16.11.02. Enten rejser Kutjma til Prag eller også rejser ingen

16.11.02. Kutjma: Medvedtjuk stiller ikke op til præsident i 2004

16.11.02. "Koltjuga"-sagen kan fortsætte i FN-regi

18.11.02. Ithacan (NY) looks to invest in development project in Ukraine

Jahjah first went to Ukraine in July on the invitation of Cohen. There he doled out business advice and sought investment opportunities in the eastern European country. While Ukraine is still a fledgling democracy barely a decade out of strict Soviet control, Jahjah believes the country is ripe with opportunity.

"It seems to me they're very open to foreign investors in Ukraine," said Jahjah, who returned to the country in September and will visit again in November. "The price is right, right now."

Jahjah described his project as consisting of an 85-room, four-star hotel on the Dnepr [Dnipro] River, with a golf course, restaurants and shopping. The project would mainly serve the needs of the local population and that of the surrounding region. He said the project would be part of a comprehensive development plan the city has been developing, which includes an enhancement of its waterfront. Jahjah said he's anticipating a profit after four years."It's a period of real growth," Jahjah said.

Jahjah said that potential risks of doing business in the former communist country are mitigated by the extent to which the investment will be "ahead of the game."

"There are some difficulties from the old system, but the mayor [of Komsomulsk] seems very open, very interested and he promised he'd do his best to make our investments successful, right and fair," Jahjah said.

Jahjah has developed good relationships with the leaders of the city, who decided to erect a plaque thanking him for his donations to libraries, schools and neighborhood improvement efforts.

He also sponsored children in skiing competitions, one of whom came in second in a national event. "I was touched with it," Jahjah said.

Also, two Ukrainian business owners are scheduled to come to Ithaca soon to consider an international import/export deal with Jahjah, involving a Ukrainian vodka that is not available in the U.S. Jahjah spent two and half hours touring the factory, which is located in Poltava. "They gave me vodka bottle souvenirs like you can't believe," Jahjah said. "I have enough to drink for years."
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NOTE: The federally-sponsored cultural exchange program mentioned in the newspaper story that Ithaca Mayor Alan Cohen and Eilia Jahjah have participated in is the Community Partnerships Project of the U.S-Ukraine Foundation (USUF), Washington, D.C.. The project is funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). For more information on the Community Partnerships Project click on www.usukraine.org/ Nadia K. McConnell is president of USUF.
 

18.11.02. 2003 Index of Economic Freedom: Ukraine: Mostly Unfree

The study shows that 74 of the 156 countries graded became more economically free and 49 became less free. Economic freedom has increased every year since the Index was first published in 1995.

Despite the continuous improvement, most of the world's economies remain relatively "unfree." Overall, 71 economies were rated as "free" or "mostly free," while 85 earned ratings of "mostly unfree" or "repressed." North America and Europe remain home to a majority of the freest economies, while most of the world's repressed economies are in Asia.

The Most Free, The Least Free

[There were many "ties" -- Editor]

Hong Kong (1st)
Singapore (2nd)
Luxembourg (3rd)
New Zealand (3rd)
Ireland (5th)
Denmark (6th)
Estonia (6th)
United States (6th)
Australia (9th)
United Kingdom (9th).
[...]
.Canada (18th)
.[...]
Ukraine: Mostly Unfree (133rd out of 156 rated countries)
Russia (137th)
[...]
Burma (148th)
Uzbekistan (149th)
Yugoslavia (149th)
Belarus (151st)
Libya(151st)
Laos (153rd)
Zimbabwe (153rd)
Cuba (155th)
North Korea (156th)
Turkmenistan (146th)

Ratings on the "Index of Economic Freedom" are based on an analysis of 50 different economic variables, grouped into 10 categories: banking and finance, capital flows and foreign investment, monetary policy, fiscal burden of government, trade policy, wages and prices, government intervention in the economy, property rights, regulation, and black-market activity.

Countries are rated one to five in each category, one being the best, five the worst.

Index of Economic Freedom 2003 Rankings (Free, Mostly Free, Mostly Unfree, Repressed)
 

18.11.02. Jane's: Irak skød ubemandet drone ned i 2001 takket være "Koltjuga"

Kuchma not welcome at NATO

JID has learned that a report by the British-US led international team of experts who visited Ukraine last month to investigate the alleged sale of four Kolchuga radars systems to Iraq in the summer of 2000 will not openly accuse Ukraine of breaching UN sanctions. Instead, the report - to be issued this week - claims it was given 'insufficient evidence' to fully exonerate President Kuchma of breaching UN sanctions.

The report concludes that the Ukrainian authorities have failed to persuade the team that Ukraine did not export Kolchuga systems to Iraq. Both the West and Ukraine agree that a July 2000 meeting did take place at which Kuchma approved the sale. An illicitly made tape recording of the meeting has been authenticated by the FBI. However, the Ukrainian authorities and Western governments disagree on whether the Kolchugas were actually sent to Iraq.

The Ukrainian government insists that it has only sold three Kolchuga radar systems to Ethiopia, but none to Iraq. Western intelligence agencies are currently investigating whether Ethiopia is still in possession of these Kolchugas or if they have been shipped to another final destination.

Ethiopia's main external security threat is Eritrea, which does not have any sizeable air force against which the Kolchuga system would be useful. The Ethiopian defence budget is only approximately US$700 million, meaning the purchase of the system would have consumed around one seventh of the country's total arms and munitions spending.

JID has also learned that US intelligence operatives already had evidence that the Kolchugas were in Iraq before the international team visited Ukraine. This intelligence, together with the FBI authenticated tape recording of the July 2000 meeting, constituted the evidence on which the US publicly accused Ukraine at the end of September of violating UN sanctions against Iraq.

Ukraine's embattled president, Leonid Kuchma, has adopted a novel approach to the US and UN accusations of sanctions busting currently being made. Ukraine initially denied that the July 2000 meeting had taken place and only dropped this claim when the USA announced it had authenticated a tape recording of the meeting in one of the world's top forensic laboratories.

However, the Ukrainian authorities continue to deny that Kuchma's authorisation was acted on.

JID has discovered that the real purpose of the visit of the international team of experts to Ukraine was to collect intelligence on technical aspects of the Kolchuga radar system. With the USA gearing up for possible war with Iraq in early 2003, Washington needs to ensure it possesses air superiority. The highly mobile and easily concealed Kolchugas are believed to be responsible for the downing of an unmanned US drone over Iraq in 2001, the first to be shot down since the 'no fly zone' was created following the Gulf war. In return for providing technical specifications of the Kolchuga radar the US has agreed to not conclude in the report that it had definite proof that the Kolchugas are now in Iraq.

That the US is in possession of concrete proof of Ukrainian sanctions busting to Iraq can be seen in the severity of Washington's accusations against Ukraine, the reduction of US governmental assistance and the pressure applied to the 18 NATO allies not to invite Kuchma to attend the summit scheduled to be held in 21-22 November in Prague.

The NATO-Ukraine 19+1 meeting will be held only at the level of foreign ministers, not of presidents as was originally envisaged prior to the Iraqi arms scandal. No bilateral meeting of US-Ukrainian presidents had been envisaged because Washington had ruled out any such summit until the Ukrainian authorities have resolved the mysterious murder of opposition journalist Georgy Gongadze in autumn 2000.

NATO's public snub to Kuchma is a foreign policy disaster for Ukraine, which since 1995 has been the most active CIS member of NATO's Partnership for Peace. After Kiev announced its plans in May to seek NATO membership, Ukraine pinned high hopes on the NATO summit to launch a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine. Whether a MAP will be drawn up in Prague now remains doubtful, particularly if Ukraine's foreign minister Anatoly Zlenko is not allowed to attend by Kuchma. This could place Ukraine's plans for future NATO membership in jeopardy.

Meanwhile, Kuchma continues to insist that he will travel to the NATO summit to attend the meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) which unites 19 NATO members and 27 post-communist and neutral states. Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenka, long unwelcome in Western capitals, has also insisted that he be allowed to attend the EAPC meeting.

JID believes it is doubtful that Kuchma and Lukashenka will be granted visas to attend the EAPC, thereby placing both in the category of pariah leaders. The only major difference is that NATO and the USA still sees Ukraine as geopolitically important and therefore have expressed a desire to continue co-operation with Ukraine while ignoring Kuchma personally.

Kuchma's troubles may only be beginning. Not only is he isolated from the West, where he has not been invited on a diplomatic visit since the so-called 'Kuchmagate' crisis began in November 2000, but the US Congress has now demanded that he be personally investigated on allegations of money laundering. Back in Kiev, the opposition has launched a court case accusing Kuchma of infringing nine counts of the law. With pressure mounting on all fronts, it is becoming more unlikely that he will be able to survive for another two years until the presidential elections scheduled for October 2004.
 

18.11.02. Shifting loyalties? Ukrainian foreign policy in flux

First, Belarusan President Alyaksandr Lukashenka is no longer useful as a buffer against an enlarged NATO and European Union. Putin is visibly less interested in a Russian-Belarusan union. (The idea, launched in 1996, has always been more virtual than real.) Russia has dropped the notion of a gas pipeline through Belarus to bypass Ukraine. Lukashenka, meanwhile, has rejected Putin's proposals for a joint referendum on unification (that is, Russia's absorption of Belarus). Lukashenka's position remains shaky: Russia is sounding out the possibility of replacing him with a less odious figure.

Second, Putin's more pragmatic approach towards Ukraine has allowed Kuchma to return to his 1994 election program of domestic and international alignment with Russia on condition that Russia recognize Ukraine's independence and sovereignty and treat it as an "equal" partner. The Ukrainian-Russian border was no longer in dispute when Putin came to power, the May 1997 treaty with Kyiv having been ratified a year earlier.

Third, unlike his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Putin has few illusions about Ukraine's permanence as an independent state, even has some grudging respect for it as such. Moscow is now concerned with securing Ukraine within the Russian sphere of influence. This is especially important now that NATO and the EU will embrace, respectively, seven and ten new former FSU states and two others by 2007.

Fourth, Putin was fortunate in that, in the same year he was elected, the Kuchmagate scandal led to Kuchma's semi-isolation in the West and a shift of Ukraine's multivector foreign policy from the West to the East. To reinforce this trend, Viktor Chernomyrdin was appointed ambassador to Ukraine in May 2001. In October 2000 and April 2001 the last remaining pro-Western government ministers in Ukraine were removed--Borys Tarasiuk (foreign minister) and Viktor Yushchenko (prime minister). Then came NATO's refusal to extend an invitation to Kuchma to attend its November 21-22 summit in Prague, a foreign policy disaster for Ukraine.

Fifth, the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 fundamentally altered international politics.Russia and Uzbekistan became, for Washington, more important allies than Ukraine. Kyiv, quite simply, was no longer needed as an anti-Moscow buffer. This factor was reinforced by the simultaneous NATO and EU expansion. Russia increased its cooperation with NATO, allowing Ukraine to do the same. In late May 2002, as U.S. President George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin met in Moscow and agreed to move jointly against terrorism in the Middle East, Ukraine announced its goal of eventual membership in NATO. But in September, after the Bush administration had made Iraq its priority, Kyiv found itself facing the biggest crisis in relations with Washington since the collapse of the Soviet Union: Washington accused Kuchma of sanctioning the sale of military equipment to Iraq in July 2000, not long after the last U.S.-Ukrainian summit with President Bill Clinton in Kyiv. Totally discredited in the West, Kuchma's regime is now perceived to be on a par with Lukashenka's Belarus. [...]

To read the entire article, visit http://russia.jamestown.org/pubs/view/rer_001_011_004.htm
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Dr. Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies and adjunct staff, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto.
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The Russia and Eurasia Review--a journal written by professionals for practitioners, by specialists for generalists--is a publication of the Jamestown Foundation. The opinions expressed in it are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the foundation.

The Jamestown Foundation is a nonprofit organization, not a government program.
4516 43rd Street NW
Washington, DC 20016
phone: 202.483.8888
 

18.11.02. Kutjma og Zlenko tager begge til NATO-møde i Prag

18.11.02. Kinakh fyret. Donetsks guvernør bliver ny premierminister

18.11.02. Rumænien utilfreds med Ukraines holdning til omstridt ø

18.11.02. Kutjma satser resterne af prestigen ved at tage til Prag

NATO har ikke sendt invitationer ud til Ukraines præsident til at tage del i alliancens topmøde i Prag den 21-22. november. Det sagde NATOs talsmand Yves Brodeur i en kommentar til den ukrainske præsidents pressesekretærs, Olena Hromnytskas, oplysning om, at alliancens hovedkvarter angiveligt havde sendt en invitation til Leonid Kutjma til at komme til topmødet.
    NATO kommenterede endvidere Det nationale sikkerheds-og forsvarsråds beslutning af den 16. november om, at præsident Kutjma skal deltage i alliancens topmøde i Prag. En af NATOs pressesekretærer - Robert Pszczel - siger til Deutsche Welle, at alliancen i slutningen af oktober har besluttet ikke at invitere Kutjma til topmødet i Prag, og at NATOs holdning i det spørgsmål forbliver uændret.
    Ifølge Pszczel mener Den nordatlantiske alliance ikke, at Leonid Kutjma ville handle fornuftigt, hvis han kom til Prag. NATOs modvilje mod at se den ukrainske præsident på topmødet er fremkaldt af De forenede Staters påstand om, at Kutjma angiveligt er involveret i ulovlig salg af våben til Irak. Men det ukrainske statsoverhoved har ret til at deltage i NATOs topmøde, eftersom Ukraine er medlem af Det nordatlantiske partnerskabs Råd.
    I alliancen siger man imidlertid, at Kutjmas tilsynekomst på dette rådsmøde kan fremkalde en demonstrativ udvandring af lederne af visse stater. Desuden kan den ukrainske præsidents ankomst til topmødet føre til en aflysning af det planlagte møde i kommissionen "Ukraine-NATO" på udenrigsministerniveau. UP. Deutsche Welles ukrainske afdeling.
    Ifølge præsident Leonid Kutjmas egen hjemmeside udsendte NATOs hovedkvarter i Bruxelles lørdag eftermiddagen deltagerlister til NATO-topmødet i Prag, hvoraf det fremgik, at den ukrainske delegation blev ledet af Ukraines præsident. Leonid Kutjma. Det har formentlig været denne meddelelse, der resulterede i pressemeddelelsen fra Kutjmas pressesekretær om, at Kutjma havde fået en invitation til NATO-topmødet.
 

18.11.02. Kutjma satser resterne af prestigen ved at tage til Prag

18.11.02. Viktor Janukovytj er ekspert i rigtige valgresultater

I en kommentar til UP til Kutjmas udnævnelse af Janukovytj siger politologen og spindoctoren (kendt for sin tilknytning til SDPU (o), red.) Mykhjlo Pohrebynskyj, at Janukovytj har "den største potentielle støtte i parlamentet". Men efter hans opfattelse skal Donetsk-guvernøren samle langt mere end de 226 stemmer, hvis han skal vælges som premierminister. "Ellers bliver han et gidsel hos de ni flertalsfraktioner".
    "Janukovytj vil forsøge at samle mere end den kritske masse. Hvis [der kun er] den kritiske masse (226 stemmer), så skal han tilfresstille alle flertallets fraktioner, hvilket er umuligt. Han har brug for 250-270 stemmer, så han kan sige: jeg har stor respekt eksempelvis for Pustovojtenko, men..."
    Ifølge Pohrebynskyj kan nogle af de nuværende ministre godt forblive i regeringen. Men så skal flertalsfraktionerne stå til ansvar for deres handlinger.
    Pohrebynskyj, der er en af forfatterne til Kutjmas henvendelse til nationen af den 24. august 2002 om overgangen til en parlamentarisk republik, mener ikke, at den nuværende regering er en ren koalitionsregering. "Der kan ikke være en seriøs koalitionsregering, så længe man har et parlament, hvor halvdelen består af partiløse og aideologiske deputerede. Det er en eufemisme af en koalitionsregering - et eksperiment. I virkeligheden forekommer den politiske ansvarlighed, når 2-3 partier har fraktioner, danner en koalition og derefter regering..."
    Pohrebynskyj påpeger, at formanden for præsidentens administration, Viktor Medvedtjuk, også har støttet Janukovytj.
    Direktør for den ukrainske afdeling af Det internationale institut for humanitært-politiske undersøgelser, Volodymyr Malenkovytj, betegnede en kommentar præsidentens forslag om at gøre Donetsk-guvernøren til premierminister som "en meget grov fejl". Det er der ifølge ham flere årsager til.
    For det første vil det have en negativ indflydelse på såvel regeringens som Ukraines prestige som helhed. "Sagen er, at millioner af ukrainske borgere og udenlandske observatører forbinder Janukovytj med kriminelle strukturer. Han er kendt som en person, som tidligere er dømt efter straffeloven".
    Politologen vil ikke hævde, "hvor troværdig" denne information er. Men taget i betragtning af, at den er meget populær i massemedierne, mener Malenkovytj, at Kutjma først burde have forlangt af Janukovytj, at denne offentligt dementerede disse beskyldninger. Eftersom det ikke er sket, vil den officielle indstilling af Janukovytj til premierministerposten blive mødt negativt i udlandet samt føre til en international isolation af Ukraine, mener politologen.
    For det andet har Janukovytjs gruppe og Janukovytj selv hidtil "reelt domineret i Donetsk og i hele Donbas-regionen". "Det er ikke morsomt, det er en trist status-quo", - siger Malynkovytj om de førende positioner "denne forretningsklan har med en tilsvarende politisk overbygning". Ifølge politologen vil denne klan, hvis Janukovytj bliver premierminister, udbrede sin indflydelse til hele Ukraine.
    For det tredje, så vil det forhold, at Janukovytj bliver regeringsleder en indikator for "det maksimale niveau for samfundsmæssig bevidsthed i Ukraine". Ifølge politologen "har vi allerede tilladt ret meget", men "hvis en person med dette omdømme stiller sig i spidsen for regeringen, så vil det vidne om, at vores offentlighed og niveauet for dens politiske og moralske bevidsthed er endnu lavere, end den var i går".
    Ifølge Malynkovytj vil Janukovytjs udnævnelse vise, at "vores land er slået ind på afrikanske og visse centralamerikanske landes vej". Med andre ord kan man godt glemme det europæiske valg - fordi der bliver foretaget et valg til fordel for et autoritært og udemokratisk regime, som er karakterisk for visse lande i Den 3. verden".
    For det fjerde kan Janukovytj som premierminister bremse de politiske reformer, som præsidenten bebudede i sin tale til nationen den 24. august. "Vi ved fra Janukovytjs udtalelser i pressen (det drejer sig om Donetsk-guvernørens interview i avisen "Kievskij Telegraf"), at han ikke er tilhænger af politiske reformer, et forholdstalsvalgsystem og overgangen til en parlamentarisk republik, siger Malynkovytj. Ifølge ham vil magten, i det øjeblik Kutjma går af, koncentrere sig i regeringen, og så vil Janukovytjs rolle få betydning for hele den politiske reforms skæbne.
    Ifølge Malenkovytj vil "Janukovytjs sejr i parlamentet være et vidnesbyrd om, at vores parlament ikke afspejler samfundets interesser".
    Volodymyr Malynkovytj siger, at han gang på gang har villet forelægge Kutjma disse problemer og bekendtgøre ham med sine synspunkter hvad angår resultatet af en indstilling af Janukovytj. Men det lod sig ikke gøre. "Præsidentens omgivelser er af en sådan art, at de ikke tillader at overbringe kritiske synspunkter", mener politologen.
    Ifølge politologen Volodymyr Polokhalo "består præsidentens logik i det banale: nemlig i skabelsen af gunstige økonomiske, politiske og retslige vilkår for en opstilling af en mand fra præsidentens og styrets parti".
    "Anatolij Kinakh er aldrig blevet betragtet som en arvtager til præsident Kutjma. Og det er ikke fordi, at han i sig selv er svag, men fordi at en række aktører betragter sig som stærkere og mere værdige til ikke alene at stå i spidsen for regeringen, men også blive arvtagere [til Kutjma]. Det er Jusjtjenko, Medvedtjuk og Janukovytj. Gruppen Tihipko-Pintjuk kommer åbenlyst til at tabe til de tre førstnævnte p.a. lederen af "Arbejdets Ukraine"s mislykkede forsøg på at indlemme "Vores Ukraine" i flertallet. Derfor står vi tilbage med 3 seriøse figurer, som repræsenterer forskellige fragmenter af styrets parti".
    Ifølge politologen har Janukovytj langt flere udsigter til at opnå 226 stemmer, end en hvilken som helst anden kandidat fra flertallet.
    Polokhalov mener, at "situationen nu har bevæget sig ind i mellemfasen". "Vi er ikke noget slutspillet endnu. Og hvis det i starten var Jusjtjenko der førte p.a. sin sejr ved valget og derefter Medvedtjuk, så er det nu Janukovytj, der har de største chancer. Han går ikke imod forretningskredse, han er i stand til at gå på kompromis med "Vores Ukraine" og har gjort mere for præsdinten end nogen anden. Janukovytj passer i den indledende fase både ind i Ruslands og Vestens kram".
    Polokhalo påpeger overfor UP, at "dette ukrainske skakparti minder om centralasiatiske narder, når det ikke altid er den klogeste, der løber af med sejren".
    Han siger endvidere, at præsidenten i dag ikke kan være fri og manøvrere: For hver dag der går, og vi nærmer os valget, mindskes hans politiske vægt. Hans erklæringer fra den 24. august
er modsætningsfyldte og berøvet en produktiv taktik. Man fornemmer, at han handler spontant og ikke inkalkulerer konsekvenserne af sine udtalelser og handlinger. Så meget desto mere i den tilstand af diskomfort, som oppositionen og de ydre vilkår har bragt ham i".
 

18.11.02. Portræt af Viktor Janukovytj

Det forhold, at Janukovytj, muligvis, har en række domme bag sig, er naturligvis udeladt i de officielle kilder. Men rygterne om Donetsk-guvernørens kriminelle fortid griber om sig med lynets hast. Man begyndte først at tale åbent om den i forbindelse med hans mulige udnævnelse til premierminister.
    Således bønfaldt Volodymyr Malenkovytj præsidenten om ikke at indstille Janukovytj, indtil denne officielt har dementeret rygterne. Julia Mostova fra "Dzerkalo Tyzhnja" mindede om, at guvernøren har to domme bag sig samt, at Janukovytj ifølge oplysninger fra ordensmyndighederne gik under øgenavnet "pøbel".
    Donetsk-jounalisten Volodymyr Bojko, der kom i fængsel med de lokale skattemyndigheders medvirken, havde også fået støvet nogle oplysninger op om den kommende premierminister (et brudstykke af en samtale med en medfange):
    "Onkel Kolja, jeg har engang hørt, at vores guvernør her i Donetsk har to domme bag sig. Har det noget på sig elle ej?"
    - Jeg ved ikke hvor mange domme Janukovytj har bag sig, men han har kun siddet inde en enkelt gang; nemlig i zone nr. 52 i Jenakievo.
    - Men det er jo "en barsk" zone.
    - Dengang var det desuden en almindelig zone. Janukovytj var som direktør for en frugt-og grøntsagsbase blevet taget i noget tyveri og fik seks år efter § 86-1 for tyveri i særlig stort omfang. Men han kom ud før fristens udløb, vistnok fire år efter, p.a. gudfaderens anbefaling.
    - Hvem var hans gudfar?
    - Det kan jeg ikke huske, men det var vistnok Ljovotjkin der var leder. Det er ham, der i dag er leder af hele landets fængsels-og rehabiliteringssystem.
    - Er det ikke ham, hvis søn arbejder som præsidentens assistent?
    - Det ved jeg for fanden ikke, jeg beskæftiger mig ikke med politik".
    Ifølge UP er Ljovotjkin den Yngre i dag 1.assistent for præsdienten og anses for at være "Donetsk"-folkenes mand i præsidentens administration, mens Ljovotjkin den Ældre vitterlig er leder af kriminalforsorgen i Ukraine.
    Der er en enkelt fejl i denne historie; nemlig det, at Janukovytj ikke var leder af en grøntsagsbase, men af en autobase, uden dog at det ændrer historiens kerne.
 

19.11.02. Parlamentet stemmer om Janukovytj på torsdag

19.11.02. Kutjma har officielt anmodet om tjekkisk visum

19.11.02. NATO giver Kutjma et vink med en vognstang

19.11.02. Ukrainsk journalist fundet død i Hviderusland

19.11.02. Medvedtjuk på sin første rejse til USA siden 1994

20.11.02. NATO og USA lægger Kutjma på is, men ikke Ukraine

20.11.02. Hemmelighedskræmmeri omgærder Medvedtjuks USA-rejse

20.11.02. NATO er alvorligt skuffet over Ukraine p.a. "Koltjuga"-sagen

20.11.02. Medvedtjuk har holdt møder i FNs sikkerhedsråd

21.11.02. Ukraine-Russia/Gazprom's got West Europeans over a barrel

The fate of Ukrainian gas pipelines has long been an object of concern for followers of the gas industry in Europe. Ninety percent of Russian exports to Europe must go through them, and Ukraine has been regularly accused of siphoning this gas. Yet this accusation has been true in only three well publicized incidents, in 1992 and 1993.

What happened back then was very simple: Russia tried to cut off its gas deliveries to Ukraine, which were not being paid for, and Ukraine retaliated by reducing deliveries on the export lines to Europe. This situation lasted only a few days; in each instance, Western buyers immediately panicked, then Russia backed off and resumed supplies to Ukraine. But deliveries to Europe have not been interrupted a single time since 1993.

Gazprom understands very well that the reliability of its supplies is essential in its relationship with European purchasers, and it took the decision then to deliver to Ukraine whatever was necessary to get the exports out on the other side. Indeed, this situation was really no worse than what was happening elsewhere in the region, with gas delivered and not paid for -- except that no other customer of Gazprom held a stranglehold on the company quite like the Ukrainians did.

Luckily for Gazprom, no other customer was also quite so bumbling. The only thing that the Ukrainians managed to achieve in return for controlling absolutely 25% of Russian exports was a dwindling supply of gas, which was wasted with the same abandon as in the Soviet period. No reforms were engaged to reduce consumption, or to try to grab the export market from Gazprom by buying the gas from them and on-selling it to Europe. Instead, the Ukrainians let Gazprom slowly take over their industry.

Corruption in the Ukrainian gas industry meant that certain officials took advantage of Gazprom's inability to enforce payment in order to enrich themselves. As in Russia , the final consumers in Ukraine quite often paid for their gas, but the bill collector chose not to pass on these revenues to Gazprom (in Russia for political reasons, and in Ukraine thanks to control over the export routes).

Gazprom's brilliant solution was to have Russian gas delivered by someone else, a private entity not affiliated to Gazprom which could cut off supplies to Ukraine without risking retaliation like Gazprom: Itera. Itera found accomplices among Ukrainian factions able to take control of the gas distribution business, and it sold directly to such private entities and not to Kiev's state gas company.

Gas was procured by Itera from Turkmenistan to build the fiction that it was not Russian gas being delivered (a scheme made all the easier because Turkmenistan was in such a weak bargaining position, with all its pipelines going straight to Russia ). The revenues collected in Ukraine from distribution of non-Gazprom gas -- whether in the form of money, goods or ownership of local production assets -- were shared between the new Ukrainians, Itera and its partners in Russia and Turkmenistan.

The fact that Itera, and Itera alone, was able to ship large volumes of gas through Gazprom's pipeline network between Central Asia and Ukraine strongly suggested to observers that it had close relations with Gazprom's top management, although this has always been denied by both Gazprom and Itera and never has been conclusively proven by outsiders. In any case, such a sort of arrangement seemed to make sense: It reduced Gazprom's deliveries to Ukraine and extracted some revenue for Gazprom from that country (whatever was paid by Itera for gas transport which would have taken place anyway) and it was a perfect opportunity for well-connected individuals to benefit. This led to massive corruption and nasty political battles inside Ukraine, to take part in this juicy business, with the population, as usual, the main victim.

Meanwhile, as Itera officials stepped in with its deliveries, Gazprom's deliveries were quickly reduced to a volume of 25-30 billion cubic meters per year, which is the volume where Gazprom loses no money in Ukraine, because the value of that gas roughly corresponds to a reasonable transit tariff payable to Ukraine for all the volumes exported to Europe through Ukraine, which is some 120 bcm a year. Ukrainians still do not pay for that gas, but they do not incur new debts (the $1.4 billion debt figure quoted all the time is essentially the debt incurred in 1992-93 which is rescheduled every other year.) Gazprom does not get cash but gets value for its gas. This can be accounted at production cost or at any equivalent transit tariff value, depending on the reporting requirements of the day -- the difference between the two extreme options can represent an extra $2 billion per year in Gazprom's declared revenues and profits.

Today, Ukraine receives 50 bcm of gas per year from, or, in the case of Turkmen gas, through Russia (compared to close to 100 bcm in 1990). Half of it is delivered by Gazprom directly, the other half by Itera or other similar "independent" traders. Gazprom's exports flow to Europe unhindered, with plenty of spare capacity (thanks to deliveries to Ukraine having fallen overall faster than Gazprom's exports to Europe have grown), and its deliveries to Ukraine bring it a decent level of revenue.

So, why would Gazprom want to bother now taking over the assets? The simple explanation is that it represents a great opportunity to make the European purchasers pay for the maintenance of the Ukrainian pipelines. Gazprom has a long history of making its clients pay, willingly or not, for its investments. For instance, Ruhrgas purchased shares in Gazprom at a time when nobody wanted to invest in Russia , in exchange for the shelving of Gazprom's expansion plans in Germany (via its Wingas venture with BASF). The Italian energy company ENI invested in the Blue Stream pipeline, which significantly increases Gazprom's export capacity to Turkey, at the same time that Gazprom's plans to develop in Italy with Edison were abandoned.

This time, the idea is to build on the bad reputation earned by the Ukrainians (since "thieves" wouldn't bother to maintain their pipeline network) to once again get the likes of Ruhrgas, ENI and Gaz de France to pay for new Gazprom investments. After all, even if they pay for truly needed work in Ukraine, it frees Gazprom resources for other projects.

In sum, while the "Russian-Ukrainian condominium" name may make it sound like a collective venture for the good of Europe, it really is closer to highway robbery. But the Western companies can't do much about it. The share of Russian gas is bound to increase inexorably in Europe in the coming 20 years as demand grows and all buyers need to renew their contracts and safeguard their supplies. Still, it would be ironic if, by agreeing to pay Gazprom to maintain its transportation infrastructure and reduce its dependency on (supposedly unreliable) Ukrainian partners, Western European companies end up strengthening Gazprom's overall control over the European gas market by way of its iron grip on the main transport routes.

Gas is essentially an infrastructure business, and Gazprom understands this better than most and has been building up and nurturing its access to the European market steadily over the past 30 years, as the Ukrainian saga attests once more. Other gas companies, beware; before it is too late.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Guillet jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr is an investment banker in Paris, and has worked with Gazprom in the past.
 

21.11.02. "Reportere uden grænser" tror ikke på journalists selvmord

21.11.02. Medvedtjuk taler Ukraines sag i FNs Sikkerhedsråd

21.11.02. Kolomijets kan være blevet myrdet p.a. sit arbejde som journalist

21.11.02. Kolomijets' lig identificeret. Han ejede 50% af aktierne i nyhedsbureauet

21.11.02. Janukovytj så godt som sikker på at blive premierminister

22.11.02. Janukovytj godkendt som premierminister med flertallets stemmer

22.11.02. Janukovytj vil gøre Donetsk-modellen landsdækkende

22.11.02. NATO har en ny handlingsplan for Ukraine

22.11.02. Udenrigsminister Zlenko hilser NATO-udvidelsen velkommen

22.11.01. Kwasniewski vil gerne mødes med Kutjma

23.11.02. USA ydmyger Ukraine ved at forlade Ukraine-NATO-mødet

23.11.02. NATO opfordrede Ukraine til at styrke demokratiet

23.11.02. Placering af delegationer ændret til fransk for at undgå Kutjma

25.11.02. Communist Party accused of crimes against Ukraine: International civil court ruling

To read the full ruling [in Ukrainian] on this case, passed on Nov. 7 2002, visit:

http://www.niagara.com/~blacksea/ruling.pdf
 

25.11.02. Colleagues of dead journalist reject embezzlement rumour

[Presenter] The director of the Ukrayinski Novyny news agency, Mykhaylo Kolomiyets, did not embezzle any money from the agency, the agency's co-owner, Volodymyr Hranovskyy, said today while refuting rumours that Kolomiyets allegedly appropriated agency money before his disappearance. Kolomiyets's colleagues have no information about any financial wrongdoing by Kolomiyets, Hranovskyy added. The following is what Hranovskyy said.

[Hranovskyy, in Russian] All the employees and those in charge of financial matters say that nothing special has been revealed about the agency's operation. Nothing special has been revealed - [changes tack] well, we do not know anything about this, but there is no information whatsoever that he was involved in some kind of other financial activity.

[Presenter] The agency co-owner and the journalists also distrust the [police] version that Kolomiyets committed suicide. They think that this version could be considered as part of the investigation but that it should not be the main one. The agency journalists are concerned by the fact that the police are increasingly inclined towards the suicide version. The case is quite complicated, and there are not enough facts to corroborate even the suicide version, his colleagues said.

[Kolomiyets went missing in late October, and a body now believed to be his was found in a Belarusian forest shortly afterwards and buried by the Belarusian authorities. See One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1730 gmt 19 Nov 02.]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Radio Kontynent, Kyiv, in Ukrainian 1430 gmt 20 Nov 02 BBC
 

25.11.02. Ukraine: Relations with U.S. reaching all-time low

Washington, 8 November 2002 (RFE/RL) Is Ukraine set to become the new Belarus?

Mired in U.S. allegations that he approved arms sales to Iraq, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's relations with Washington are going from bad to worse. The situation threatens the country -- once considered to be a strategic buffer between Russia and the West -- with deep isolation.

The darling of U.S. policy among the former Soviet states during the 1990s, Ukraine's relations with the United States are looking more and more like those of its neighbor Belarus -- Europe's most isolated country under authoritarian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

Catherine Fitzpatrick is a leading U.S. activist for human rights in the former Soviet Union. She said she's surprised things have gotten this bad with regard to Ukraine. "It is the 'Belarusification' of Ukraine. Even I think that that can't be happening. [Some people say:] 'What do you mean? Ukraine is better. It's better than all that.' But guess what? It isn't," Fitzpatrick said. It's an apparent trend that has left the State Department concerned.

This week, a senior U.S. diplomat, who asked not to be named, said: "We've already downgraded relations. We don't want to put Ukraine in the Belarus category. We do want to have a relationship."

Yet the question remains whether the crisis over alleged arms sales -- along with a new strategic reality that has lessened Ukraine's importance to Washington and allegations implicating Kuchma in a journalist's murder -- will lead to a Minsk-type isolation for all Ukraine or stay confined to Kuchma and his senior associates.

Fiona Hill is an expert on the former Soviet Union with the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. She said that, although Ukraine still has ties with the outside world, Belarus does not, and the "trajectory" over the last year has "clearly been negative." She said this is in part because of a strategic shift. "The priorities for the United States now are in the Middle East and Central and South Asia, rather than in Europe. In that regard, Ukraine's strategic importance as a bulwark between NATO and Russia seems to be diminished," Hill said. [...]

According to Anders Aslund, an economic adviser to Kuchma in the mid-1990s, the general crisis has Kuchma's court stewing in the same sort of anxiety that gripped Richard Nixon's inner circle before scandal forced the former U.S. president to resign in 1974. "It's a bit worse than the White House after Watergate. It's a feeling of the whole place being on the verge of serious destabilization," Aslund said.

The State Department has already cut off $55 million in aid to Ukraine after concluding that it has proof Kuchma signed off on the arms sale [and] is threatening to cut off more aid unless Kyiv cooperates with investigators and answers more questions.

As relations between Washington and Kyiv tumble, Aslund said the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush is unlikely to take steps to cushion their fall -- and is more likely to take what he called a "hard-line-by-default" position.

Aslund, who is a senior fellow at Washington's Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that while Ukraine's opposition is united in its desire to take power democratically, it is divided over what tactics to use before elections scheduled for November 2004.

He said a hard-line U.S. position -- with relations kept at a minimum -- may be welcomed by the opposition led by Yuliya Tymoshenko. Aslund said that wing wants to destabilize the situation on the ground in hopes of toppling Kuchma before the elections.

But the Swedish-born Aslund said the moderate opposition, led by the Our Ukraine party of former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, a Washington favorite, would prefer to keep contacts open with Kuchma and go to elections in two years, as scheduled. "There's an obvious danger of [the hard-line approach]. In particular, the people in Our Ukraine are very afraid that this is happening, that Ukraine is becoming increasingly isolated from the West, and this essentially benefits those forces that are either isolationist or pro-Russian. Western-oriented people are then left in a situation that what they're arguing for is [not a] viable option," Aslund said.

To be sure, Kuchma has not yet reached the level of Lukashenka, who has been diplomatically ostracized for alleged human rights abuses and is not welcome in the West. [...]

With several disappearances of journalists and opposition politicians still unsolved, activist Fitzpatrick of the New York-based International League for Human Rights said Kuchma is looking increasingly like his neighbor, Lukashenka. "The secret of Ukraine is it's always been more like Belarus than we've wanted to admit. But because of the Ukrainian diaspora, because of the need to have an alternative to Russia, [Kyiv] got all this [U.S.] aid. And it was a big wash. It really was," Fitzpatrick said.

It's a view heard more and more in Washington. Last week, the U.S. Congress's bipartisan Helsinki Commission sent a letter to Bush calling the arms sale "a hostile and reckless act." It urged Bush to examine a host of other alleged illegal acts by Kuchma, including money laundering.
 

25.11.02. USAs ambassadør skriver åbent brev om "Koltjuga"- undersøgelsen

"Redaktøren for avisen "2000", hr. S. Kytjyhin, skrev fornylig et brev til mig, hvori han bad mig om at forklare visse ting omkring båndoptagelsen af samtalen mellem præsident Kutjma og hr. Malev den 10. juli 2000. Jeg vil gerne benytte mig af lejligheden til endnu engang at forklare USAs regerings synspunkter. Taget i betragtning af den omfattende interesse for disse spørgsmål, vælger jeg at svare hr. Kytjyhin i et åbent brev, som jeg sender til pressen.
     Spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt båndene er autentiske, påvirker USAs politik, men er ikke en juridisk sag. USAs forbundspoliti (FBI) har gennemført en fuldstændig og udtømmende analyse af båndoptagelsen, så, at De forenede Staters regering kan træffe et bevidst valg i sin politik, og ikke for at føre en retssag. Bekræftelsen af autenticiteten af båndoptagelsen førte uomgængeligt til et sammenbrud af tilliden i de amerikansk-ukrainske relationer på allerhøjeste niveau. Når det er sagt, så har vi ikke behov for eller en interesse i en duel mellem eksperterne.
     Eksperterne i FBIs laboratorium for elektroniske studier har gennemført en laboratorieanalysse af de originale båndoptagelser og den originale apparat, som Mykola Melnitjenko havde stillet til rådighed. Optagelsen er blevet lyttet igennem og set igennem adskillige gange med anvendelse af en række tekniske- og audiometoder, som sammenlagt kan bestemme, hvorvidt der er blevet manipuleret med den digitale optagelse, og hvorvidt den er blevet forvansket. Eksperternes konklusion er således, at optagelsen er ægte, at den ikke har undergået manipulation eller er blevet forvansket. Eksperterne konklusion er således, at optagelsen er ægte, at den ikke har undergået forandringer og indeholder en samtale mellem præsident Kutjma og hr. Malev.
     De tekniske eksperter, som gennemførte analysen, har ikke fundet afbrydelser i optagelsen, har ikke fundet tegn på manipulationer med digitale filer og har ikke opfanget nogen usædvanlige lyde, som ville være tilstede, hvis nogen havde pillet ved optagelsen. I løbet af analysen bekræftede eksperter fra tre af De forenede Staters regerings styrelser, at båndet indeholder præsident Kutjmas stemme. De påpegede, at en fabrikering af en sådan dialog, som var genstand for analysen, er usandsynlig, selv ved hjælp af meget avanceret elektronisk udstyr. Kort sagt, så er der set udfra et teknisk synspunkt ingen behov for yderligere analyse.
     Vi ved, at visse private grupper har gennemført analyser af kopier af en række af hr. Melnitjenkos optagelser, men vi har ikke været med i disse analyser og kan ikke kommentere dem.
Ukraines regering har underrettet De forenede Staters regering om, at den havde gennemført en analyse af optagelsen af samtalen mellem præsident Kutjma og hr. Malev, men den ukrainske regering nåede frem til, at denne optagelse blev reproduceret efter en version, som var lagt ud på internettet; altså at den ikke havde analyseret den originale optagelse. I pressen har der også været misforståelser omkring brugen af ordene "optagelse" og "bånd". Når det drejer sig om samtalen mellem præsident Kutjma og hr. Malev, blev FBIs analyse foretaget på den digitale optagelse af denne samtale, og ikke på bånd.
     Efter vores opfattelse er begrundelsen for, at der fortsat sættes spørgsmålstegn ved autenticiteten af optagelsen fra den 10. juni 2000 nogles ønske om at fjerne opmærksomheden fra den klare kendsgerning - beslutningen om at overdrage systemet "Koltjuga" i strid med FNs sanktioner.
     Problemet med "Koltjuga" er vigtig for os, fordi den har en betydning for sikkerheden for vores piloter, som patruljerer flyvebegrænsningszonerne over Irak. Den er desuden vigtig for os og vores europæiske partnere fordi, at beslutningen om at overdrage dette system til et land, som konstant overtræder international ret og menneskerettighederne, klart er i modstrid med Ukraines erklærede hengivenhed overfor "det europæiske valg".
     Har overdragelsen af systemerne "Koltjuga" så rent faktisk fundet sted? Lige fra starten af denne episode har De forenede Staters regering sagt, at mens vi er overbevist om autenticiteten af optagelserne af den 10. juli 2000, ved vi ikke, hvorvidt selve overdragelsen rent faktisk har fundet sted. Visse informationer, som vi har til rådighed, peger på, at den kunne have fundet sted. Det ukrainske styre inviterede til Ukraine en gruppe amerikanske og britiske eksperter for at forvisse sig om, at overdragelsen ikke havde fundet sted. På grund af manglende adgang til vigtige dokumenter og alvorlige mangler i dokumentationen omkring overtrædelsen af processen for Ukraines eksportkontrol kunne gruppen ikke udelukke muligheden af overdragelsen af systemet "Koltjuga" til Irak.
     Gruppen fik eksempelvis ikke lov til at stifte bekendtskab med de fulde rapporter om den efterforskning, som ifølge Ukraines regerings information, allerede var blevet gennemført af Det nationale sikkerheds-og forsvarsråd, Ukraines sikkerhedstjeneste og Rigsadvokaturen samt med vigtige kontraktdokumenter. Gruppen var blevet lovet adgang til til alle disse dokumenter, men senere blev den nægtet. Gruppen fik heller ikke adgang til at tale med nøglepersoner, inklusive den tidligere SBU-chef Leonid Derkatj og Iraks tidligere honorærkonsul i Ukraine.
     Gruppen fandt endvidere alvorlige mangler i måden som eksportkontrollen i Ukraine blev gennemført. Selvom Ukraines eksportkontrolproces opererer med tilstedeværelsen af et system af tilbageholdelser og modvægte, blev sådanne skridt ikke taget, eller også blev de ikke dokumenteret, hvilket umuliggør en rekonstruktion af begivenhederne omkring godkendelse af salget af "Koltjuga" i 2000. Derfor bør spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt en overdragelse fandt sted, forblive åbent. For at den videre undersøgelse i FN-regi skal give resultat, bør den ukrainske regering først bestemme sig for, hvorvidt den vil stille den dokumentation til rådighed, som blev nægtet den amerikansk-britiske gruppe. Ellers vil FNs gruppe støde ind i de samme forhindringer i vurdering af, om overdragelsen har fundet sted, som gruppen fra De forenede Stater og Storbritannien stødte ind i.
     Uanset at vi ikke er tilfredse med resultatet af besøget af ekspertgruppen, forbliver De forenede Stater i det store hele hengivne overfor brede og energiske relationer med Ukraine. Med det formål støtter De forenede Stater et aktivt samarbejde ad de bilaterale og multilaterale diplomatiske kanaler. Vores støtte til handlingsplanen NATO-Ukraine og det intensive program, som bør være resultatet af den - er blot et af eksemplerne. Vi fortsætter endvidere med at støtte samarbejdet mellem vores militærpersoner, ikke- spredningsprogrammet, udviklingen af små virksomheder, udviklingen af den private sektor i landbruget, projekter indenfor lokalt og regionalt selvstyre, tiltag der skal styrke civilsamfundet og den uafhængige presse, udvekslingsprogrammer, samarbejdet med Verkhovna Rada og andre former for tiltag.
     Jeg håber, at mine kommentarer har hjulpet til at give svar på de spørgsmål, som er opstået i forbindelse med den mulige overdragelse af "Koltjuga"-systemet til Irak." UP.
 

25.11.02. Ukraine mindes hungersnøden i 1932-33

25.11.02. Ukraine vil have 1933-hungersnøden anerkendt som folkemord

26.11.02. U.S. Ambassador's to Ukraine open letter to the editor of 2000 Newspaper

The question of the authenticity of the recording affects U.S. policy, but it is not a juridical matter. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) made a full and thorough analysis of the recording in order to allow the United States Government to make informed policy choices, not for the purpose of a legal proceeding. Inevitably, the authentication of this recording has eroded confidence in U.S.-Ukraine relations at the highest levels. That said, we have no need or interest in a duel between experts.

Experts at the FBI's Electronic Research Facility conducted a laboratory analysis of the original recording and the original recording device provided by Mykola Melnychenko. The recording was reviewed numerous times using a range of technical and audio techniques that together can determine if a digital recording has been manipulated or distorted. The experts' findings are that the recording is genuine, has not been altered, and contains a discussion between President Kuchma and Mr. Malev. The technical experts performing the analysis detected no breaks in the recording, found no manipulation of the digital files, and detected no unusual sounds that would have been present if the recording had been tampered with. In the course of the analysis, experts from three United States Government departments confirmed that the recording includes the voice of President Kuchma. They indicated that it would be implausible that a conversation such as the one examined could be fabricated, even with highly sophisticated electronic equipment. In short, there is no need from a technical standpoint for further analysis.

We are aware that some private groups have conducted analyses of copies of some of Mr. Melnychenko's recordings, but we have not been involved in such analyses and cannot comment on them. The Ukrainian Government has told the United States Government that it conducted an analysis of a recording of the conversation between President Kuchma and Mr. Malev, but the Ukrainian Government admitted that it reproduced this recording from a version that is available on the internet; that is, it did not examine the original recording. There has also been some confusion in the press about the use of the words "recording" and "tape." Regarding the conversation between President Kuchma and Mr. Malev, the FBI's analysis was done on the original digital "recording" of that conversation, and not on a "tape."

From the U.S. Government's perspective, continued questioning of the authenticity of the July 2000 recording seems to be motivated on the part of some by a desire to deflect attention from the matter at hand - the decision to transfer the Kolchuga system, in violation of U.N. sanctions, to Iraq. The Kolchuga issue is important to us because it affects the safety of our pilots patrolling the Iraq "no-fly" zones. But it is also important to us and to our European partners because the decision to transfer the system to a country that has consistently violated international law and human rights seems to contradict Ukraine's stated commitment to a "European choice."

Did an actual transfer of the Kolchuga system to Iraq occur?
From the beginning of this episode, the United States Government has said that, while we are certain of the authenticity of the July 10, 2000 recording, we do not know whether the transfer actually did occur. There is some information available to us that suggests it may have occurred. Ukrainian authorities invited a team of U.S. and British experts to Ukraine to establish that a transfer did not take place. Faced with a lack of access to important documents and serious gaps in documentation in violation of Ukraine's export control process, the team was unable to rule out the possibility of a transfer of the Kolchuga system to Iraq. In particular, the team was not permitted to see the full investigation reports the Government of Ukraine informed us had already been completed by the National Security and Defense Council, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the Office of the Procurator General, as well as important contractual documents. Access to all of these documents had been promised to the team and was later denied. The team also did not have access to key individuals, including former SBU head Leonid Derkach and the former Iraqi honorary consul to Ukraine.

The team also found serious flaws in the way that Ukraine's export control system is implemented. While Ukraine's export control system is supposed to have checks and balances, such checks either were not exercised or they were not documented, precluding a reconstruction of the events that surrounded the authorization of the sale of the Kolchuga system in 2000. Thus, the question of whether a transfer took place must remain open. Moreover, if further investigation by the United Nations is to prove useful, the Ukrainian Government must first decide whether it will make available documentation denied to the U.S.-UK team. Otherwise, a United Nations team will face the same obstacles in assessing the question of a transfer as were faced by the team from the United States and United Kingdom.

Despite our disappointment with the results of the experts team visit to date, the United States remains committed to a broad, robust relationship with Ukraine as a whole. Toward this end, the United States supports active engagement through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels. Our support for the NATO-Ukraine action plan and the intensive program that will result from it is only one example. We also continue to support our military-to-military engagement, non-proliferation programs, small business development, private agricultural development, local and regional government projects, activities to strengthen civil society and an independent media, exchange programs, engagement with the Verkhovna Rada, and other activities.

I hope these comments have helped address questions that have been raised on the possible transfer of the Kolchuga system to Iraq.

Sincerely, Carlos Pascual
Ambassador
 

26.11.02. Ukrainsk Tv: Prag blev en diplomatisk succes for Ukraine

26.11.02. "Koltjuga"-spørgsmålet står i centrum for NATO

27.11.02. Ukraine skjuler noget om besøg fra Irak i 2001

27.11.02. Udskiftning på de centrale poster i regeringen

27.11.02. Kina bekræfter at have købt "Koltjuga" af Ukraine

28.11.02. Mistanke om salg af "Koltjuga" til Irak via Kina

29.11.02. Intet flertal for Tihipko som nationalbank-chef

29.11.02. Kutjma mødte paven i Rom

Leonid Kutjma var tilfreds med de forhandlinger, som fandt sted under hans officielle besøg i Italien. Det sagde han under mødet med Roms borgmester, Walter Veltroni.
    Ifølge Kutjma er den vigtigste konklusion, som glæder ham, at "man her allerede godt ved, hvad Ukraine er for noget, og hvem ukrainerne er". Han er endvidere også glad for, at "italienerne gerne ser Ukraine i den europæiske familie og er parate til at støtte Ukraine på vej mod Europa".
    Roms borgmester forærede Kutjma Roms symbol - Hunulven, der fodrer Romulus og Remus, mens Kutmja forærede Roms borgmester symbolet på Ukraines hovedstad - en båd med Kyivs grundlæggere - Kyi, Stjek, Khoriv og deres søster Lybid.
    Veltroni sagde, at Rom ser med stor sympati på Ukraine. Podrobnosti. UNIAN.
 

29.11.02. Ukraines præsident i vanskeligheder

Der findes næppe noget mere formaliseret indenfor organiseringen af det menneskelige samfund en
diplomatiske relationer. I den forbindelse er det kun logisk, at diverse krumspring og manipulationer
med formaliteterne for at tilpasse dem sine mål har opnået deres største udbredelse netop i denne
sfære. Hvis man tilmed kontrollerer mediebilledet, så har man endnu bedre mulighed for at redigere
virkeligheden og fortolke begivenhederne. Et klart eksempel herpå kan blive - og er det for så vidt
allerede - situationen omkring den ukrainske deltagelse i NATOs topmøde i Prag. Denne
internationale begivenhed, som har formatet til at blive en milepæl for mange stater og for Den
nordatlantiske Alliance i særdeleshed, har på paradoksal vis opnået en særlig betydning for Ukraine.
 Førende vestlige stater har i efterhånden mere end et år holdt en pause i kontakterne med
Ukraines præsident, Leonid Kutjma. Det møde mellem den ukrainske og amerikanske præsident,
som vores propræsidentielle presse gang på gang har forudsagt, viser sig nu at være en fuldkommen
umulighed. Spørgsmålet om Frankrigs præsidents besøg i Ukraine hænger i en tynd tråd.
 Bankova-gaden (det sted, hvor det ukrainske præsidentpalads befinder sig, red.) forsøger at
glatte situationen ud og skabe indtrykket af, at der ikke er nogen problemer, ved hjælp af hyppige
besøg i mindre og mellemstore lande, der ikke er tilbøjelige til at hæfte sig så meget ved principielle
spørgsmål. Man har endvidere maksimalt udnyttet brede internationale fora, hvor alle har adgang, til
at understrege Leonid Kutjmas tilstedeværelse i Europa. Man har ikke taget notits af vigtigheden af
de spørgsmål, som blev diskuteret i den forbindelse. Det virker som om, at [udenrigsminister]
Anatolij Zlenko på det seneste står uden arbejde. Obstruktionseffekten var der imidlertid stadig. Det
er åbenlyst, at Ukraines præsident har brug for bare et rituelt møde med lederne af de førende
vestlige stater.
 På den baggrund betød Bruxelles beslutning om at afholde mødet i kommissionen “Ukraine-
NATO” i Prag på udenrigsministerniveau og ikke på statsoverhoved-og regeringschefniveau som
forventet ikke alene, at håbet brast, men at situationen blev yderligere forværret. Leonid Kutjmas
iver efter at komme ind i det fine selskab under påskud af deltagelse i mødet i Det nordatlantiske
Partnerskabs Råd ser afslørende ud. Den har allerede fremkaldt en strøm af ironiske kommentarer i
den internationale presse.
 Det er symptomatisk, at ingen i den forbindelse ser hans opdukken i Prag i en kontekst af
udviklingen af relationerne mellem Ukraine og NATO. Han er selv ude af stand til at gøre noget som
helst for disse relationer. En meningsmåling for nylig gav en vigtig strømpil: Undersøgelsen, der blev
foretage af Ukraines center for fred, produktionsomlægning og udenrigspolitik, viste, at præsidenten
og hans administration er den nationale magtinstitution, der er den største forhindring for landets
bevægelse mod et NATO-medlemsskab.
 Desværre gælder det også for en lang række andre udenrigspolitiske opgaver. Nu står det
aldeles klart, at præsidenten ganske enkelt bruger Vesten til at fremme egne specifikke mål.
Eksistensen af normale forbindelser er en bekræftelse af legitimiteten i ens handlinger, accepten af
ens politik udfra et demokratisk normsæt, befæstelsen af ens position i kampen mod de
indenrigspolitiske opponenter og skabelsen af et positivt image for styret...
 Landet har i de senere år ikke skaffet sig reel autoritet, har ikke formået at artikulere sine
natonale interesser, har mistet en betydelig del af partnerskabspotentialet, er havnet i periferien af
ikke alene europæiske, men også euroasiatiske relationer. I den forstand befinder præsidenten sig
reelt for længst udenfor international storpolitik. Nu er han endvidere sat udenfor spillet.
 Naturligvis er beskyldningerne for illegale leverancer af “Koltjuga” til Irak en alvorlig sag. Men den
nuværende fase i relationerne med de mest perspektivrige partnere bør man  ikke så meget forbinde
med deres reaktion på præsidentens personlige uhæderlighed som med en organisk udstødning af en
statslig politik, der er fremmed for et demokratisk international samfund. Og det er en usandhed at
påstå, at staten ikke vil lide skade, og at man smertefrit kan adskille landet fra dets leder. Landet er
ude af stand til at hjælpe sig selv. I fremmede hovedstæder er man allerede i gang med at udtænke
særlige regler for landet og lede efter reelle samarbejdsperspektiver i de næste to år.