16.05.02. Oppositionen fik vedtaget hemmelig afstemning

16.05.02. Lytvyn kom under beskydning lige fra starten

16.05.02. Arbejdets Ukraine-leder forudser en opsplitning af "JedU"

16.05.02. "JedU"-fraktionen sætter alt ind på at få flertal med SDPU (o)

16.05.02. Lytvyn-Martynjuk-Zintjenko sandsynligvis VRs ny ledelse

Ukraine tilbagegiver stort nodesamling til Tyskland: Krigsbytte fra 2. verdenskrig

17.05.02. Tyskland siger tak til Ukraine for tilbagelevering af Bach-arkiv

17.05.02. Kutjma får et tiltrængt pusterum i "Koltjuga"-sagen

17.05.02. Prodi og Kutjma holdt uformelt møde om EU-Ukraine forholdet

20.05.02. Usikkerhed om nye IMF-kreditter i år

20.05.02. Krigsmonument i Lviv fortsat polsk-ukrainsk stridsæble

21.05.02. "Vores Ukraine" betinger sig demokratiske reformer

21.05.02. Alle fraktioner forhandler om fælles program

21.05.02. Verdensbanken stiller "umulige" betingelser for nyt lån

RUSSIA CONTINUES TO DISRESPECT UKRAINIAN SOVEREIGNTY
RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 6, No. 86, Part I, 9 May 2002

By Taras Kuzio

It took Russia five years after the demise of the USSR to sign an
all-encompassing interstate treaty with Ukraine in 1997, and then a further
two for both chambers of the Russian parliament to ratify that treaty. Three
years later, Russia's actions in a number of areas show that although
Ukraine's borders might no longer be in question, Moscow still finds it
extremely difficult to recognize Ukraine as an equal and sovereign state.
Former Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin was appointed ambassador to
Ukraine and "special presidential envoy for the development of
Russian-Ukrainian trade and economic ties" in May of last year. Since then,
his actions show confusion as to whether he also has a third unofficial
position, that of regional governor. Chernomyrdin's appointment was meant
to consolidate the Russian vector in Ukraine's "multivector" foreign policy as
the primary one at a time when the West was becoming increasingly
disenchanted with Ukraine. During the 31 March elections, Chernomyrdin
openly interfered in favor of pro-presidential parties, helped fan the flames of
an "antinationalist" campaign against pro-Western forces, and chided
Ukrainian Foreign Ministry State Secretary Oleksandr Chaly as "obtuse"
when he listed among Ukraine's goals joining the European Union, not the
alternative Eurasian Economic Community.

Two factors, both of them related to Russian perceptions of national identity,
form Chernomyrdin's gubernatorial style. First, Russia has looked upon the
CIS since its creation in December 1991 as a loose commonwealth or
confederation guided and led by Russia. In Russia's view, other CIS member
states only possess partial sovereignty as the "near abroad," a region that is
no longer part of the USSR but, at the same time, is not as fully sovereign as
the "far abroad." Chernomyrdin and other members of the Russian elite are
hostile to the Our Ukraine election bloc's foreign policy objective of
integration into the European Union and NATO because this is seen as an
attempt at fully breaking from Russia. Hence, Russia's open support for the
pan-Slavic and pro-Soviet Communist Party of Ukraine and for oligarchic
centrist parties that back a foreign policy strategy of "to Europe with
Russia." Second, Russia still finds it difficult to accept Ukraine (and Belarus)
as separate countries with independent statehood. Russian Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov told "Rossiiskaya gazeta" in February that Ukraine and Russia
are destined to be close "strategic partners" because of "our shared linguistic,
religious, cultural, and historical legacy, our kindred mentality..." A year ago,
Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked his Foreign Ministry to protect the
rights of Russian speakers ("compatriots") in the CIS and organized the first
congress of "compatriots" in Moscow last October. Russia has used this
concern for "compatriots" as a pretext for repeated complaints about the
alleged infringement of their rights in education and the media in Ukraine.

Although only the extreme left in Ukraine supports Ukraine's membership of
the Russia-Belarus Union, Russia still holds out hope that this will change. In
an interview in "Trud" in January, Chernomyrdin was asked if a union of the
three eastern Slavic peoples was possible. His reply was indicative: "When
Ukrainian society matures to this point it will opt for such a step." According
to a March poll by the Russian Public Opinion Fund, almost 50 percent of
Russian citizens would like Russia and Ukraine to unite, while another 35
percent believe Ukraine and Russia should remain independent but remove
border restrictions and have no visas or customs controls.

When Russia equates demarcation with erecting a "fence" between two
countries, it is referring to the kind of border demarcation that was formerly
undertaken by the Soviet Union. In Russia's eyes, the only difference
between the former borders between the constituent republics of the USSR
and the present frontiers between CIS states is that the latter can be now
delimited on maps. But this is as far as Russia will go. Demarcation should
only be applied -- as it was in the USSR -- to the "external frontiers" of the
CIS. Chernomyrdin, whose views have been echoed by other Russian
officials, said that "demarcation is out of the question" because it is being
imposed on Ukraine and Russia by the West.

To some extent this is true. Ukraine cannot make good on its rhetoric in
favor of aspiring to become an associate and then full member of the EU if it
has not demarcated its 2,000-kilometer-long eastern border with Russia (the
2,600-kilometer western border was demarcated in the Soviet era). But this
is not the only reason why Ukraine has unsuccessfully pushed for
demarcation. Ukraine's elites have always steadfastly defended their
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to them borders are a symbol of this
sovereignty.

To accept Russia's division of borders in the CIS into delimited "internal" and
delimited-demarcated "external" ones would be to accept a status of only
partial sovereignty. Some 30,000 migrants manage to enter Ukraine each
year because of its transparent border with Russia. The security of the
Russian-Ukrainian border cannot be therefore resolved without demarcation,
according to National Security and Defense Council Secretary Yevhen
Marchuk. As is common with Russian officials who like to speak on behalf
of the CIS, Chernomyrdin claimed that the decision not to proceed with
demarcation was taken by "mutual agreement." This is not the case.
Ukrainian Foreign Ministry First Deputy State Secretary Volodymyr
Yelchenko responded by saying demarcation is an integral part of the
legalization of national borders. Nevertheless, three years after its ratification
of the border treaty, Russia continues to rule out taking the next logical step;
namely, border demarcation. Delimitation of the border is all but settled
except for the Azov Sea, which Russia wants to maintain as a common lake.

In an article published last month in the journal "Nations and Nationalism,"
Vera Tolz outlined advances made in Russian post-Soviet historiography on
Ukraine that she suggested reflect a Russian retreat from its traditional
imperial, "big brother" paternalistic attitude. Nevertheless, Tolz concluded
that it will take decades to redefine Ukrainian-Russian relations "on the basis
of Russia's full acceptance of an independent Ukraine as an equal partner in
the international arena." This would be similar to the protracted process of
Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, which began after World War II but
eventually only bore fruit in the 1980s.
 

22.05.02. Krisen i Ukraines udenrigspolitiske doktrin set fra Warszawa

Den 21. maj ville Georgij Gongadze være fyldt 33

I dag har jeg en helt anderledes skarp fornemmelse af de dage, som jeg tilbringer, fordi jeg råder over en så utilladelig luksus som livet. Og så længe jeg lever, har jeg friheden til at gøre alt det, som samvittigheden påbyder mig.
    Tilbage har jeg mindet om den blide forårsvind der strejfer min kind. Jeg har altid haft lyst til at stille mig med ansigtet mod vinden og mærke dens strøm. Jeg er glad for solen, indimellem sågar en dyster himmel og især torden og regnvejr.
    Men en så lys fornemmelse af livet har jeg ikke altid haft - den kom først efter den smertelige erkendelse af, at HAN aldrig mere kommer til at se det. I begyndelsen fremkaldte det tårer. Nu forstår jeg, hvor vigtigt det er bare at leve. Bare at se på knopskydningen og se børn vokse op.
    Georgij kommer aldrig mere til at se det. Han vil altid være 31, selvom vi i dag markerer hans 33-års fødselsdag - Jesus' alder. Den korsfæstede Georgij er endnu ikke begravet. Der er nu gået over halvanden år.
    Tiden har ingen betydning mere for ham. Han er vigtig for os. Hvert eneste år vil vi blive ældre, og hans børn vil vokse op. Når vi er 50 vil han fortsat være så forbandet ung. Det er hans eneste fordel i forhold til os andre.
    Til forskel fra ham har vi livet i behold, men indimellem kan man spørge sig selv, om det er værd at leve det hundeliv, som nogen af os lever? Den "luksus" kunne han ikke tillade sig. Georgij havde mange ansigter, men han var aldrig gemen eller kujon.
    Mindet om ham er ikke alt, hvad vi skylder at gøre for ham, men bare en lille smule af det, som vi kan.
    Tillykke med fødselsdagen, Georgij!
 

23.05.02. Melnitjenko holdt stor pressebriefing i Washington

23.05.02. Oppositionen fortsætter forhandlinger i parlamentet

UKRAINE'S 'PERIASLAV COMPLEX.'

On 13 March, President Leonid Kuchma issued a decree to commemorate
the 350th anniversary of the Periaslav Treaty of 8 January 1654 between
Ruthenia/Ukraine and Muscovy/Russia. Kuchma ends his second term in
office in October 2004, so the commemoration would therefore be one of
his final acts before leaving office. It would follow two years of "Ukraine
in Russia" and "Russia in Ukraine" celebrations in 2002 and 2003.

The decree appointed Volodymyr Lytvyn, the head of the presidential
administration and the For a United Ukraine election bloc, as the head of
the organizing committee. Other members of the committee were drawn
from the government, Academy of Sciences, parliament, state
administration, and cultural sphere. The activities planned during the
commemoration include academic conferences, roundtables, publication of
books and brochures, cultural events, competitions for students, exhibitions,
and television and radio programs. The Ukrainian and Crimean
governments, and the State Committee on Information, Television, and
Radio were instructed to ensure that all of these events were financed and
efficiently organized.

In the Soviet era the Periaslav Treaty was commemorated as the
"reunion" of two "brotherly peoples" who were united in the medieval state
of Kyiv Rus and later torn apart by foreign intrigue but fated to be always
in union. This was to buttress the argument of Soviet nationality policy that
Russia was the "elder brother" and the sole inheritor of the Kyivan legacy.
An association of equals with Ukrainians was therefore out of the question
as they were "younger brothers" and junior partners. As "union" was the
natural state of affairs, the desire of post-Soviet Belarus to reunite with
Russia is understood as normal while Ukrainian independence is confusing,
abnormal, and unlikely to last. A view still held by the majority of Russian
citizens asserts that Ukraine was never an independent state and
Ukrainians are not a separate nation to Russians.

A small group of Russophiles in Ukraine has continued to promote such a
historiography. Former Crimean President Yuriy Meshkov celebrated the
anniversary of the Periaslav Treaty in January 1994, the same month he
was elected. This year the Russian Movement of Ukraine appealed to
President Kuchma to make 8 January "the day of Russian-Ukrainian
union." The Communist Party of Ukraine also continues to hold similar
views.

Only political forces that oppose Ukrainian statehood continue to subscribe
to this Russophile and Sovietophile historiography, which makes Kuchma's
decree on commemorating the Periaslav Treaty even more baffling. In
post-Soviet Ukraine, historiography is dominated by the statist school that
discusses the Cossacks within the framework of national-liberation
terminology and refers to the 1648 uprising led by Hetman Bohdan
Khmelnytsky as a "Ukrainian national revolution."

Historiography in Russia, coupled with historiography of Russia in the
West, has not changed its views on the Periaslav Treaty. In contrast,
Ukrainian historiography has undergone a radical rewriting since the late
Soviet era on such issues as the Periaslav Treaty. Just after being elected
president and the holding of the referendum on independence on 1
December 1991, Leonid Kravchuk said the empire that had existed since
1654 had ended because of Ukraine's independence. "For me this is a
source of great personal pride," Kravchuk added. On the 400th
anniversary of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's birth in 1995, Kuchma
defined the Periaslav Treaty as giving birth to a new state, Ukraine, which
was independent of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In other words,
not submission to, or "reunion" with Russia as the treaty was traditionally
understood.

Post-Soviet Ukrainian historiography defines the Periaslav Treaty as a
"confederal military alliance" undertaken with Muscovy as the lesser of
two evils, a treaty between two states that were very different in
language, culture, and ethnicity. The treaty was not, therefore, unilateral
submission, as the tsars understood it, or "reunion" as it was defined in the
USSR, but a contractual relationship of two equals between Ukraine and
the Muscovite monarchy. Hetman Khmelnytsky demanded that the
Muscovite tsar take an oath to them, in the same manner as had Polish
kings, a step rejected by the tsar. Ukrainian historiography also now
stresses that the treaty provided for a great deal of autonomy. In
Ukrainian eyes, therefore, the treaty was similar to the 1707 treaty
between Scotland and England; the major difference being that England
respected the contractual arrangement of two equals and Muscovy/Russia
reneged on it.

Kuchma's decree is especially confusing because of the widely shared
view among the intelligentsia and the elite that the Periaslav Treaty was a
disaster for Ukraine. In contrast, Russian/Soviet historiography lauded the
Periaslav Treaty as Ukraine's salvation from Polish Catholic assimilation.
This viewpoint of the treaty as a disaster influences Ukraine's foreign
policy because of the fear that too close a relationship with Russia, as in
the case of Belarus, would be again harmful to Ukraine. Yevhen Marchuk,
the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, saw the treaty
as a complete disaster that led to a decline in Ukraine's national
consciousness. The treaty led to the transfer of the jurisdiction of the Kyiv
Orthodox Metropolitan to Moscow in 1686, a factor that has contemporary
relevance because the largest of Ukraine's three Orthodox Churches is
still subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate.

Over a century after the treaty, Ukraine's autonomy was completely
destroyed. In the 1830s its system of city self-government based on the
Magdeburg law was abolished and the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church
was made illegal in central Ukraine. A few decades later any publication
in the Ukrainian language was banned, a step that was not applied to any
other language in the tsarist empire.

Kravchuk, Marchuk, and the Ukrainian intelligentsia must be therefore
baffled as to what there is in the Periaslav Treaty to commemorate. Its
commemoration is a sad reflection of the schizophrenia found in Kuchma
and some sections of the former Soviet Ukrainian elite, a disposition that
negatively impacts their ability to decide, once and for all, whether Ukraine
belongs to Europe, Eurasia, or straddles both as a "bridge." The Periaslav
Treaty removed Ukraine from the European family of nations, the
newspaper "Ukrayina moloda" argued, and its commemoration at the state
level "signifies that in the near future [Ukraine] will not return to this
family." This is certainly true as long as the current elite remain in power.

24.05.02. Ukraines mål er NATO-medlemsskab

24.05.02. NATO afventende overfor Ukraines tilnærmelse

24.05.02. Jeljashkevytj vil anlægge sag mod Kutjma i USA

27.05.02. Ukrainsk NATO-medlemsskab har lange udsigter

28.05.02. Ukraine risikerer at sætte sig mellem to stole

28.05.02. Oppositionen prøver igen at få valgt sit præsidium

29.05.02. Lytvyn valgt til parlamentsformand med 226 stemmer

29.05.02. Rusland-NATO - Ukraine-NATO

30.05.02. Præsentation af Lytvyn, Vasyljev og Zintjenko

Kilde: Hvem er hvem i Ukraine.

1. viceformand for Verkhovna Rada - Hennadij VASYLJEV. Født i 1953, valgt i enkeltmandskreds nr. 61 i Donetsk-regionen, hvor han blev bakket op af "ZaJedU!".
    Vasyljev var også deputeret i forrige samling, hvor han var medlem af komiteen til bekæmpelse af korruption og organiseret kriminalitet, medlem af det midlertidige udvalg til efterforskningen af Gongadze-sagen og efterforskningen af andre store forbrydelser. I 2000 blev han medlem af gruppen "Arbejdets Ukraine". Inden han i 1998 blev valgt til parlamentet, arbejdede han som statsadvokat for Donetsk-regionen.

Viceformand for Verkhovna Rada - Oleksandr ZINTJENKO, født i 1957, valgt til parlamentet som nr. 3 på SDPU (o)s liste. Siden 1996 medlem af SDPU (o)s råd og politbureau, siden 1998 1. viceformand for partiet. I det afgående parlament var han leder af SDPU (o)s fraktion, formand for udvalget for ytringsfrihed og informationsfrihed. Ærespræsident for TV-stationen Inter. Er uddannet som cand.scient og er medlem af Ukraines nationale televisionsakademi. Har fået tildelt ordenen "Hellige Fyrst Volodymyr af 4. grad".
 

30.05.02. Det russisk-amerikanske topmøde og Ukraines muligheder

30.05.02. OSCE konstaterer ejendommeligt afstemningsmønster

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN UKRAINE UP 14. 3% IN Q1

Foreign direct investment reached $4.53 billion as of April 1 2002.

Foreign investment totaled $237.9 million in January-March, while $116.9 million was withdrawn.

Foreign direct investment amounted to $166.6 million in the first quarter of 2001, while $50.3 million was withdrawn.

Monetary investments amounted to $129 million, or 54.2% of the total, while movable assets and real estate accounted for 26.0%, or $61.9 million.

Foreign direct investment was received from 112 countries.

The largest investments were
$763.3 million from the United States (72.1% of the total),
$485 million from Cyprus (10.7%),
$426.3 million from Britain (9.4%),
$383.8 million from the Netherlands (8.5%),
$317.7 million from Russia (7.0%),
$277.8 million from the Virgin Isles (6.1%),
$251.3 million from Germany (5.5%),
$194.9 million from Switzerland (4.3%), and
$170.5 million from Korea (3.8%).

The most appealing sectors for investment included the food and processing
of agricultural products, which received $806.9 million (17.8% of the total),
while
$673.4 million went into wholesale trade and mediation in trade (14.9%),
$375.4 million to the financial sector (8.3%);
$343.2 million to engineering (7.6%),
$319.4 million to transport (7.0%),
$248.3 million to metallurgy and metal processing (5.5%),
$200.1 million to chemicals and petrochemicals (4.4%), and
$190.8 million on real estate operations, leasing and legal entity services.

Foreign investment went into 7,992 Ukrainian companies.
 

31.05.02. Elites not interested in healing divisions in society

By TARAS KUZIO

As the parliamentary elections this March showed, nationalism remains a
taboo subject in Ukraine. It is still difficult to hold a quiet, intelligent debate
here about a phenomenon that has been an important factor in world history
ever since nation-states started appearing in the late 18th century. In the
Soviet era, intense ideological campaigns were regularly directed against
"Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." The inclusion of the word "bourgeois" in
this epithet was meant to suggest that Ukrainian nationalism was a class
enemy in Marxist-Leninist terms, as well as being an obstacle to the
friendship between the "brotherly" Russian and Ukrainian peoples. In reality,
the term "bourgeois" nationalism was applied indiscriminately to anybody who
upheld national consciousness, including those who held on to the Ukrainian
language in the face of Russification.

As a result, the Soviet Gulag was filled with dissidents who opposed the
Soviet campaign against Ukrainian culture, language and traditions. Divisions
were deliberately fostered between western and eastern Ukrainians. Western
Ukrainians were depicted as bloodthirsty "bourgeois nationalists" or, even
worse, "Banderovtsi" (followers of Stepan Bandera, leader of the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) in the pay of the West.

After a decade of independence, very little has changed. Ukraine's
post-Soviet elites have not sought to overcome regional divisions. As the last
elections showed, they deliberately play them up when threatened by serious
opposition forces. Meanwhile, they have not even begun to initiate a
reconciliation between hostile groups such as veterans of the Soviet army and
supporters of the OUN and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), whose
quarrels go back to the Second World War and the immediate post-war
period. This really should not be so difficult. The Spanish Civil War was also
brutal and yet the different sides have managed to overcome its bitterness
and move on. On the interstate level, Ukraine has notched up some notable
achievements since independence. Poland and Ukraine experienced centuries
of bitter conflict right through to the late 1940s. While there are still
occasional glitches in the relationship between the two countries, in general,
their reconciliation ranks as a European success story alongside the example
of France and Germany post-1945.

Reconciliation between different groups within Ukraine itself appears much
harder to achieve for some reason. This is mainly due to the lack of resolve
and interest on the part of the elites. Ukraine's elites have not attempted to
deal with these questions for two inter-connected reasons. Firstly, regional
divisions allow Ukraine's elites to maintain their self-appointed role as umpires
between the "nationalist west" and the "pro-Russian east." The former Soviet
Ukrainian elites, who are today's oligarch centrists, promote their "pragmatic"
policies as the only means open to Ukrainian society to maintain "zlahoda"
(accord) between different regions and groups. A favorite buzzword among
the elites, "zlahoda" actually means support for stability and the policies of
paternalistic elites who pretend to know what is best for the country and its
citizens. Without this ingredient, it is argued, western and eastern Ukraine
would soon be at each other's throats and Ukraine would disintegrate.

The country's ruling elites therefore have no interest in overcoming regional
divisions or promoting reconciliation along Spanish lines. Such policies would
squeeze out their base of support in eastern and southern Ukraine. The
pro-presidential parties understandably feel threatened by Our Ukraine and
other opposition groups with power bases in western and central Ukraine,
such as the Socialists and Yulia Tymoshenko's bloc. Their response in the last
election was to launch an anti-nationalist campaign that bore all the hallmarks
of the Soviet era, labelling Our Ukraine "nationalists" and accusing it of being
financed by the United States.

Secondly, the former Soviet Ukrainian elite cannot undertake the step of
reconciliation because this would mean dealing with the OUN and UPA as a
part of Ukraine's history, alongside the Soviet war effort, and would remove
them from the field of political debate. By keeping the issue open, the OUN,
UPA and other military formations, such as the Galicia Division of the
Waffen SS, can be wheeled out whenever the elites need them to discredit
their "nationalist" opponents. This is really nothing but a more-refined version
of the Soviet era "anti-nationalist" policy.

The elites are also ideologically amorphous. They lost their faith in
communism back in Brezhnev's "era of stagnation" and were only too happy
to ditch the Communist Party in August 1991. The slogans of Ukraine's
pro-presidential forces and oligarchs, such as "zlahoda," "pragmatic centrism"
and "multi-vectorism," are all designed to mask their complete lack of
ideology. Without any domestic or foreign policies, they instead promote what
the Ukrainian sociologist Yevhen Holovakha calls a "momentocracy." That is,
everybody lives for the moment and short term. In reality, nationalism is not
the exclusive preserve of the "bourgeois," western Ukrainians or Ukrainian
speakers. It can operate through any ideology from extreme left to right. The
Cuban, North Korean and Chinese regimes are at once communist and
nationalist. For Gennady Zyuganov, leader of Russia's Communists, the
"national idea" is more important than Marxism-Leninism. A more liberal type
of civic nationalism is commonly able to exist within the constraints of
Western nation-states.

After a decade of independence, it is clear that Ukraine still lacks the sort of
nationalism/patriotism we find in the West and in developing countries such as
South Korea. The former-Soviet elites who have run Ukraine since
independence cannot promote civic nationalism/patriotism and national
integration because their "centrism" is ideologically empty. Those that prefer a
"momentocracy" see Ukraine as a milking cow to be squeezed dry. It will be
up to the next generation of politicians, less tainted by Soviet cynicism, to
offer the Ukrainian state the patriotic civic nationalism that is the norm in
nation-states. Only when "momentocracy" is replaced by concrete domestic
and foreign policies will Ukraine see a reduction in the gap between elites and
the population, national integration and the overcoming of historical divisions.
By consigning the OUN and UPA to history, the Ukrainian state could
proceed to create a modern civic nationalism - one that allows people to feel
pride in their country on the basis of the successes of domestic and foreign
policies that worked in the national interest, rather than in the interest of
offshore bank accounts and clans that act like an occupying medieval army.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto.