ANALYSIS--The appointment of Bohatiorova as NSDC secretary will continue President Yushchenko's use of the NSDC as an alternative centre of governance to the government. In 2005, during the first Tymoshenko government, Yushchenko appointed Petro Poroshenko as NSDC secretary whose remit was to counter balance the government.

The use of the NSDC to attack and counter balance domestic competitors was begun under former President Leonid Kuchma. Following round one of the 1999 elections, Kuchma co-opted opposition leader Yevhen Marchuk as NSDC secretary and used him against Deputy Prime Minister Tymoshenko's reforms against energy corruption.

The Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies (known as the Razumkov Centre) wrote that the NSDC is being used, "towards strengthening the Presidents position in his stand-off with the coalition majority in Parliament and creating something like a 'mini government' rather than towards more effective provision of foreign policy activity of the head of state".

In December 2007, the Constitutional Court began deliberations over 14 decrees issued by Yushchenko on the NSDC. The parliamentary deputies who placed the complaint before the court argued that the president has infringed the constitution in expanding the remit of the NSDC.

Bohatiorova will join former Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov as Defence Minister who will also act as a counter weight to the Tymoshenko government. The inexperienced Yekhanurov replaced Anatoliy Hrytsenko who was popular in the armed forces, NATO and Western governments.

Hrytsenko entered government as the President of the Razumkov Centre and was one of a few ministers who had come from civil society, despite high hopes during the Orange Revolution that there would be an inflow of young NGO activists. Hrytsenko was one of few ministers who had served in all three governments since Yushchenko's election.

The replacement of Hrytsenko by Yekhanurov, leader member of the anti-Tymoshenko wing of Our Ukraine-Peoples Self Defence (NU-NS), coupled with the demand that NU-NS control the Interior Ministry, aims to place law enforcement fully under the presidents control. Razumkov Centre expert Valeriy Chaly concluded that, "greater attention is being given to political issues than maintaining professionals in place".

Under Kuchma, the NSDC secretary went to experts in foreign and defence policy, such as Volodymyr Horbulin and Marchuk. Under Yushchenko, the NSDC secretary has gone to businessmen and economic technocrats, such as Poroshenko (February-September 2005), Anatoliy Kinakh (October 2005-May 2006), and Vitaly Hayduk (October 2006-May 2007). Ivan Pliushch (June - November 2006) was parliamentary speaker during Yushchenko's 1999-2001 government.

Poroshenko, Kinakh and Pliushch are members of the anti-Tymoshenko wing of NU-NS. Bohatiorova's appointment therefore continues in the tradition of placing Tymoshenko's opponents in the position of NSDC secretary with no experience in foreign and defence policy.

Controlling the Tymoshenko Government. Constitutional reforms in 2006 no longer make it possible for the president to dismiss the government, as was undertaken against Tymoshenko in September 2005. The new constitution places the government under the control of the parliamentary coalition.

The president has three remaining ways to influence the government:

1. Using the NSDC and NU-NS control over law enforcement as a counter-balance;

2. Placing NU-NS Yushchenko loyalist Arseniy Yatseniuk as parliamentary speaker. Yatseniuk was promoted by the president as an alternative to Our Ukraine's choice for speaker, its leader Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, who is closer to Tymoshenko.
 

3. If relations deteriorate, using the presidential secretariat to pressure NU-NS to withdraw from the coalition thereby leading to the collapse of the Tymoshenko government.
 

President Yushchenko has outlined six proposals that aim to control the Tymoshenko government:
 

1. The government meets weekly with the president and speaker.

2. The prime minister meets the president each day for 30 minutes.

3. The president would attend government meetings.

4. Bohatiorova ensures the implementation of all NSDC resolutions. The majority of these would deal with domestic issues that are within the governments competence, such as reforming law enforcement, energy and coal.

5. The NSDC to become the main generator of national priorities that would be taken on board by the government.

6. The NSDC would become a vehicle to promote dialogue between the government and opposition and to promote national integration.

Yushchenko's aim to counter-balance Tymoshenko are unsustainable due to constitutional reforms, internal divisions in NU-NS and public ratings.

The 2006 constitution removes the government from presidential control.

The president's demand for NU-NS to withdraw from an orange coalition would be sufficient for the orange coalition to collapse as it has a slim majority of 227 deputies and upwards of a third of NU-NS are in the anti-Tymoshenko camp. But, such a demand would irrevocably split NU-NS ahead of the 2009 presidential elections.

The Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT) came only 3% behind the Party of Regions in the 2007 elections and a December poll put it, for the first time, ahead with 26.3% (compared to 25% for the Party of Regions). The presidents NU-NS had collapsed from 14% in the elections to 7.9%.

Another poll gave Tymoshenko 30.7% as politician of the year compared to 14.8% for Yanukovych and only 6.6% for Yushchenko. Planned anti-corruption programmes and social policies by the Tymoshenko government will serve to increase her popularity ahead of the 2009 presidential elections.

Divisions in the Party of Regions. The appointment of Bohatiorova was opposed by the Party of Regions presidium because it contradicted its opposition stance. The appointment repeats Yushchenko's long-standing inability to separate the authorities from the opposition.

During Kuchma's second term, Yushchenko and Our Ukraine wavered between joining the opposition with Tymoshenko or being in "constructive opposition" through a coalition with pro-Kuchma moderates, including the party of Regions that Poroshenko assisted in establishing in 2001. In autumn 2006, Our Ukraine was both in opposition, with Tymoshenko, and in the Viktor Yanukovych government and was only forced to fully join the opposition after its ministers were forcibly removed.

Presidential strategy aims to divide the Party of Regions into its liberal "constructive" and conservative wings. Bohatioriva is a close ally of the leaders of the constructive wing of the Party of Regions, Boris Kolesnikov and oligarch Renat Akhmetov who threatened to resign from the party in December.

In the next two years ahead of presidential elections, Ukraine's political spectrum could be re-aligned:

1. Centre-right: Tymoshenko bloc and a majority from NU-NS. A large majority of NU-NS are exasperated by Yushchenko's arrogance and lack of consultation with them. NU-NS was not informed of the plan to appoint Bohatioriova and many opposed it;

2. Centrist, Pro-Business: constructive and youth wings of the Party of Regions and the anti-Tymoshenko minority in NU-NS;

3. Conservatives: remnants of the Party of Regions under Yanukovych.
 

In opposition under Kuchma and as president, Yushchenko has felt more comfortable with the second group than with the first or third. As NSDC secretary, Bohatiorova would be in a good position to assist in Yushchenko's re-alignment as the candidate of the second group in the 2009 presidential elections. The cost to Yushchenko would be the loss of the bulk of orange support.

If the orange coalition were to collapse in the governments first year the Tymoshenko government would remain as acting government as new elections are only possible after September 2008. If Yushchenko were to re-align from orange to the new centrist grouping it would take place under a new government in 2008-2009.

Tension with the Government. The anti-corruption and justice-seeking platform of the Tymoshenko government will, as in 2005, come into conflict with the consensus seeking president. In a 21 December speech to Inter TV, whose viewers are primarily in eastern Ukraine, Tymoshenko said, "We are commencing the process of purifying the country, and I will make every effort to ensure that dirty money is no longer a defining factor in Ukrainian politics".

No senior officials have been criminally charged under Yushchenko who has instead sought reconciliation. If corruption is to be seriously reduced in Ukraine, criminal charges against senior officials who have continued to remain above the law will have to follow. Two Socialist Party members of the former Yanukovych government, Interior Minister Vasyl Tsushko and Transport Minister Mykola Rudkovsky, are being investigated and could be charged as the Socialists are no longer in parliament.

If charges were laid against senior Party of Regions deputies there would be the potential for conflict between the president and government. In December, Yushchenko awarded a state medal to Kolesnikov, head of the Party of Regions 2007 campaign and briefly arrested on extortion charges in 2005. The award was ridiculed by Tymoshenko but defended by the president in a three-hour live marathon in December.

Yushchenko described Kolesnikov as a member of the "constructive" wing of the Party of Regions which sought to compromise during the spring 2007 crisis after the president had disbanded parliament. Kolesnikov, who is close to presidential secretariat head Viktor Baloga, agreed to early elections after being offered a grand coalition with NU-NS after the elections. The appointment of Bohatiorova, who shared a parliamentary office with Kolesnikov, was an attempt at fulfilling the deal, but outside parliament.

The NSDC secretary would be in a position to defend the Party of Regions from criminal charges and to oppose re-privatisation. Tymoshenko has stated her plan to take back Dniproenergo privatised in summer 2007 by Party of Regions oligarch, Renat Akhmetov, a close ally of Kolesnikov and Bohatiorova. Tymoshenko has raised questions as to who is responsible for corruption and negligence in permitting Naftohaz Ukrainy to nearly go bankrupt.

Conclusion--The appointment of a senior Party of Regions official to the NSDC continues the tradition of using this institution not for foreign policy but as a counter-balance to the government. Presidential strategy also seeks alternative allies in the constructive wing of the Party of Regions ahead of presidential elections. Attempts by an unpopular president under a new constitution to control a popular Tymoshenko government will fail, lead to conflict and a possible final split in the orange camp.

12.01.08. Ideology vs personal ambition

Lucan Way - political scientist, Professor, University of Toronto, an expert on post-Soviet countries, shares his opinions with NRS on the situation in Ukraine.

-- How do you assess the current situation in Ukraine, including such outrageous excesses, as the brawling in parliament and deputies dousing each other with water?

-- This is absolutely normal and expected chaos at the highest level. There is a balance of power, but in general the parties and politicians are weak. They easily bribe one another. These events are unpredictable, on the one hand; on the other - are expected.

-- Why, do you think, it has been so difficult for the "Orange" to agree?

-- Because these politicians are not united by a common ideology, but by personal ambitions. This always creates an unstable political environment. Yushchenko -Tymoshenko in tandem reminds me of Kuchma and Marchuk few years ago. Here too there was no ideology - only personal ambitions. This always weakens the opposition coalition. This, by the way, distinguishes Ukraine from Russia, where party discipline is strong now.

-- Ukrainian chaos - is exclusively political. How does it affect the daily lives of people? My girlfriend from Kyiv complains: How is it possible to permanently live in the apartment, which is constantly under repair.

-- I think this comparison is not entirely appropriate. Political storms have shaken various countries. Ukrainian upheaval - is only chaos at the top. This is of interest to political scientists, as I, as well as for journalists. But ordinary people live their lives. What is happening in the parliament now - is good. Opponents are seeking a compromise - a normal democratic practice. The dangerous situation is when a group takes power into their hands - as is now happening in Russia.

-- Does Russia have any influence on the Ukrainian situation today?

-- In general, only energy prices. The rest - hardly. Only Russia's proximity has the largest influence on Ukraine.

-- Do you think that Yulia Tymoshenko has a dictatorial streak?

-- She dangerous because she very active and effective. She is like Trotsky and Stalin all rolled into one. Like Trotsky she has great oratory skills, but she can be tough like Stalin

- master of back room intrigue.

-- Yulia Tymoshenko is dangerous for Ukraine?

-- Yes, very dangerous. She is a populist with no ideology, only a need for power. If she ever becomes President, all these current democratic Ukrainian experiments will be immediately discontinued. I think Ukrainian democracy is still alive today only because of laziness of Viktor Yushchenko. He, incidentally, is very similar to Kravchuk, the first Ukrainian president. Both like to be akin to the British monarch - always staying on top, but not involved in the day to day matters. Yulia Tymoshenko would wield power on a daily basis. She would concentrate power in her hands. I have known her for some time and worked with her once. She is clever and efficient. She has no ideology. Money in itself does not interest her. She is driven by ambition. I am not saying that this is bad for politics, but in the case of Yulia Tymoshenko this can be dangerous.

-- Many Ukrainians are watching on television the unfolding political situation in Russia. Some are even begin to yearn for a strong hand. Who is on the right political path?

-- Ukraine is on the right track - in the general sense of what is understood by democracy. In Russia, Putin can do the most stupid thing, and no one will stop him. The Ukrainian situation is different - there will be discussions, douse each other with water and criticize the decision of the President. So in that the sense, democracy in Ukraine is ahead of Russia.

-- And what do you think of a possible union with Moscow and Minsk?

-- Full delirium. Lukashenko and Putin will not be able to exist together. http://vlasti.net/
Lucan A. Way
B.A. (Harvard), M.A., Ph.D. (California)
Research interests: regime change, hybrid regimes, weak states, fiscal and social reform, corruption, comparative politics of developing countries, and post-Communist politics. He has published articles in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Comparative Politics, East European Politics and Societies, Journal of Democracy, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Politics and Society, Post-Soviet Affairs, Studies in Comparative and International Development, World Politics, as well as several book chapters.

16.01.08. The challenges of the Ukrainian government to manage its energy sector

January 10, .2008

A dynamic, efficient energy sector is a major prerequisite for Ukraine`s development into a vibrant market economy that could rapidly improve living standards for its citizens. However, Ukraine will need to make the energy industry much more efficient because it has the highest ratio of energy use to per capita GDP in the world. It has the world`s most energy intensive economy.

Ukraine has extensive reserves of coal and a large nuclear power industry. However, it relies heavily on imports of oil and especially natural gas for its energy needs.

Natural gas is more important than oil for Ukraine. The country consumes five times more natural gas than oil in energy equivalent terms. Although Ukraine consumes about a quarter of its natural gas from domestic production the other three quarters are purchased from Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Unfortunately, all of these imports come through Russia with its imposed tariffs.

The recognized corrupt corporate system of energy imports and sales has actively discouraged Western investment in the energy sector, leaving Ukraine with one of the lowest levels of foreign direct investment in energy in the region.

Ukraine is the key energy corridor bringing oil and gas shipments to Europe from Russia and Central Asia and can play an even more significant role in Europe`s attempt to achieve greater energy security.

If Ukraine were to implement progressive policies in its energy sector including current market pricing for its products and reducing barriers to foreign investment, it could reduce Russia`s influence on economic policy decision making in Ukraine and it might even induce Russia to introduce additional reforms into its own energy sector.

Current Situation

Despite the known corporate corruption, Ukraine has had some major accomplishments in the energy sector, including increases in energy efficiency. As a result, the country is about 20 percent more energy efficient today than it was in 1990. New nuclear power plants have replaced most of the electricity previously generated by the RBMK reactors at Chernobyl. Ukraine is set to become a net exporter of electricity as a result of its robust nuclear industry. In spite of continued Russian pressure, the Ukrainian government intends to retain control of its major gas pipeline system rather than allow it to be controlled by Gazprom, a Russian company. The World Bank has indicated that it is anxious to help Ukraine modernize its energy infrastructure, develop a progressive tariff system and integrate the country`s energy sector with those of Western Europe.

There is a great awareness in Ukraine of the need to diversify the country`s sources of oil and natural gas and to reduce its domestic consumption through increased efficiency.

Ukraine is fortunate in that the country contains ( 1 ) significant reserves of oil and gas, both on and off shore, ( 2 ) massive coal deposits, with Europe`s best coal-bed methane prospects, and ( 3 ) at least six functioning nuclear reactors, backed by a sophisticated nuclear industry. With improved energy policies and stronger rule of law to support supply contracts, Ukraine has the capability to reduce its import dependency by 50% over the next 15 years. Other reforms could also strengthen Ukraine`s position when negotiating energy import prices with Russia and the Central Asian suppliers.

Unfortunately, Ukraine has become more dependent on energy imports. Ukraine still lags behind other European nations in modernizing its energy sector. It requires greater business transparency, coupled with tariff reform and energy efficiency gains that could help reduce or eliminate the constant build up of payment arrears to Russia and Central Asian suppliers.

What the critics recommend

The critics of the government have stated that Ukraine should immediately repudiate its contracts with RosUkrEnergo, the Russian subsidiary of Gazprom and negotiate gas purchase contracts directly with Gazprom. This move would weaken the power of Ukrainian oligarchic groups who benefit financially through their collaboration with Russian state - controlled entities.

Conclusions

Further, Ukraine should implement the transit protocol of the European Energy Charter that stipulates the creation of a “ common carrier “ system.ConclusionsReforms in the energy market in Ukraine can have a multiplier effect including the reduction of influence of the corrupt business groups over the country`s political system. It could also accelerate Ukraine`s economic and political integration into the West.

There are a total of nine recommendations in this report.

The complete text of this article can be read at:
http://www.otherside.com.ua/news/detail.php?lang=3&id=38322

16.01.08. Will Holodomor receive the same status as the Holocaust?

by Josef Zisels, Halyna Kharaz

[ ... ]

Why is the issue of Holodomor so important for Ukraine? At present the country is undergoing a process of national and historic self-identification. It is trying to understand afresh the events of the distant and recent past, especially those which were momentous and tragic pivotal points in its history. Holodomor and World War II were just such points, and they are difficult and painful subjects. For this reason the issue around declaring Holodomor to have been an act of genocide is a burning one for Ukraine.

When we use the word “genocide”, we mean first and foremost the Holocaust. Yet there are other tragic examples also: Armenia, Cambodia, Ruanda. We should also remember the mass deportation of whole ethnic groups – the Crimean Tatars, the Chechens, Ingush people and others carried out by Stalin’s regime and which led to the deaths of virtually half of those deported.

The formal reason why Holodomor has still not been recognized as genocide from the point of view of international law is a question of terminology. According to the definition in the UN Convention, “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

1. Killing members of the group;
    
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
    
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
    
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
    
5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
    

There is no doubt that Holodomor was organized artificially, for political and ideological reasons, that it resulted in the deaths, according to various estimates, of from 5 to 7 million people, the absolute majority of whom were Ukrainian peasants, as well as rural people in Kuban (also mainly of Ukrainian descent, Povolzhya (Volga region) and Kazakhstan.

For Ukraine this crime perpetrated by the communist regime was a national tragedy, a terrible attack on the gene pool of the nation. Yet there are still now plenty of people ready to argue about whether the destruction of the Ukrainian peasants was the direct purpose of Holodomor, or whether their deaths were only the result of the communist regime’s policy against the individual peasant farmers as a class.

Such discussions strike us as being at very least unethical. What Stalin and his people planned we will one day find out from archival documents. However what it led to is absolutely clear and we must judge the terrible events of those years specifically on the results. These were such that they fall under the definition of genocide. Now, when a number of countries, including European states, have recognized Holodomor as genocide, it would be senseless to become bogged down in a dispute over terminology. We are talking after all of a symbolic act, once again strengthening our bipolar world.

Unfortunately Russia’s position in this seems highly ambiguous with it on principle refusing to accept Holodomor as genocide, saying that not only people from Ukraine, but in other places suffered as a result of it. In actual fact, Russia is worried that it, as successor to the USSR, could face claims and even demands for compensation. These fears are only warranted if Russia indeed considers itself to be not only the successor, but to also be continuing the Soviet state. Then it will indeed have to not only make use of Soviet achievements, but also take upon itself responsibility for the crimes of the Soviet regime.

As for other countries, in the first instance democratic and civilized states, we hope that they will recognize Holodomor as genocide, in awareness of the historic justice of this step. This recognition would be enormously important for Ukraine in its aspiration to become a part of the democratic world. It is possible that Russia will also realize that Ukraine’s tragedy is its own tragedy. After all we are not talking about one people’s grievances against another, but of the crime of a totalitarian regime and the implementation of plans by those from different ethnic groups blinded by hatred and hiding behind a particular ideology.

In the case of Israel, we can see three reasons at least why it cannot at the present time recognize Holodomor as genocide.

1. Stereotypical thinking in relation to Ukraine weighed down by memories of dark pages in Ukrainian-Jewish relations in the past;

2. The fixed idea that the Holocaust was unique and lack of willingness to officially recognize that in the history of other people there were tragic events no less painful for them, than the Holocaust is for Jews. We would note that such an attitude meets with no understanding from many peoples not only having experienced their tragedies, but having successfully escaped them.

3. “Tactical” considerations – reluctance to have any conflict with Russia.

One would like to believe that sooner or later other reasons will dominate with both Israel’s official position and Israeli public awareness, namely;

1 Empathy from one people who experienced tragedy for others who have experienced theirs;

2 Solidarity from the democratic world against the remnants of imperialist, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes;

3 The good prospects for relations between Ukraine and Israel, unlike, in our view, the lack of such prospects for relations between Israel and Russia.

We believe that Israel will sooner or later recognize the Armenian tragedy and Holodomor to have been acts of genocide, as well as Stalin’s deportations. And for the moment we hope that Israel will receive the calls from Ukraine to recognize Holodomor as genocide with understanding, and will put the question forward for consideration and discussion.

If it had not been for those very “tactical” considerations which have often made it impossible to stop the criminal actions of totalitarian empires in time, the world would today look quite different. If after the genocide of the Armenians the world community had understood the danger of such crimes for all humanity and had found an antidote, then perhaps there would not have been Holodomor or the Holocaust or other crimes on a mass scale.

There can be no other but moral criteria. The pain of each people must become the pain of all mankind – there is no other way to a tolerant world.

21.01.08. Ukrainian famine genocide. The smoking gun

By Roman Serbyn  http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/subscriber/westview/
story/4091019p-4689260c.html, Dec 10 2007

At a recent international conference in Toronto devoted to the study of the Holodomor (Ukrainian famine of 1932), an American scholar remarked on how difficult it is to keep up with new publications of secret Soviet documents uncovered in Russian and Ukrainian archives. A Ukrainian archivist drew attention to the wealth of material, which is now available to researchers, but still has to be published.

The truth of these remarks is borne out by Daniel Stone's article (No Smoking Gun, Free Press, Dec. 2), which is a striking example of historical interpretation based on insufficient mastery of old and new sources.
Stone looks for a "smoking gun" to the Ukrainian genocide, but finds none, and calls to his aid Michael Ellman who came up with the verdict "Not Proven." The quoted British scholar is a masterful polemicist, but he has never researched the famine in Soviet or post-Soviet archives, and the subject is not really his field of expertise.

Stone could have done better by quoting the Italian scholar Andreas Graziosi or the French expert Nicolas Werth, both of whom have worked in the archives, know the documentation very well and have come to a different conclusion. Nicolas Werth, remembered for his contribution on the U.S.S.R. in the Black Book of Communism, has come to the following conclusion: "On the basis of these elements (documents and their analysis), it seems legitimate from now on to qualify as genocide the totality of actions carried out by the Stalinist regime to punish by hunger and terror the Ukrainian peasantry."

Werth is well aware of the famine in Russia and in Kazakhstan, but recent documents have convinced him of "the strong specificity of the Ukrainian famine."

Among these documents, two will suffice to illustrate the two elements of the UN definition of genocide: a) the "intent to destroy in whole or in part" b) "a national or ethnic... group, as such."

On Dec. 14, 1932, the Communist Party and state authorities in the Kremlin blamed the national revival among Ukrainians, both in Ukraine proper and Russia (which had a population of eight million Ukrainians), for difficulties in grain deliveries to the state and banned the Ukrainian language in schools, administration and mass media in Russia, and introduced a more gradual Russification in the Ukrainian republic itself.

On Jan. 22, 1933, a secret directive signed by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and his foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, closed the borders between the Ukrainian republic and the rest of the Soviet Union to peasants who were fleeing Ukraine in search of food in Russia where it was more readily available.

The same directive isolated the Northern Caucasus Territory, mentioning especially the Kuban region (over two-thirds Ukrainian) from the rest of the Russian republic (of which it was a part) and the Ukrainian republic. As a result of the directive, during the next six weeks 225,000 Ukrainians were arrested. About 85 per cent were sent back to their villages to starve to death and the rest disposed of in various other ways. Both these orders targeted not peasants but Ukrainians.

All serious scholars recognize the human loss in Ukraine was at least four million; furthermore, the loss of life in the Russian republic was mainly in the ethnically mixed regions of Northern Caucasus, Middle and Lower Volga. The 1926 census pegged the Ukrainian population for the U.S.S.R. (outside the Ukraine) at eight million; by 1937, the number of Ukrainians in the same regions declined to four million.

A large part of the loss of half the Ukrainian population in Russia was due to the famine, but probably a greater part was due to registration of the survivors as Russians.

The UN convention recognizes as one form of genocide the transfer of children from one group to another. Such a transfer affected whole Ukrainian families.

There are other inconsistencies in Prof. Stone's article, but those mentioned should be sufficient to show that the article does not have the scholarly candour expected from an expert in his field. When an author signs his name with his academic credentials he claims professional authority, and such authority carries responsibility towards his discipline and his readers.

Roman Serbyn is a professor of history (retired) at the Université du Québec -- Montréal.

EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
Volume 5 , Issue 11
January 21, 2008

By Taras Kuzio

The issue of the lack of action against corruption led to a physical showdown on January 18 in the presidential secretariat. Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko struck Kyiv Mayor Leonid Chernovetsky over his alleged involvement in corrupt land schemes. Lutsenko said afterward, “I have no regrets for this incident and believe that it was a manly hit that should be undertaken by everybody who wants to live in an honest state.”

On December 7, 2007, Lutsenko and Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT) deputy Svyatoslav Oliynyk introduced a parliamentary resolution to remove General Prosecutor Oleksandr Medvedko. The Rada was set to debate the resolution on January 18, but that was postponed when Medvedko conveniently checked into a clinic earlier in the week.

The draft motion collected 180 signatures out of the 227 members of the pro-democratic orange coalition, consisting of BYuT and Our Ukraine-Peoples' Self Defense (NUNS). While all BYuT deputies signed the resolution, NUNS – specifically its pro-grand coalition wing, loyal to the president – is divided.

Medvedko’s job is politically linked to that of Raisa Bohatyryova, the former Party of Regions parliamentary faction leader appointed secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) on December 24. Both Medvedko and Bohatyryova are from Donetsk, the Party of Region’s stronghold. Stepan Havrysh, legal adviser to the 2004 Yanukovych election campaign, was also appointed deputy head of the NSDC on January 18.

Medvedko became general prosecutor in November 2005 and has remained in that position except for a brief period in April 2007. That month he was replaced by Sviatoslav Piskun, who had served as general prosecutor from December 2004 through October 2005, as well as earlier under President Leonid Kuchma in July 2002-October 2003.

Herein lies the dilemma. Yushchenko claims to support a break with the Kuchma era and a battle against corruption, but his choice of general prosecutors has been inconsistent with this statement. Maintaining Piskun in place for the first ten months of his presidency reassured the Kuchma-era elites of their immunity from prosecution, which had been negotiated during the Orange Revolution’s roundtables in late 2004.

Under Yushchenko, no general prosecutor has done much to advance the rule of law or to combat high-level corruption and abuse of office among Ukraine’s elites. As Zerkalo nedeli (December 15-21, 2007) wrote, “Fortunately, groundless political repressions are no longer an element of public policy. Unfortunately, deserved punishments are not, either.”

Other parties have poor records as well. Two senior Socialists, (former interior and transport ministers Vasyl Tsushko and Mykola Rudkovsky), from the previous government of Party of Regions prime minister Viktor Yanukovych, are under investigation, but, based on past experience, they are unlikely to be prosecuted. As a recent Atlantic Council of the United States report pointed out, the Party of Regions has never expressed much interest in battling corruption. Ukrainians give very low marks to the second Yanukovych government (2006-2007) for failing to battle corruption.

Although most political parties claim they are in favor of combating corruption, especially at election time, Ukrainians remain skeptical. The 2007 Transparency International survey found that the majority of Ukrainians believe that the judiciary is the most corrupt institution in Ukraine, followed by political parties, parliament, and the Interior Ministry. When asked if there would be a breakthrough in overcoming corruption over the next three years, 44% of Ukrainians said “No,” while 38% said corruption would increase. Only 18% of Ukrainians believed that corruption would decline by the end of Yushchenko’s first term in office in 2010.

Some 70% of Ukrainians do not believe that the authorities are effective in their struggle against corruption. Another 22% saw no results from the campaign, while only 8% believed any campaign was effective.

Ukrainians are particularly disappointed with the president who, they believe, has continued Kuchma’s virtual campaign against corruption. The Atlantic Council wrote, “While there are many reasons for the persistence of corruption in Ukraine, polling suggests that public disappointment is particularly strong in the case of President Yushchenko, as many voters believe he is one of the few top politicians who is not tainted by corruption. Yet, Ukrainians believe he has done too little to fight it.” Only 21% of Ukrainians believe the president has shown the political will to combat corruption.

NUNS deputy and deputy head of the parliamentary Committee on Law Enforcement Volodymyr Stretovych said, “He [Yushchenko] has outlined a campaign against corruption that he repeated many times. But without cardinal cadre changes in the procuracy, nothing will change. In the current situation the procuracy is corrupt from bottom to top, from the raion to the general prosecutor.”

The Tymoshenko government is committed to battling corruption and reforming law enforcement, including in the procuracy. Tymoshenko has stated that she will not run in the 2009 presidential elections if her government’s reforms and campaign against corruption are successful; she believes they were blocked by the president in 2005 during her first government.

Yushchenko is caught between having to choose to protect the Party of Regions and further inaction against elite abuse of office or supporting the Tymoshenko government. The two are in direct contradiction.

(acus.org; transparency.org; president.gov.ua; rada.kiev.ua; Ukrayinska pravda, January 8-12; Zerkalo nedeli, December 15-21, 2007)

26.01.08. Tymoshenko not free to act independently