange coalition is doomed to collapse in the same way as its Orange predecessor did. Bracing itself for such an eventuality, the Party of Regions is keeping its options open and has avoided saying "no" to a future coalition with Our Ukraine.

Our Ukraine unambiguously suggested that its own coalition with the Party of Regions is a possibility when it invited its main enemy in the Orange Revolution to participate in coalition talks last week. Therefore, what looked like an attempt to blackmail Tymoshenko into becoming more pliant in the coalition talks a week ago may well prove to be a practical move.

29.06.06. Usikkerhed om pakkeafstemning i parlamentet

Socialisterne er tilbøjelige til at være imod en "pakkeafstemning" om parlamentsformanden og premierministeren. (En "pakkeafstemning" indebærer i dette tilfælde, at man ved at vælge en bestemt kandidat som formand for parlamentet, samtidigt stemmer for en bestemt premierministerkandidat, red.). Det meddelte medlem af SPU's fraktion i parlamentet, Mykola Rudkovskyj ifølge UNIAN.

Samtidig understregede han, at fraktionen endnu ikke har truffet nogen endelig afgørelse herom, men at mange medlemmer af gruppen under mødet talte for, at afstemningen finder sted i henhold til parlamentet Verkhovna Radas forretningsorden.

Som bekendt blev det på den orange koalitions møde den 27. juni besluttet at gennemføre en "pakkeafstemning" om parlamentsformanden og premierministeren. Koalitionsmedlemmerne aftalte, at Julia Tymoshenko skal være kandidat til premierministerposten, mens Petro Pororshenko skal være kandidat til posten som parlamentsformand.

Regionernes parti går imod pakkeafstemningen, idet man påpeger, at denne måde at vælge regeringschefen og parlamentsformanden på at ulovlig, fordi de strider mod parlamentets forretningsorden og forfatningen. UP.

29.06.06. Nye tegn på splittelse i den orange koalition

"Vores Ukraine" parlamentsgruppe mener, at Socialistpartiets krav om en udskiftning af Petro Poroshenkos kandidatur til posten som parlamentsformand kan betyde, at partiet forlader koalitionen.

"Vores Ukraine" vil gerne spørge Oleksandr Moroz (socialisternes formand, red.) om hans erklæring om, hvem der skal være formand for Verkhovna Rada, kan betragtes som en udtræden af koalitionen", siger lederen af "Vores Ukraines" informationsafdeling Tetyana Mokridi, oplyser partiets pressetjeneste.

Ifølge Mokridi vil medlemmerne af hendes parti også spørge socialisternes leder "om han har læst koalitionsaftalen, inden han underskrev den".

"Som bekendt går koalitionsaftalen ud på, at ingen af de partier, som deltager i koalitionen, har vetoret overfor en kandidat, som et af de øvrige partier har foreslået. Inden underskrivelsen af aftalen sagde Moroz, at SPU er enig i alle vilkårene for koalitionsaftalen og er parat til at skrive den under", siger Mokridi.

Som bekendt udsendte Moroz tidligere på dagen en pressemeddelelse, hvori han bad "Vores Ukraine" om at erstatte Poroshenko med en anden kandidat til posten som formand for parlamentet. UP.

30.06.06. De orange partier og Jusjtjenko vil mødes med oppositionen

Præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko og lederne af de fraktioner, som indgår i koalitionen, har udarbejdet en handlingsplan i forhold til at løse konflikten i Verkhovna Rada.

Det sagde Roman Bezsmertnyj fra Vores Ukraine, Julia Tymoshenko og Oleksandr Moroz under et møde i præsidentens sekretariat, oplyser "Vores Ukraines" pressetjeneste. Ifølge Bezsmertnyj er man blevet enige om, at man kl. 11 mandag vil afholde en rundbordssamtale med repræsentanterne for alle fraktioner.

Her vil koalitionen kræve, at alle politiske partier giver afkald på ultimative omgangsformer, og det uacceptable i, at politiske partier stiller krav til statslige myndigheder.

Koalitionen vil også kræve, at det er uacceptabelt, at et parti eller en samfundsorganisation blokerer Verkhovna Radas arbejde.

"I det sidstnævnte tilfælde er jeg nødt til at advare om, at der er mulighed for retssager og ansvarspådragelse efter straffeloven", sagde Bezsmertnyj.

Ifølge koalitionslederne vil man under rundbordssamtalerne også foreslå at oppositionen i de lokale råd rundt om i landet får en indflydelse som nogenlunde svarer til oppositionens indflydelse i parlamentet. UP.

07.07.06. Den orange koalition ligger i ruiner

Ukraines provestlige orangekoalition er på vej mod opløsning, efter at en partileder løber fra tidligere aftaler.

11.07.06. Moroz foreslår Jusjtjenko Janukovytj som premierminister

Formanden for parlamentet Verkhovna Rada, Oleksandr Moroz, har officielt sendt præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko koalitionens forslag om at udpege Viktor Janukovytj til premierminister, oplyser parlamentets pressetjeneste lørdag.

"I henhold til parlamentets forretningsorden fremsender jeg hermed i overensstemmelse med den vedtagne fremgangsmåde, et forslag vedtaget af flertallet i Verkhovna Rada den 11. juli 2006 om at udnævne Viktor Janukovytj til premierminister", hedder det i dokumentet.

Moroz tilføjer i brevet, at han ikke ser noget grundlag for en opløsning af parlamentet. Ifølge Moroz har der i det ukrainske parlaments historie allerede været nogle situationer, som ligner den nuværende, og som regel blev der fundet en udvej af situationen.

"Jeg er nødt til at arbejde under disse betingelser. Og hvis der bliver mulighed for at vedtage legitime beslutninger, så vil jeg arbejde videre.  I modsat fald vil der være pauser og vil blive fundet et kompromis", sagde formanden.

Moroz forklarede, at han ikke havde mulighed for at navneopråbe alle de deputerede, som er deltagere i den nye koalition pga. den utrolige larm, der var i sessionssalen.

Samtidig tilføjer Moroz, at det ikke betyder,  at den nye koalition ikke er blevet stiftet. "Juridisk set er dette en kendsgerning", sagde han.

Blokeringen af parlamentets talerstol forklarer Moroz med Julia Tymoshenkos ønske om at afholde et ekstraordinært parlamentsvalg og blive premierminister.

Han gentog sin tese om, at koalitionen af demokratiske kræfter gik i opløsningen udelukkende fordi, at blokken "Vores Ukraine" ikke ville have Tymoshenko som premierminister. UP. Liga

12.07.06. Nye forhandlinger mellem Regionernes Parti og Jusjtjenko

I dag indledte Regionernes Parti og "Vores Ukraine" en ny forhandlingsrunde i præsidentens sekretariat om dannelsen af en bred koalition.

Kilder i Regionernes Parti siger, at partiet er repræsenteret af Andrij Kljujev, Mykola Azarov, Rajisa Bohatyrjova, Olena Lukash og Eduard Prutnik. 

Samtidig oplyste deputeret i Regionernes Parti Hanna Herman, at forhandlingsdelegationen består af Rajisa Bohatyrjova, Mykola Azarov, Andrij Kljujev, Olena Lukash og Volodymyr Rybak. Ifølge Herman vil partiets politiske råd tage stilling til forhandlingsresultatet på onsdag.

Fra "Vores Ukraines" side deltager ifølge kilderne Roman Zvarytj, Mykola Martynenko, Borys Tarasyuk og Anatolij Kinakh. Det forventes endvidere, at Jurij Jekhanurov også deltager.

Mødet foregår hemmeligt, fordi det ikke er blevet officielt bekendtgjort af hverken af "Vores Ukraine" eller Regionernes Parti. UP.

21.07.06. Ukraine President’s Party sets conditions for joining coalition

By Judy Dempsey
New York Times
July 15, 2006

Ukraine’s political landscape shifted  radically on Friday when President Viktor A. Yushchenko’s pro-Western party,  Our Ukraine, said that under certain conditions it would join a coalition  with its archrival, the pro-Russian Party of the Regions led by Viktor F.  Yanukovich.

Our Ukraine is insisting that a new government exclude the Communists,  who were part of an earlier coalition proposal. Another contentious issue is  control over who would become the next prime minister.

Ukraine has been in a state of political turmoil since parliamentary  elections in March, when Mr. Yanukovich’s party won the most seats, but not  enough to form a government on its own. Mr. Yanukovich, who was defeated by  Mr. Yushchenko during the presidential runoff in January 2005, would like to  make a political comeback as prime minister.

But Mr. Yushchenko, whose Our Ukraine was one of two parties that  spearheaded the 2004 Orange Revolution, is eager to maintain a more  Western-leaning government and might press for another candidate.

Mr. Yanukovich has until Tuesday to decide whether he will meet the  president’s demands.    The Socialist Party, which opposes economic reforms and Ukraine’s joining  NATO, would also join the proposed coalition. The Socialists’ participation  in a new government could derail attempts by the United States to invite  Ukraine to start negotiations for joining NATO at the alliance’s meeting in  Riga, Latvia, in November.

This “anticrisis” coalition -- the third attempt at forming a coalition  since the parliamentary elections -- was brokered after marathon talks on  Thursday and Friday.

The proposed coalition, however, would not include the other leader of  the Orange Revolution, Yulia V. Tymoshenko, whose party, the Tymoshenko  Bloc, came in second in the elections.

She has said she had no intention of supporting the anticrisis coalition  and would join the opposition.

Ms. Tymoshenko was poised last week to become prime minister after the  Orange Revolution parties won the support of the Socialist Party, led by  Oleksandr O. Moroz.    But negotiations became bogged down by bitter rivalries and clashes  between Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko, whose cooperation during the  heady days of the Orange Revolution has all but evaporated.

Mr. Yushchenko repeatedly tried to block Ms. Tymoshenko from becoming  prime minister, particularly since constitutional changes that took effect  last January strengthened that post at the expense of the president. There  were disputes, too, over who would be president of the Parliament and who  would lead the parliamentary committees.

Amid the political haggling, Mr. Moroz suddenly changed sides, saying he  would join with the Party of the Regions. With support from the small  Communist Party, Mr. Yanukovich said this week that he would establish the  next government. Mr. Moroz was rewarded by being elected president of the  Parliament, a powerful position he had long sought.

21.07.06. Tør Jusjtjenko opløse Ukraines parlament på tirsdag

En af lederne af Socialistpartiet Mykola Rudkovskyj siger, at parlamentet på mandag den 24. juli forventer at få en indstilling fra præsidentens side om at godkende Janukovytj som premierminister. Og derfor har vi fremsat et resolutionsforslag om at gøre dagen til en arbejdsdag i Verkhovna Rada", meddelte Rudkovskyj til pressen.

Som bekendt er tirsdagen den 25. juli den dag, hvor fristen for parlamentets godkendelse af premierministeren udløber, hvorefter parlamentet kan blive opløst af præsidenten.

Rudkovskyj understregede, at han håber på, at Jusjtjenko vil indstille Viktor Janukovytj som premierminister.

"Jeg tror, at præsidenten er indstillet konstruktivt", sagde han og tilføjede, at Jusjtjenko ikke har ret til ikke at foreslå Janukovytj.

Rudkovskyj gjorde også opmærksom på, at Jusjtjenko risikerer en rigsretssag mod sig, hvis han ikke foreslår Janukovytj senest 15 dage efter, at hans første indstilling til premierminister.

"Hvis han indstiller Janukovytj senere end 15 dage efter den første indstilling, så betyder det, at præsidentens rådgivere fører ham bag lyset, fordi hvis præsidentens inderkreds har tænkt sig at radikalisere situationen, så kan Jusjtjenko mødes af en rigsretssag. Men det vil vi selvfølgelig helst undgå", tilføjede Rudkovskyj.

Som bekendt blev Janukovytj første gang foreslået som ny premierminister den 11. juli. UP

23.07.06. Rystet Jusjtjenko tager 15 dages betænkningstid

Præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko vil meddele sin beslutning i forhold til godkendelsen af premierministerkandidaten indenfor 15 dage efter indstillingen.

"Jeg vil forelægge min beslutning indenfor de af forfatningen fastsatte frister", sagde præsidenten i en radiotale i lørdags.

"Præsidenten har modtaget en indstilling fra koalitionen med forslag om den kommende premierminister. I henhold til forfatningen har statsoverhovedet 15 dage til at tage stilling til forslaget og fremlægge det i Verkhovna Rada", sagde han.

"Jeg vil udelukkende handle indenfor normerne af den ukrainske lovgivning, idet jeg vil træffe en ansvarlig beslutning i forhold til det kommende parlament og regering", understregede Jusjtjenko.

Han oplyste desuden, at han er tilfreds med landets udvikling i første halvår 2006. Ifølge præsidenten udgjorde den reelle tilvækst i BNP i første halvår af 2006 5%, mens den alene for juni måned udgjorde 9,3%, som er et af de højeste i Europa.

Jusjtjenko fremhævede, at der siden årets start er blevet skabt omkring en halv million arbejdspladser i Ukraine, inflationen er mere end halveret og statens gæld er mindsket.

Samtidig med det understregede præsidenten, at prisstigningerne er en uundgåelig følge af en hurtig vækst i BNP. "Det er markedets måde at reagere på, at der kommer flere penge i ukrainernes lommer", sagde han.

"Det er også en realitet, at priserne på el, gas og transport stiger. Det er regeringens nødvendige skridt. En betydelig stigning i priserne på energi er en global tendens, og Ukraine er nødt til at regne med, at olie og gas bliver dyrere år for år", forklarede præsidenten. UP.

27.07.06. West weary of Ukraine once again

By Taras Kuzio

The deepening political and constitutional crisis in Ukraine has contributed to growing Ukraine fatigue in the West. Unlike the Ukraine fatigue found in the Leonid Kuchma era, today's Ukraine fatigue is of a different 'lighter' nature. During Kuchma's second term as president, Ukraine fatigue rested on allegations of abuse of office, illegal arms sales and alleged involvement in the murder of journalist Heorhiy Gongadze.

Today's Ukraine fatigue-lite is of a different nature and can be divided into genuine and disingenuous feelings. Genuine Ukraine fatigue-lite can be found inside and outside Ukraine among those who welcomed the Orange Revolution and hoped it would lead to a democratic breakthrough in Ukraine. This, in turn, would have led to Ukraine's integration into the West, firstly into the WTO and NATO, and at a later date into the EU.

Genuine Ukraine fatigue-lite is exasperated by five policy failures.

FIRST, Viktor Yushchenko has been unable to grow into the president's shoes. Western media now openly talk of the lack of leadership in Ukraine. Since January 2005, Ukraine has not had a 'hospodar' (master) at home.

Insiders in the president's team say Yushchenko does not have loyal and honest advisers whom he can trust to speak to him candidly. Yushchenko does not have his own Condoleezza Rice or Dick Cheney, like U.S . President George Bush.

SECOND, loyalty to the president has been a more important factor than competence. The past two heads of the presidential secretariat (Oleksandr Zinchenko, Oleh Rybachuk) have failed to provide the president with an efficient, strategic and competent support structure. Volodymyr Lytvyn and Viktor Medvedchuk, who served under Kuchma, had many negative traits, but they were nevertheless competent managers.

Anatoliy Kinakh, with little knowledge of international affairs, was not the right secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. While trumpeting the virtues of cooperation with NATO, his own parliamentary faction was backing the left and Party of Regions in voting against it. Kinakh's support for Ukraine joining the WTO together with Russia was at odds with government policy.

Continued support for Oleksiy Ivchenko as head of Naftogaz Ukrainy until his resignation in May was another poor cadre choice. One energy expert compared former Naftogaz Ukrainy head Yuriy Boyko to Ivchenko. While Boyko was corrupt, he noted, Ivchenko was both incompetent and corrupt.

THIRD, the division of the Orange camp in September 2005, following Yushchenko's dismissal of the Yulia Tymoshenko government, has proved impossible to heal. After three months of negotiations, an Orange coalition collapsed in June before it could even propose a government.

The dragging out of coalition negotiations increased Ukraine fatigue in the West and overshadowed the holding of a free and fair election in March 2006.

This year's controversial gas agreement with Moscow showed how the authorities reacted to, rather than formulated policy toward important strategic issues.

There has also been a poor understanding of the link between domestic and foreign policy factors. The choice of which coalition and government would be created, and how long it would take to create them following the elections was bound to have an impact on Ukraine's integration into the WTO, NATO and EU.

FOURTH, if Yushchenko has shown how difficult it is to move from central banker to revolutionary, then this is even more the case for Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov. A good technocrat does not always have the right qualities for a politician, as seen in Mr. Yekhanurov's weak leadership of the pro-presidential Our Ukraine party during the 2006 elections and since.

FIFTH, a lack of leadership following the elections is to blame for Ukraine's current crisis. Why couldn't the president have stated his support for an Orange coalition immediately following the elections, rather than wait until mid-June?

Why did the president permit Our Ukraine to simultaneously hold talks with its two Orange partners as well as the Party of Regions, whose leader Viktor Yanukovych had challenged Yushchenko for the presidency in 2004?

While accepting credit for holding a free and fair election, Yushchenko and Our Ukraine were unwilling to accept its logical outcome, as party leader Roman Besmertnyiy had argued in favor of doing. In holding simultaneous talks, Our Ukraine sought to secure for itself an upper hand in either an Orange or Grand coalition, thereby negating the fact that it had come in third in the elections.

DISINGENUOUS UKRAINE FATIGUE-LITE

Disingenuous Ukraine fatigue-lite fails to take into account the positive legacies of the Orange Revolution, which remain numerous, no matter how poorly Orange politicians have mismanaged the country since Yushchenko's election. Ukraine is both a different country to that of the Kuchma era and very different from the norm in the CIS. One has only to compare Russia and Ukraine to see how this is indeed the case.

Disingenuous Ukraine fatigue-lite can be better understood by comparing that felt by Ukraine's supporters in the West and those who were always cynically predisposed toward the Orange Revolution. The U.S., Canada, Scandinavia and Central-Eastern Europe welcomed the Orange Revolution and supported Ukraine's rapid integration into the West.

Among these countries, genuine disappointment is akin to that found among Orange supporters inside Ukraine, who feel let down and who are today recreating a Maidan-2, or protest tent camp, in Kyiv.

NATO as an organization welcomed the Orange Revolution and reiterated its open door policy toward membership. Until the June anti-NATO demonstrations in the Crimea, which cancelled planned military exercises, and the creation of the Anti-Crisis coalition, NATO was ready to invite Ukraine into a Membership Action Plan this year and membership in 2008-2010.

Western Europeans, particularly in the EU, exhibit a disingenuous Ukraine fatigue-lite. The EU has largely cold-shouldered the Orange Revolution, citing the failed referendum votes on the EU constitution, enlargement fatigue and the Turkish membership question for the EU not opening its doors to Ukraine. The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan that Ukraine signed in February 2005 is no different than what would have been offered to Viktor Yanukovych if he had won the 2004 elections.

Western European EU members have had a cynical view of the likelihood of the Orange Revolution succeeding. This view is surprisingly similar to that found among Yanukovych's voters and supporters of the Party of Regions, who repeatedly stated their pessimism of the chances of the Orange coalition remaining united. The crises in Ukraine are pointed to by Western European EU members as alleged proof of the correctness of their cautious position toward the country.

Unlike the U.S. and NATO, the EU has been unwilling to accept the important strategic ramifications of Ukraine's integration into the West. West European EU members have been unwilling to upset relations with Russia, which is a vital source of energy supplies. Russophilia has fed a disingenuous Ukraine fatigue-lite.

27.07.06. Ukraine's probable next prime minister didn't steal this election

The Washington Post
Editorial
Monday, July 17, 2006; A14

TWO YEARS AGO, politics in Ukraine seemed to be a battle between good and evil. Now the picture is more complicated. The good guy is president, but the bad guy is likely to become the next prime minister. Some say it's a failure of democracy. We disagree.

In the uproar after Ukraine's 2004 presidential election, there were clear principles at stake. Viktor Yanukovich, the Russia-backed candidate, tried to steal the presidential election through massive voting fraud. His pro-West opponent, Viktor Yushchenko, nearly died after a poison attack that no one has yet explained. Ukraine's weak democratic institutions were crumbling under the weight of election rigging and political violence. Massive popular demonstrations forced a rerun of the presidential race and ultimately kept a vote-rigger out of the presidential palace.

But since then, Mr. Yushchenko and his Orange coalition have faltered. The government has had to face Russian bullying and a bevy of domestic problems while the momentum of revolution waned. In March's parliamentary elections, the party of Mr. Yanukovich claimed the most seats. And after months of parliamentary wrangling, he won the nomination for prime minister last week.

It's not an outcome the West will like; Mr. Yanukovich as prime minister will do his best to keep Ukraine in Moscow's orbit. Even if he doesn't get the parliament's top job, which is still a possibility given the volatility of Ukrainian politics, Mr. Yanukovich will rank among the most influential politicians in government. It is tempting to wish that Ukraine's president would call for new parliamentary elections, a move he called a last resort on Saturday, in the hope that a pro-West coalition would get more seats.

But Ukrainians elected the current parliament only three months ago, and there was no evidence of widespread vote tampering. The emerging political settlement in Ukraine reflects the current divisions within the country, which has a large ethnic Russian population in the east, Mr. Yanukovich's natural constituency, and a fierce Ukrainian nationalist movement in the west, Mr. Yushchenko's power base. It should be no surprise that the leader of the parliament might represent one end of the country and the president the other. The continued political instability that new elections would cause and the distrust in the east that they would encourage wouldn't help cement Ukraine's democratic institutions.

This is a chance for the United States and Europe to show that they favor democracy first, not a particular democratic outcome in a single parliamentary election. That means being ready to support Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO or to assist Mr. Yushchenko in claiming energy independence from Russia -- if the Ukrainian government asks. Providing an attractive alternative to Russian domination through deference to the democratic process and willingness to act in partnership with Ukraine will further the West's cause much more than would a pliant pro-West parliament.

Mr. Yanukovich may not be the prime minister we would have voted for. But we respect the honest choice Ukrainians made.

31.07.06. Jusjtjenko klar til at udskrive nyvalg

Formanden for præsidentens sekretariat Oleh Rybatjuk siger, at hvis ikke lederne af parlamentets partier underskriver Den nationale enigheds universal sammen med præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko, så vil denne udskrive nyvalg til parlamentet. Det meddelte Rybatjuk i ukrainsk tv den 30. juli.

"...selvom jeg ikke forestiller mig, at dokumentet ikke bliver underskrevet. Men hvis det skulle ske, så vil følgen deraf være, at præsidenten er nødt til at beslutte, at der skal afholdes nyvalg", - sagde han.

Rybatjuk mindede om, at præsidenten siden den 25. juli har haft ret til at opløse parlamentet.

"Det er klart, at præsidenten siden den 25. har haft ret til at opløse parlamentet, og at han ikke har benyttet sig af denne ret, men det betyder ikke, at han ikke vil gøre det", sagde Rybatjuk

Samtidig fremhævede præsidentens sekretariatschef, at præsidenten forstår, at det ikke vil løse problemet, og derfor prøver han på at få politikerne til at nå frem til en konsensus.

Rybatjuk fortalte, at man under den seneste rundbordssamtale, som sluttede den 29. juli ved 4 tiden om morgenen, havde diskuteret politikernes visioner for landet.

"Halvdelen af denne tid drejede sig i virkeligheden ikke om universaldokumentet. Politikerne drøftede forskellige temaer som de ukrainske kirkers enighed og deres personlige forståelse af Ukraines fremtid", sagde Rybatjuk.

Ifølge ham forventer præsidenten, at rundbordssamtalerne fortsætter og, at man ender med at underskrive universaldokumentet.

Som tidligere omtalt afstod Jusjtjenko og lederne af parlamentets partier natten mellem fredag og lørdag fra at holde en rundbordskonference i direkte Tv, men besluttede i stedet at drøfte udkastet til Den nationale enigheds universal bag lukkede døre.

De kunne ikke nå til enighed om at underskrive dette dokument, fordi Regionernes Parti og SPU først ville have det behandlet på respektive møder i deres hovedbestyrelser. Podrobnosti, 5. kanal, Ukrajinski Novyny.