By Taras Kuzio
Ukraine and the European Union held a summit in Copenhagen on 4 July followed five days later by a visit by NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson to Kyiv on the fifth anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine charter. The outcome of both events reflects the skepticism with which Ukraine's strategic foreign policy goal of "returning to Europe" through integration into trans-Atlantic and European structures is still met in Brussels.
In his annual address to parliament in May, President Leonid Kuchma outlined a timetable for the creation of a free-trade area with the EU by 2004, a customs union in 2005-07, signing an associate agreement in 2007, and fulfilling all of the criteria laid out by the EU in order to join the union by 2011. On the eve of the Copenhagen summit, the Ukrainian parliament issued an appeal approved by 257 out of 450 deputies asking the summit to upgrade the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was ratified and put into effect only in 1998, "to a qualitatively new level of development" that would lead to EU membership. But the joint EU-Ukraine summit statement reaffirmed that only the PCA would be the basis "for developing our relations further" (PCAs do not recognize aspirant membership status and were signed only with CIS members, while the EU signed association agreements with other postcommunist states). The EU also refused at the Copenhagen summit to grant Ukraine the status of a "market economy."
Why has Ukraine again failed to convince Europe of its right to join the EU? Denmark, which took over the EU presidency in July, is the only EU member to have closed down its Ukrainian Embassy, itself a reflection of its lack of interest in that country. For the EU it is highly convenient that Ukraine's domestic policies simply reinforce the deeply held view in Brussels that Ukraine is not part of "Europe." Bertel Haarder, Danish Minister for Refugees, Immigration, and Integration, laughed off Kuchma's plan to gradually move into the folds of the EU by 2011 as reminiscent of Soviet-era announcements that communism was on the verge of being achieved, but never actually was. "Instead of statements and expectations for clear signals, the Ukrainian authorities should switch to fulfilling arrangements and fulfilling their declarations," Haarder advised.
A major obstacle to "returning to Europe" is the deeply ingrained Soviet political culture that eastern Ukrainian leaders, such as Kuchma and his oligarchic allies, are seemingly incapable of breaking with. The executive and its oligarchic allies fail to grasp that their unwillingness to resolve the murder of journalists such as Heorhiy Gongadze undercuts their desire to switch from a PCA to an association agreement as the stepping stone to future EU membership. Only nine days after the Copenhagen summit, Our Ukraine member and anti-Kuchma campaigner Oleksandr Zhyr was removed, through a flagrant misuse of the legal system, from contesting repeat elections in Dnipropetrovsk he was set to win. His removal ensured a victory for the pro-Kuchma For a United Ukraine candidate.
The visit by NATO Secretary-General Robertson to Ukraine was more productive than that of the EU summit because the EU has a closed-door while NATO has an open-door policy on membership. Whereas the EU rules out moving from a PCA to an association agreement, NATO is willing to upgrade Ukraine from a charter to a Membership Action plan (MAP), which must be fulfilled for membership. But Ukraine is still at least 10 years away from NATO membership.
For the moment, NATO still doubts Kyiv's willingness to adopt the necessary all-round nonmilitary reforms that make up four of out five MAP sections. Robertson warned that Kyiv would have to display "a sustained commitment to the implementation of political, economic, and defense reforms" and uphold human rights, the rule of law, and freedom of the media.
NATO also remains concerned that Soviet-era ties between CIS intelligence services could compromise shared intelligence between Ukraine and NATO. Ukraine's annual expenditure of $590 million on the military is abysmal and would require a six- to sevenfold increase. Hungary, with armed forces only one-seventh the size of Ukraine's, spends twice as much annually on the military ($1.09 billion), while Poland, with a population only slightly less than Ukraine's, spends $3.58 billion annually. Ukraine spends only $2,900 per serviceman per year, compared to $9,700 by Romania, one of the poorest NATO aspirants, or Poland's $18,000.
The newspaper "Zerkalo nedeli/Dzerkalo tyzhnya" pointed to a lack of enthusiasm in NATO for Ukraine's membership and a Polish newspaper reported that only one-third of NATO members support Ukraine's membership. NATO is also tempering its enthusiasm so as not to damage its new strategic relationship with Russia.
The 23 May decision by Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) to seek NATO membership was transformed into a presidential decree during Robertson's visit. Nevertheless, NATO, like the EU, believes Kuchma issues declarations that go unfulfilled. The government has not, for example, made any attempt to mobilize public support for NATO membership or to create a consolidated position on NATO among the Ukrainian leadership, which presidential administration head and oligarchic Social Democratic Party-united leader Viktor Medvedchuk opposes. A July poll by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies found that the same proportion (32 percent) supported and opposed NATO membership, with 22 percent of Ukrainians undecided.
The EU still continues to rule out Ukraine's membership and it would be only forced to change this position if someone it has faith in to implement Ukraine's "Europeanization," such as former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, was elected president in 2004. If, on the other hand, Kuchma succeeds in engineering the election of a like-minded successor, Ukraine's aspirations for EU membership will be again thwarted for five to 10 years. NATO's secretary-general believes that Ukraine's membership also remains "hypothetical" and "long-term," and that "membership is not on the agenda right now." Nevertheless, at least NATO has not fully ruled out Ukraine's membership, unlike the EU.
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http://www.worldbank.org/transitionnewsletter/julaug99/pgs3-4.htm
World Bank
Transition Newsletter
What Went Wrong with Foreign Advice in Ukraine?
by Vira Nanivska
Reform in Ukraine has been greatly hampered by its government's lack of institutional capacity for policymaking. The reform process was conceived, designed, and guided by donors. So what went wrong? Somehow the political will to go the "Western way" did not manifest itself in concrete policy decisions. The government lacked the institutional capacity to make radical political choices. To fix what has already gone wrong, Western technical assistance must be reassessed and shifted to enable Ukrainians to initiate their own institutional capacity building.
After Ukraine gained independence in December 1991, the general view was that it had great economic potential. Already blessed with well-educated people, abundant natural resources, relatively well-developed industry and agriculture, Ukraine's geographical location in the heart of Europe was also advantageous for world trade.
Lowering High Expectations
Instead of reaching this great potential, however, Ukraine endured one of the world's worst depressions in modern history. Even among the struggling countries of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine stands out as having one of the longest and deepest periods of economic decline--one lasting for nearly nine years and with a contraction in GDP of more than 60 percent. The effect of this economic downturn on the people has been severe. Most Ukrainians live on less than half the income of a few years ago. At least 30 percent--and perhaps up to 75 percent--of families now live below the poverty line. Sickness from preventable causes is rising, death rates are climbing, life expectancy is falling, and the population is shrinking.
Poor policy decisions and the lack of a sound economic strategy have exacerbated the economic decline in Ukraine. While the president and government have articulated a clear, medium-term economic policy, its implementation bears little resemblance to its vision. As a result, Ukraine has stumbled from one crisis to another, and the government has been bogged down in putting out fires.
While reformists did not have the necessary skills, experience, or resources to defend their course, well-organized opposition groups rapidly attracted financial resources and retained social support by successfully using familiar Communist slogans.
[ . . . ]
Donors' Miscalculations
Foreign technical assistance to date has not helped to develop Ukraine's analytic competence inside and outside the government. Recommendations offered to the government by groups of foreign experts who conduct their own research cannot directly be used with any great or lasting effect on Ukrainian policymaking.
[ . . . ]
More Training, Less Advising
On the contrary, Ukraine has paid a high price for early democratization, which has not been matched by the government's institutional capacity to take reform decisions in the presence of opposition and freedom of speech. Market forces, embedded in people's vested interests, thrive in Ukraine. Private initiative is far ahead of regulatory framework, and a "shadow economy" makes up 60 percent of GDP. The problem lies in the reform design. This design did not account for the Soviet institutional legacy and for the market behavior of people who instinctively make money wherever possible and who are unwilling to wait for the proper and correct legislation or procedures to be in place.
[ . . . ]
Peter BakerWashington Post Foreign Service
August 5, 2002; Page A11
KIEV, Ukraine -- Like many former Soviet cities, Kiev retains unmistakable
signs of the past in the form of towering Stalinist buildings in the heart
of downtown. These days, though, the aging behemoths bristle with dozens
of satellite dishes. And they are all pointed west. After a decade of independence
and straddling the line between two worlds, Ukraine has decided that it
wants more from the West than television signals. As Russia draws closer
to the West after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Ukraine fears being left
behind and has set its sights on finally integrating with the rest of Europe.
President Leonid Kuchma announced recently that, after years of flirting, Ukraine plans to seek NATO membership. The two sides are considering how to proceed and, according to a senior diplomat here, may announce this fall that Kiev will begin the application process, which is likely to be an uphill struggle. Kuchma has also put together a task force to work on joining the European Union, setting a goal of becoming an associate member by 2007 and a full member by 2011.
The main obstacle is ambivalence on both sides. The West, especially the United States, has been loath to work with Kuchma because of allegations that he ordered a journalist's murder and shipped military equipment to Iraq. And Kuchma has yet to demonstrate a sustained commitment or capacity to follow through on the painful economic, political and military changes necessary to link up with the West.
"He realizes that Europe is where Ukraine should be," said Markian Bilynskyj, vice president of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation here. "But to undertake the serious reforms it would take would cause severe difficulty -- not for the population, which has already suffered a lot in the last decade, but for powerful political players here."
The stakes are substantial not just for Ukraine but also for the West. Ukraine -- Europe's second-largest country after Russia, and its fourth most populous -- sits at a strategic crossroads with an abundance of natural resources. Its educated if impoverished population of nearly 50 million offers an important workforce and a potentially lucrative market. And, analysts say, anchoring Ukraine in the West would help keep Russia in Europe as well.
Until now, Ukraine has trod carefully in pursuing ties with the West for fear of offending Moscow, and for a time last year Kuchma drew closer to Russia as scandal repelled the West. But now that Russia has created a joint council with NATO, political leaders here believe they have more freedom to maneuver.
Ukraine would seem to have little choice. Europe is integrating its neighbors all around it. If Ukraine does not join the trend, it risks becoming Europe's "gray zone," as legislative leader Yuri Kostenko put it.
"After September 11, Russia achieved Western respect and went to a higher status," said Heorhiy Pocheptsov, a Kuchma adviser and head of his new office for strategic initiatives. "That's why we can follow Russia's steps, because Russia has gone further."
"Suddenly, the geopolitical wind started blowing the other direction," said a senior Western diplomat here. "The internal dynamics are pulling Ukraine to say, at least, that it wants to integrate with Europe. The big question everybody has is, will the leadership stick with it?"
In a gesture of encouragement, NATO Secretary General George Robertson paid a high-profile visit a few weeks ago, as did U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill. NATO and Ukrainian officials are developing a plan to put Kiev on a path toward membership, and NATO will complete a force structure analysis in September. By November, when NATO will hold a summit in Prague, the two sides hope to announce that Ukraine has entered "intensified dialogue" with NATO, the first step toward applying for membership.
In reaching out to the West, Kuchma has allowed U.S. military planes to fly through Ukrainian airspace more than 2,500 times as part of the war on terrorism and has made some halting progress on reforms. Ukraine has achieved notable success in increasing agricultural output by allowing land sales.
But real integration would require a more dramatic break with the past. Vitaliy Opryshko, director of the Institute of Legislation, conducted a study to determine the reforms needed to remodel Ukraine in European fashion. All told, he figured, Ukraine needed 469 new laws.
"Today it's hard to find somebody who's against [integration], because everybody understands that today it's hard to survive on your own," Opryshko said. But "the question of whether to join the European Union or not is not so simple. Are we ready for this? We need to think about it."
All of which has the potential to stoke passionate opposition. Older Ukrainians remain nostalgic for Soviet times and resist the idea of abandoning their Slavic brothers.
"They're trying to pull us into NATO and turn Ukraine into an instrument of their struggle for world empire and an instrument in their struggle against our brothers in Belarus and Russia," complained Nadezhda Trofimova, a regional leader of the Progressive Socialist Party. Yet in reality the West has done little to aid Ukraine's shift because of Kuchma.
A former bodyguard defected in 2000 with secret audiotapes purporting to prove the president conspired to have journalist Heorhiy Gongadze murdered. More recently, the bodyguard produced a transcript of a tape suggesting Kuchma authorized sale of a sophisticated $100 million radar system to Iraq.
Kuchma has disputed the allegations, but U.S. leaders consider him untouchable.
To some here, though, U.S. disengagement has only made a bad situation worse. When Kuchma had Viktor Yushchenko, a pro-Western reformer, as prime minister, Washington provided little new financial assistance, and he was ousted last year after just 16 months.
Legislative leader Kostenko, head of the Ukrainian Popular Movement and a Yushchenko ally, called it "the biggest political mistake." During a visit to Washington, he said he pressed senior U.S. officials: "You give money to all the corrupt governments of Ukraine, but you did not give it to the first non-corrupt democratic government." A White House official told him it reflected "the absence of real Western policy for Ukraine," he said.
Bilynskyj agreed that the White House policy has been one of "benign interest" and noted that it has left U.S. Ambassador Carlos E. Pascual struggling. "You sense that he's frustrated," Bilynskyj said. Pascual declined to comment.
U.S. officials are debating whether to reengage with Ukraine. Policymakers are considering whether to invite Kuchma to a meeting with President Bush and Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski this fall, according to sources familiar with the situation.
Such a prospect worries Kuchma's opponents, who are trying to organize a coalition to give them control of parliament and have rallied behind Yushchenko's presumed presidential bid in 2004. A meeting between Bush and Kuchma "would be an endorsement of what he's doing," said Oleksandr Moroz, head of the Socialist Party and former speaker of the Supreme Council, the parliament.
"Both NATO and the European Union understand perfectly well that Ukraine
is not ready and in the next 10 years won't be ready," he said. "They understand
our Ukrainian politics. This is all political speculation for the purpose
of diverting U.S. and Western attention from illegal arms sales and other
issues."
In some respects, the question of what to do about Ukraine seems easy. Given its huge size, strategic location in southern and central Europe and relatively sophisticated industrial economy, Ukraine is a natural member of the transnational organizations that are slowly spreading across the continent. Without Ukraine, the longstanding Western goal of a Europe "whole and free" will remain incomplete; without an anchor in those institutions, the country's long-term stability and even its viability as an independent nation could be seriously threatened. Yet Ukraine as it exists today is a most difficult partner for the West to take on. Its economy remains a post-Communist shambles, and though it is nominally a democracy, its president, Leonid Kuchma, has frequently resorted to thuggish tactics. His own poll ratings are in single digits, but Mr. Kuchma managed to manipulate a recent parliamentary election so that his cronies, rather than opposition parties that won 70 percent of the popular vote, maintained control.
Of even greater concern is Ukraine's involvement in improper arms trafficking and service as a transit point for illegal drugs and other contraband. Flouting Western appeals, Ukraine's big weapons companies have shipped arms to Macedonia, Serbia and East Africa; secretly recorded audiotapes suggest that Mr. Kuchma himself at least discussed selling sophisticated antiaircraft systems to Iraq. Iraq recently opened an embassy in Kiev and announced it was interested in purchasing Ukrainian industrial goods and technology.
The Bush administration and most European governments have steadily distanced themselves from Mr. Kuchma. Congress has reduced U.S. aid. Some officials argue that Ukraine should not be invited even to begin discussions with NATO on conditions for becoming a member, at least as long as Mr. Kuchma and his cronies are in power. But NATO, which has laid out comprehensive and detailed reform programs for each of the countries seeking membership offers later this year, could also provide a structure for long-term change by Ukraine. A dialogue could constructively begin on such issues as arms sales, drug trafficking and military reform, with the understanding that these are the first steps in a membership preparation process that could extend for a decade. Making countries such as Ukraine fit for the club of Western democracies may not be NATO's first purpose, but the alliance is the best vehicle that exists for managing what is, ultimately, a transition vital to long-term European security.
© 2002 The Washington Post Company
Aside from the 1.4% monthly rise in consumer prices recorded in April--sparked primarily by an increase in food prices--Ukraine has seen unseasonal deflation in three of the last four months, which has accentuated the sharp slowdown in inflation seen over the past year. By May year-on-year inflation had fallen to a record low of 1.4% (compared with 15.1% in May 2001) and the consumer price index stood unchanged from the start of the year.
Deflation in February and March was partly a reflection of political factors, with local officials ensuring price caps on basic food items in advance of the election, and the central government resisting any moves to raise electricity tariffs. However, it also reflects the bumper grain harvest recorded in 2001, which reduced food prices (food items are heavily weighted in the consumer basket). Although an EU decision to raise duties on Ukrainian wheat exports resulted in a significant drop in domestic wheat prices in May, the major contributors to deflation in that month were a drop in prices of services, milk and eggs.
A stable exchange rate and weak commodity prices have played a major role in ensuring consumer price stability over the past year. In the coming year, a gradually weakening exchange rate, as well as a rise in international prices for energy and manufactures as a result of global economic recovery, should cause inflation to accelerate. Higher domestic energy tariffs (a precondition for both World Bank funding and successful energy privatisation), as well as moderate rises in the prices of telecommunications and transport, are also anticipated during the second half of 2002. Given the need to boost interest in upcoming privatisations, a long overdue increase in service prices is also expected to take place in the second half of the year.
The hryvnya remained relatively stable in nominal terms against the US dollar, the rouble and the euro over the first five months of 2002. Two factors helped in this regard: the tight control over foreign-exchange markets maintained by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU, the central bank) and the large surplus of trade in goods and services. Because consumer price inflation in Ukraine was low relative to its trading partners over this period, this nominal stability translated into a slight real depreciation against the currencies of the US and the euro zone, and a stronger real depreciation against the rouble.
Although the market has anticipated a gradual depreciation for some
time, owing to slower export growth and a drying up of privatisation-related
inflows, the NBU continues to prioritise currency and price stability over
external competitiveness. The hrynvya's recent real effective depreciation
will have helped to fend off calls for swifter nominal depreciation-- although
pressure from both business and government circles is likely to force the
NBU to accept greater currency softening over the remainder of the year.
In real effective terms, the hryvnya still remains some way below the level
it reached before the 1998 financial crisis, when it was overvalued to
an even greater extent.
by Taras Kuzio
The political, economic and cultural stagnation of the second half of Leonid Kuchma's second term is fueling growing regional tension. Whereas in the past, such movements have been mainly associated with Donbas and Crimea, now discontent is rising in Galicia and more broadly western Ukraine. That these issues are being widely discussed in influential and respected Ukrainian publications suggests that they should be taken seriously, and not just dismissed as the ravings of a small group of crackpots.
In general, demands for federalism, autonomy and separation are protectionist measures against an actual or perceived threat from elsewhere. This is true of western Ukraine, which has always been the heartland of the Ukrainian national consciousness, and was the region that produced the most dissidents during the Soviet era and propelled Ukraine to independence in 1989-1991.
Historically, Ukraine has a tradition of supporting autonomist and federalist projects. Mykhailo Drahomaniv, the late 19th century political theorist, was a supporter of federalism. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the doyen of Ukrainian historiography and (unelected) president of the Central Rada of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) in 1917-1918, advocated a German-style federal arrangement of "lands" (lander). When the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) united with the UNR in January 1919, it did so on the basis of an agreement that it would be accorded autonomy.
Autonomist sentiment resurfaced in Galicia in March 1990 after republican and local elections had removed the Communist Party from power in all three Galician oblasts -- Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil. The then-leader of Rukh, Vyacheslav Chornovil, who was elected chairman of Lviv Oblast Council, wanted to create a mechanism to safeguard the democratic victory in Galicia from the remainder of Communist-ruled Ukraine. He proposed a Galician Assembly, which would promote the transformation of Ukraine along federal lines, the ultimate goal of which was to convert 24 oblasts into 10 or more "lands."
Elites sideline westerners
With the sudden arrival of independence in January 1992, Rukh dropped its backing for federalism and the Galician Assembly was discarded. President Leonid Kravchuk was not a supporter of federalism, which he feared would lead inevitably to Ukraine's disintegration. The only exception Kravchuk made was Crimea, which was allowed to change from an oblast to an autonomous republic after a local referendum in January 1991. Speaking at a conference at the University of Birmingham in 1996, Kravchuk said that he had little choice in the matter. If Kyiv failed to grant autonomy, the Crimeans were threatening to appeal to the USSR's Supreme Soviet to annul the 1954 decision transferring Crimea from Russia to Ukraine. This meant that Ukraine would have become independent without Crimea.
Autonomist and federalist sentiment raised their heads again in Donbas and Crimea in 1993-1995.
In Crimea in the early 1990s, autonomist sentiment grew into a full-blown separatist movement. Yury Meshkov, the head of the Russia Bloc, was elected as Crimean president in January 1994. This separatist movement proved short-lived, however, collapsing in early 1995 when President Kuchma abolished the institution of the Crimean president. The separatist Russia Bloc could not compete against the pro-autonomist "party of power" (the Party of Economic Revival of Crimea, and later the People's Democrats) or the far larger Crimean Communists, who supported autonomy within Ukraine, in the belief that it would ultimately return to a revived USSR.
In Donbas, the autonomist movement was at the time said to reflect resistance to the "Ukrainianization" policies Kravchuk was promoting in alliance with the national democrats. However, the real reasons were different. The eastern elites from Dnipropetrovsk and Donbas, who had run Ukraine during the Soviet era, felt excluded from what they saw as their rightful share of the benefits of running the country.
Since eastern Ukraine had remained largely passive in the drive for independence, Kravchuk was forced to rely on the Kyiv elites and his national democratic allies. This kind of alliance was not unique to Ukraine. Regional elites that had ruled Soviet republics were also replaced in the three Baltic states, Moldova, Tajikistan (where it led to a civil war between the north and south) and elsewhere.
Eastern Ukraine wanted to return to being "top dog" in independent Ukraine, and the general economic collapse and hyper-inflation of 1993 allowed the eastern Ukrainian elites to mobilize disgruntled coal miners against Kravchuk. President Kravchuk was forced to replace the incompetent Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma with Yufym Zvyahilsky, a coal boss and former mayor of Donetsk.
The election of Kuchma as president in July 1994 marked a return to the Soviet-era domination of the "Dnipropetrovsk mafia." Western Ukraine has been sidelined ever since. Ukraine's stagnation today is therefore reminiscent of the "era of stagnation" under Leonid Brezhnev. Galician resentment grows
Ukraine's "era of stagnation" has produced a new movement for federalism and autonomy in Galicia, where it was originally propagated in 1990. Taras Wozniak, editor of the journal "Ji" (I) and head of foreign affairs for the Lviv city council, has championed the ideas of Galician autonomy and a federal territorial-administrative structure for Ukraine [see "Ukraine should consider federalism," Kyiv Post, May 23]. His ideas have been supported by the local newspaper Postup, which has its origins in the samizdat Post Postup newsletter published in the late Soviet era by the Tovarystvo Lev NGO. Other writers published articles supporting Wozniak's proposals in a recent issue of the well-known literary-political monthly Suchasnist, and at various times in the Internet-based Ukrainska Pravda and the daily newspaper Den.
The reason for the popularity of these ideas should be clear. Galicia and western Ukraine have felt excluded from running the country since Kuchma returned Ukraine to rule in the Soviet tradition after 1994. Western Ukraine is in a severe socio-economic crisis and survives largely thanks to funds sent home by locals working abroad, often illegally, or from shuttle trade with Poland and other central European countries. During the Kuchmagate crisis in early 2001, most of the demonstrators were from west Ukraine and Kyiv. Now the region feels cheated by Kuchma's unwillingness to accept the victory in the March parliament elections of Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc, which swept western and central Ukraine. The executive's antics in forcing Volodymyr Lytvyn into the position of Rada speaker, and its refusal to replace Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh after the bloc he supported (For a United Ukraine) received only 12 percent of the vote are all contributing to a sense of Ukraine's new "era of stagnation." The air show disaster in Lviv on July 27 is also bound to increase anti-Kuchma feeling in the region.
Galicia and western Ukraine also feel threatened by what they see as the Kyiv authorities' "Little Russian" cultural policies, which continue Soviet-era Russification. The view of the "Dnipropetrovsk mafia" that Ukraine should "re-join Europe together with Russia" is also disconcerting to western Ukrainians. They understand very well that this means Ukraine will never "re-join Europe" since Russia has never expressed a desire to join either the EU or NATO.
While it seems unlikely at the moment that Galicia will ever campaign for outright separatism, the threat clearly exists. A recent article in the Polish magazine Polityka reprinted on the Ukrainska Pravda Web site claimed that slogans have appeared on walls in Lviv calling for "Nezaleznist Halycyny!" (Independence for Galicia) written in Latin letters to emphasize the point. A local poll also found that 40 per cent of Galicians would support their region's separation if Kyiv decided to ever join the Russian-Belarusian union.
In the next two years Ukraine's territorial integrity will be severely tested by three events. First, the negative psychological effect of the introduction of visas by Poland in July 2003 will be greater in western Ukraine than in other regions. Second, the enlargement of NATO and the EU in 2002-2004 will bypass Ukraine, intensifying the feeling of being shut out of "Europe." Third, regional disgruntlement in western Ukraine will grow if the 2004 presidential elections lead to the victory of Kuchma’s chosen successor.
One can only imagine the stagnation awaiting Ukraine during another
two terms under a ruler cast in Kuchma's mould. Ukraine would probably
have to change its foreign policy from "returning to Europe" to "returning
to Eurasia." But in that case, it might have to do so without Galicia.
The Ukrainian parliament on 4 July approved by 347 votes President Leonid Kuchma's candidate for prosecutor-general, Svyatoslav Pyskun. Less than a month into his new position, Pyskun's first major move was to reopen the case against anti-Kuchma oppositionist Yuliya Tymoshenko, accusing her of violating eight articles of the Criminal Code. This follows the arrest of four of her former colleagues from Unified Energy Systems, which she headed in the mid-1990s, in Turkey on 1 June. The Ukrainian authorities are demanding their extradition to Ukraine.
Pyskun is a former lieutenant general in the State Tax Administration (DPA) and served since May as that organization's deputy head. Pyskun's appointment consolidates the growing power of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine-united (SDPU-o), whose leader, Viktor Medvedchuk, is now head of the presidential administration. Pyskun and Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh have close ties to Medvedchuk's SDPU-o clan.
The Prosecutor-General's Office had long been discredited under its previous head, Mykhaylo Potebenko, who was elected to parliament on the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) list, because of his failure to reduce the extent of oligarchic and executive corruption. He had also failed to make any progress in solving the murder of opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze.
Pyskun promised shortly after his appointment to rid Ukraine of corruption and resolve Gongadze's murder. But as a Kuchma appointee, Pyskun is unlikely to succeed in eradicating corruption, which has always been targeted in a highly selective manner. Corrupt oligarchs who have supported Kuchma financially or politically have never been investigated.
Yuliya Tymoshenko and, after he was allowed to flee Ukraine, former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko were only accused of corruption charges after they went into political opposition to Kuchma. A Kyiv court ruled on 30 April that criminal charges against Tymoshenko and her husband, Oleksandr, who was arrested earlier in August 2000, were "groundless."
In reopening the case against Tymoshenko, Pyskun is continuing his predecessor's policy of only accusing of "corruption" individuals who are in opposition to the executive. As the newspaper "Zerkalo nedeli/Dzerkalo tyzhnya" noted in its 6-13 July edition, "People from the world of big money have become the major driving force behind Pyskun's success." Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz accused Kuchma of being directly behind Pyskun's new move against Tymoshenko, which, according to Moroz, is an attempt to intimidate the opposition ahead of an announced protest action in September. Pyskun is further discrediting the Prosecutor-General's Office, Moroz believes, by refusing to investigate the oligarchs' involvement in corruption. But opening any cases against oligarchs would be impossible now that Medvedchuk is head of the presidential administration.
As for the Gongadze case, President Kuchma said in a BBC Television documentary aired in April, "Killing the Story," that he is interested above all in resolving the murder. The most contentious issue will be whether Pyskun utilizes the tapes made illicitly by security guard Mykola Melnychenko in Kuchma's office, the FBI expert reports on the tapes, and the testimony Melnychenko has offered to give in the United States in the investigation. Pyskun has created a new investigative group on Gongadze and has hinted at undertaking a fifth autopsy on the headless corpse found in November 2000.
Why is Pyskun in such a hurry to deal with this case, which is not the only example of political repression or intimidation of journalists? And why is Pyskun in such a hurry to establish his credentials as an "anticorruption" fighter? Two factors may have a bearing on this urgency.
The first is the presidential elections due in October 2004. The Gongadze scandal is one of the main reasons why Kuchma is so discredited domestically. The "Kuchmagate" affair that erupted after November 2000 led to the creation of Ukraine's largest protest movements and the defeat of the pro-Kuchma For a United Ukraine (ZYU) in the March elections. Any candidate proposed by Kuchma to replace him as his chosen successor would stand little chance of being elected, unless Kuchma succeeds in salvaging his image.
Ukraine's political spectrum is now evenly divided into two camps. Four ideologically driven opposition groups on the left and right (Socialists, Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Bloc, and the Communists) are pitted against an ideologically amorphous, pro-Kuchma, oligarchic center that has grown out of ZYU and the SDPU-o. The latter is working with Kuchma to ensure stage-managed presidential elections that would lead to a victory by Kuchma's hand-picked successor and his immunity from prosecution. The former seeks to push for early elections, and most want Kuchma impeached. Each side has 218 deputies in parliament, a factor that may make it difficult for Pyskun to obtain the required 226 votes to remove Tymoshenko's immunity unless the Communists switch sides and back the move.
Second, Pyskun was heavily involved in launching a trumped-up criminal case of "corruption" against Borys Feldman's Slovyanskyy bank and Tymoshenko (which is why her bloc voted against Pyskun's appointment). The executive tried every method to prevent the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc from entering parliament but failed. In a May poll conducted by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, Tymoshenko was seen by Ukrainians as the most radical of the four opposition groups. The poll found that her popularity had increased from 5.7 in December 2001 to 14.2 percent today, just 13 percentage points fewer than Yushchenko. She is ready to replace Yushchenko as opposition presidential candidate if he fails to rise to the challenge. Interviewed in "Moloda Ukrayina" on July 25, Tymoshenko warned that, "If we see that Mr. Yushchenko's team is not able to protect Ukraine, then we will strive to attain power independently. A potential candidate should prove his right to lay claim to this post through consistent and decisive actions and through responsibility before the people."
Pyskun's new case against Tymoshenko is Kuchma's response to Tymoshenko's prioritization of impeachment proceedings in the newly elected Verkhovna Rada, the creation of the Tymoshenko-backed Citizens Defense Committee Against Tyranny, and the threat felt by Kuchma from the uniting of four opposition groups for the first time. The opposition plans to launch mass protests calling for early presidential elections on 16 September, the second anniversary of Gongadze's abduction. During the "Kuchmagate" scandal of 2000-01, the Communists did not back the opposition, while Yushchenko was forced to be neutral as he was then prime minister and had not yet united Ukraine's national democrats into the Our Ukraine Bloc.
Pyskun's appointment to the position of prosecutor-general is not a
sign of progress in the rule of law in Ukraine, as the executive has now
combined two state institutions -- the State Tax Administration and the
Prosecutor-General's Office -- into one office that is already being used
to pursue political repression ahead of the presidential elections.
Below is a translation of the "Ukrayinska pravda" transcript of the conversation, with "stage directions" supplied by the website. The language of the conversation is very strong in its obscenity and spontaneous anti-Semitism, but "RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report" decided to reproduce it as closely as possible to the original (with some original terms supplied in brackets) in order to let readers experience the flavor of the vernacular -- essentially Russian, but with Ukrainian intrusions -- that apparently is used in Ukraine's corridors of power.
The "Ukrayinska pravda" transcript:
The office of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.
A conversation in the office between Leonid Kuchma and then-Ukrainian Security Service Chairman Leonid Derkach. A television set is on with a live broadcast of a session of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada.
People's Deputy of Ukraine Oleksandr Yelyashkevych is addressing the session of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada.
Leonid Kuchma, instantly agitated by Yelyashkevych's proposals, breaks off his conversation with Derkach.
KUCHMA: [Very loudly, in a state of extreme agitation]: Here is a f**king [blyad] Yiddish sprout [zhydenysh]!
Yelyashkevych continues to address the session, while Kuchma and Derkach suddenly begin to speak in low voice.
KUCHMA: He will get [what's coming to him].
DERKACH: F**k him up!
KUCHMA: F**k him up! Let's [do it]! Let the little Jew [evreichik] be handled by yids [zhydy]!
DERKACH: Be handled and done for. What does he f**king think [he is], in the end? [Let them] beat him a little and say: Prick [mudak]!
KUCHMA: Let the yids [handle] the yid! Well, I agree. [The name of the man charged with the direct task of organizing an assault is voiced -- "Ukrayinska pravda" website's note.]
DERKACH: Let's hurry! At this moment, parliamentary speaker Ivan Plyushch begins to comment on one of Yelyashkevych's proposals that was voiced shortly before [regarding the announcement of a recess in the session to hold consultations among the leaders of all parliamentary caucuses]. Kuchma, agitated by this, says loudly in his characteristic style that the speaker has to continue the session without announcing a recess before the time stipulated by parliamentary regulations.
KUCHMA: Drag it out until 12:00, you motherf**ker! The conversation between Kuchma and Derkach, interrupted for a moment, resumes.
DERKACH: He'll meet his end!
KUCHMA: You arrange everything.
DERKACH: By what date?
KUCHMA: Tomorrow.
DERKACH: Good. He'll be at home!
tsb: Finish [him] off! He, the little yid [zhydok], will f**king get [what he's got coming]!
Kuchma tries to reach first deputy speaker [Viktor] Medvedchuk by phone, but it is impossible to connect with him for the moment. Medvedchuk is in the presidium in the session hall, and it is impossible to find an assistant who has the right to enter the session hall to summon [Medvedchuk to the phone].
Kuchma becomes extremely nervous. He switches to exquisitely vile swearwords. He demands that he be immediately connected with Medvedchuk, [and] he demands that Medvedchuk's secretary be sacked.
Eight minutes after his previous address, Yelyashkevych is once again allowed to take the floor. His speech is heard in the presidential office. Comments in low voices are heard.
DERKACH: He will get [what he's got coming]! At this moment, Kuchma begins to talk with Medvedchuk on the phone.
KUCHMA: [loudly and very swiftly, mumbling]: Hello! [unintelligible] Listen! There is no need to take an early break. It is necessary to continue until 12. Otherwise, they will celebrate a victory. They will mess up everything. Under no circumstances. Drag it out. Any issues [you like]. Good.
Kuchma and Derkach again listen to deputy Yelyashkevych's speech. Kuchma says in low voice:
KUCHMA: Let them beat him! He's become impudent, that son of a bitch [suka]!
...AND SUGGEST THAT KUCHMA WAS NOT ONLY TAPED, BUT ALSO TAPED OTHERS. The "Ukrayinska pravda" website on 5 August published a transcript of what it claims to be a secret audio recording made by former presidential bodyguard Melnychenko of President Kuchma's conversation on 9 September 2000 with then-Security Service Chairman Derkach. The recording, the website says, testifies to the fact that Ukraine's Security Service successfully bugged embassies of several NATO countries (including Turkey and Spain) and -- "if Derkach did not lie" -- broke the codes of secret messages sent by those embassies to their governments. As in the above transcript, the website supplied "stage directions."
The "Ukrayinska pravda" transcript:
9 September 2000 Kuchma's office Ukrainian Security Service Chairman Leonid Derkach reports [to the president].
Kuchma rustles papers that Derkach brought him.
DERKACH: All these are a decoding of the... The embassy sends classified information to Spain -- we read it. And we read Turkey as well. We have taken programs from Switzerland, [as well as] algorithms and some equipment. Most likely, five [or] six pieces more, and [we] should [one word is unintelligible -- website's note] 26 other states. Kuchma continues to rustle papers.
DERKACH: These are all three, almost one by one [literal translation -- compiler's note]. And here is one more.
KUCHMA: What's this?
DERKACH: A scheme how to ship out [vyvezti] millions of hryvnas.
(Jan Maksymiuk)
An Aug. 8 editorial about the prospects for Ukraine's integration into the West said President Leonid Kuchma "has frequently resorted to thuggish tactics," a groundless and politically motivated accusation. Moreover, its statements about the manipulation of the recent parliamentary elections in Ukraine are inconsistent with the conclusions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, European Union and other international observers.
Ukraine's economy is far from being a shambles, as the editorial claimed. Last year Ukraine's GDP grew by 9.1 percent; this year's 4.3 percent GDP growth ranks Ukraine among the most dynamic economies in Eastern Europe.
I further refute allegations of Ukraine's illegal selling of armaments. Neither the United Nations nor the U.S. government has ever given credit to them. I also was surprised by The Post's negative emphasis on the fact that Iraq opened an embassy in Ukraine; many European capitals have Iraqi embassies.
In regard to the selling of arms to Macedonia, the transactions were conducted pursuant to contracts concluded before the outbreak of hostilities in that country. In response to Western appeals, Ukraine suspended shipment of heavy weaponry to Macedonia and reached an understanding on this issue within the NATO framework.
The editorial said Ukraine was "a transit point for illegal drugs and other contraband." Combating these crimes remains one of the priorities of Ukraine's policy. Despite Ukraine's requests, Western countries are still hesitant about rendering adequate support for upgrading border infrastructure. Nevertheless, Ukraine pursues an open policy and will address this problem during a conference on border control, international terrorism, illegal migration and drug trafficking in November.
VOLODYMYR YATSENKIVSKYI
Charge d'Affaires
Embassy of Ukraine
Washington
The only pleasant associations they saw in Ukraine were "culture" and sports. The company which commissioned the study, Ukraine Cognita," when releasing the study, announced that it had applied to the Ukrainian government for a grant of 20 million Hryvnia's to bolster the image of the country.
It plans to do this by first inviting a group of 20 or so journalists to tour parts of the country and show them the finer side of Ukrainian reality. This might indeed be a painless way of improving the image in the short term, but in the greater picture it would be a terrible waste of money. In order to improve Ukraine's image in a meaningful way, much more needs to be done then merely wining and dining 20 journalists so that they in turn would write nice articles about Ukraine.
A few suggestions which might save Ukrainian taxpayers 20 million hryvnia's and dramatically improve Ukraine's image can be as follows:
President Leonid Kuchma should resign his position as President of Ukraine
immediately and new elections be held within a period set by parliament.
He is the person most responsible for Ukraine's terrible image and there
is no way that a Ukrainian state led by Kuchma will ever improve its image
in the world.
The real killers of Gongadze must be arrested and tried in a court
of law. Those among them who presently hold parliamentary immunity must
of deprived of this shield. Their names are not a state secret and every
reasonable person who has followed developments in the case knows their
names, as does Mr. Piskun, the new Prosecutor General. For some strange
reason however, he pretends that he knows nothings and insists that elected
members of parliament and journalists also refrain from learning the truth
- under penalty of prosecution. Mr. Piskun promised to bring the killers
of Gongadze to trial in 6 months, by January 2003. Will he keep his promise
to a parliament which confirmed him, or will he continue to push Ukraine's
image into the gutter as his predecessor Poteben'ko did?
Those responsible for illegal arms sales to criminal regimes and those
who stole millions, including those now hiding in parliament, must be prosecuted
to the full extent of the law. This includes such people as Alexander Volkov
for his alleged money laundering and other illegal acts; Andriy Derkach
for his alleged involvement in illegal arms sales and financial crimes,
Ihor Bakaj for alleged fraud and depriving the state treasury of millions
of dollars by his activity as head of Naftogaz Ukraina. Mykola Azarov must
be brought to trial for abusing his official position by activities which
were highly illegal. Mykola Poteben'ko should be tried for obstructing
justice and possibly receiving bribes. Vadym Rabinovich should be made
to stand trial for his alleged involvement in the illegal arms trade. Yuriy
Lytvyn should be made to answer charges of being an accomplice to a number
of high crimes. Oleksander Tkachenko should be made to stand trial for
alleged fraud. Gregoriy Surkis should be investigated for possible involvement
in the murder of Jefferey Ostrovsky in New York. This is the short list.
The long list is too long to elaborate upon. Once they are indicted and
placed on trial you can count upon Ukraine's' image to dramatically improve.
The Ukrainian military must be brought under civilian control before
it is too late. Their record of incompetent criminal behavior followed
by cover-ups reached its limits by the downing of the Russian airplane
over the Black Sea and the tragedy at the Lviv Air Show disaster. It seems
that the military leadership of the country cannot be trusted to command
when left to it's own cadres. If anything, they are a major factor for
Ukraine's terrible image of a state out of control.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be investigated for possible
criminal activities, including bribe taking for assigning positions abroad,
illegal commercial activities, incompetence of some of its staff and mismanagement.
The SBU should be deprived of a role in domestic police work. It cannot
be a tool of the President to gather compromising information about his
political opponents. The numerous illegal operations mounted by Mr. Leonid
Derkach when he headed the SBU contributed greatly to the image of Ukraine
becoming what it is today. This seems to have ceased under the new management,
but it can emerge again.
Ukraine's borders should be made more visitor friendly. The long and
complicated entry procedures, the needless redundant paperwork and the
often hostile attitude of the border inspectors all contribute to a shocking
"welcome to Ukraine" for first time visitors. Why is it that Poland, the
Czech Republic, Hungary and other former socialist countries have managed
to make their entry points friendly and welcoming, while the protectors
of Ukrainian borders are still more geared to keeping Western spies out
of the country then making visitors feel welcome? The Soviet era managers
of Ukrainian borders should once and for all be told that the cold war
has ended, that Ukraine wants to join NATO and that visitors from the West
are not saboteurs and agents, but VIP's who do not want to pay the outrageous
bribe charged by the "VIP Lounge" in order to be treated as people.
Ukraine, as they say, must "clean up its act" and then its image will
improve very rapidly. There are many people in the West who want to see
Ukraine succeed and join the European community of states. The image will
not improve however, if the hard political and legal measures are avoided.
It is no use trying to fool the World by pretending that the cause of Ukraine's
poor image is the Western press which is "hostile to Ukraine." This is
nonsense. You do not shoot the messenger of bad news.
| Sandsynlig præsidentkandidat | august 2002 i % | juni 2002 i % |
| Viktor Jusjtjenko (centrum-højre) | 23,8 | 26,2 |
| Petro Symonenko (kommunist) | 11,9 | 13,5 |
| Julia Tymoshenko (centrum-venstre) | 5,9 | 6,2 |
| Viktor Medvedtjuk (socialdemokrat) | 5,8 | 9,4 |
| Natalia Vitrenko (progressiv socialist) | 5,1 | 5,5 |
| Oleksandr Moroz (socialist) | 3,8 | 4,4 |
| Anatolij Kinakh (centrum) | 3,3 | 3,5 |
| Volodymyr Lytvyn (centrum) | 1,8 | 1,7 |
| Oleh Dubyna (centrum) | 1,0 | 0,9 |
| Volodymyr Seminozhenko (centrum) | 0,5 | 0,3 |
| Serhij Tihipko (centrum) | 0,4 | 0,8 |
| Ville stemme mod alle | 11,1 | 10,0 |
| Ville boykotte valget | 9,5 | 6,8 |
| Ved ikke | 16,1 | 10,8 |
Razumkov-centret er et uafhængigt meningsmålingsinstitut,
der sympatiserer med Jusjtjenko. Det har gennemført sin rundspørge
blandt 2004 personer i dagene fra den 7. til den 16. august.
På trods af, at han er stort set afskåret
fra medierne fortsætter lederen af "Vores Ukraine" Viktor Jusjtjenko
med at være vælgernes klare favorit. Hele 25,1% af ukrainerne
støtter ham fuldt ud, mens 33% støtter nogle af hans tiltag.
Jusjtjenko efterfølges af Petro Symonenko,
som støttes fuldt ud af 13,9% og delvist af 22,4%. Tredjepladsen
indehaves af den nuværende regeringschef Anatolij Kinakh og oppositionslederen
Julia Tymoshenko, som begge fuldt ud støttes af 10,7% af ukrainerne.
Dele af premierministerens tiltag støttes af hele 40,9% af vælgerne,
mens Julia Tymoshenko må nøjes med 21,8%.
Dernæst følger Viktor Medvedtjuk, som
støttes fuldt ud af 9,7% og delvist af 29,3%. Medvedtjuks tilslutning
er dalet efter at han er blevet udpeget til præsidentens stabschef.
I juni blev han nemlig bakket op fuldt ud af 13,4% og delvist af 34,5%.
Præsident Kutjmas tal er henholdsvis 6,4%
og 32% og er dermed lavere end oppositionsledernes, premierministerens
og sin egen stabschef.
De mindst afholdte politikere i Ukraine er Natalia
Vitrenko, som har 57,3% af vælgerne imod sig, dernæst kommer
Leonid Kutjma med 54,1% af vælgerne skarpt forfulgt af sin hovedmodstander,
Julia Tymoshenko med 52,6%.
Lederen af Razumkov-centeret, Anatolij Hrytsenko,
siger, at hovedkonklusionen må være, at styrets kandidat ikke
vil kunne opnå det nødvendige antal stemmer for at komme i
anden runde af præsidentvalget. "Parret Jusjtjenko-Symonenko har
ligget i spidsen i halvanden års tid. Hvis der var valg i dag, ville
Jusjtjenko vinde overbevisende".
Som Razumkov-centerets undersøgelse viser,
så har Vestukraine allerede valgt Jusjtjenko til sin præsident.
53,1% af vælgerne i Vestukraine ville stemme på ham i dag.
I Centralukraine er Jusjtjenkos tilslutning på 27,6%. Syd-og Østukraine
er de steder, hvor Jusjtjenko står relativt svagt med hhv. 9,2% og
10,1%.
De oppositionelle kandidater opnår over tre
gange så mange stemmer tilsammen som de pro-præsidentielle,
mener Razumkov. UP.
The subject of Ukraine's 'EuroAtlantic future' has been broached on a theoretical level at the conference's two predecessors - Roundtables I and II. Roundtable III: "Ukraine and the EuroAltantic Community" will take into account Ukraine's efforts to move matters from theory to practice, as exemplified by its firm backing of the U.S.-led struggle against global terrorism, its various probes to stimulate serious discussion concerning its entry into the EU, and its formal request, announced on May 24, 2002, to be considered a candidate for NATO membership
The two-day conference, which will be held at the JW Marriott on Pennsylvania
Avenue in the heart of our nation's capital, will feature twelve panels,
held during the course of four regular sessions, two working luncheons,
and four special focus sessions. Additionally, Roundtable III will play
host to two evening receptions -- including a celebration dedicated to
marking a special event for the Ukrainian American community -- the 25th
Anniversary of the Ukrainian National Information Service.
Copyright (c) Dansk-Ukrainsk Selskab og Ivan Nester