Dansk-Ukrainsk Selskab

"Amnesty International", som har hovedkvarter i London, beskylder Ukraine for at have leveret våben til Congos regering, fremgår det af organisationens rapport om våbenleverancerne til opførerne i Øst-Congo og den congolesiske regering, hvis indhold det britiske ugeblad Sunday Times har fået fat i, oplyser Deutsche Welle.

Menneskerettighedsorganisationens dokument indeholder detaljer om aftaler om udveksling af våben for diamanter mellem Congos regering og selskaber fra Ukraine, Tjekkiet og Israel.

Deutsche Welle påpeger, at det er uklart, hvorvidt Ukraines nye regering er involveret.

Amnesty er også nået frem til, at Albanien i årene 2002-2003 leverede 250 tons våben til oprørerne i Øst-Congo, som er ansvarlige for massemord, tortur og voldtægter. Også Serbien har leveret 150 tons våben til oprørerne via Rwanda.

"Amnesty International" fører kampagne for en begrænsning af udbredelsen af konventionelle våben i verden og forsøger at overbevise regeringerne om at indgå en hård og restriktiv international aftale om våbensalg.

"Amnesty Internationals" rapport om våbenleverancerne til oprørerne i Øst-Congo og den congolesiske regering vil blive offentliggjort i morgen tirsdag - lige inden G8 topmødet for de mest industrielt udviklede lande i verden, hvor Afrikas problemer vil være centrale på dagsordenen.

Congo er ramt af en den blodigste væbnede konflikt siden 2. verdenskrig, som allerede har kostet mere end fire millioner mennesker livet. UP.

04.07.05. Berezovskij: Martjuk stod bag mordet på Gongadze

Lederen af Fonden for civile friheder, som finansieres af den russiske oligark Boris Berezovskij, Goldfarb, siger i en kommentar til en artikel i UP om "Mykola Melnitjenkos hold", at man bør arrestere "en kendt politiker", som kendte til og stod bag aflytningen af tidligere præsident Kutjmas kabinet.

Goldfarb understreger, at hvis montagen af brudstykkerne af samtalerne om Gongadze begyndte om mandagen den 18. august 2000 - blot et døgn efter bortførelsen og mordet på journalisten, så var Melnitjenkos hold gået i gang med at sammenstrikke "Kutjmagate" på et tidspunkt, hvor ingen endnu var klar over, at journalisten var myrdet, fordi han på dette tidspunkt kun havde været væk i et døgn".

"Brudstykker af de 14 samtaler, som blev offentliggjort af Moroz, stammer fra forskellige optagelser, der var foretaget i løbet af de forudgående måneder. Det tager flere timer at montere de fragmenter, og for at finde dem i hele aflytningsmaterialet kræves der flere dages intens aflytning af optagelserne", resonerer Goldfarb.

På dette grundlag mener Goldfarb, at personen, som stod bag mordet er "den samme kendte politiker", som ledede hele aflytningsoperationen, og som gav Savtjenko og Melnitjenko besked på at montere filerne til brug for Moroz".

"En hvilken som helst fornuftig efterforsker bør i den pågældende situation gøre alt for at arrestere "den kendte politiker", afhøre Moroz og kræve Savtjenko og Melnitjenko arresteret og udleveret fra Portugal og USA på mistanke om medvirken til mord", mener Goldfarb.

Han stiller også spørgsmålet, hvorfor rigsadvokaturen ikke foretager sig noget, men begrænser sig til at forsyne pressen med vigtige oplysninger.

"Måske sker det for at fremprovokere endnu et par "selvmord", som det skete med minister Kravtjenko? Eller for at give Mykola og hans venner mulighed for at forsvinde, som general Pukatj gjorde det? Eller måske forsøger efterforskerne således at lade alle forstå, at de kender morderne, men at de holder informationerne tilbage af storpolitiske hensyn", antager Goldfarb.

Som bekendt er Jevhen Martjuk adskillige gange tidligere blevet nævnt som den person, der stod bag aflytningen. UP.

05.07.05. Moroz tvivler på, at Jusjtjenko-blokken holder til næste valg

Socialistpartiets leder Oleksandr Moroz tvivler på, at regeringskoalitionen i form af alliancen mellem "Folkeunionen Vores Ukraine", Julia Tymoshenkos Blok og Folkepartiet" vil holde til næste valg.

Det siger han i et interview med avisen "Ekspress" i en kommentar til udtalelserne fra vice-premierminister Roman Bezsmertnyj om, at unionen mellem Jusjtjenko og Tymoshenko er "en mur, som det aldrig vil lykkes nogen at nedbryde, og som Moroz allerede er blevet knust imod".

Ifølge Moroz har hans "parti aldrig ønsket at træde ind i nogen blokke, herunder sammen med "Folkeunionen" (Jusjtjenkos parti). "Vi forsøger ikke på at spille nogen ud mod hinanden", siger lederen af SPU og tilføjer:

"Jeg er meget i tvivl om, hvorvidt regeringskoalitionen vil holde til det næste valg i den form, som den har i dag. Fordi repræsentanterne for de tre politiske partier, som skulle have stået bag den, kan ikke engang blive enige om at tale med én stemme. Bezsmertnyj siger ét, mens Lytvyn siger det stik modsatte".

Ifølge Moroz bør netop Bezsmertnyj sætte alt ind i kampen for at SPU får et godt resultat af sin valgkamp". "Vores partis succes er en redning for hele det nuværende styre. For det er kun hvis socialisterne er med, at regeringspartierne kan organisere det kommende parlamentariske flertal. Og netop dette flertal vil efter forfatningsreformens ikrafttræden løse mange vigtige spørgsmål i staten".

Samtidig siger medlem af SPU's fraktion Mykola Rudkovskyj, at SPU højst sandsynligt vil stille op til det kommende parlamentsvalg for sig selv. "For hver dag der går, har vi en voksende støtte, uanset de meningsmålinger, som bliver udført på bestilling i magtens korridorer", siger han.

Desuden understreger parlamentsmedlemmet, at præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko endnu før partiet "Folkeunionen Vores Ukraines" kongres var blevet informeret om Socialistpartiets beslutning om at stille op til valget for sig og i princippet er enig i socialistpartiets holdning.

"Men i politik kan der altid være forhandlinger, hvor alle mulige varianter kan blive drøftet. Måske kan vi nå frem til nogle aftaler om den fortsatte koalition eller noget andet", siger han. LIGABiznesInform, UNIAN, UP.

05.07.05. "Vores Ukraine" vil blive marginaliseret uden Jusjtjenko på listen

Næsten halvdelen af de adspurgte ukrainere siger i en frisk meningsmåling, at præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko ikke bør deltage i parlamentsvalget direkte. I så fald vil kun 8% af vælgerne stemme på partiet "Folkeunionen Vores Ukraine", der har præsidenten som æresformand.

Det viser en meningsmåling, som er foretaget af "Den ukrainske demokratiske kreds" for Institut for politik i Kiev. 49% af vælgerne mener, at Viktor Jusjtjenko bør blive garant for valgets demokratiske gennemførelse uden selv at tage del i det. 22% er overbevist om, at præsidenten bør deltage i parlamentsvalget, mens 29% endnu ikke har bestemt sig for, hvad de skal mene i denne sag.

Alt i alt siger 71% af de adspurgte, at de har tænkt sig at stemme ved parlamentsvalget i marts 2006.

Hvis der var valg i næste uge, ville "Folkeunionen Vores Ukraine" uden Viktor Jusjtjenko på listen og med vicepremierminister Roman Bezsmertnyj som spidskandidat opnå kun 8% af ukrainernes stemmer. 21% ville stemme på partiet "Fædrelandet" med premierminister Julia Tymoshenko i spidsen. Regionernes parti med Viktor Janukovytj i spidsen ville blive bakket op af 16% af vælgerne. De øvrige partier ville opnå følgende tilslutning:

7% - Folkepartiet (Lytvyn), 5% - Kommunistpartiet (Symonenko), 5% - Socialistpartiet (Moroz), 4% - Ukraines progressive socialistiske parti (Vitrenko), 2% - De Grønne (Kononov), 2% - Industri- og erhvervspartiet (Kinakh), 2% - "Vores Ukraine" - Pynzennyk, 1% - "Arbejdets Ukraine" (Konovaljuk) og 1% til Ukraines forenede socialdemokratiske parti (Medvedtjuk). Partierne Rukh (Tarasyuk), Det folkedemokratiske parti (Pustovojtenkjo), "Det forenede Ukraine" (Hubskyj) og Ukrainsk folkeparti (Kostenko) ville opnå under én procent af stemmerne.

3% af vælgerne ville stemme "mod alle", 18% havde endnu ikke taget stilling, mens 5% ville blive hjemme.

Meningsmålingen blev gennemført i dagene 23-29. juni 2005. Et repræsentativt udsnit af Ukraines befolkning på 1000 personer deltog.

Ifølge en meningsmåling fra centeret "Social monitoring" og "Det ukrainske institut for sociale studier" ville 22,4% af vælgerne i maj i år stemme på "Folkeunionen Vores Ukraine", såfremt Jusjtjenkos efternavn var på stemmesedlen. Dette tal ville falde til omkring 16%, hvis Bezsmertnyjs familie også stod på listen. Samtidig ville 14,5% støtte Regionernes parti, mens 11,3% ville stemme på Julia Tymoshenkos blok. Korrespondent.net

07.07.05. Håndgemæng i Ukraines parlament

Parlamentsformand Volodymyr Lytvyn måtte i formiddag udsætte mødet i Ukraines parlament til kl. 12:30 pga. sammenstød i præsidiet og blokering af talerstolen.

En række kommunistiske deputerede brød ind i parlamentets præsidium, hvor de stødte sammen med "Vores Ukraine", som forsøgte at forhindre, at de trængte igennem til præsidiet.

De deputerede fra "Vores Ukraine" dannede en kæde omkring præsidiet og formåede at holde presset i venstre side, men kommunisterne brød igennem fra højre, hvorefter der opstod håndgemæng. Kommunisterne med Volodymyr Bondartjuk i spidsen, som allerede havde ødelagt tre mikrofoner, var lige ved at vride halsen om på Mykhajlo Volynets fra BjUT, da de trak hans jakke op over hovedet på deres modstander. Det lykkedes andre deputerede at trække de stridende parter til siden.

Ved siden af talerstolen står deputerede fra SDPU (o) og "Ukraines Regioner" og forholder sig passive.

Gentagne gange lyder der sirener i salen, idet parlamentsmedlemmer anvender de samme tudehorn, som man bruger ved fodboldkampe.

Ved siden af parlamentsformand Lytvyn har deputerede fra Folkepartiet taget opstilling for at beskytte ham. Alt i alt befinder sig næsten 100 deputerede ved siden af talerstolen og præsidiet.

Formanden har endnu engang anmodet de deputerede om at holde op med at bruge tudehorn. "Vi skal nok give jer en rapport om, hvilken skadelig indflydelse de har på helbredet", påpeger Lytvyn. Formanden er i godt humør og når han vender tilbage til talerstolen sætter han sin pegefinger til tindingen og drejer den rundt for at vise, hvad han mener om optrinnet.

Parlamentsformandens stol er ved at give efter for trykket mod ham bagfra. "Bare I ikke løber med min stol", griner han.

Håndgemænget opstod i forbindelse med drøftelserne af ændringsforslag til budgettet. UP.

08.07.05. SDPU (o) klager til Europarådet

Formanden for partiet SDPU (o), Viktor Medvedtjuk, har holdt møde med en delegation fra Europarådets parlamentariske forsamling og forelagt sin holdning til de begivenheder, som finder sted i Ukraine, herunder den "massive politiske undertrykkelse", meddeler partiets pressetjeneste fredag.

Under mødet fortalte Medvedtjuk til PACE's præsident van der Linde, at "forfølgelsen ud fra politiske motiver af dem, som ikke støttede den nuværende præsident ved det sidste valg, har antaget karakter af masseforfølgelser".

Ifølge partilederen "foregår der vilkårligheder såvel fra embedsmænds som fra ordensmyndighedernes side".

"Under mødet blev begge parter enige om, at det vigtigste for Ukraine i dag er at gennemføre forfatningsreformen samt nødvendigheden af at sikre domstolenes uafhængighed", hedder det i pressemeddelelsen.

Ifølge pressetjenesten understregede van der Linden i forbindelse med kontrollen med situationen i Ukraine fra PACE's side, at "forsamlingen vil fortsætte med således at bistå Ukraine i etableringen af demokratiet". Lederen af PACE forsikrede desuden om, at organisationen forholder sig meget alvorligt til den forestående valgkamp i Ukraine. "Marts næste år vil vise, hvorvidt Ukraine er en helstøbt demokratisk stat", understregede van der Linden.

I slutningen af mødet overrakte Medvedtjuk PACE's præsident "den anden udgave en bulletinen om de politiske repressioner i Ukraine, som lige er blev udsendt og som SDPU (o) sender rundt til udenlandske demokratiske organisationer og menneskeretsorganisationer, politikere og journalister".

Fra ukrainsk side deltog i mødet endvidere 1. næstformand for SDPU (o). deputeret Nestor Shufrytj og næstformand for SDPU (o) Mykhajlo Papijev. UP.

11.07.05. Regeringschef imod at Jusjtjenko stiller op til parlamentsvalget

Premierminister Julia Tymoshenko betegner Oleksandr Moroz og Volodymyr Lytvyn som sine modstandere ved det forestående parlamentsvalg.

Udtalelsen faldt i søndags i et interview med Tv-stationen "1+1" i forbindelse med en kommentar til slagsmålet i parlamentet og den manglende vedtagelse af de dokumenter, som er en forudsætning for at kunne blive optaget i WTO.

"Lad være med at høre på alt det sludder, når de siger, at regeringen har lavet noget makværk og fremsat et ugennemarbejdet forslag", sagde Tymoshenko. "Når I hører den slags beskyldninger, skal I vide, at der er nogen der ganske enkelt generer regeringens arbejde", tilføjede hun.

"Man bør vænne sig til, at parlamentsvalgkampen i Ukraine er skudt i gang. Både Moroz', Lytvyns fraktioner og Regionerne samt SDPU (o) er modstandere i den ene eller den anden forstand", sagde Tymoshenko.

Hun er også imod, at præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko stå i spidsen for en partiblok ved valget i 2006. Hun mindede om, at præsidenten selv har sagt, at det er forfatningsstridigt at stå i spidsen for en valgliste. "Og han har fuldstændig ret, og heri støtter vi ham. Præsidenten bør være hævet over alle politiske bataljer, fordi præsidenten er forfatningens garant", sagde Tymoshenko.

På spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt hun vil sige nej til at være med blokken, hvis ikke hun er nummer ét på opstillingslisten, svarede premierministeren: "Jeg vil tro, at det principielle er enheden på vores hold og sejren ved parlamentsvalget". UP.

13.07.05. Topfolk fra Kutjma-styret trues med straffesager (eng.)

Eurasia Daily Monitor Friday, July 1, 2005

Taras Kuzio
http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2369966

Ukrainian Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko has publicly announced that he is seeking to strip 16 parliamentary deputies of their immunity from prosecution (Interfax-Ukraine, June 28). All 16 figure in criminal cases that are not connected to the 2004 presidential election. However, Lutsenko added that parties loyal to former president Leonid Kuchma had extorted funds from businesses and then given the money to charities they controlled. These charities were often used to transfer funds to Viktor Yanukovych's election campaign.

This new development confirms that corruption, election fraud, and separatism charges reach into the highest levels of the Kuchma camp. All 16 names on Lutsenko's list, which was quickly leaked to obkom.net.ua (June 29), are former Kuchma allies. Eleven are from the two main centrist opposition parties, four are unaffiliated deputies, and one is from parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn's People's Party.

Four of the 11 are high-ranking members of Viktor Medvedchuk's Social Democratic Party-United (SDPUo). Two are long-time Medvedchuk allies: Nestor Shufrych, who faces separate criminal charges of bribing voters to win his seat in 2002, and Hryhoriy Surkis, chairman of Kyiv's Dynamo football club.

Seven deputies on the list are from Yanukovych's Party of Regions, including Vasylyi Horbal and Andrei Kluyev. Kluyev headed Yanukovych's dirty-tricks team (see EDM, September 22 and 23, 2004) and his voice is heard on the Security Service tapes transferred to President Viktor Yushchenko's coalition after round two of the contentious 2004 presidential election (EDM, December 3, 2004).

Other deputies on the Lutsenko list, although unaffiliated, are well known. Tatiana Zasukha took control of Peasants Party in July 2004 (EDM, July 27, 2004). She is married to the former governor of Kyiv oblast, Anatoliy Zasukha. Both Tatiana and Anatoliy Zasukha are long-time Kuchma allies, reputedly involved in widespread corruption in Kyiv oblast. Tatiana is also close to former first lady Ludmilla Kuchma.

Since Yushchenko's election, criminal charges have gradually diffused from the lower to the middle ranks of former Kuchma officials. Lutsenko's list indicates that charges will now spread to the senior levels over the summer parliamentary recess and be driven home in the fall. As parliament goes into recess on July 8, it is unlikely to strip the 16 of their immunity by that date.

High-ranking former Kuchma officials are uneasy because of other signals sent by the authorities. During Yushchenko's February visit to Donetsk, a Yanukovych stronghold, he "spoke with Donetsk in the language of force and not compromise" ( glavred.info, February 14). He "behaved like a conqueror who had come to a subjugated territory" ( glavred.info, April 5).

After the February visit, Yushchenko allegedly ordered Prosecutor Sviatyslav Piskun to "destroy" the Donetsk clan and break up its monopoly in the region ( glavred.info, April 7). Two months later Boris Kolesnykov was arrested on extortion and separatism charges. Kolesnykov headed the Donetsk oblast council and the Donetsk oblast's Party of Regions. He was widely regarded as a key Party of Regions ideologue and was close to Ukraine's wealthiest oligarch, Renat Akhmetov.

Kolesnykov's arrest was widely seen as a "declaration of war" against the Donetsk elites ( glavred.info, April 7). During the Kuchma era the region had been allowed de facto autonomy in return for political loyalty. Consequently, the region allegedly had the highest crime rate in Ukraine. During the Kuchma era the region saw 40 high-ranking officials murdered in a turf war that only ended after Yanukovych became governor.

Yanukovych was intimately involved in these developments. Akhmetov and other clan leaders accumulated their greatest capital during Yanukovych's six-year stint as Donetsk governor (1997-2002). Serhiy Kornych, head of the Interior Ministry's Directorate to Combat Organized Crime, is convinced that Yanukovych will eventually face criminal charges for abuse of office and corruption. Kornych also publicly described Donetsk oligarch Akhmetov as the "real organizer of an organized crime group" ( Ukrayinska pravda, June 23).

Interior Minister Lutsenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko caution that there is no evidence to prove Akhmetov's links to organized crime -- yet. Nevertheless, many of the businesses that are under criminal investigation are linked to Akhmetov ( Ukrayinska pravdda, June 28 and 29).

These growing trends are leading to two contradictory responses.

The pro-Kuchma camp is loudly complaining of "political repression." Russia raised this very issue at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in June to deflect criticism of its own democratic failings. Yet the hysterics of former President Leonid Kravchuk -- now the SDPUo parliamentary leader -- betray a fear that the SDPUo could bear the brunt of these future criminal charges. In parliament he made the outlandish statement that he would not have supported Ukrainian independence if he had known that it would have led to "political repression." Kravchuk recently claimed that there are numerous cases of "political repression" that amount to "political terror" (Interfax-Ukraine, June 28).

However, neither Western governments nor international organizations nor Ukrainians themselves believe these allegations. Few members of PACE supported the Russian motion condemning "political repression" in Ukraine. Among Ukrainians there is little sympathy for the tribulations of the former pro-Kuchma camp. Only 30% believe that criminal charges target the opposition ( Ukrayinska pravda, June 23).

When asked what the new opposition is defending, Ukrainians reveal their cynicism. Thirty percent (the largest group) believe the new political opposition is merely defending its own interests, while another 25% see them defending their business interests. Only 13% see the opposition defending citizens and 10% party interests. A mere 7% are convinced that the opposition is really defending Ukraine's national interests ( Ukrayinska pravda, June 23).

13.07.05. Udenlandske investorer betænkelige pga. nationaliseringer (eng.)

New York Times
July 3, 2005

ZAPOROZHYE, Ukraine - With his face turned to the hellish river of molten metal, Vasily A. Fedko, 55, said he left the Soviet Army 30 years ago and joined a new force, the metal workers at Nikopol, a mill in eastern Ukraine that produces steel alloys. He earns about $300 a month - and he does not talk politics.

A security guard at Nikopol, a mill in Ukraine that the government wants to take back from its owner.

"I like the work, and no, I don't speak about that sort of thing," Mr. Fedko said, flipping his mask down and jabbing his long metal feeder into the blast furnace, where metal ores fed into the fire emerge as finished pipe.

Nevertheless, politics may decide the fate of his plant, one of many prize assets at the center of an enormous new fight in Ukraine over the spoils of a social and political upheaval known as the Orange Revolution that pitted a conservative old guard from eastern Ukraine - oriented toward Russia and heavily industrialized - against the more liberal, market-oriented challengers from the west and the capital, Kyiv.

The challengers won in part because of a campaign promise to reverse the country's contentious 1990's privatizations, in which state-owned companies were sold to political insiders for pennies on the dollar.

But the past is proving extremely hard to unravel and is threatening to divide Ukraine's top two leaders, Viktor A. Yushchenko, the popular president, and Yulia V. Tymoshenko, his nationalistic prime minister.

The two are openly struggling for power as they look to parliamentary elections scheduled for March 2006, and Ms. Tymoshenko is widely described as ambitious and willing to split with Mr. Yushchenko to gain power - and possibly even to run for president herself someday.

Mr. Yushchenko remains popular as he raises pensions and salaries and his country's international profile by traveling the globe appealing for aid and investment. But six months into his term, Ukrainians are grumbling about the economy, which has slowed sharply in the last year while inflation has taken off.

Business leaders blame Ms. Tymoshenko and her brand of economic populism, which they say is undermining Ukraine's image as a market-friendly country that aspires to join the European Union. In May, for example, her critics say she created a fuel shortage by limiting prices of gasoline and diesel fuel, calling rising prices a "plot" by international oil companies.

One Russian oil company executive met with Ms. Tymoshenko and came away saying she "didn't listen" and was "acting like a socialist and alarming investors," a person who attended the meeting said. Oil importers simply shipped less fuel, and long lines formed at gas stations around Ukraine.

Later in May, Mr. Yushchenko removed the price controls and blamed Ms. Tymoshenko for the fuel crisis in a harshly worded statement. "What happened on the oil market was a clear example of how not to manage affairs," he told news agencies.

Ms. Tymoshenko is also faulted for holding up the review of state assets sold to private investors under the previous administration, dragging her feet in issuing the hotly debated list of privately held companies that could be up for resale.

During the campaign, Mr. Yushchenko promised a government review of the often-rigged privatization sales of the 1990's. But he delegated making the list of companies to his prime minister. Ms. Tymoshenko still has not published it, although at least one version was leaked to Ukrainian and Russian newspapers.

"It's not in her interest for the list to be released before the March 2006 parliamentary elections," said Katya V. Malofeeva, director of new markets strategy for Renaissance Capital, a brokerage firm in Kyiv. "It makes more sense for her to keep as many businesspeople on the hook for as long as possible," and build support before the elections.

Meanwhile, the economy is suffering as foreign investors step back, wondering if Ukraine is truly as market-oriented as its democratically elected leadership promised it would be. Ms. Tymoshenko has not helped matters by wondering aloud if Ukraine might not be better off renationalizing its largest industries.

Caught in the middle are workers like Mr. Fedko at the Nikopol mill. The government wants to take back the factory from its wealthy owner, Viktor M. Pinchuk, the son-in-law of the former president, Leonid D. Kuchma. The plant, like many others that were privatized, has become a profitable and stable employer. Workers are taking sides, and the wealthy plant owners are hiring private armies to defend themselves.

"No seizure! Law for everyone!" read a banner over the workers' entrance at Nikopol. A security force patrols the grounds with dogs, and shiny concertina wire rings the plant.

Company managers said nearly half the 8,000-strong work force gathered for a recent protest after Mr. Pinchuk asserted that a rival business group in league with the new government had staged an illegal shareholders' meeting to try a hostile takeover. He hired the security force to ensure they did not succeed.

But according to some Ukrainian news media reports, the demonstration, broadcast widely on national television, could well have been staged. After all, Mr. Pinchuk also owns two of the country's main television channels.

Mr. Pinchuk, whose personal worth was estimated at $1.3 billion by Forbes magazine, is a prime target of the new administration's privatization review.

His factory, Nikopol, is just one of about 30 enterprises likely to appear on the government's list when it is finally released. What will be done next is unclear: renationalize outright, auction the companies again or simply demand that the current owners pay more. The way the assets are redistributed will signal whether the country is headed toward Western-style market changes and eventual membership in the European Union and the World Trade Organization, or toward a Russian- or Chinese-style state interventionist economy.

For now, some workers seem happy that Mr. Pinchuk has increased production to above Soviet-era levels - and that he is paying them on time. "He's helping us," said Tamara, a control room operator at Nikopol who declined to give her last name but said she had attended the rally. "A lot of workers support him."

Mr. Pinchuk argued in an interview that his workers benefited if he compromised with the government. "We never said we were angels or saints," he said. "The workers know I am a capitalist, I am a rich guy. But I speak frankly to them: we want profits, the workers want salaries, we have a joint interest and we both need stability."

He admits he benefited from being the son-in-law of the last president. But he says he is willing to compromise with the new leaders over contested assets like Nikopol and Krivorozhstal, the country's largest steel mill, which he won for a greatly discounted price of $800 million last year. U.S. Steel and Mittal Steel reportedly offered Ukraine almost twice that.

[One sign of how reprivatization could proceed: In June, the state took back Krivorozhstal after an appeals court upheld an earlier decision that its privatization was illegal. The government says it will resell the mill. But is unclear whether the state will compensate Mr. Pinchuk. The case could continue in the courts.

Prime Minister Tymoshenko has said that the mill, which produces one-fifth of Ukraine's steel, could be resold by the end of this year, and that Mr. Pinchuk and his partners would be permitted to participate.]

14.07.05. Regeringen kritiserer parlamentets ledelse

Regeringen udtaler, at der i løbet af de senere uger i Verkhovna Rada har fundet "en vaskeægte provokation sted mod regeringens og Ukraines præsidents arbejde" med Verkhovna Radas ledelse som deltagere.

Ifølge UNIAN's korrespondent er det indholdet i en regeringserklæring, som onsdag blev offentliggjort af premierminister Julia Tymoshenko.

"I løbet af de seneste uger har den ukrainske offentlighed og verdensoffentligheden været vidner til en planlagt provokation i Verkhovna Radas mødesal. Det er trist at skulle erkende, at det lovgivende organs ledelse umiddelbart har været medvirkende til den, idet den valgte at foretrække bevarelsen af den sociale og økonomiske spænding i samfundet", påpeges det i regeringens erklæring.

I erklæringen betones det også, at sådanne handlinger var rettet mod en miskreditering af regeringens og Ukraines præsidents arbejde.

Regeringen understreger, at man i sessionens sidste samling bevidst undlod at sætte en række vigtige lovforslag til afstemning, herunder i forhold til at ændre den forældede boligmasse og at normalisere situationen på kød- og sukkermarkedet.

"Alt dette sluttede med en total politisk vildskab, hvor man for første gang i historien har skabt en præcedens for, at man har sat spørgsmålstegn ved præsidentens og PACE's præsidents ret til at henvende sig fra Verkhovna Radas talerstol til det ukrainske folk", påpeges det i erklæringen.

Den 6. juli forhindrede som bekendt medlemmer af KPU's fraktion præsidenten for Europarådets parlamentariske forsamling, Rene van der Linden, i at tale i Ukraines parlament.

I erklæringen betones det også, at regeringen godt forstår, at regeringens og præsidentens vellykkede arbejde ikke giver det gamle styre mulighed for at befæste sin position i parlamentet.

I denne forbindelse har regeringen henvendt sig til alle de statsloyale politiske kræfter i parlamentet med forslag om at gå sammen om at føre præsidentens og regeringens program ud i livet og skabe et effektivt parlamentarisk flertal til at opnå dette mål.

"Kun regeringens og Verkhovna Radas fælles indsats vil garantere en forbedring af folks levestandard og Ukraines udvikling som en europæisk, demokratisk og socialt ansvarlig stat", betones det i erklæringen. UNIAN. UP.

20.07.05. Jusjtjenko må igen drikke vodka

Præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko har ikke problemer med leveren og må godt drikke vodka, siger lederen af den dermatologiske klinik ved universitetshospitalet i Geneve, Jean Sora, i et interview med avisen "Ukrajina moloda" onsdag.

"Jusjtjenkos lever er i fremragende forfatning. Jeg kan sågar oplyse jer om, at jeres præsident rolig kan drikke vodka", påpeger han. Lægen afviser spekulationerne om, at Jusjtjenkos sygdom kan føre til udbrud af kræft. "Et menneske kan ikke udvikle kræft via en dioxinforgiftning", siger han.

På spørgsmålet om, hvilken behandling Jusjtjenko får, svarer lægen, at "alle procedurerne tager sigte på at fjerne dioxinen fra organismen". "Han tager medicin og holder en streng ansigtshygiejne. Jeg vil helst ikke komme ind på, hvad det er for nogle procedurer og lægemidler, der er tale om", sagde lægen.

Han oplyser endvidere, at behandlingen ikke er særlig smertefuld, og at der er daglige procedurer, og procedurer, som der går længere tid imellem. På spørgsmålet om, Jusjtjenko er en artig patient, svarer Sora: "Han går alt, hvad der står i hans magt".

Lægen påpeger også, at "der ikke er sket noget særligt" i Jusjtjenkos liv pga. sygdommen". "Behandlingen tager ikke særlig lang tid og influerer ikke på arbejdet. Jusjtjenko holder en let diæt - og det er sådan set det hele", siger den schweiziske læge.

På spørgsmålet om, han tidligere har haft med lignende sager at gøre, svarer Sora, at han ikke har oplevet noget lignende i de 35 år, han har været læge.

Jeg har haft andre patienter, som blev syge efter at have indåndet dioxin gennem luften. Tilfældet med jeres præsident, som har modtaget dioxinen via maden, er det første af sin art", siger han.

"Selvom vores klinik i mange år har arbejdet med patienter med dioxinforgiftninger og i lang tid har forsket i nye metoder til at helbrede disse patienter", tilføjer Sora. UP.

20.07.05. Parlamentsformand Lytvyn i en nøglerolle (eng.)

By Taras Kuzio

As the Ukrainian parliament adjourns today for its summer recess, Western observers are increasingly noting the divisions inside President Viktor Yushchenko's team. However, such commentaries typically focus on the wrong divisions.

In a report entitled, "Political Rivalries Threaten Ukraine's Reforms," the Financial Times (July 4) focused on divisions between Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the free-market proponents grouped around Petro Poroshenko, secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. This split between left-right populists (Socialists, Tymoshenko) and free marketers (Yushchenko, Poroshenko, First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh) has been noted before (see EDM, May 11). Although this division does exist, and personal relations between Tymoshenko and Poroshenko are poor, focusing on this schism misses two fundamental points.

First, although a populist, Tymoshenko is not ideologically determined, unlike left populists in the Socialist Party. This was clearly seen in parliamentary debates over legislation to join the WTO, which Tymoshenko and her faction supported but the Socialists (and Communists) opposed. Tymoshenko's penchant for state capitalism was also short lived, from February to May, since she no longer supports price controls. The memorandum signed by the government, president, and parliament at the recent mini-Davos summit in Kyiv ended speculation about mass re-privatization (see EDM, June 29).

Second, Yushchenko must decide the expediency of forging an electoral alliance with Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn for the March 2006 parliamentary elections. Such an alliance would include Lytvyn's People's Party (the former Agrarians), Yushchenko's People's Union-Our Ukraine, and Tymoshenko's Fatherland party. Currently polling only 2-3%, Lytvyn's party might not cross the 3% threshold on its own.

According to Serhiy Skrypnyk, head of the Kyiv-based Evolution Media Research and Analysis Service, "Yushchenko needs Lytvyn because Tymoshenko is too radical for Yushchenko. She still relies on revolutionaries more than on the ruling elites. Lytvyn helps Yushchenko to incorporate the former, not-too-compromised elites in the new authorities while distancing them from the opposition."

Yushchenko's team needs to prevent Lytvyn from joining the ranks of the hard-line opposition parties (Regions of Ukraine and Social Democratic Party-United) or from becoming a third force positioned between the authorities and the hard-line opposition.

First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Besmertnyi, the main organizer behind Yushchenko's new People's Union-Our Ukraine Party, does not see Lytvyn bringing anything positive to an alliance, but his inclusion would ensure "that there will be no minuses" from him either (Ukrayinska pravda, July 2).

Lytvyn sat on the fence throughout the 2004 presidential election, although his People's Party officially supported Prime Minster Viktor Yanukovych. Lytvyn, however, did keep parliament open during the protests and when the legislature refused to accept the official results declaring Yanukovych the winner.

Lytvyn's parliamentary faction has tripled to 40 deputies since the Orange Revolution, as moderate defectors from former president Leonid Kuchma's camp have rallied under his umbrella. Lytvyn also has the loyal Democratic Ukraine satellite faction of 20 deputies, giving him a reliable bloc of at least 60 deputies.

Poroshenko remains Lytvyn's main lobbyist in the Yushchenko coalition. Speaking about Lytvyn during the 2004 election Poroshenko averred, "I am certain that this person undertook a major role in the revolution" (Ukrayinska pravda, June 29). He and Lytvyn have similar backgrounds in the Kuchma camp. Until 1998-99 he was aligned with the SDPUo, but after leaving the SDPUo Poroshenko created the Solidarity parliamentary faction with Lytvyn's assistance. In 2000-2001 Solidarity merged with Regions of Ukraine.

Like Yushchenko, Poroshenko only went into the opposition against Kuchma after the April 2001 parliamentary vote of no confidence in then-Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko's government. New transcripts of conversations in Kuchma's office in June 2000, only ten months earlier, quote Poroshenko describing his loyalty to the president. The transcripts also reveal the hostility Poroshenko and Kuchma held toward then-First Deputy Prime Minister Tymoshenko (Ukrayinska pravda, July 6).

Poroshenko and Lytvyn are also united by their reluctance to pursue the inquiry into the murder of opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze. Although head of the presidential administration when Gongadze was murdered in fall 2000, Lytvyn has not been called to give testimony to the Prosecutor's office. Rumors suggest that Lytvyn "earned" immunity thanks to his stance during the 2004 election.

Ukrainian commentators and Gongadze's widow, Myroslava, believe that it was Lytvyn who lobbied Kuchma to order his Interior Minister to "deal" with Gongadze in September 2000. Lytvyn has blocked the parliamentary commission investigating the murder from presenting its findings, as the report accuses Lytvyn of involvement. Yushchenko and his Our Ukraine faction have also voted against hearing the report, which by law should have been heard in 2003 (rep.in.ua, June 15).

Local parties members and key Yushchenko allies in Kyiv are resisting an alliance between People's Union-Our Ukraine and Lytvyn, because they see former Kuchma officials taking political refuge in Lytvyn's party. State Television Channel 1 President Taras Stetskiv complained that those who have joined Lytvyn's People's Party "are all from Kuchma's guard!" (Ekspress, June 21). He fears that an alliance with these former Kuchma supporters would harm the ratings of People's Union-Our Ukraine.

Besmertnyi admitted that local branches of People's Union-Our Ukraine are pressuring him to not cooperate with Lytvyn. The head of the Kharkiv branch of the People's Union-Our Ukraine, for example, complained that former Kuchma supporters are joining Lytvyn's People's Party to ingratiate themselves with the new authorities (razom.org.ua, July 4).

Lytvyn has fiercely responded by accusing People's Union-Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko's representatives of doing "everything in their power to discredit the idea [of an election alliance] at its birth" (Ukrayinska pravda, July 7). He is now threatening to have his party independently contest the 2006 election.

21.07.05. Akhmetov kan blive sigtet for medvirken til mordforsøg

Indenrigsministeriet har til hensigt at rejse en tiltale efter straffeloven for mordforsøget på Serhij Tjernyshov, også kaldet Botsman, i en sag hvor den ukrainske forretningsmand Rinat Akhmetov kan blive blandt de sigtede.

Det oplyser vice-indenrigsminister Hennadij Moskal til UP. Ifølge ham har indenrigsministeriet "udarbejdet en specialoperation", idet man inviterede Akhmetov til en vidneafhøring via massemedierne uden at nævne ofrets navn.

"Hele denne historie har vi med fuldt overlæg ladet komme ud i medierne. Og vel at mærke uden at nævne ofrets navn. De efterfølgende begivenheder forløb lige efter vores plan", siger vice-indenrigsministeren.

Ifølge Moskal tog folk fra Akhmetovs sikkerhedstjeneste til Moskva for at mødes med Botsman, ligeså snart de havde modtaget invitationen fra indenrigsministeriet og det var gået op for ham, at det drejede sig om mordforsøget på ham.

"De rejste til Botsman" fik snakket ud om tingene, hvorefter han på deres opfordring angiveligt skrev, at der havde været et mordforsøg, men at det ikke var Akhmetov, som skød. Og det var lige det, vi havde brug for", siger Moskal.

Efter at have modtaget en erklæring fra skadelidte har indenrigsministeriet grundlag for at rejse en straffesag for mordforsøg. "For der var tale om et rent mordforsøg. Det første skud ramte ham i et kors, som han havde om halsen, og som de kriminelle gik med dengang. Det andet skud ramte ham i lungerne. Han modtog førstehjælp i hospitalet i Donetsk, hvorefter han blev opereret i Moskva. Lige nu er vi i gang med at rekvirere dokumenterne om det", siger Moskal.

Ifølge ham vil Akhmetov først blive indbudt som vidne, "og så må vi se", hvilke materialer, vi får frem i sagen. Moskal siger, at der ikke er nogen forældelsesfrist for forbrydelser efter straffelovens § 115.

"Denne artikel opererer med en strafferamme på 10 til 15 år, men livstid er også en mulighed", understreger han.

Tidligere har indenrigsministeriet nogle gange forsøgt at indbyde Akhmetov til at forklare, under hvilke omstændigheder Tjernyshov blev såret, men Akhmetov dukkede ikke op med den begrundelse, at han befandt sig i udlandet.

Tjernyshov har sendt et brev til indenrigsministeriet, hvori han betoner, at Akhmetov ikke skød mod ham. UP.

22.07.05. Jusjtjenko bekræfter Ukraines ønske om NATO-medlemskab

Præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko betoner, at Ukraines ønske om at træde ind i Den europæiske Union og NATO "ikke er en politik, som er vendt mod nogle" og ikke skader en eneste stats interesse, herunder Ruslands.

Jusjtjenko holdt under sit besøg i Tokio en pressekonference om fredagen i Den nationale presseklub, oplyser præsidentens pressetjeneste.

"Vi ser et forenet Europa som et unikt kontinentalt projekt. Og hvis vi vil tale om et europæisk værdisystem, så bør vi også tale om en adækvat måde at forsvare det på", sagde Jusjtjenko, idet han tilføjede, at NATO lige nu er den mest harmoniske sikkerheds- og forsvarsstruktur.

Samtidig indrømmede præsidenten, at integrationsprocessen i forhold til en indtræden i de euroatlantiske strukturer er et "langvarigt projekt".

Endvidere betonede Jusjtjenko, at beslutningen om at føre den ukrainske fredsbevarende styrke ud af Irak inden 2005 forbliver uændret. Han mindede om, at beslutningen om at føre de ukrainske tropper ud af Irak blev truffet på et møde i Det nationale sikkerheds- og forsvarsråd "under indtryk af folkestemningen i Ukraine og ændringen af den politiske situation i Irak".

Samtidig indrømmede Jusjtjenkjo, at Irak forbliver indenfor Ukraines strategiske interessesfære. "Vi er i dag interesserede i denne region", sagde han, idet han tilføjede, at den militære tilstedeværelse i Irak i dag "bør ændres til en aktiv genopbygningspolitik i landet".

Ifølge præsidenten drejer det sig blandt andet om nødvendigheden af at indlede projekter i Irak, som tager sigte på at genopbygge veje og broer. Ukraine er ifølge Jusjtjenko interesseret i at deltage i sådanne projekter. Præsidenten oplyste, at landet allerede har tilbudt Irak sin hjælp i forhold til en omskoling af politifolk, samt en række andre uddannelsesmæssige programmer.

Alt i alt kan man ifølge Jusjtjenko tale om, at situationen i Irak i dag bliver normaliseret.

"Selvom denne proces er vanskelig, foregår der alligevel en proces, hvor demokratiske statsinstitutioner bliver skabt", sagde præsidenten. UP.

22.07.05. Domstol bekræfter lovligheden af køb af "Dynamo" Kiev

Retten i Kievs Holosijivskyj distrikt bekræfter lovligheden af Ihor Surkis' og Valentyn Zhurskyjs køb af aktierne i fodboldklubben "Dynamo" Kiev. Retten traf beslutningen i torsdags, skriver hjemmesiden Obkom.

"Retten i Kievs Holosijivskyj distrikt har efter et søgsmål fra Surkis og Zhurskyj mod "A/S Registr" og den statslige kommission for værdipapirer og fondsbørsen truffet en afgørelse, som bekræfter lovligheden af Ihor Surkis' og Valentyn Zhurskyjs køb af aktierne i FC "Dynamo" Kiev", hedder det i meddelelsen.

Tidligere har visse udenlandsk baserede selskaber, som er tæt på brødrene Surkis, solgt "Dynamo"s aktier til Ihor Surkis og Valentyn Zhurskyj.

En anden ejer af "Dynamo"s aktier, Kostiantyn Hryhoryshyn, mener, at de dermed havde overtrådt hans ret til at eje klubbens aktier. UP.

26.07.05. Jusjtjenko standser privatisering af Ukrtelekom

Præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko har suspenderet privatiseringen af aktieteleselskabet "Ukrtelekom". Et tilsvarende dekret dateret den 5. juli er blevet lagt ud på præsidentens hjemmeside.

I medfør af dekretet har præsidenten stillet ikrafttrædelsen af loven "Om særlige omstændigheder ved privatiseringen af aktieselskabet "Ukrtelekom" i bero, indtil et nyt statsligt privatiseringsprogram er vedtaget.

I oktober 2000 vedtog Verkhovna Rada enstemmigt et lovforslag fremsat af det daværende parlamentsmedlem for "Arbejdets Ukraine" Oleksij Kostusev om privatiseringen af "Ukrtelekom". UP.

27.07.05. WTO-pakke i fare pga. intern splittelse (eng.)

EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
Wednesday, July 13, 2005 -- Volume 2, Issue 135
By Taras Kuzio

The Ukrainian parliament went into summer vacation this week after adopting only six of the 14 legislative acts needed for possible WTO membership. Two related laws were adopted earlier. The government had wanted parliament to consider all 14 laws as a package, but parliament refused.

A key legislative act adopted on July 6 deals with intellectual property rights. Ukraine has long been a major player in the worldwide market of pirated CDs. The bill passed, although the Communists, Regions of Ukraine, and Social Democratic Party-United (SDPUo) all opposed the law.

The Ukrainian government and World Bank believe that, although all 14 draft laws were not adopted, a sufficient number passed to qualify Ukraine to be considered for WTO membership at the WTO biannual conference in Hong Kong on December 13-18 (AP, July 11). Ukraine will need to adopt a total of 26 laws for WTO membership.

According to Economics Minister Serhiy Teryokhin, Ukraine has now adopted 90% of the legislative acts required to join the WTO ahead of Russia later this year. After gaining membership, Ukraine hopes to begin negotiating a free-trade zone with the EU. President Viktor Yushchenko also sees WTO membership as a key component of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration.

Yushchenko and the government claimed that joining the WTO would lead to an additional 1.9% annual growth of GDP, $300 million additional in exports, and new markets would open to Ukrainian goods. Ukraine would also save $1.6 billion that it currently loses due to laws that are not compatible with those of the 148-member WTO.

The opposition argued that WTO membership would lead to price rises and the collapse of Ukraine's agriculture, auto, and metallurgical industries. Opposition centrists, such as Regions of Ukraine and the SDPUo, support Ukraine's joint entry into the WTO alongside Russia. The Communists oppose WTO membership, while the Socialists support joining in stages.

Attempts to force the laws through parliament ahead of the summer recess were hampered by the lack of leadership on the part of Yushchenko and a lack of unity in the Yushchenko coalition. Writing in Zerkalo Nedeli/Tyzhnia (July 9-15), Serhiy Rakhmanin declared that the new political leadership had flunked its first major test, because, "The entire political leadership lacks potency, and the new system of political decision-making works too poorly."

This "impotence of authority" has emerged because the new regime does not use bribes, threats, and blackmail as was common under former president Leonid Kuchma. The new opposition is not afraid of the authorities because, Rakhmanin believes, Yushchenko's team has not adequately punished the former regime for its past misdeeds.

Yushchenko made another strategic miscalculation when he did not order his own governors and government ministers to relinquish their parliamentary seats. Twenty parliamentary deputies held government or state administrative positions, including National Security and Defense Council secretary Petro Poroshenko. The Communist and centrist opposition seized on this issue to demand that they give up their seats ahead of the parliamentary debate on WTO membership. While in opposition, Yushchenko had specifically criticized the authorities for illegally holding parliamentary and government positions, now this issue was used against him. Yushchenko finally ordered his team to vacate the parliamentary seats on July 2, only six days before the summer recess.

Yushchenko's team did not present a united front on the WTO issue. Although the Socialists supported Yushchenko in round two of the 2004 presidential election and have been rewarded with government and governor positions, the SPU joined the Communists and centrists in opposing WTO legislation. The SPU seems unclear on whether it is part of the opposition or part of the governing coalition. Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz said, "We criticize constructively. We should do this because these are our authorities" (Interfax-Ukraine, July 9). Yet just last month Moroz declared that the SPU would never go into opposition to Yushchenko (Ukrayinska pravda, June 16).

Yushchenko's People's Union-Our Ukraine party and Prime Minister Tymoshenko are divided on the usefulness of the SPU. After the SPU failed to back the WTO legislation, Tymoshenko and Economics Minister Teryokhin called for the replacement of SPU ministers, particular Agriculture Minister Oleksandr Baranovskiy. In contrast, Yushchenko and People's Union-Our Ukraine officials continue to delude themselves that the SPU are useful and should be therefore be invited to join their bloc in the March 2006 parliamentary election.

The SPU also differs with the government over privatization, including whether to keep Kryvorizhstal in state hands or put it up for a new privatization tender. The SPU is also hostile, like the Communist and centrist opposition, to NATO membership.

Parliamentary bickering in the last week before the summer recess also deepened the rift with parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, whose People's Party is a potential member of the Yushchenko coalition in the 2006 election (see EDM, July 8). Lytvyn accused the government of preparing flawed bills in great haste and called for greater debate about the merits of joining the WTO. Lytvyn also accused the government of being unwilling to cooperate with parliament (Inter TV, July 10).

Tymoshenko retorted that Lytvyn and Moroz were, alongside the Communist-centrist opposition, also her opponents (Ukrayinska pravda, July 10). As for government work on WTO legislation, she said, "Don't listen to these stupidities, when they say that the government submitted something in haste, that it submitted half-baked documents, that something was not agreed with MPs" (1+1 TV, July 10). In reality, "The government is being obstructed from working," Tymoshenko alleged.

A show, that was happening in Verkhovna Rada last week and which we have been able to observe for the three days, was not scheduled albeit forecasted. The hot issue was Ukraine's accession to the WTO.

27.07.05. WTO: between pro et contra

On Tuesday, July 5, the Minister of Economy Sergey Teryokhin might have led Ukrainian delegation to Geneva in order to participate in the last session of the working group, dedicated to the review of Ukrainian application to the WTO.

If the President, the Prime-minister and Mr. Teryokhin himself have managed to convince the Parliament, that it shall adopt the WTO legislative package -- the minister would have reported to the foreign colleagues about the victory of orange state patriotism over red-white-blue oligarchy. That might have happened on Wednesday morning and Ukraine might have had a good chance to join WTO this year.

However, instead of flying to Geneva, minister Teryokhin remained in Kyiv before the rioting parliament accompanied by fellows from the government.

I will assume that most of my compatriots do not quite understand why "WTO", a word, consisting of three letters, causes a fury of emotions among Ukrainian political establishment. Arguments, that reject or support Ukraine's membership in WTO can be summarized as following:

"PRO": the whole civilized world trades under the guidelines of WTO. Ukraine's accession into the organization will put an end to anti-dumping investigations against Ukrainian exports.

"CONTRA": the accession to the WTO will ruin a domestic market.

As it always happens -- the truth in the middle: Ukraine must join WTO, but terms of accession are too risky for Ukrainian producers.

Why does opposition rebel?

It is evident, that the accession to WTO under the leadership of President Yushchenko and his government may become the first real breakthrough in Ukrainian foreign policy.

On the other hand, the frontier will be opened for the imported products, due to efforts of Ukrainian WTO negotiators. As a result, the government predicts a decline in price for the consumer goods, that is very important for the government on the eve of Parliamentary elections. In this way the famous motto "protect the national customer, the national producer would care for himself" becomes a reality.

The hospitality of Ukrainian market may lead to the bad consequences, such as bankruptcy of many Ukrainian producers, now protected by high import tariffs (for example, of domestic farmers, pharmacists, alcohol traders, producers of machinery and chemicals, metallurgists and others.

It becomes clear now, why the "godfathers" of these industries do not rush to give an order to support WTO legislative package to "their" deputies. The appeals of government officials, stating that accession to the WTO will enable Ukrainian export to avoid anti-dumping filings does not help.

As experience of the other WTO members shows: the problems of domestic producers that are related to the WTO accession last for approximately six month and then the national market becomes stabilized. However, there is still a possibility, that the experience of the other WTO members will appear irrelevant for Ukraine in view of traditional 'mental disorders' of our enterprises, namely: excessive power-consuming, underdeveloped technology, insufficient labor qualification, lack of financing and the like.

The Russian factor is another specific aspect of the future (may God help us!) WTO membership. That is also an explanation for the storms and clashes in our Parliament.

The quotation from the letter to the Head of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine Olexiy Kostusev written by the Russian State Duma member Sergey Glazyev, who is also the Chairman of the Russian Industrial Producers Federation and the Leader of the Foreign Trade Committee at the Russian Chamber of Commerce follows in the next three paragraphs.

"Consent of Ukraine to open almost all significant market sectors in the current conditions of free trade between Russia and Ukraine would result into uncontrolled transfer of commodities, belonging to the third countries into Russian Federation through the territory of Ukraine and will bring a substantial damage to both Russian and Ukrainian producers in such market sectors as agriculture, timber, paper and other light industries, furniture manufacturing, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy".

"According to the estimations, that were made by Russian experts, should Ukraine accept such discriminatory terms of joining WTO, reimport of commodities of the third countries through Ukraine to Russia may amount to more than USD 5 billion".

"The budgets of both countries will suffer losses as a result of abrupt decrease of import tariff and expulsion of domestic goods. The particular disturbance is caused by the consent of Ukrainian negotiators to terminate the import tariff for alcohol, while Russian Federation had agreed to fix 100% of the given tariff. Terms of Ukraine's accession to WTO, agreed by Ukrainian negotiators, obviously violate the interests of Ukrainian and Russian producers in the major fields of industry".

There is no doubt, that similar discriminatory and contradictory terms for domestic producers will not be accepted by Russian Federation. It means that Ukraine's accession to WTO under these terms will prevent the creation of the Customs Union and implementation of the Single Economic Area between the two countries".

In that case free trade policy will scarcely be retained. Anyway, to defend the domestic market against uncontrolled reimportation of the commodities, produced by the third countries, through the territory of Ukraine, Russia will have to extend the list of free trade withdrawals, including the wide range of foodstuffs, furniture, timber and ferrous products.

Recent complicated relationships with Russian Federation may become even worse. Russia is obviously the greatest recipient of Ukrainian export, and the loss of Russian markets will be hard blow for the domestic producers.

Are the problems of Ukraine's accession to WTO so inevitable? Certainly not!

The author managed to be present at the March session of the WTO working group. My personal impressions are fragmentary and thus cannot surely characterize the long-term negotiation process, however...

During the March visit of Ukrainian delegation to Geneva the "orange" Minister of Economy Sergey Teryokhin felt as if he was having a birthday party. The English-speaking and professionally skilled minister fascinated WTO leaders by deep understanding of the global processes, European style and witty persistence.

He practically forced WTO bureaucrats to make decision regarding our accession, and they have almost given their consent. The story reminds an old tale about a old man, begging the Lord to win in the lottery. The Lord did not object, but the old man forgot to buy a lottery ticket, although he dreamed to win a lot of money.

Ukraine behaved in the same manner, declaring the WTO accession as one of the top priorities in the life of nation and the country in general. However, during the last visit of our delegation to Geneva the level of preparation was insufficient, to chose the words carefully.

It looked like Ukraine had to be accepted to the WTO just because the new government was appointed and the revolution had won.

Of course these changes have influenced the negotiators in a positive manner, but not to the extent that could put aside a fact that the information regarding the subsidizing levels of the Ukrainian rural sector was almost ten (!) years old.

An Australian negotiator asked with anger: "Have nothing been changed since then?" There were no doubts he knew that the subsidizing levels for our rural sector are changed annually, when the Law on the annual state budget is adopted.

Going back to the present events, when the WTO legislation package was submitted to the Parliament the same day, when negotiations with WTO regarding the accession of Ukraine were to start, it had become clear that nothing had really changed. The traditions of Ukrainian State management are still as they were.

A process of negotiations on the WTO accession as well as any other process which OUR OFFICIAL undertakes can be characterized by the following: the LACK of skill, the lack of management, the ignorance of the interests of the State, dependence (an official avoids to bear responsibility for the decisions or to express his professional point of view, if the leader has another, usually unmotivated, opinion), lack of consistency (the work of the predecessor is considered as totally absurd and non-professional).

Should you add the back-breaking burden, that was undertaken by the government officials in attempt to regulate each and every process indiscriminately -- it would become evident why this enormous bureaucratic gang is always experiencing a lack of human resources, and that any project, concerning either WTO or anything else, is realized hastily, fragmentarily and only after the 'big boss' gives a strong kick in one's back. Nevertheless, should you fail to give a kick in the right moment -- the whole thing would die.

If Ukraine joins the WTO in 2005, then the terms of accession would be that the Western exporters might have prayed for.

If Ukraine yields to Russia, and Russians will join WTO before us, they can require revision of tariff agreements. That means, the new round of negotiations would have to be conducted.

How much time would it take? Probably, another 10 years?

28.07.05. Jusjtjenko udvider visumfrihed for vesterlændinge

Præsident Viktor Jusjtjenko har afskaffet visumkravet for canadiske statsborgere, fremgår det af et præsidentielt dekret "Om etableringen af visumfrihed for borgere fra Canada", oplyser hans pressetjeneste torsdag.

I medfør af dekretet indføres der fra den 1. august 2005 visumfrihed for canadiske borgere ved indrejse til Ukraine eller transit gennem ukrainsk territorium, såfremt deres ophold i Ukraine varer i højst 90 dage.

Jusjtjenko har også underskrevet et dekret "Om etableringen af visumfrihed for borgere fra Den europæiske unions medlemslande, Den schweiziske Konføderation og Fyrstendømmet Lichtenstein".

I medfør af dekretet kan disse lande borgere pr. 1. september 2005 opholde sig i landet uden i visum i indtil 90 dage. UP.

29.07.05. Jusjtjenko ringede selv til journalist

af Serhij Lesjtjenko, UP

Fredag blev internetavisen "Ukrainska Pravda" (UP) ringet op af Jusjtjenkos pressesekretær, Iryna Herasjtjenko, som bad mig om blive ved telefonen, fordi landets præsident ville ringe om to minutter. Det skete også.

Viktor Jusjtjenko talte i et roligt toneleje, selvom man godt fornemmede, at denne samtale var svær for ham. Vi drøftede de seneste dages begivenheder, som har været en udløber af artiklerne om præsidentens søn Andrij Jusjtjenko og statsoverhovedets skarpe udfald under mandagens pressekonference. Læs mere her.

Viktor Jusjtjenko sagde indledningsvis, at sagen havde flere aspekter. Hvad sønnen angik, så forsikrede han, at han havde haft en meget alvorlig samtale med ham, og at Andrij Jusjtjenko havde draget sine slutninger og at det vigtigste nu var, at han fik tid til at tænke over det, som var sket.

"For at komme ud af denne situation ønsker jeg at støtte Andrij og have ham ved siden af mig selv for en stund", sagde faren, som i øjeblikket befinder sig på Krim.

Viktor Jusjtjenko forsikrede desuden, at hans svar på mit spørgsmål under mandagens pressekonference "var følelsesladet" og at han havde "fået sig en lektion". På hans stemme kunne man fornemme, at præsidenten havde svært ved at få disse ord over sine læber. Jeg svarede, at jeg forstod ham og ikke bar nag.

Præsidenten foreslog at vi gav hinanden hånden og "betragter denne konflikt som et overstået kapitel", som begyndte for fem dage siden.

Ved at bruge en af Jusjtjenkos egne formuleringer, sagde jeg, at hans hånd ikke ville blafre i vinden. Håndsrækningen skete telefonisk.

Jusjtjenko tilføjede, at følgerne af hele denne historie vil kunne udnyttes til at destabilisere situationen i staten. Hvortil jeg svarede, at dette helt sikkert ikke havde været formålet med vores artikler.

Præsidenten foreslog at mødes, når jeg på lørdag kommer til Krim sammen med den øvrige presse, der skal dække regeringsmødet på Krim. Jeg sagde, at der ikke er nogen grund til at forstyrre ham på et tidspunkt, hvor har er sammen med sin familie.

På sin side forsikrede jeg ligeledes præsidenten om, at artiklerne i UP ikke har været betalt bestillingsarbejde. Jeg fornemmede, at han tog imod mine argumenter.

Da vi tog afsked, sagde Jusjtjenko "Hej så længe!" UP.