15.02.02. Valgkommission afviser på ny Jusjtjenko-dobbeltgænger
15.02.02. Omeltjenko anerkender dobbeltmagt i Kyiv
14.02.02. Kutjma har besluttet, at Omeltjenko må gå
13.02.02. Højesteret giver Jusjtjenko-dobbeltgænger nyt håb
13.02.02. Udenrigsministeriet kræver Melnitjenko udleveret
13.02.02. Pljusjtj kritiserer Kutjma for Omeltjenko-beslutning
13.02.02. "ZaJEdU!" får 90% af den politiske Tv-reklame
13.02.02. Magtkamp i Kyivs bystyre er i gang
13.02.02. Kutjma beskærer Kyiv-borgmesterens magt
12.02.02. Premierminister taler om "mordet på Gongadze"
11.02.02. Melnitjenko kaster grus i maskineriet
11.02.02. Ukraine economy: The emerging middle class - impact
11.02.02. Brzezinskis disciple råber vagt i gevær (eng.)
08.02.02. Ny leder af komite for informationspolitik
07.02.02. SDPU (o) støtter lukket Tv-kanal
07.02.02. Jusjtjenko sikker på, at han overhaler KPU
07.02.02. Ukraine og Ungarn vil samarbejde i grænseregionen
07.02.02. Valgkommission afviser Jusjtjenkos dobbeltgænger
06.02.02. Populær ukrainsk Tv-kanal frataget sendetilladelse
05.02.02. Holovatyj vil føre Melnitjenkos sag
05.02.02. Kutjma lover diplomater et ærligt valg
05.02.02. Forskelle og ligheder mellem Jusjtjenko og Kostunica
04.02.02. Gennemsnit af meningsmålinger
02.02.02. JP Morgan names Ukraine most investment attractive country in 2001
02.02.02. Russia gives Ukraine a helping hand in its elections
01.02.02. IMF-mission ankommer til Ukraine (orig.)

02.02.02. Russia gives Ukraine a helping hand in its elections

NEWSLINE Vol. 6, No. 13, Part II, 22 January 2002

                        By Taras Kuzio

                        Preparations for the Ukrainian parliamentary elections on 31 March are
                        being keenly followed not only in the West but also in Moscow. Russia is
                        keen to capitalize upon its success over the past two years in
                        reorientating Ukraine's multivector foreign policy eastward. The main
                        threat to the consolidation of this eastward orientation and Russia's
                        increasing influence in Ukraine is Viktor Yushchenko and his Our
                        Ukraine bloc.

                        In Ukraine, as in other postcommunist states, support for the pursuit of
                        reform, reviving national identity, and an orientation toward "Europe" are
                        closely tied together. The West is seeking to support this package of
                        policies by encouraging reform and free elections, as exemplified by U.S.
                        training of 25,000 local election commissions and $200,000 in support for
                        the regional media in Ukraine. In contrast, Russia's primary concern is to
                        reassert its influence within Ukraine, regardless of who is in power in
                        that country (as in Belarus).

                        During the last two years, Russophile oligarch clans and their media
                        outlets in Ukraine have increasingly given credence to a "Brzezinski
                        plan&quo! t; conspiracy that was first aired by Russian sources close to
                        President Vladimir Putin. The "Brzezinski plan" is supposedly an
                        elaborate plan concocted by a group of U.S. policymakers to overthrow
                        President Kuchma and replace him with Yushchenko in a "bloodless
                        revolution." An analogy is drawn with the overthrow of Slobodan
                        Milosovic in Serbia in October 2000. Yushchenko's alleged allies in this
                        plot are the two wings of the radical anti-Kuchma opposition, Yuliya
                        Tymoshenko, his former deputy prime minister, and Socialist leader
                        Oleksandr Moroz.

                        The "Brzezinski plan" was allegedly behind the "Kuchmagate" scandal
                        that broke in November 2000, when incriminating tapes illicitly made in
                        Kuchma's office were released, leading to Ukraine's largest opposition
                        demonstrations. The "Brzezinski plan" therefore played a classic
                        disinformation role in seeking to deflect attention from possible Russian
                        involvement in the scandal (in cahoots with a Ukrainian oligarch group)
                        by laying blame on the West. After Kuchma survived calls for his ouster
                        in 2000-2001, the conspiracy was quietly forgotten, but it was again
                        revived in November of last year by "Kievskiye Vedomosti," a
                        newspaper owned by the Social Democratic Party (United) (SDPU-O).

                        Controversial Kremlin strategist and Putin imagemakers Gleb Pavlovskii
                        and Merat Gelman, who are joint owners of the Fund for Effective
                        Politics (FEP), have given the maximum publicity to the "Brzezinski plan"
                        conspiracy. The FEP is seeking to continue other shadowy PR activities
                        in the Ukrainian elections together with the SDPU- O. Its main target is,
                        unsurprisingly, Yushchenko, who is the archenemy of SDPU-O leader

                        In a recent survey of attitudes to foreign policy by political parties!
                        undertaken by the Analytical Centers of Ukraine Network (http://www.i
                        ntellect.org.ua), only the SDPU-O, apart from the Communists,
                        supported Ukraine's membership of the Russia-Belarus Union. The
                        SDPU-O also recently raised the question of changing the 1989 Law On
                        Languages by adding Russian as a second "official language." This
                        Russophile populism did not prevent the SDPU-O from including the
                        "nationalist" and pro-NATO former President Leonid Kravchuk among
                        its top five candidates for the elections.

                        The SDPU-O is also the main backer of the extreme nationalist,
                        anti-Western, and pro-Kuchma Rukh for Unity (NRU-ye) splinter group
                        led by Bohdan Boyko, which was suspiciously created only three days
                        before the Kuchmagate scandal began. The NRU-ye and the
                        Progressive Socialists play the role of "radical opposition" parties on the
                        left and right controlled by the executive, in a similar manner to Vladimir
                        Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. The NRU-ye
                        controls the Ternopil-based "Tryzub" paramilitaries led by Colonel
                        Yevhen Fil who orchestrated the violence at the March 9, 2001
                        demonstration in order to discredit the anti-Kuchma opposition.

                        The SDPU-o has also duplicated some of the shadowy PR activities that
                        the FEP earlier successfully used in Russia. This includes attempting to
                        blacken Yushchenko's character, which unlike that of the majority of
                        other politicians, remains beyond repute. The FEP has an agreement
                        with the SDPU-O to provide "campaign advice," and 10 of its associates
                        are working on this campaign. This has included creating a fake
                        Yushchenko website (http://www.yuschenko.com), an action that the
                        FEP also undertook in the 1999 Russian parliamentary elections against
                        Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov and then-Foreign Minister Yevgenii

                        The FEP and its SDPU-O allies were very probably behind Ukraine's
                        second taping scandal, that of Yushchenko and Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr
                        Omelchenko in early January 2002. As Serhiy Sobolev, deputy head of
                        the Reform and Order pro-Yushchenko party said, this latest scandal "is
                        a fresh pointer to those who organized the tape scandal" in Kuchma's
                        office. This is apparently because of the similarity in advanced
                        technology used in both cases. Sobolev had in mind the suspicion -- first
                        voiced by "RFE/RL Newsline" in December -- that the SDPU-O (with
                        Russia) was behind the taping of Kuchma's office.

                        The latest tape was released by the newly organized civic group "For
                        Trustworthiness in Politics," which is closely linked to the SDPU-O and
                        the NRU-ye. It aimed to discredit Yushchenko by creating the
                        impression that he conspired with Omelchenko to remove Medvedchuk
                        as deputy speaker. The latest taping was condemned by the majority of
                        political parties and Omelchenko has taken the matter to court.
                        Omelchenko, whose son is a member of the Yushchenko bloc and is
                        himself a strong opponent of the SDPU-O, also accused Pavlovskii and
                        the FEP of underhand practice by "humiliating Ukrainian national

                        The Ukrainian elections are the scene of a fierce geopolitical competition
                        over the future direction of Ukraine, and yet the choices open to Ukraine
                       are only twofold. Either it can continue to muddle along and "rejoin
                        Europe together with Russia," the preferred option of Kuchma and the
                        oligarchs, which postpones integrating into Europe indefinitely and ties
                        Ukraine's fate to Russia's. Or it can revitalize its reform and
                        nation-building policies and integrate into Europe regardless of Russia,
                        the option promoted by Yushchenko and his allies.

02.02.02. JP Morgan names Ukraine most investment attractive country in 2001

 Ukraine returned 57.1% of profit to foreign investors in 2001.
                        Source: Interfax, January 15, 2002

                        Ukraine tops the list of the most investment attractive countries in 2001:
                        it returned 57.1% of profit to foreign investors. According to the JP
                        Morgan international investment bank, this indicator is last year's highest,
                        the BBC Ukrainian service reported on Tuesday referring to the Time
                        magazine. Ukraine is followed by Russia (55.8%), Nigeria (36.3%),
                        Ecuador (30. 5%), and Cote d'Ivoire (29. 5%). At the same time, the list
                        of the "losers" that failed to return profit on investments is topped by
                        Venezuela (5. 6%), Uruguay (4.6%), Egypt (3.3%), the! Dominican
                        Republic (2.4%), and Argentina (- 66.9%).

04.02.02. Gennemsnit af meningsmålinger

Nyhedstjenesten podrobnosti, som er den elektroniske udgave af den ukrainske Tv-kanal Inters nyhedsprogram, bringer en oversigt over den gennemsnitlige tilslutning til de ukrainske partier og valgforbund i tre forskellige meningsmålingsinstitutters vælgerundersøgelser i løbet af de seneste par måneder:

Parti eller valgforbund

Fond "Svobody" SOCIS og Fond for Demokratiske Initiativer Ukraines Centrum for økonomiske og politiske studier
KPU 20,3% 15% 16,5%
"Vores Ukraine" 15,1% 21% 19,2%
SDPU (o) 6,5% 5% 5,6%
"For et samlet Ukraine" 6,2% 5% 4,9%
"Jabluko" 4,9% 4% 1,5%
"Kvinder for fremtiden" 4,5% 5% 6,1%
De Grønne 3,8% 8% 5%

05.02.02. National Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Explaining the Yushchenko Phenomenon

Western commentary has
focused primarily on
Yushchenko's personal
popularity and has ignored
why this popularity has not
been transformed into a
nationwide mass movement.

                        RFE/RL NewsLine 30 January 2002
                        By Taras Kuzio

                      Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko entered Ukrainian politics on a national
                      scale when he moved from chairman of the National Bank to prime minister
                      in December 1999. During his government's 18-month tenure he oversaw
                      Ukraine's emergence from a decade-long slump and paid off wage and
                      pension arrears. A survey of different Ukrainian opinion polls conducted
                      between June 2001 and January 2002 showed that Yushchenko's popularity
                      ratings remained between 18-30 percent.

                      Western commentary has focused primarily on Yushchenko's personal
                      popularity and has ignored why this popularity has not been transformed into a
                      nationwide mass movement. In other words, why has Yushchenko not become
                      a Ukrainian equivalent of Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) head Vojislav
                      Kostunica, who was able to mobilize both democratic and nationalist
                      anticommunist mass opposition to former President Slobodan Milosovic in
                      October 2000? Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma is as unpopular as
                      Milosovic was, and yet the opposition newspaper "Vecherniye Vesti"
                      compared Ukraine unfavorably to Yugoslavia and asked, "What kind of
                      people would put up with discredited rulers? Are we worse than the Serbs?"

                      In Ukraine, the creation of a similar mass movement is made more difficult
                     because of the national question that prevents Yushchenko and his Our
                      Ukraine bloc from capturing the same levels of high support elsewhere in the
                      country that it already enjoys in western and central Ukraine. A
                      November-December 2000 International Foundation for Electoral Systems poll
                      found that approximately the same number of ethnic Russians and ethnic
                      Ukrainians suffered as a result of a decade of social change. Nevertheless,
                      only 26 percent of Russian respondents in the poll said they trusted
                      Yushchenko, compared with 45 percent of Ukrainians. This gap in attitudes
                      along ethnic lines was not reflected in attitudes toward President Kuchma, who
                      was trusted by 31 percent of Ukrainians and 22 percent of Russians (the poll
                      was conducted before the "Kuchmagate" scandal erupted in November 2000).

                      In the late Soviet era, the national democrats in Ukraine were strong enough to
                      propel the country to independence, but not to take power. In the '90s they
                      were nonetheless able to prevent Ukraine from fully sliding into
                      authoritarianism, a regression that has been the norm in the remainder of the
                      Commonwealth of Independent States. The opposition movement that grew up
                      during the Kuchmagate scandal was based in the same regions as the
                      anti-Soviet, nationalist movement of the late Soviet era, namely western and
                      central Ukraine.

                      If the Ukraine Without Kuchma movement had been able to mobilize
                      countrywide support, as Kostunica did in Serbia, it is doubtful that Kuchma
                      would be still in power today. But, as in the late Soviet era, eastern and
                      southern Ukraine remained passive. As Russophile activists Mykhailo
                      Pogrebynsky and Vladimir Malynkowitch bemoaned in a roundtable convened
                      at the Russian newspaper "Nezavisimaya gazeta" in April 2001, civil society is
                      closely linked to national identity in Ukraine. Consequently, an active civil
                      society only exists in western and central Ukraine, while the east is passive.
                      Eastern and southern Ukrainians only become involved in politics in the run-up
                      to national elections when their more numerous votes in regions such as the
                      Donbas with its 10 million population are sought after by election blocs.

                      Because the national democrats were not able to take power in Ukraine they
                      were therefore unable to ensure that Ukraine undertook the "radical reform
                      and return to Europe" strategy adopted by the three Baltic states and
                      post-Milosovic Serbia. Instead, Ukraine has muddled along w! ith "third way"
                      and "multivector" policies favored by the former Soviet Ukrainian

                      The only way Ukraine can escape from these confused policies is through the
                      creation of a broad reformist movement, such as Our Ukraine, that combines a
                      patriotic, anticorruption, and socioeconomic platform. For the first time since
                      the late Soviet era, the Communist Party and its leader Petro Symonenko have
                      been pushed into second place by Our Ukraine and Yushchenko. But, as in the
                      late Soviet era when they allied themselves with the "sovereign communists,"
                      national democrats have today been forced to compromise by forming a
                      tactical alliance with the centrists. The major difference between the late
                      Soviet era and today is that Our Ukraine has for the first time expanded the
                      reach of national democrats into eastern and southern Ukraine, the traditional
                      preserve of the Communist Party and the oligarchs.

                      The link between national identity and civil society that makes Ukraine so
                      different from Yugoslavia is reflected in a January poll by the Ukrainian
                      Center for Economic and Political Research (UCEPS). Unsurprisingly, Our
                      Ukraine is strongest in western and central Ukraine, where it commands 51.9
                      and 20 percent support. These are the only two regions where Our Ukraine
                      has pushed the Communist Party into second place. In the north, east, and
                      south Our Ukraine's popularity drops to second place after the Communist
                      Party with 9.5, 7.9, and 11.6 percent respectively.

                      The two radical antipresidential Yuliya Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Moroz's
                      Socialist Party election blocs are more geographically restricted to western and
                      central Ukraine. The Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, although led by a party with its
                      origins in the eastern Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk, is only popular in
                      western and central Ukraine, while the Socialists are confined to Ukrainophone
                      central Ukraine. Opposition newspapers, such as Tymoshenko's "Vecherniye
                      Vesti," are only able to obtain printing facilities in Western Ukraine.

                      Western and central Ukraine are the strongholds of the opposition movement
                      against Kuchma and the oligarchs. According to the UCEPS poll, seven blocs
                      would pass the 4 percent threshold for the 225 seats elected by proportional
                      voting. In western Ukraine only four of these seven would pass the threshold,
                      and of these Our Ukraine and the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc top the list. In
                      central Ukraine, seven blocs would pass the threshold, of which the top four
                      are national democratic or in the opposition camp (Our Ukraine, Yuliya
                      Tymoshenko Bloc, Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko's Unity, and the
                      Socialist Party bloc).

                      For a United Ukraine, the bloc favored by President Leonid Kuchma that
                      includes five "parties of power," would not pass the threshold in either western
                      or central Ukraine. In Kyiv, a city with a large number of state officials, For a
                      United Ukraine would only manage to scrape through with 4.3 percent.

                      National identity, reform, and civil society are closely linked in Ukraine, as they
                      are in other postcommunist states. Ukraine's regional and linguistic divisions
                      inhibit national integration and a civil society encompassing the entire country.
                      Meanwhile, the more pervasive Soviet legacy in eastern and southern Ukraine
                      has led to a passive population and a weak civil society. This, in turn, prevents
                      Yushchenko's Our Ukraine from becoming a mass movement throughout
                      Ukraine in the same manner as Kostunica's! DOS in Serbia. The popularity of
                      Yushchenko's Our Ukraine in Western and Central Ukraine reflects the
                      region's role as Ukraine's main engine for reform, a bastion of opposition to the
                      Communist Party and oligarchs, and preventing a further slide to

05.02.02. Kutjma lover diplomater et ærligt valg

Præsident Kutjma så helst, at det ordinære valg til Verkhovna Rada resulterede i et ansvarligt og struktureret parlament, som vil påtage sig ansvaret for uddybelsen af reformerne i landet, skriver UP med henvisning til Interfaks-Ukrajina.
    På et møde i går med lederne af det diplomatiske korps i Kyiv og repræsentanterne for de internationale organisationer, der har akkreditiver i Ukraine, erklærede Kutjma, at styrkelsen af den politiske stabilitet i Ukraine vil afhænge af valgresultatet. Samtidig vil det kommende parlamentsvalg efter hans opfattelse "blot være endnu et skridt på vejen mod udviklingen af demokratiet i staten".
    Han påpegede, at den slags prøvelser venter der mange af endnu, "herunder valget i 2004", når Ukraine skal vælge sin næste præsident.
    Kutjma forsikrede, at det kendetegnende ved dette valg ikke bliver "fremkomsten af beskidte valgkampstricks, som visse kræfter ganske givet har planer om". Den vigtigste prioritering vil være valgdeltagernes overholdelse af Ukraines forfatning og love, mener præsidenten. "Valget bør ikke udnyttes til at trække opinionen ind i en sump af skuffelser og manglende tro på fremtiden".
    Kutjma understregede, at han som præsident vil gøre sit til, at valget kommer til at forløbe "demokratisk og gennemskueligt og afspejle det ukrainske folks valg". Han lovede at forhindre overtrædelser af processen fra statens side, "og styrets indblanding i den politiske kamp".
    Ifølge præsidenten kan et hvilket som helst lands demokrati-modenhed "ikke være højere end civilsamfundets udviklingsniveau". I den forbindelse understregede han de politiske kræfters ansvar overfor gennemførelsen af ærlige og demokratiske valg.
    Ukraine demonstrerer verden åbenhed og giver mulighed for at overvåge og kontrollere valget, påpegede Kutjma. "Vi vil være de internationale observatører meget taknemmelige for en objektiv og fordomsfri monitoring af såvel selve valghandlingen som hele valgkampens forløb", - sagde han. "Jeg tror på, at vores vurderinger og konklusioner vil være sammenfaldende med iagttagernes og diplomaternes holdninger".

05.02.02. Holovatyj vil føre Melnitjenkos sag

Folkedeputeret Serhij Holovatyj vil varetage den tidligere major i sikkerhedstjenesten Mykola Melnitjenkos sag i den ukrainske Højesteret, som tirsdag indleder behandlingen af Socialistpartiets kæremål i anledning af Den centrale Valgkommissions beslutning om ikke at registrere Melnitjenko som kandidat til parlamentsvalget for SPU.
    SPUs pressetjeneste oplyser ifølge UP, at aftalen med Holovatyj blev underskrevet mandag. Serhij Salov bliver Melnitjenkos anden advokat.
    Holovatyj er for øjeblikket medlem af monitoring-komiteen og medlem af Europarådets parlamentariske forsamlings udvalg for forretningsorden.
    Den 26. januar afviste Den centrale Valgkommission i Kyiv at registrere den tidligere major som kandidat på SPUs opstillingsliste med henvisning til usandfærdige oplysninger om hans bopælsadresse samt om længden af hans ophold i Ukraine indenfor de seneste fem år.
    Justitsministeriet har udarbejdet en konklusion til Den centrale Valgkommission om, at Melnitjenko "ikke har opfyldt lovens krav om permanent bopæl på ukrainsk territorium indenfor de sidste 5 år".
    SPU har kæret afgørelsen til Højesteret og begæret at omstøde valgkommissionens beslutning samt at forpligte den til at registrere Melnitjenkos som kandidat til parlamentet på partilisten. SPU gør gældende, at Melnitjenko befinder sig i udlandet i henhold til internationale aftaler, som Ukraine har ratificeret.
    Ifølge formand for Den centrale Valgkommission, Mykhajlo Rjabets, er det Højesteret, der har det sidste ord i denne sag.

06.02.02. Populær ukrainsk Tv-kanal frataget sendetilladelse

Mandag besluttede Kyivs erhvervsdomstol, at et af Ukraines største Tv-selskaber - "Studio 1+1" - skal have frataget sin sendetilladelse på den anden landsdækkende ukrainske Tv-station UT-2. Formand for Verkhovna Radas udvalg for ytringsfrihed betegnede denne beslutning som "helt igennem bestilt arbejde". Selve beslutningsproceduren og afgørelsens art er uden fortilfælde og jeg håber ikke at det vil ske igen, - sagde Oleksandr Zintjenko (SDPU (o) ifølge podrobnosti. Lederne af "1+1" holdt i går en pressekonference, hvor de tog bladet fra munden.
    "Vi forventede, at der ville komme et angreb på Tv-stationen, men vi havde ikke troet, at det ville blive så kynisk", - sagde direktøren for "Studio 1+1". Oleksandr Rodnjanskyj betegnede afgørelsen fra Kyivs erhvervsret som bestilt arbejde. Taget i betragtning af, at Tv-selskabet AITI, som havde indgivet et søgsmål mod "1+1", i lang tid og ikke uden grund har været sat i forbindelse med forretningsmanden Vadym Rabynovytj, lå svaret på spørgsmålet ligesom i luften. Men Rodnjanskyj sagde, at Rabynovytj ikke kunne have magtet at gennemføre denne beslutning alene. Han havde brug for en magtfuld medspiller.
    Oleksandr Rodnjanskyj: "Denne person har haft alle muligheder for at iværksætte dommen fra Kyivs erhvervsret. Det drejer sig om Omeltjenko. Det er min teori".
    Rodnjanskyj kom ikke nærmere ind på, hvorfor Kyivs overborgmester Omeltjenko skulle bekrige en af de mest populære Tv-kanaler i Ukraine. Han ville ikke udelukke, at en mulig anstødssten kunne være programmet "Det store kapløb" eller journalisternes kritiske holdning til borgmesterens mange bygningsprojekter.
    Oleksandr Rodnjanskyj: "Jeg tror, at nogle har overbevist Omeltjenko om, at kanalen ikke hører blandt hans tilhængere. Og at det ville være en fordel at løse det problem nu. Appelinstansen har 2 måneder, og det kan være en slags afpresning mod os. [Man vil] vente i to måneder og så kan vi opføre os sådan som vi får besked på".
    Rabynovytj selv forsikrer naturligvis, at han ikke har indgået aftaler med nogen, og at Kyivs bykonge ikke er herre over ham.
    Vadym Rabynovytj, forretningsmand: "Herrerne blev afskaffet hos os for en 800 år siden. I 17 gjorde man op med andre herrer. Jeg ved ikke, hvordan Rodnjanskyj har det med sine herrer, men jeg har i hvertfald ikke nogen".
    Ikke desto mindre tror de færreste på, at hele denne historie ikke har nogen politiske undertoner og kun drejer sig om en forretningsmæssig tvist. Dem, der tror mindst på det, er politikerne. Især fordi retten traf afgørelsen 2 måneder før valget.
    Leonid Kravtjuk, deputeret: "Kanalen har allerede tilbagelagt denne juridiske vej. Det er den anden beslutning. Min konklusion er, at der her er tale om bestillingsarbejde".
    Jurij Lutsenko, medlem af SPU: "Det er den sædvanlige fremgangsmåde: jage en skræk ind i livet på dem og lade dem gå. Man har vist dem, hvad der kan ske, hvis de ikke vil vise, hvis de ikke vil forvanske sandheden, sådan som de højtstående magthavere hos os ønsker det."
    Oleksandr Rodnjanskyj oplyste i går, at kanalens politik forbliver uændret, og at man vil forsvare sine interesser i retten, skriver podrobnosti.

07.02.02. Valgkommission afviser Jusjtjenkos dobbeltgænger

Den centrale Valgkommission har påny afvist at registrere valgforbundet "For Jusjtjenko!"s kandidater til parlamentsvalget, oplyser Ukraine.ru med henvisning til UNIAN.
    Medlem af Den centrale Valgkommission Jaroslav Davydovytj begrundede afvisningen med, at kongressen afholdt af Det alukrainske Tjornobyl-parti "For folkets velfærd og sociale sikkerhed", Ukraines frie bonde-og erhvervsparti og Slaviske parti fandt sted under valgprocessen (dvs. efter valgkampens officielle start, red.) hhv. den 6, 12 og 19. januar 2002. Følgelig blev blokken "For Jusjtjenko!" stiftet i strid med valglovgivningen, og eftersom den ikke har antaget en status af valgprocessens subjekt, kan den ikke opstille kandidater til parlamentsvalget. Der var ifølge Davydovytj endvidere tilgået Valgkommissionen en erklæring fra Den alukrainske sammenslutning "Jedyna Rodyna" og Det alukrainske Tjornobyl-folkeparti "For folkets velfærd og sociale sikkerhed" om, at valgforbundet "For Jusjtjenko!" var blevet stiftet i modstrid med beslutningerne på disse partiers kongresser, eftersom de havde vedtaget at stifte et valgforbund sammen med 53 partier, hvori Det slaviske Parti ikke indgik, selvom det blev indlemmet i valgforbundet og deltog i opstillingen af kandidater.

Kommentar: Viktor Jusjtjenkos valgforbund "Vores Ukraine" har hele tiden kæmpet imod godkendelsen af Rzhavskyjs blok "For Jusjtjenko!", fordi man er af den soleklare opfattelse, at denne alliance udelukkende er stiftet med det formål at forvirre de potentielle Jusjtjenko-vælgere og fratage "Vores Ukraine" flest mulige stemmer ved parlamentsvalget efter samme opskrift som et andet valgforbund fx har opstillet en Oleksandr Moroz som spidskandidat for at stjæle stemmer fra det oppositionelle SPU. Processen har bølget frem og tilbage i nogen tid, indtil retten i Kyivs Shevtjenko-distrikt forleden besluttede at pålægge Valgkommissionen at suspendere registreringen af "For Jusjtjenko!". I forgårs besluttede Højesteret, at Valgkommissionen skulle træffe en endelig afgørelse i sagen inden midnat den 5. februar, hvilket også skete i henhold til den officielle frist for godkendelse af partier og valgforbund.
    Den centrale Valgkommissions beslutning om at afvise "For Jusjtjenko!"-blokken bekræfter, at de ukrainske myndigheder stiller sig forholdsvist positivt overfor "Vores Ukraine" og gerne vil hjælpe dem til en pæn valgsejr, som kan danne grundlag for et præsidenttro flertal i parlamentet. "Vores Ukraine" er et mindre onde for magthaverne end et stærkt KPU fro slet ikke at tale om SPU og "Fædrelandet". De kandidater fra "Vores Ukraine", som bliver betragtet som halv-oppositionelle har til gengæld oplevet, at man i deres valgkredse har opstillet en eller flere navnebrødre. Her er de tre-fire kandidater med efternavnet Stetskiv opstillet i samme valgkreds i Lviv som Taras Stetskiv vel nok det mest groteske eksempel. Og så har man Bojkos "Rukh for Enhed" som en terrier, der bider "Vores Ukraine" i haserne bl.a. ved at offentliggøre udskrifter af mobiltelefonsamtaler mellem Viktor Jusjtjenko og Oleksandr Omeltjenko, hvor de drøfter, hvordan de får fjernet Viktor Medvedtjuk fra posten som Radaens 1. viceformand.

07.02.02. Ukraine og Ungarn vil samarbejde omkring flodbølger

Ukraine og Ungarn underskrev i går konceptet for en mangesidig ombygning af Tysas flodleje, som skal forhindre fremtidige oversvømmelser, skriver Forum. Ifølge dokumentet skal landene omkring Tysas flodseng (Ukraine, Ungarn, Slovakiet, Rumænien og Jugoslavien) deltage på lige fod, ligesom projektet skal have deltagelse i form af internationale organisationer der skal bistår med at løse problemerne med katastrofesituationer i grænseregionerne.
    Ifølge Podrobnosti underskrev de to landes regeringer endvidere en aftale om grænsekontrol med bil,- tog- og flodtrafik. Denne aftale sigter på at forenkle og fremskynde kontrollen med bil,- tog- og flodtrafikken på den ukrainsk-ungarnske grænse. Aftalens regler tager sigte på at udvikle kontakten henover grænsen og de internationale transporter af personer, ejendom og værdier samt forenkle og fremskynde kontrollen med kontrollen med bil,- tog- og flodtrafikken ved grænseovergangene.
    Endvidere har parterne paraferet en aftale mellem Ukraines og Ungarns regering, som sigter på at samordne de dokumenter, som er nødvendige for kunne krydse den ukrainsk-ungarnske grænse i embeds medfør. Aftalen skal forenkle udformnings,- udleverings,- og kontrolprocessen i forhold til de dokumenter, som er nødvendige for at krydse den ukrainsk-ungarnske grænse i embeds medfør og med henblik på at samkøre dem.
    Endvidere underskrev parterne en aftale om udveksling af ratificeringsdokumenter og aftaler mellem Ukraine og Ungarn om retshjælp i civilsager. Protokollen indeholder det ukrainske parlaments og det ungarnske parlaments godkendelse, som blev afstemt mellem Ukraines og Ungarns premierministre under Anatolij Kinakhs officielle besøg i Ungarn i august 2001. (Ukraines parlament mangler at ratificere dokumenterne, red.)
    Dokumenterne er underskrevet efter ukrainsk-ungarnske forhandlinger. Som tidligere oplyst, befinder Ungarns præsident Ferenc Madlo sig på et to-dages officielt besøg i Ukraine, skriver Forum.

07.02.02. Jusjtjenko sikker på, at han overhaler KPU

Lederen af valgforbundet "Vores Ukraine" Viktor Jusjtjenko er sikker på, at hans alliance opnår en større tilslutning ved parlamentsvalget i næste måned end Ukraines kommunistiske Parti. Det sagde han i et interview med journalister fra det polske dagblad "Dziennik Polski" og det svenske dagblad "Dagens nyheter", oplyser podrobnosti.
    Ifølge Jusjtjenko-alliancens valgstab oplyste han, at "Vores Ukraine" vil blive det førende valgforbund ved parlamentvalget. Efter hans opfattelse har den kommunistiske ideologi overlevet sig selv i den ukrainske bevidsthed, og samfundet er parat til at tage imod en ny og europæisk type politisk kraft.
    Samtidig understreger Viktor Jusjtjenko, at "der er forhold, som vanskeliggør denne sag." Han vil bl.a. ikke udelukke, at 8-12% af stemmerne ved valget vil blive forfalsket. Viktor Jusjtjenko konstaterer, at forfalskningerne ikke kun vil finde sted under stemmeoptællingerne, men også under valgkampen. Ifølge ham kan visse politiske kræfter ved at manipulere med den offentlige mening via de såkaldte "sorte PR-teknikker" føre vælgerne bag lyset. Som eksempler på den slags teknikker nævner Viktor Jusjtjenko brugen af navnebrødre til kendte politikere og populære politiske kræfters dobbeltgængere.
    "Kun en gennemskuelig og ærlig valgkamp kan dæmme op for dette og øge "Vores Ukraine"s tilslutning", mener den tidligere premierminister.
    Han forudser, at samfundet i løbet af dette års valgkamp "lettere vil strukturere sig og finde frem til sine ideologiske sympatier". Desværre, beklager han, identificerer kun 2% af borgerne sig i øjeblikket med et eller andet parti.
    Viktor Jusjtjenko er overbevist om, at eksemplet med "Vores Ukraine", som har forenet 10 partier, vil styrke vælgernes tillid til partierne, mens samfundets strukturisering vil gøre politikken mere gennemskuelig.
    Lederen af "Vores Ukraine" betegner denne blok som en kraft, "der ikke er ved magten" og har sit syn på Ukraines fremtid og et alternativt udviklingsprogram og en effektiv økonomisk model foruden, at den forfægter "en stærk samfundsmoral".
    Viktor Jusjtjenko mener desuden, at "alle ressourcerne i magtens grene bør være effektive og bruges til demokratiske beslutninger", oplyser podrobnosti.

07.02.02. SDPU (o) støtter lukket Tv-kanal

Partiet SDPU (o) er "oprørt" over afgørelsen fra Kyivs erhvervsdomstol om at fratage Tv-stationen "Studio 1+1" dens sendetilladelse. "Millioner af Tv-seeres ret til hver aften at se deres ynglingskanal er hermed i fare"", - hedder det i en erklæring fra socialdemokraterne, som blev udsendt onsdag.
    Det forhold, der er "særligt oprørende" for SDPU (o), er, at beslutningen er truffet midt under en valgkamp, hvor "enhver begrænsning af ytringsfriheden ikke kan være bestemt af andet en rent politiske motiver". "Det kan ikke udelukkes, at den hænger knap så meget sammen med parlamentsvalget som med byrådsvalget, idet det er velkendt, at kanalen ikke er tilhænger af en meget nidkær byboss", - skriver socialdemokraterne.
    SDPU (o) udtrykker "solidaritet med et af de mest professionelle journalistiske kollektiver i landet og erklærer Tv-kanalen "1+1" sin støtte i dens bestræbelser på at håndhæve pluralismens, demokratiets og ytringsfrihedens principper i ukrainsk fjernsyn".
    "Vi mener, at man under ingen omstændigheder må tillade gentagelsen af "Historien fra Moskva" med kanalen TV-6, hvor man udfra politiske motiver og ved hjælp af den dømmende magt afviklede et meget professionelt journalistisk kollektiv", - understreges det.

08.02.02. Ny leder af komite for informationspolitik

Parlamentsmedlem Ivan Tjyzh blev i går udnævnt til ny formand for Ukraines statslige komite for informationspolitik, hvor han afløser forfatteren og Rukh-politikeren Ivan Dratj, som har beklædt embedet siden 1999. Ivan Tjyzh er af den opfattelse, at internettet skal reguleres via lovgivningen, skriver UP.
    I den forbindelse understregede han efter parlamentets udnævnelse, "bør man ikke overskride den usynlige grænse" - således at loven "ikke bliver prohibitionistisk; men nettet heller ikke skaber problemer, der er knyttet til udbredelsen af vejledninger [i brugen af] terrorismens våben".
    Tjyzh anser det for at være et positivt fænomen, at "en repræsentant for oppositionen" nu er blevet udpeget til formand for Statskomiteen.
    I et interview til Tv-stationen STB senere på aftenen understregede han, at han var en "statsloyal socialist". Tjyzh var under præsidentvalget 1999 Oleksandr Moroz' højre hånd, men meldte sig efter valgnederlaget ud af SPU og stiftede - formentlig i en af ukrainsk politiks utallige vanskeligt gennemskuelige politisk-taktiske manøvrer - det præsident-loyale venstreparti "Retfærdighed".
    Han anser ifølge UP ikke sin udnævnelse for at være politisk motiveret, men et stykke professionelt motiveret "bestillingsarbejde". "Jeg vil bestræbe mig på at leve op til præsidentens og Verkhovna Radas tillid", påpegede han. Samtidig understregede han, at han vil "til fulde demonstrere sin oppositionalitet", såfremt der bliver udøvet pression mod ham.
    Tjyzh anser skabelsen af et public service Tv-og radio for at være "den strategiske dimension i komiteens arbejde". Han betegnede "det reelle fravær af professionel frihed" samt manglen på "den fabrikshalsmæssige solidaritet mellem journalisterne" for at være hovedproblemerne i informationssfæren.
    Tjyzh føjede til, at han helst vil skabe en statskomite, hvor massemediernes repræsentanter "fandt støtte og beskyttelse". Han ville ikke ind på, hvilke tiltag han agtede at indlede sin embedsførelse med.
    Samtidig udtalte formand for Verkhovna Radas udvalg for informationspolitik, Oleksandr Zintjenko, at man såvel i Kyiv som lokalt bør revurdere sammensætningen af statskomiteens ledende organ, "eftersom den ikke er professionel".

11.02.02. Brzezinskis disciple råber vagt i gevær (eng.)

Indications of crisis of Ukraine-U.S. "Strategic Partnership" policy
from Taras Kuzio

 One cannot say for sure that
 without Ukraine Russia is not
 going to be an empire, but with
 Ukraine Russia automatically
 becomes an empire...
 Independent and secure
 Ukraine turns Russia into a
 post-imperial, potentially
 democratic state, which could
 have fruitful ties with the West...
 Democratization and
 Europeization of Russia is
 incompatible with a force-based
 Zbigniew Brzezinski

 Current trends in the
 Ukraine-U.S. relationship give
 serious grounds for concern
 with the state of the "strategic
 partnership'.... The amount of
 export-import transactions
 between Ukraine and USA does
 not fit the strategic partnership

 Geopolitical interests of Russia,
 the other strategic partner of
 Ukraine, were a significant
 factor that hindered the
 development of strategic
 partnership with the United
 States. With USA and Russia as
 its strategic partners, Ukraine
 has found itself in a situation
 when the level of its relations
 with these partners is
 determined by the degree of
 geopolitical contention and
 permanent controversy between
 USA and Russia rather than by
 the stand and intentions of

 The Ukrainian leadership did
 not voice its official support for
 U.S.-led operation in
 Afghanistan as resolutely as
 Russia did. Although the
 Ukrainian president decided to
 allow the U.S. transport aircraft
 to pass via the Ukrainian air
 space en route to Afghanistan,
 he took that decision after
 relevant consultations with
 President Putin of Russia.

 The U.S. Administration real
 ized there is no sense in
 extending economic benefits to
 Ukraine in exchange for
 semblance of political changes
 in the country. As a result
 Ukraine has faced economic
 sanctions on the part of the
 United States.

 To prove that the sanctions are
 unfair, one may also recall that,
 for instance, in Russia,
 according to experts, CD piracy
 is much bigger than in Ukraine,
 but no one is saying about
 sanctions against Russia so far.
 It suggests that the U.S.
 sanctions are to a large extent
 politically motivated.

 Secretary Powell raised the
 issue of the Gongadze case
 investigation and downing of a
 civil aircraft by an Ukrainian
 missile as the examples, in
 which it is critical to be open
 and honest, to provide
 maximum of information "so
 that the public knows for sure
 what has really happened"[13].
 The Secretary of State also
 stressed the necessity to comply
 with openness and
 transparency, the rule of law
 and, especially, to "fight
 corruption" - something that
 Ukrainian homebred oligarchs
 would hardly be enthusiastic

 The recent development of the
 Ukraine-U.S. and
 Ukraine-Russia relations gives
 certain grounds to say that
 being unable to develop
 strategic partnership with USA
 and Russia at the same time,
 Ukraine will prefer the Russian
 Federation. Evidently, such
 reorientation will sooner or
 later lead to discontinuance of
 the strategic partnership
 between Ukraine and USA,
 which is not all-embracing
 anyway, whereas the United
 States will lose their strategic
 interest in Ukraine in the
 context of the Russian factor.

 With a kind of eagerness for
 integrating with Russia now
 readily demonstrated by the
 Ukrainian leadership, Ukraine
 may become a rather tempting
 gambling card to play in the big
 geopolitical game between
 Russia and USA.

                         CENTER FOR PEACE, CONVERSION AND
                         FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE

                         POLICY PAPER # 1 (JANUARY 2002)

                         Indications of Crisis of Ukraine-U.S. "Stragetic Partnership"

                         1. ABSTRACT
                         January 21 marked 10th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic
                         relations between Ukraine and the United States. The anniversary
                         almost coincided with imposition of U.S. trade sanctions on Ukrainian
                         imports. The sanctions were imposed as a result of the unwillingness
                         of the Ukrainian parliament to approve an unprecedented tough bill
                         regulating CD industry, which was lobbied by the United States. It is an
                         indication of crisis in the Ukraine-U.S. relationship.

                         2. BACKGROUND
                         Having declared its adherence to the European integration policy, the
                         Ukrainian leadership is certain that the success of this policy will
                         depend on whether the Russian Federation supports it. Unlike Ukraine,
                         other CEE countries regard their relations with namely the United
                         States as a key factor of their integration into the European and
                         Euro-Atlantic structures, such as the European Union and NATO. It is
                         not accidentally that the development of strategic partnership with the
                         United States is among major components of the European integration
                         policy of such countries as Poland and Romania. Prospects for joining
                         NATO and EU by the Czech Republic and Hungary have been and
                         are still determined by large amounts of American investments into their
                         economies. Naturally, there is a tough economic competition between
                         the United States and the European Union, which sometimes leads to
                         factual trade wars. But despite all contradictions and efforts of the EU
                         to become an independent geopolitical dominant in Europe, the United
                         States continues to be a major pillar of its political stability and security.
                         USA has played and continues to play its historic role in developing and
                         strengthening the European democracy, i.e. the political foundation on
                         which EU is based.

                         The political and economic influence of the United States on the EU
                         countries is enormous. To large extent, this influence is a result of the
                         U.S. spiritual and economic ties with Europe. The latter continues to be
                         first historic fatherland for 70% of the Americans. Europe ranks
                         second in the U.S. export-import transactions. It accounts for a b out
                         30% of the American exports. [1] The United States is also Europe's
                         major investor. Transatlantic investments of the United States are much
                         higher than those in the Pacific and Asian countries.

                         Due to such powerful influence, for CE countries, their strategic
                         partnership with the United States is a major guarantee of their
                         integration into the European community. Ukraine has declared its
                         relations with that most powerful country of the world at the level of
                         "strategic partnership". However, when Ukraine became independent,
                         its relationship with USA was not a simple one. As is well known, back
                         in July 1991, President George Bush urged Ukraine "not to divide the
                         Soviet Union, and not to prefer "separatism" for democracy". [2] At the
                         initial stage of the evolving Ukraine-U.S. relations the United States
                         played a role of a mediator between Ukraine and Russia in the field of
                         security. Ukraine failed to find a stable political basis for normalizing its
                         relations with Russia. Direction of the relations with Russia is a major
                         foreign policy problem of Ukraine's national security. Initially that
                         problem was in the field of division of the ex-USSR property, and then
                         it was shifted into the field of Russian neo-expansionist policies.

                         Without international guarantees of its security and being weaker than
                         Russia economically and militarily, Ukraine availed itself of the "nuclear
                         disarmament" factor as a means of its security. Such policy coincided
                         with the U.S. interests, which sought after removing a major obstacle to
                         full implementation of START-1 and START-2. To a great extent such
                         goal conditioned the U.S. initial view at Ukraine through the prism of
                         "nuclear weapons". Such approach was characterized by the U.S.
                         intent to solve the Ukrainian "nuclear problem" by means of pressure,
                         persuasion and assurances. When USA found it impossible to solve
                         the problem in this way, it reviewed its stand vis-a-vis Ukraine and
                         began to regard it not only as a nuclear weapon stockpile, but also as
                         country of great geopolitical significance in Europe.

                         The mediation policy became productive for the United States, as it
                         enabled it to achieve the main thing - to realize American interests
                         related to Ukrainian nuclear weapons. The U.S. mediation policy turned
                         out to be positive for Ukraine, too, as it promoted reaching the tripartite
                         statement between presidents of the United States, Ukraine and Russia.
                         This arrangement, in its pure form, is a linkage of Ukraine's nuclear
                         disarmament to conditions laid down by Ukraine as regards economic
                         assistance and security assurances, although not everyone in Ukraine
                         thinks that the arrangement has served the Ukrainian interests in the
                         best way. Certainly, the tripartite arrangement has not resolved all
                         problems, while its basic provisions are still to be implemented. But its
                         significance stems from the fact that it is a strategic structure to
                         address a broad range of issues that Ukraine may face.

                         The next stage of development of the Ukrainian-U.S. relations is the
                         current one. It started following Ukraine's denuclearization. A peculiar
                         feature of this stage is the U.S. shifting from the "Russia above all"
                         political concept to the "expansion of stability from the West to the
                         East" concept. At this stage, the United States and Ukraine have
                         shifted to relations of "strategic partnership". Such relations imply
                         broader security cooperation, in particular in defense area, and policy
                         coordination in enhancing the all-European security. U.S. military
                         personnel have provided significant consultative and technical assistance
                         to the Ukrainian military concerning development and
                         implementation of various aspects of the military reform in Ukraine.

                         Evidently, it is in the field of security that strategic interests of Ukraine
                         and USA coincide to the utmost extent. The strategic interests of
                         Ukraine vis-a-vis the United States have a global dimension, as they are
                         determined by the ability of the United States, as the only "superpower",
                         to have a global impact on world processes. Due to such impact, the
                         "strategic partnership" with the United States could play the role of a
                         rather strong foreign policy anchor that could enable Ukraine to resist
                         external threats to state sovereignty, territorial integrity and other
                         challenges to its national security. It is not by coincidence that 54% of
                         the polled experts indicated USA as a state on which Ukraine could
                         rely most of all in the case of imminent aggression.[3] Most experts
                         (90%) think that cooperation with the United States is also critical for
                         realization of Ukraine's foreign policy interests. [4]

                         For the United States, Ukraine as a "strategic partner" is essential, first
                         of all, in the regional context. This context has two dimensions: the
                         European and the Russian one. In the European context, USA regards
                         independent and sovereign Ukraine as a significant stability and security
                         factor in Europe. As for the Russian context, Ukraine's implication for
                         USA was most clearly outlined by Zbigniew Brzezinski: "One cannot
                         say for sure that without Ukraine Russia is not going to be an empire,
                         but with Ukraine Russia automatically becomes an empire".[5]
                         "Independent and secure Ukraine turns Russia into a post-imperial,
                         potentially democratic state, which could have fruitful ties with the
                         West... Democratization and Europeization of Russia is incompatible
                         with a force-based empire".[6]

                         3. CURRENT DEVELOPMENT
                         Current trends in the Ukraine-U.S. relationship give serious grounds for
                         concern with the state of the "strategic partnership'.

                         Despite the high level of concurrence of security interests of both
                         countries, it is hardly possible to say that they fully coincide in other
                         spheres. U.S. investments in Ukraine, being the largest in their amount
                         as compared to other countries (18%), are still insignificant in absolute
                         figures ($ 511 million) and extremely immaterial to be able to raise a
                         strategic interest of USA in Ukraine. It was obviously because of these
                         figures that only 24% of the respondents said that USA regards
                         Ukraine as a strategic partner.[7] The amount of export-import
                         transactions between Ukraine and USA does not fit the strategic
                         partnership either. In 2000, the United States accounted for 5.8% of the
                         Ukrainian exports and 2.5% of imports.[8]

                         The lack of mutual strategic interests in the economic sphere created
                         vacuum within the strategic partnership between Ukraine and USA. In
                         fact, without economic foundation and internal factors such partnership
                         was mainly of a declarative nature on the part of both the United Sates
                         and Ukraine being based only on mutual foreign policy and security
                         interests. As the previous and current U.S. ambassadors to Ukraine,
                         Steven Pifer and Carlos Pascual, point out in their article in the
                         Washington Quarterly, "yet Ukraine never quite reached the anticipated
                         economic levels that its Central European neighbors achieved. In
                         hindsight, Ukraine and its relations with other nations suffered because
                         Ukraine did not achieve "necessary and sufficient" conditions for
                         successful reforms".[9]

                         Geopolitical interests of Russia, the other strategic partner of Ukraine,
                         were a significant factor that hindered the development of strategic
                         partnership with the United States. With USA and Russia as its
                         strategic partners, Ukraine has found itself in a situation when the level
                         of its relations with these partners is determined by the degree of
                         geopolitical contention and permanent controversy between USA and
                         Russia rather than by the stand and intentions of Ukraine. Namely
                         these contradicting interests of the United States and Russia reduce the
                         effectiveness of Ukraine's endeavors to minimum as regards
                         development of strategic partnership with these countries. Being devoid
                         of internal content, the strategic partnership with USA is doomed to
                         exist only at the level of declaration.

                         The year 2000 was a viability test for such level of relationship for
                         Ukraine. The U.S. stand in the Gongadze case and Melnychenko tapes
                         scandal stultified the strategic partnership. In 2001, Ukraine took a
                         stand different from the U.S. one in the conflict in Macedonia. Such
                         mechanism of realization of strategic partnership as the Kuchma-Gore
                         Commission ceased to exist. The Ukrainian leadership did not voice its
                         official support for U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan as resolutely as
                         Russia did. Although the Ukrainian president decided to allow the U.S.
                         transport aircraft to pass via the Ukrainian air space en route to
                         Afghanistan, he took that decision after relevant consultations with
                         President Putin of Russia.

                         The visit of Prime Minister Anatoliy Kihakh of Ukraine to Washington
                         in October 2001 demonstrated that relations of strategic partnership
                         between Ukraine and USA were nearly off the track and the United
                         States was loosing its strategic interest in Ukraine in the context of the
                         Russian factor (President Putin was on official visit to USA at the
                         time). The first visit of the Ukrainian high-ranking official to the United
                         States under the new U.S. Administration demonstrated weakness
                         rather than potency of Ukraine's position in relations with USA.

                         Although Kinakh was trying to reactivate the old-time rhetoric to the
                         effect that his visit "is a logical continuation of the dialogue and strategic
                         cooperation between the two countries", such declarations could not be
                         backed with concrete results in Ukrainian reforms and achievements.
                         The new Administration of George W.Bush has no more faith in the
                         assurances and declarations of Ukrainian officials about their
                         commitment to democratic values and European integration.

                         The U.S. Administration realized there is no sense in extending
                         economic benefits to Ukraine in exchange for semblance of political
                         changes in the country. As a result Ukraine has faced economic
                         sanctions on the part of the United States.

                         4. DECISION EXPERTISE
                         Economic sanctions against Ukrainian metal producers have already
                         resulted in cuts of the Ukrainian exports to USA by 31.6% during
                         January-June 2001. The next step of the United States has been
                         imposition of new sanctions against Ukrainian CD producers. The
                         previously announced U.S. trade sanctions against Ukraine took effect
                         on January 23. The sanctions are intended to compensate for US losses
                         from unauthorized copying and sale of audio and computer CDs in
                         Ukraine. The restrictions concern metal, footwear and other goods
                         exported from Ukraine, worth a total of 75 million USD, which now are
                         subject to higher dues. Ukrainian parliament on January 17 passed a
                         law regulating the production of CDs, thus meeting the U.S. demand,
                         but the sanctions were nevertheless imposed. According to A.Kinakh,
                         such sanctions against Ukrainian exporters would cost Ukraine "at least
                         $400 million a year in losses".[10]

                         In response, the Ukrainian government banned any U.S. chicken
                         imports to the country because of chemicals used in America's chicken
                         industry that are banned in Ukraine. According to Ukrainian sources,
                         last year Ukraine imported 69,000 metric tons (76,060 U.S. tons) of
                         chicken, 90 percent from the United States.

                         It should be noted that the United States has never demanded from
                         underdeveloped countries to license CD production. To prove that the
                         sanctions are unfair, one may also recall that, for instance, in Russia,
                         according to experts, CD piracy is much bigger than in Ukraine, but no
                         one is saying about sanctions against Russia so far. It suggests that
                         the U.S. sanctions are to a large extent politically motivated. According
                         to the International Federation of Phonographic Industry (IFPI),
                         Ukraine is not even among the ten biggest CD piracy countries. The
                         latter include Russia, China and even certain European countries. But
                         no one is going to impose sanctions on them. According to experts of
                         the Ukrainian Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies,
                         there is a great suspicion that under the pretext of the "wrong" law the
                         United States attempts to introduce restrictions making it difficult for
                         Ukrainian producers to compete at world markets - both in CD industry
                         and metallurgy, chemical industry, textiles, etc.

                         Certainly, such trade war cannot be considered an indication of
                         strategic partnership, and the Ukrainian prime minister was eager to
                         remind his American counterparts about that. Deferment of the
                         sanctions by half a month or even a month can by no means be
                         considered a success of A.Kinakh's visit. The United States takes
                         practical steps only if they see specific results that correspond to U.S.
                         interests. This thesis, in particular, is proved by the fact, perhaps the
                         only positive one, that during the visit the parties signed an arrangement
                         under which the USAID is to extend a $125,000 grant to the Ukrainian
                         joint stock company Naftogaz Ukrayiny to make a feasibility study of
                         the Odessa-Brody pipeline operation.[11]

                         The reason behind such cold pragmatism of the United States in its
                         relations with Ukraine is the fact that Ukraine has practically exhausted
                         the limit of political credibility on the part of its "strategic partner".

                         It was not unintentionally that during the visit A.Kinakh emphasized the
                         necessity of "raising trust to Ukraine as a state, a reliable partner that
                         can develop appropriate conditions for transparent competition"[12]
                         Responding to that, Secretary Powell raised the issue of the Gongadze
                         case investigation and downing of a civil aircraft by an Ukrainian
                         missile as the examples, in which it is critical to be open and honest, to
                         provide maximum of information "so that the public knows for sure
                         what has really happened"[13]. The Secretary of State also stressed the
                         necessity to comply with openness and transparency, the rule of law
                         and, especially, to "fight corruption" - something that Ukrainian
                         homebred oligarchs would hardly be enthusiastic about. Therefore,
                         Kinakh's statement to the U.S. secretary of the Treasury about
                         Ukraine's intention to integrate into the European and global community
                         and to accede to WTO could hardly be apprehended by the Americans

                         5. PROGNOSIS
                         The recent development of the Ukraine-U.S. and Ukraine-Russia
                         relations gives certain grounds to say that being unable to develop
                         strategic partnership with USA and Russia at the same time, Ukraine
                         will prefer the Russian Federation. Evidently, such reorientation will
                         sooner or later lead to discontinuance of the strategic partnership
                         between Ukraine and USA, which is not all-embracing anyway,
                         whereas the United States will lose their strategic interest in Ukraine in
                         the context of the Russian factor.

                         Russia has rather effectively availed itself of the September 11
                         developments. It expressed its resolute support of the West and
                         manifested its willingness to cooperate with the United States and
                         NATO in the struggle against Islamic terrorism. This brought about
                         reviewing the very format of the Russia-NATO relationship, so that
                         Russia could affect NATO's decision making. As V.Putin said, "the
                         Russia-NATO Permanent Council, the so-called PCC, has generally
                         been practical at the certain stage. Today, this body is obviously not
                         enough to change the quality of relations between Russia and NATO".

                         However, there is a question of whether Russia is going to avail itself of
                         this situation as well as of certain "weakness" of the United States to
                         implement its geopolitical interests that are not directly related to
                         terrorism. For instance, would the United States, in exchange for
                         cooperation in fighting terrorism, compromise with Russia in such issues
                         as: renouncing modernization of the ABM system; acknowledging the
                         Chechen issue as exclusively the problem of international terrorism; and
                         acknowledging Russia as a leading geopolitical actor in the world
                         (second one to the United States). At least the Newsweek has said that
                         during his visit to the United States V.Putin "attempted to make
                         Russia a major player again" [14]. As is well known, Ukraine is in the
                         epicenter of the U.S.-Russia rivalry. Therefore, the issues of
                         acknowledging Ukraine as a sphere of Russia's exclusive responsibility
                         and Russian vital interests may arise on the agenda. With a kind of
                         eagerness for integrating with Russia now readily demonstrated by the
                         Ukrainian leadership, Ukraine may become a rather tempting gambling
                         card to play in the big geopolitical game between Russia and USA.

                         6. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
                         For the United States, Ukraine is not a strategic partner in the same
                         sense as Ukraine considers the USA to be a strategic partner of
                         Ukraine. Ukraine is not a kind of a strategically critical country for the
                         United States, without which it could be unable to play its leading role in
                         the modern world. Nevertheless, in addressing specific critical issues,
                         the interests of Ukraine and the United States may and do coincide,
                         being of strategic nature. For instance, for Ukraine it is rather
                         advantageous and necessary to rely on the United States as the most
                         powerful country in the world that can and does have a comprehensive
                         direct and indirect impact on global processes. In this context, the
                         United States is a major factor and a guarantor of the process of
                         Ukraine's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. In order that
                         USA really backs Ukraine in these intentions, a change of the "political
                         climate of bilateral relations" is required. Slogans alone to the effect that
                         Ukraine does not see any reasons for concern in view of the NATO
                         potential eastward enlargement[15] are not enough any more.
                         Especially, against the background of the unprecedented steps being
                         made by Russia in its rapprochement with the United States and

                        Oleksandr Sushko & Volodymyr Poberezhny

                         UKRAINIAN MONITOR

                         Ukrainian Monitor is an information product of the Center for Peace,
                         Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine that continues and develops
                         traditions of the Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine,
                         published in 1997-2001. The project aims to gather and analyze
                         information related to international aspects of Ukrainian political,
                         economic and social life, and to promote strengthening the European
                         political values and standards of analyzing in Ukraine.

                        The project is supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany)
                         Regional Office in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova


                            1.Statistical Abstract of the United States: Washington DC, 1993, pp.
                            2.In: Bodruk O.S. Struktury Voyennoyi Bezpeky: Natsionalny ta
                              Mizhnarodny Aspekty. - K.: NIPMB, 2001 - P.218.
                            3.Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona, #122000. P.43.
                            4.Ibid., p.38.
                            5.Z.Brzezinski. Peredchasne Partnerstvo Rosvytok Podiy v Krymu:
                              Materialy Mizhnarodnoyi Konferentsiyi. - K., 1994 - P.195.
                            6.The New York Times. - 1994 - June 29.
                            7.In: Nauka i Oborona, #122000, p.39.
                            8.Zovnishnya Torgivlya Ukrayiny Tovaramy za 9 Misyatsiv 2000 Roku. -
                              Derzhavny Komitet Statystyky Ukrayiny. Express-Report of November
                              9, 2000.
                            9.Carlos Pascual and Steven Pifer. Ukraine's Bid for a Decisive Place in
                              History. The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002. PP. 180-181.
                           10.Amerikanskaya Ugroza Zastavit Deputatov Pisat Zakony.
                              Mignews.com.ua 31.10.2001.
                           11.Ukrayina ne Boitsa Rashyreniya NATO. Mignews.com.ua 31.10.2001.
                           12.Torgovaya Voina Otkladyvayetsa. Mignews.com.ua 01.11.2001.
                           13.Kinakh Vernulsya Mignews.com.ua 01.11.2001.
                           14.Gutman R., Conant E., America's New Friend? Newsweek, November 19,
                              2001, p.33.
                           15.Ukrayina ne Boitsa Rashyreniya NATO. Mignews.com.ua 31.10.2001.

11.02.02. Ukraine economy: The emerging middle class - impact

 From: Taras Fedoriuk

 An indication of the size of
 the emerging middle class
 may be gleaned from the
 growth of the mobile
 telecommunications market
                       EIU ViewsWire 29 Jan 2002

                       COUNTRY BRIEFING

                       The economic upturn of the last two years in Ukraine has brought into
                       existence a definable, and growing, middle class with money to spend on
                       non-essential items. While average incomes have fallen slightly in dollar
                       terms, the spending power of this small group of the population is
                       increasing. It has stimulated markets in property and consumer goods that
                       scarcely existed until 2000, and created demand for consumer credit for
                       the first time.

                       Aleksandr Fedorshin, general director of GfK-USM, the market research
                       company, says: "The growth of the economy does not directly result in the
                       growth of income and spending power, but nevertheless it is clear that
                       the top end of the consumer market is growing."  GfK-USM has
                       run a consumer confidence survey over the last six quarters, during which
                       indicators of confidence, and in particular of readiness to purchase costly
                       household items, have risen uninterruptedly.

                       Mr Fedorshin adds: "Three years ago no one in Ukraine knew what it
                       meant to have a debit or credit card: now there are hundreds of thousands
                       of them. Not only foreign companies' employees and office workers, but
                       even industrial workers, have their salaries paid into the bank, opening the
                       way for a great expansion of consumer credit in future."

                       Another sign of movement towards West European styles of consumer
                       spending is the sudden boom in hypermarkets, which are characterised not
                       only by large floor space and number of check-outs but also by the range
                       of choice, in particular of foreign brands.

                       There are now between 15 and 20 in Kiev, with more planned. The
                       German retail group REWE has invested US$9.4m into the development
                       of Western- style supermarkets, becoming the second-largest Western
                       investor in Ukraine after McDonalds (US), and opened several outlets
                       under the brand name Billa (Austria). The Metro group (Germany) opened
                       its first store in Kiev last month.

                       Additional spending remains the preserve of a small minority in Kiev and a
                       still smaller minority in the five or six other major cities. Recent statistics
                       compiled by the National Institute for Strategic Research showed that
                       average wages (excluding "grey" earnings) fell from US$67.26 in
                       December 1995 to US$39.81 in December 1999 and rose only slightly to
                       US$42.05 in December 2000. Average earnings followed the same
                       pattern (US$28.98 i n 1995, US$24.89 in 1999 and US$26.69 in 2000),
                       while pensions continued to fall (US$26.28 in 1995, US$16.68 in 1999 and
                       US$13.40 in 2000).

                      * Consumer goods
                       An indication of the size of the emerging middle class may be gleaned
                       from the growth of the mobile telecommunications market. The number of
                       subscribers has more than doubled over the last year to an estimated 2m
                       (40% contract subscribers, 60% pre-paid).

                       Ihor Mykhailenko, public-relations manager of Kyivstar, which along with
                       UMC dominates the market, says: "Our prognosis is that the market can
                       double in size again in the coming year, providing the economic situation
                       continues to improve or at least remains stable. Once we get past a
                       market penetration level of 3% -- and it is now at an estimated 3.2% -- it
                       is pretty well assured that it can rise to 10%."

                       Mr Mykhailenko believes that mobile-phone usage is starting to spread
                       from the richest 5% of the population to the next 15%, who might be
                       considered middle class. "There is an element of conspicuous consumption
                       by this section of the population. They will save up to buy a mobile phone
                       not because they cannot be without it for work or business reasons, but
                       because it is a sign of status." Kyivstar's customer base has grown (year-
                       end figures) as follows: 1997 -- 500; 1998 -- 13,400; 1999 -- 50,000; 2000
                       -- 300,000; 2001 (projected) -- 1,150,000.

                       The combination of a rapidly expanding market and fierce competition for
                       customers has in recent months stimulated reductions in costs that
                       comprise a 30% saving to the average user: en! trance costs (ie price of
                       mobile phone and number) have been reduced, standard tariffs have been
                       reduced, and some companies have moved from charging per second from
                       the first second instead of the 30th.

                       Mr Fedorshin at GfK notes that this year there has been a boom in sales
                       of mobile phones, kitchen appliances and electrical goods, but that sales of
                       personal computers and furniture remain as yet low by comparison. He
                       believes that these markets will expand dramatically if economic
                       improvements continue. Another market yet to boom is that for new cars:
                       at present sales run at just 40,000 per year, mostly of Russian models.

                       Hennady Verbilenko, deputy general director of the local company
                       Unitrade, a leading computer retail outlet in Kiev, said that over the last
                       year (third quarter 2000 to third quarter 2001) sales of desktop computers
                       had increased by 80-90% and sales of portable computers by 70-80%,
                       although from a low base. "I am sure the growth of this market is
                       associated with the emergence of the Ukrainian middle class," he says.
                       "At present, we might say this is the preserve of the upper middle class:
                       people who send their children to paid-for schools expect computers to be
                       available at school and also try to provide computers at home."

                       * The property market
                       A boom in the construction of residential space, which began in 1998, is
                       perhaps the surest sign of the rise of the new middle class in Kiev. It is
                       estimated that 1msq metres of residential space will be built in the city this
                       year, about three- quarters of that in the outskirts, and one-quarter
                       comprising elite apartments in the centre. Prices range from US$350 per
                       sq metre in the outskirts to US$2,200 per sq metre in the centre of the

                       Anatoly Lakhno, general director of the estate agent Citycon, says: "Prices
                       are increasing because of rising construction costs (higher electricity,
                       transport and construction materials costs, and higher salaries), as well as
                       the general economic upturn and increased buying power of the

                       "Construction of residential space reached its lowest level (about 400,000
                       sq metres per year) in 1995, and grew slowly until 1998. Then a real
                       construction boom began. New construction companies appeared on the
                       market -- such as Kiyivmiskbud, Zhytlo-Invest, Zhytlobud,
                       Posnyakizhylstroy, TMM, Consol, Agropromservice-A, AKB Kyiv, HCM
                       and UkrAsiaBud (all Ukrainian) -- who accessed financing from future
                       owners for building projects. They work with Ukrainian banks who make
                       loans to the future owners of the apartments, using as collateral future
                       ownership rights."

                       Sales are usually arranged by construction companies themselves without
                       any involvement of estate agents. Alongside the main market for new flats
                       a new market in modernised roof space, providing elite attics and
                       penthouses in central Kiev, is growing. This is the top end of the market,
                       serving the most well-off businessmen and managers.

                       As well as private credit schemes, a programme of loans to young families
                       (under age 30) over 30 years at an interest rate of 3% (compared to
                       commercial rates of around 30%) was introduced by the government. State
                       funds were available to extend the loans to only 2,500 of 40,000 applicants.

                      * Consumer credit
                       Another significant measure of the emergence of a middle class is the
                       growth of consumer credit. There are now an estimated 700,000 Ukrainians
                       who receive their wages directly into a bank account, and of these an
                       estimated 50,000 have in the last 18 months become consumer credit
                       customers. Banks including Aval, Privat, First Ukrainian and East
                       European Bank (all Ukraine) are operating schemes, and three or four
                       Western banks with subsidiaries in Ukraine are considering introducing

                       Igor Slobodsky, deputy chief executive officer of Bank Aval, one of the
                       leading Ukrainian banks, says that his institution has been a member of the
                       Visa system since 1996, but that only in the last year have a significant
                       number of customers applied for, or received, consumer credit through the

                       "After the 1998 crisis our first credit lines went not to consumers but to
                       small traders -- the 'chelnoki' going to Turkey or Poland to buy consumer
                       goods and bringing them back for sale in Kiev," Mr Slobodsky says. "Then
                       we began to encourage customers to receive their salaries directly into
                       their bank accounts. After six months we would give them a debit card,
                       and after two years offer them credit facilities." The bank offered
                       discounts both on use of the debit cards and for frequency of use in an
                       attempt to get customers accustomed to the cards, which were almost
                       unknown three years ago.

                       Aval now participates with 14 insurance companies, in schemes to offer
                       consumer credit through retail outlets. It has just started a scheme with a
                       car salesroom to finance consumer credit for Western makes including
                       Opel (US) and Volvo (Sweden). Credit for up to three years for the
                       purchase of residential property is available from another scheme that it
                       runs with five construction companies in Kiev.

                       Unitrade has for the last year been operating a consumer credit scheme
                       typical of the type initiated by Aval and other banks. Mr Verbilenko of
                       Unitrade says that at first the company financed the scheme from its own
                       turnover, but then made arrangements with banks and insurance
                       companies whereby the banks supply the credit and insurers cover
                       non-payment risk. Under the scheme, the customer is required to provide
                       documentary proof of identity and income, and to pay 30% of the cost of
                       the item, typically a personal computer. The bank pays the remaining 70%
                       and collects payments, on which interest charged is 30% on hryvnya
                       contracts and 16% on dollar contracts.

11.02.02. Melnitjenko kaster grus i maskineriet

Den 9. februar 2002 blev USAs ambassadør i Ukraine, Carlos Pasqual, indkaldt til samtale i Ukraines udenrigsministerium. Ifølge udenrigsministeriets pressetjeneste blev den amerikanske ambassadørs opmærksomhed henledt på en af bestemte politiske kræfter nøje planlagt provokation, som udspillede sig den 8. februar foran Ukraines ambassade i Washington med den tidligere major Mykola Melnitjenko i centrum. I følge med en gruppe journalister, som optog begivenheden på video, efterlod han ved indgangen til den diplomatiske repræsentation en såkaldt personlig henvendelse vedrørende det amerikanske udenrigsministeriums angiveligt ihærdige forsøg på at få fingre i materialerne fra den famøse "båndskandale". I den forbindelse afslog Melnitjenko demonstrativt enhver form for kontakt med diplomaterne på ambassadens område, fremhæves det i udenrigsministeriets pressemeddelelse.
    Der er ingen tvivl om, hedder det videre i meddelelsen, at man bag denne aktion kan øjne et forsøg fra bestemte politiske kræfters side på at vanskeliggøre relationerne mellem Ukraine og USA.
    I den forbindelse lod man USAs ambassadør forstå, at de omtalte handlinger, såvel som USAs forhanling af udleveringen af Mykola Melnitjenko, undergraver de eksisterende muligheder for ukrainsk-amerikansk samarbejde på grundlag af tillid og reelt partnerskab, oplyser podrobnosti med henvisning til UNIAN.

12.02.02. Premierminister taler om "mordet på Gongadze"

Ukraines premierminister Anatolij Kinakh er ikke i besiddelse af de officielle resultater af den  ekspertise af tidligere major Mykola Melnitjenkos båndoptagelser, som nys er blevet offentliggjort i USA; men han slår til lyd for, at sagen om mordet på journalisten Georgij Gongadze kommer for retten.
    "Ukraine bør utvivlsomt gøre alt for at få sagen om mordet på Gongadze overdraget til retten i henhold til gældende national såvel som international lovgivning. Og kun retten kan træffe en afgørelse om det konkrete resultat og strafudmålingen overfor dem, som er indblandet i denne tragedie", - sagde Kinakh på en pressekonference i Kyiv i går.
    Premierministeren betegnede mordet på Gongadze "en tragedie" for familien, vennerne og samfundet som helhed", og fremhævede, at han kendte journalisten personligt og anså en tilbundsgående undersøgelse af denne sag for at være absolut nødvendig.
    Kinakh betegnede det desuden som værende uacceptabelt, at "nogen har lavet den ene eller den anden form for politisk spekulation eller har oparbejdet en billig og amoralsk politisk gevinst" med afsæt i denne tragedie. "Det er vores fælles opgave at forhindre tingene i at udvikle sig i denne retning", - tilføjede han.
    Som tidligere meddelt, læste formanden for det ukrainske parlaments udvalg til efterforskning af journalisten Georgij Gongadzes forsvinden, Oleksandr Zhyr, i sidste uge i Radio Liberty op af konklusionerne på den undersøgelse, som den kendte amerikanske ekspert Bruce Konig havde lavet i USA. Hans ekspertise bekræftede, at de båndoptagelser, som Melnitjenko gennemførte i præsident Leonid Kutjmas kabinet, og som indeholdt omtale af Gongadze, var autentiske, oplyser UP med henvisning til Interfaks-Ukrajina.
    Anatolij Kinakh er en af spidskandidaterne for den præsident-loyale valgalliance "ZaJEdU" til parlamentsvalget den 31. marts 2002.

13.02.02. Kutjma beskærer Kyiv-borgmesterens magt

I mandags gik præsident Leonid Kutjmas såkaldte nivelleringssystem i gang med Kyivs magtfulde borgmester Oleksandr Omeltjenko, der i december stod bag parlamentets detronisering af socialdemokraten Viktor Medvedtjuk som 1. viceformand.
    Omeltjenko, som fra mange sider har været beskyldt for at misbruge den administrative ressource til fordel for sit eget parti "Jednist", skrev i fredags et brev til Kutjma, hvori han informerede landets overhoved om, at han gik på orlov under valgkampen og overlod sine beføjelser til sin nære medarbejder Mykhajlo Holytsia. Med andre ord: selv med Omeltjenko på orlov ville hovedstadens magtapparat arbejde upåklageligt, skriver UP i en analyse.
    Efter at have udfærdiget brevet til præsidenten tog Omeltjenko til Tyskland for at overvære en boksekamp med en af de ukrainske Klytjko-brødre. Efter hjemkomsten søndag kom det så til hans kundskab, at en anden af hans stedfortrædere - Ihor Shovkun (som er medlem af finansmanden Volkovs SDPU (o)-venlige "Demokratisk Union" og opstillet som nr. 20 på blokken "Dempartija-Demsojuz"s liste) - havde været til samtale hos Kutjma og dernæst hos Kinakh, og at begge lederne havde tilbudt ham at overtage posten som "fungerende formand for Kyivs statsadministration". Det var et råd, han ikke kunne andet end sige ja til, selvom også han siden i fredags var taget på orlov i forbindelse med valgkampens officielle start den 9. februar.
    Ifølge UP illustrerer denne omstændighed, at den egentlige årsag til udnævnelsen af en fungerende formand for byen Kyivs statsadministration er meget konkret; nemlig én gang for alle at skaffe sig af med Omeltjenko. Mandag sagde Kinakh: "Jeg er ikke arkitekt af fag, men hvis jeg skal være ærlig, så er jeg lidt urolig over det kaos der hersker omkring forskellige arkitektoniske beslutninger i Ukraines hovedstad - Kyiv. For nogle år siden, da Kinakh endnu var formand for Ukraines industri-og erhvervsforbund, kom han rimelig godt ud af det med Omeltjenko.
    Mandag morgen fulgte Omeltjenko Kutjma til Boryspil-lufthavnen og fældede en tåre, da han så præsidentens fly gå på vingerne på vej mod den fjerne russiske egn Khanty-Mansijsk. Han havde ikke fået noget direkte svar på sit spørgsmål til præsidenten om, hvorvidt denne havde underskrevet et dekret om hans orlov. Efter at have erfaret, at hverken Kinakh, Lytvyn eller Potebenjko havde søgt om orlov under valgkampen, tog Omeltjenko en beslutning om, at nu ville han skrive et nyt brev til Kutjma, hvori han trak sin orlovsansøgning tilbage.
    Da Omeltjenko ville ind på sit kontor, måtte han imidlertid lide den bet, at konstatere, at sikkerhedsfolk fra SBU var igang med gennemrode det rum, hvor premierministeren skulle præsentere den nye byadministrationschef for pressen. Hvem er det, spurgte Omeltjenko, og fik at vide, at det var Shovkun.
    Ihor Shovkun har hidtil været souschef i Kyivs statsadministration og formand for økonomisk afdeling. Statsadministrationen er beliggende i samme bygning på Kyivs hovedstrøg som byrådet og borgmesterens kontor. Det parti, han tilhører, er allieret til SDPU (o) - den ambitiøse borgmester Omeltjenkos fjende nr. 1.
    Omeltjenko ringede straks til præsidentens administation, hvor han fik at vide, at hans første orlovsansøgning var blevet efterkommet.
    Senere mødte Kinakh frem med den af Kutjma underskrevne erklæring ifølge hvilken Omeltjenko får frataget hvervet som formand for byens statsadministration og afløses af Shovkun, som Omeltjenko selv havde sendt på orlov i fredags. Shovkun ankom til rådhuset sammen med Kinakh, men afviste senere at snakke med pressen.
    Præsidenten udtalte fra sit ophold i den russiske Tjumen-region: "Omeltjenko er ikke præsident, hvad enten han kan lide det eller ej, han har at rette sig efter den beslutning. En anden person er udnævnt til fungerende".
    Kutjma stillede endvidere i udsigt, at Omeltjenkos orlov kommer til at vare længe: "Så meget magt, som Omeltjenko har koncentreret i sine hænder, findes ikke noget andet sted i de ukrainske regioner. Det sidste ord er ikke sagt i denne sag."
    Omeltjenko beklæder som bekendt to poster i Kyiv; nemlig posten som Kyivs borgmester og stillingen som formand for Kyivs statsadministration. Den første post blev han valgt til af byens borgere (i 1999), mens det er præsident Kutjma, der har udpeget ham til formand for Kyivs statsadministration. Det er den sidstnævnte post, som virkelig forslår i forhold til administrationen og det eksekutive apparat. Ifølge loven "Om hovedstaden" kan borgmesteren udpege en 1. viceformand og viceformænd for statsadministrationen. Desuden står borgmesteren i spidsen for byrådet Kyivrada.
    Den omstændighed, at Omeltjenko beklædte begge poster umuliggjorde på den ene side en magtkamp i bystyret. På den anden side afstedkom det en enorm magtkoncentration hos en enkelt mand. Omeltjenko kan kun forlade posten som byens borgmester, hvis han taber et valg. Hvis hans afskedigelse står ved magt, så er Kyiv på vej mod dobbeltmagt, hvor Omeltjenko ikke er den, der har fat i den lange ende, hvad beføjelser angår.
    "Omeltjenko-regimets" skæbne bliver dog først beseglet efter den 1. april. Indtil videre sender Kutjma hilsner fra Tjumen. Nu er det Lytvyns tur. "Ligeså snart Lytvyn er blevet udskrevet, tager han orlov", - sagde Kutjma og tilføjede, at "to guvernører også er på vej", uden dog at præcisere, hvem der er tale om. Vice-premierminister Seminozhenko og privatiseringschef Bondar har allerede taget orlov.

13.02.02. Magtkamp i Kyivs bystyre er i gang

Kyivs borgmester Oleksandr Omeltjenko vurderer den fungerende administrationschef Ihor Shovkuns beslutning som et bevidst forsøg på at øge den politiske spænding i Ukraines hovedstad samt et forsøg på social destabilisering. (Den 12. februar 2002 pålagde fungerende chef for byen Kyivs statsadministration, Ihor Shovkun, bestyrelsesformanden i den private bank "Kreshtjatyk" Hryzhuk midlertidigt at stoppe bevægelser på alle konti tilhørende Kyivs statsadministration og dens underafdelinger), oplyser podrobnosti.
    Ifølge borgmesterens pressetalsmand Metertjuk drejer det sig reelt om en suspension af eksekveringen af Kyiv-byrådets beslutninger gennem dets udøvende organ - Kyivs statsadministration, fordi overførsler fra byen Kyivs budget til finansieringen af sundheds-, undervisnings, - kultur- og transportvæsen, den kommunale boligøkonomi samt alle sociale programmer herved ophører.
    I dag er der ingen tvivl om, at et af de første dekreter udstedt af Ihor Shovkun, bl.a. kan medføre såvel tilbageholdelse af lønudbetalinger til de ansatte i de kommunale institutioner som hjælpen til de mindrebemidlede familier. Derfor har Kyivs borgmester Oleksandr Omeltjenko annulereet Ihor Shovkuns retsstridige handling, skriver podrobnosti med henvisning til UNIAN.

13.02.02. "ZaJEdU!" får 90% af den politiske Tv-reklame

Formand for Den centrale Valgkommission, Mykhajlo Riabets, ville i går i parlamentet ikke udelukke, at "propagandaen i Tv for valgalliancen "For et samlet Ukraine!" ville blive genstand for en alvorlig drøftelse i valgkommissionen med en passende konklusion til følge".
    Folkedeputeret Mykhajlo Kosiv (Rukh) pegede bl.a. på, at "propaganda" for blokken "For et samlet Ukraine!" fyldte 90% af sendetiden. Socialisten Oleksandr Moroz og andre deputerede berørte også emnet.
    Oleksandr Moroz henledte opmærksomheden på, at "For et samlet Ukraine!" fungerer som sponsor for transmissionen af De olympiske Vinterlege på Ukraines Tv-1. Han spurgte: "Hvem agter at reagere på den slags overtrædelser, og hvem vil træffe afgørelse om at fratage "ZaJEdU!" godkendelsen som opstillingsberettiget?, skriver podrobnosti med henvisning til UNIAN.

13.02.02. Pljusjtj kritiserer Kutjma for Omeltjenko-beslutning

Formanden for Verkhovna Rada, Ivan Pljusjtj, forudser, at Kyivs borgmester Oleksandr Omeltjenko vil indbringe præsident Leonid Kutjmas dekret om sin afskedigelse under valgkampen for rette. "Man må ikke forvente, at det er præsidenten, der får det sidste ord i denne sag, men derimod loven", - sagde Pljustj i går ifølge Ukrajinski Novyny, skriver korrespondent.net.
    Pljusjtj tilføjede, at hvis Kutjmas eller Omeltjenkos handling strider mod loven om Ukraines hovedstad byen Kyiv, så vil de kunne indbringes for Forfatningsdomstolen eller en anden domstol.
    Pljusjtj lod endvidere forstå, at han er utilfreds med Kutjmas beslutning om Omeltjenkos orlov. "En sådan beslutning tyder på manglende omtanke", - sagde Pljusjtj.
    Omeltjenko, som i går flere gange forgæves havde forsøgt på at komme i telefonisk kontakt med Kutjma i Rusland, erklærede, at han fortsat udøvede sit hverv som hovedstadens borgmester.

13.02.02. Udenrigsministeriet kræver Melnitjenko udleveret

Ukraines udenrigsministerium har sendt en begæring til De forenede Staters regering om at udlevere præsidentens tidligere livvagt, Mykola Melnitjenko.
    Det oplyste det ukrainske udenrigsministeriums talsmand Ihor Dolhov på en briefing i går. Han mindede i den forbindelse om, at der mellem Ukraine og USA eksisterer en aftale om hjælp i efterforksningen af kriminalsager i henhold til hvilken Ukraine kræver Melnitjenko udleveret.
    Ihor Dolhov påpegede desuden, at udenrigsministeriet allerede havde afsendt en række noter med lignende indhold til USA vedrørende en anden ukrainsk statsborger, den tidligere premierminister Pavlo Lazarenko. USA har foreløbig ikke givet sit samtykke til at udlevere ham til de ukrainske myndigheder, oplyser obkom.net

13.02.02. Højesteret giver Jusjtjenko-dobbeltgænger nyt håb

Ukraines Højestret forpligtede i går for anden gang Den centrale Valgkommission til at behandle spørgsmålet om registreringen af kandidater fra Oleksandr Rzhavskyjs blok "For Jusjtjenko" som opstillingsberettigede til parlamentsvalget. "Vores Ukraine" betragter "For Jusjtjenko" som dobbeltgængere. Det virkede som om Rzhavskyj selv blev overrasket over denne beslutning, skriver podrobnosti. Så sent som i går sagde han farvel til journalisterne og lovede at vende tilbage o 2 år. Men valgforbundets politiske råd besluttede at kæmpe til det sidste. Og i går ville Rzhavskyj da heller ikke skjule sin tilfredshed, idet han påpegede, at blokken muligvis vil ændre navn for at fjerne enhver lighed med "Vores Ukraine". "For Jusjtjenko" har opstillet en vis Volodymyr Jusjtjenko som spidskandidat - heraf valgforbundets navn, påstås det.
    Ligeledes i går afviste Højesteret at efterkomme "Vores Ukraine"s begæring til Højesteret om at omstøde Den centrale Valgkommissions beslutning om at godkende Bojkos blok "Narodnyj Rukh Ukrajiny" som opstillingsberettiget. Bojkos blok har bl.a. opstillet Taras Tjornovils bror Oleksandr Tjornovil som spidskandidat.

14.02.02. Kutjma har besluttet, at Omeltjenko må gå

Præsident Kutjma bekræftede i går endnu engang, at han har tænkt sig at sende formanden for Kyivs statsadministration borgmester Oleksandr Omeltjenko på orlov, så længe valgkampen står på.
    "[Omeltjenko] underskrev en erklæring, jeg underskrev et dekret, og et dekret skal eksekveres", - sagde Kutjma onsdag til journalister i Novyj Urengoj (Ruslands Jamalo-Nenetskij autonome region).
    "Sådan bliver det", - tilføjede han og understregede, at han ved sin hjemkomst til hovedstaden agtede at få rede på den situation, som er opstået omkring embedet som formand for byen Kyivs statsadministration. "Efter ankomsten får jeg sat skik på tingene", - sagde Kutjma.
    Som tidligere oplyst afskedigede Ukraines præsident via sit dekret Omeltjenko midlertidigt fra posten som formand for byen Kyivs statsadministration. Dokumentets ordlyd fremgår teksten på Ukraines Verkhovna Radas officielle website.
    "Oleksandr Omeltjenko er løst fra sine forpligtelser som formand for byen Kyivs statsadministration så længe valgkampen op til valget af Ukraines folkedeputerede står på", - hedder det i dekretet. Dekretets andet punkt overdrager udøvelsen af hvervet som formand for byens statsadministration under valgkampen (som officielt slutter den 29. marts) til statsadministrationens souschef Ihor Shovkun.
    Dekretet er vedtaget i forbindelse med Omeltjenkos registrering som kandidat til Ukraines folkedeputerede, valget af hvilke er fastsat til den 31. marts 2002, og i lyset af den af ham fremsatte begæring.
    Omeltjenko ville ikke gå med til udnævnelsen af Shovkun og sagde desuden, at han agtede at udføre sine hverv, indtil han har snakket med Kutjma under fire øjne.
    Ifølge de sidste oplysninger var Omeltjenko ude i lufthavnen for at tage imod præsidenten. Da Kutjma var kommet ud af flyet, gik han straks i retning af Kinakh, som han vekslede nogle ord med. Omeltjenko deltog ikke i samtalen, skriver UP med henvisning til Interfaks-Ukrajina.

15.02.02. Omeltjenko anerkender dobbeltmagt i Kyiv

Kyivs borgmester Oleksandr Omeltjenko har anerkendt Ihor Shovkun som fungerende formand for byen Kyivs statsadministration (lederen af byens eksekutivmagt, red.). "Jeg fungerer som Kyivs borgmester (officiel titel: byens overhoved, red.) i henholdt til forfatningen og lovene, mens Ihor Vasyljovytj (Shovkun) af præsidenten er udnævnt til fungerende formand for Kyivs statsadministration", citeres Omeltjenko i Ukrajinski Novyny ifølge korrespodent.net.
    Omeltjenko ville ikke ind i detaljer med, hvilke pligter og beføjelser han har overladt til Shovkun, idet han henviste til, at Shovkun deltager i et møde Kyivs statsadministration. Omeltjenko tilføjede, at Shovkun indtil videre formelt har ferie.
    Han sagde endvidere, at han i morges mødtes med præsident Leonid Kutjma under kransenedlæggelsen ved mindesmærket for de faldne i Afghanistan, men fik ikke lejlighed til at drøfte den opståede situation efter fremkomsten af dekretet om udnævnelsen af Shovkun.
    Omeltjenko sagde i går, at hans møde med Kutjma vil finde sted i dag, uden at han havde noget viden om dets sted og tidspunktet for afholdelsen.

15.02.02. Valgkommission afviser på ny Jusjtjenko-dobbeltgænger

Ukraines centrale Valgkommission (CVK) har endnu en gang afvist at registrere blokken "For Jusjtjenko!" som opstillingsberettiget med henvisning til overtrædelser af valglovgivningen under afholdelsen af blokkens sammenlægningskongresser. Denne resolution vedtog CVK den 14. februar efter at have hørt på CVK-medlem Maryna Stavnyjtjuks beretning, oplyser obkom.net.
    Der blev i den forbindelse lagt vægt på, at dokumenterne vidner om, at det kun var Den alukrainske sammenslutning "Jedyna Rodyna" med Oleksandr Rzhavskyj i spidsen der havde truffet sin beslutning om at stifte blokken i pagt med reglerne for valget af folkedeputere; nemlig inden startskuddet på valgkampen officielt havde lydt. De andre politiske partier som deltager i blokken "For Jusjtjenko!" traf deres beslutning om at stifte blokken først efter valgkampen var gået i gang.
    Desuden viste de af CVK gennemgåede dokumenter, at Det slaviske Parti, som indgår i blokken, herunder dets repræsentanter, ikke havde fået fuldmagt fra deres parti til at underskrive aftalen om  "For Jusjtjenko!"-blokken. Med andre ord blev aftalen om stiftelsen af "For Jusjtjenko!"-blokken og opstillingen af kandidater til folkedeputerede fra denne blok indgået i strid med gældende lovgivning.
    P.g.a. fejl i opstillingsprocessen for kandidater til folkedeputerede på "For Jusjtjenko!"- blokkens opstillingsliste er samtlige af blokkens kandidater blevet nægtet registrering som opstillingsberettigede.
    Lederen af "For Jusjtjenko!"-blokken, Oleksandr Rzhavskyj meddelte imidlertid, at han ville indbringe CVKs resolution for Højesteret.
    Ifølge Rzhavskyj har CVK nu for tredje gang afvist at registrere kandidaterne fra "For Jusjtjenko!"-blokken "på det hidtige grundlag selvom de to forudgående beslutninger var blevet underkendt af Højesteret". For så vidt angår CVKs erklæringer om, at de partier, som deltager i blokken, havde overskredet tidsrammerne for afholdelsen af de sammenlæggende kongresser, henledte Rzhavskyj opmærksomheden på, at der i loven af valget af folkedeputerede ingen steder er fastsat et krav om, at den slags kongresser skal afholdes inden valgkampens start.
    Som tidligere omtalt besluttede CVK den 5. febraur at afvise at registrere valgforbundet "For Jusjtjenko!" som opstillingsberettiget. Den 12. februar tog Højesteret stilling til det klagemål over CVKs handlinger, som lederen af "For Jusjtjenko!"-blokken Oleksandr Rzhavskyj havde indgivet, og efterkom det delvist. Højesteret kendte CVKs beslutning om at afvise at registrere "For Jusjtjenko!"-blokken som opstillingsberettiget ulovlig. Retten forpligtede Den centrale Valgkommission til endnu engang at behandle spørgsmålet om registreringen af "For Jusjtjenko!"-blokken.

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