KYIV -- Ukraine's prime minister survived a no-confidence vote in parliament, but a deepening economic slump and political bickering spell trouble for the country's Western-leaning leaders.
The move by pro-Russian factions to undermine Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko came as she and her onetime ally, President Viktor Yushchenko, have seen their images dented by personal rivalry.[...]
The disarray threatens Western hopes that this nation - geographically slightly smaller than the state of Texas - on Russia's border could become a beachhead for democratic values in the former Soviet Union.
Diplomats say Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko have all but given up governing, and their rivalry is jeopardizing Ukraine's ability to meet criteria of the International Monetary Fund, which extended to Ukraine a $16.5 billion rescue package last year.[...]
Ukraine has been hit hard by the economic crisis and the collapse in prices of metals and fertilizers, its main exports. Ukraine's industrial production fell by 26% in December from a year earlier and its currency has lost a third of its value since the summer.
Moscow has been using the economic crisis to strengthen its hand in the region, and last month forced Ukraine to agree to sharply higher prices for natural gas after a standoff in which it cut off shipments. The increased cost to Ukraine's gas-hungry industries is expected to pummel the economy further.
Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko have often feuded since the so-called Orange Revolution that swept them to power in 2004, and the approach of presidential elections has worsened matters.[...]
The leaders managed to cobble together enough legislation to secure the help of the IMF, but Ukrainian debt trades at default levels amid fears government spending is out of control.
An IMF mission has been in Kyiv for the past two weeks to determine whether to release the second tranche of its loan. IMF officials have made no statements on the government's plans.
Mr. Yushchenko's approval ratings have crept to the low single digits in recent months. Ms. Tymoshenko's ratings, though higher, are also softening amid signs voters want new faces.
Former parliament speaker Arseny Yatsenyuk, 34 years old, saw his ratings rise after he was sacked by parliament in November, and has been taking support from both Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko.
The fracture of the government has also benefited a figure who has been mostly locked out of power in recent years -- Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian candidate in the 2004 vote that sparked the Orange Revolution.
Mr. Yanukovych, who pushed for the no-confidence vote, has predicted that this year marks Ukraine's "last Orange winter."
Complete article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123387574604054371.html
February 9, 200
By Alan Cullison
The International Monetary Fund is likely to suspend loan payments to Ukraine, a move that would further push the government toward Moscow for aid and exacerbate a feud between top leaders in Kiev.
Ukraine is failing to meet the terms of its loan deal with the IMF, and likely won't get the next installment this month, according to a person close to talks between the fund and the government in Kiev.
Faced with a cash shortage, Kiev is passing the hat around to global powers. Talks were held in Moscow last week over a $5 billion loan to help plug Ukraine's budget deficit.
Ukraine Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko said her government also sent letters to the U.S., European Union, China and Japan, and that "Russia is ready to help with the credit agreement's signing."
President Viktor Yushchenko criticized the talks with Moscow. "It's a dangerous policy and poses a threat to Ukraine's national interests," he said.
The U.S. State Department said it was looking into reports of Ukraine's request for aid.
Ukraine has been hit by falling prices of metals and fertilizers, its main exports. Infighting between Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko has led to a policy deadlock.
The deficit has been a sticking point in talks with the IMF on the release of the second installment of a $16.4 billion loan that it agreed to extend to Ukraine last year. The IMF released the first $4.5 billion tranche in November and had made further disbursements contingent on Ukraine reducing the budget shortfall and making progress on bank restructuring.
Complete article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123422995045566031.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
25.02.09. Viktor Yushchenko: Consumers of Russian gas must show a united front
http://www.mfa.gov.ua/usa/en/publication/content/26251.htm
February 17, 2009
By Viktor Yushchenko
For those of us who lived under the Soviet Union, there is a certain irony
about energy supplies. We may have been in a Cold War with the West, but
Soviet gas always flowed uninterrupted across the Iron Curtain. Nowadays,
thankfully, the Soviet Union is no more -- and yet Russian gas has become a
strategic weapon. Those of us who are net importers cannot help but wonder:
Is Moscow saying that gas supplies will be a problem unless it can have its
sphere of influence once again?
So long as those countries which rely on Russian gas are divided, we put
ourselves in a dependent position. Since 2006, though, alarm bells on the
gas issue have been largely ignored. Of course Russia deserves a fair price
for the exploitation of its natural resources, but the relationship needs to
be rebalanced. The politics need to be taken out of the equation and a more
normal commercial relationship established.
Whether Moscow is motivated by political concerns or simply a desire to
increase the return on its assets, it is in the interests of all importing
countries to coordinate our response. Only by cooperating can we maximize
our collective bargaining power and secure our individual national interests.
As significant net importers of energy, Ukraine and the European Union have
a clear common interest. Energy security for Ukraine, a major transit
country, is also the best guarantee of energy security for our European
neighbors. The energy security of the wider European space is therefore
indivisible.
A strong response to the challenge we face must have at least three
elements: liberalization, diversification and conservation.
By 2030, the International Energy Agency predicts, European gas imports will
double because Europe won't be able to supply its own energy needs. Much of
the extra supply could come from Russia if the necessary investment is made
in new production. But unless action is taken now, importers could be in a
very vulnerable position.
Liberalizing its energy industry would be in Russia's own best interests.
But it will probably resist appeals to do so until the European Union leads
by example: encouraging network operators to invest in interconnectors to
build the energy grid and pipeline networks of the future, thereby reducing
the risk of one customer being played off against another. Energy
independence will come through energy interdependence. We all need
international trade in energy to be open, transparent and competitive.
The current economic crisis is causing considerable suffering for both
households and businesses. This situation provides an added incentive to
solve the problem that arises from all of us, Ukrainians as much as our
European friends, being at the mercy of a self-interested monopolist.
Working together, we can secure our mutual interests -- and, in the long
term, reduce unnecessary friction with Russia. A single, competitive gas
market would help depoliticize the EU-Russia gas relationship, with major
foreign-policy benefits for Europe. It would also improve the security of
supply for all European gas consumers.
The European Energy Community is the obvious building block for this
approach, but its scope needs to extend beyond market liberalization and
include more proactive and practical forms of cooperation. For our part,
Ukraine is determined to reform our gas sector to encourage investment,
increase efficiency by upgrading the pipeline infrastructure to minimize
energy loss in transmission, and create a modern EU-compatible energy sector.
The EU can further those aims by helping transit countries like Ukraine to
reduce reliance on Russian gas, and hence vulnerability to energy blackmail.
One way to reduce reliance on Russia, and an important part of the policy
package for any country planning for the long term, is diversification. In
Ukraine's case, for example, our untapped Black Sea gas reserves needed to
be quantified and exploited with European cooperation. But putting all of
our faith in gas is not the answer: The emphasis should be on cleaner
technologies. All of us in the European neighborhood can learn from each
other to increase the proportion of renewable sources in the energy mix. In
other words, limiting global warming and improving our energy security can
go hand in hand.
Short-term deals between Moscow and any country, including Ukraine, are no
substitute for this kind of comprehensive energy security strategy. Some of
the measures will take time to implement, and so it is essential that the
Transit Protocol of the legally binding Energy Charter Treaty is concluded
as soon as possible. Agreement and ratification would reassure investors in
the pipeline network that transit would occur, and our European neighbors
that gas will be delivered.
Action, not further debate, is needed. The EU in particular has the capacity
to change the entire dynamic of energy relations across Eurasia. But first
it must unite and lead.
Across Europe, the pace of energy reform needs to be increased. Equally, we
all need to be more forthright in reacting to the use of energy as a tool of
foreign policy. Ending divisions in the European house is the only way to
assure energy security for our citizens and industries for the decades to
come.
European solidarity can bring warm homes -- and warmer relations with Russia.
Mr. Yushchenko is president of Ukraine.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3c6d7fae-f7dd-11dd-a284-000077b07658.html
February 11 2009
Mr Viacheslav Kniazhnytskyi
Counsellor on Energy Issues,
Mission of Ukraine to the European Union
Sir, Last month Gazprom launched a massive and aggressive misinformation
campaign against Ukraine. After the conclusion of the Ukraine-Russia gas
deal, I had hoped that this propaganda war was over. Therefore I was
surprised to read in your newspaper ("Russia denies Ukraine gas system move
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4dc11f0-f230-11dd-9678-0000779fd2ac.html>
February 4) groundless allegations about Ukraine's gas transport system (GTS).
Surely, Vladimir Chizhov, the Russian ambassador to the European Union, was
aware of the European Commission's Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth
of Independent States programme conclusions, published in 2007, that the
Ukrainian GTS was in a satisfactory technical condition? Surely, Mr Chizhov
was aware of the official data of the Russian and Ukrainian ministries of
emergencies: while Ukraine had three accidents in its transit pipeline
network, the biggest in Europe, in 2006 and one in 2007, Russia had 37 in
2006 and 43 in 2007. Is Mr Chizhov really in any position to make expert
statements on Ukrainian GTS reliability?
My point is that Ukraine is conscious that its GTS, like any other
continental infrastructure facility, needs ongoing modernisation. To this
end we are investing our own resources as well as co-operating with
interested parties to ensure upgrading of our GTS and improve its security.
On March 23 we will host a special investment conference in Brussels devoted
to this topic.
The recent crisis proved that our security and efficiency systems were
reliable and operational. Moreover, its operation in the crisis environment
revealed additional potential in terms of its sustainability.
By cutting gas off and attempting to place Ukrainian operators in breach of
operational procedures, Gazprom committed an act of technological
aggression. Its ploy did not work because Ukraine has modernised the system
and was able to continue operating.
Europe needs co-operation, not accusations.
Eurasian Daily Monitor
February 18, 2009
Volume 6, Issue 32
Taras Kuzio
On January 27 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)
issued another damning report about the poor state of Ukraine's
investigation into the murder of opposition journalist Georgi Gongadze in
the fall of 2000 (www.assembly.coe.int).
The involvement of senior Ukrainian leaders in the murder was made public
using tape recordings made in President Leonid Kuchma's office by
presidential guard Mykola Melnychenko, who sought asylum in the United
States in April 2001.
Four years after the Orange Revolution and Viktor Yushchenko's promise to
investigate the Gongadze murder, there has been little progress in the
inquiry. Three lower-ranking policemen have been sentenced for their
involvement in the murder, but the organizers have managed to escape justice
thus far: Leonid Kuchma remains in Kyiv, then-Interior Minister Yuriy
Kravchenko allegedly "committed suicide" under suspicious circumstances in
March 2005, and General Olexiy Pukach, who is alleged to have actually
murdered Gongadze, supposedly fled Ukraine in 2004. Gongadze's wife,
Myroslava, accused senior Interior Ministry officers of hiding Pukach in a
similar manner to that of Ratko Mladic, a Serbian war criminal.
Melnychenko's recordings, which are crucial to any investigation, were
ignored by the prosecutor until December 2008, when the tapes and tape
recorder were handed over to the Prosecutor's Office, which agreed to
organize the first analysis of the tapes by an impartial European
organization.
It is no coincidence that after four years of inactivity the Prosecutor's
Office, which is constitutionally under the control of the president, has
only now become interested in the Melnychenko tapes. Ukraine will hold
presidential elections in December, and progress in the Gongadze murder case
could help Yushchenko improve his current dismal 2.4 percent popularity
rating (Democratic Initiatives, January 2009 poll [www.dif.org.ua]).
Three key individuals in the investigation have refused to give voice
samples for comparison to those on the tapes: Kuchma, Volodymyr Lytvyn (head
of the presidential administration during the Gongadze scandal), and the
chairman of the Security Service at the time, Leonid Derkach. Lytvyn, as
speaker of parliament, is the only one of the three who is still a public
figure.
Melnychenko suggested that Yushchenko should set an example by voluntarily
giving a voice sample: "If Yushchenko states that this affair is a matter of
his honor, then he is obliged as a Ukrainian citizen to come forth and set
an example and give evidence" (Radio Svoboda, January 29). The PACE report
demanded that the identity of the voices on the tapes be ascertained.
In a visit to Ukraine last month, Melnychenko said that the European
analysis of his tapes not only would reveal information about the organizers
of the Gongadze murder but would allegedly include details about high-level
abuse of office by Ukraine's elites and interaction with their Russian
counterparts.
Melnychenko directs much of his criticism at Lytvyn as the agitator who
persuaded Kuchma to order the Interior Ministry to "deal" with Gongadze. Any
undermining of Lytvyn could potentially unravel the Orange coalition that
was reestablished in December only after the Lytvyn bloc had agreed to join.
Without the Lytvyn bloc's 20 deputies, there could not be an Orange
coalition, and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's government could collapse.
A full analysis of the tapes could be problematical for more people than
Lytvyn; after all, the majority of Orange leaders (including Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko) were either in government or in business, or both, in the 1990s.
Melnychenko's recordings were made in 1999 and 2000 after Tymoshenko had
entered parliament in the opposition Hromada but before Yushchenko joined in
2001.
Melnychenko has accused Lytvyn of being protected by Russia in a deal struck
in the last days of the Kuchma regime. On January 12 the Russian
Prosecutor's Office declined to assist in the investigation because it would
infringe on Russia's "national interests."
Melnychenko asserts that "the organizers met and required certain assistance
from senior levels of the Russian authorities." Whether this indicates that
the Gongadze affair was a "Russian conspiracy," as Yushchenko and his
national democratic allies have always believed, or (more likely) that the
organizers sought Russian support after the crisis began unfolding remains
unclear. Kuchma re-orientated Ukraine to Russia from 2001 to 2003 after
becoming isolated and shunned by the West.
Melnychenko claims that Russia's knowledge of the real details of the
Gongadze murder enables it to "blackmail Lytvyn and Kuchma's entourage,"
something that is more in Russia's national interests than assisting the
investigation. In a BBC Ukrainian service interview (February 2),
Melnychenko said that as a presidential candidate, "Lytvyn is supported by
Russia in the form of Dmitry Medvedev, Vladimir Putin, and FSB Director
Oleksandr Bortnikov."
It is very likely that blackmail materials on Kuchma and Lytvyn are in
Russian hands (as are similar materials about Russian leaders in Kyiv).
Ukrainian and Russian elites, particularly in the energy sector, are said to
have operated as a criminal joint venture during the "Wild West capitalism"
of the 1990s. With such blackmail materials, Russia may indeed hope that it
would be in a position to manipulate a future "President Lytvyn."
Opinion polls show, however, that this scheme would be farfetched: the two
top presidential candidates have long been Tymoshenko and Party of Regions
leader Viktor Yanukovych (on whom the Russian leadership might also have
blackmail material, as Yanukovych was Donetsk Governor during the "Wild
West" of the 1990s). Lytvyn is both trailing and is being out-flanked by the
rising star of former speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk.
The PACE report and Melnychenko's accusations continue to shed light on an
episode that is one of the most important in recent Ukrainian history and
remains a black spot on Yushchenko's presidency. As Melnychenko rightly
states, "The result we received [from the Kuchmagate crisis] in 2004 was in
the form of the Orange Revolution" (Radio Svoboda, January 29). Other young
democracies have managed to investigate similar conspiracies--Peru under
Alberto Fujimori and contemporary Turkey--but the Gongadze affair continues
to elude a thorough investigation by Orange Ukraine.
30.03.09. OUN-UPA recognition obstinants in Ukraine losing support base in Russia?
Miron Kryzhan-Iwskiy
Recently premiered WWII film in Moscow reveals the truth on the deleterious state of confusion and panic surrounding the Eastern Front events until the 1943 reversal of fortunes at Stalingrad. Initially, the 22 June attack on the USSR by the Third Reich was met with the mass surrender of the Red Army divisions resulting in the Wehrmacht reachiing Moscow suburbs by the summer of 1942. Hitler, however, had miscalculated the apparent Blitz success as omnipotence in conquering the USSR by his own might disregarding the psychological factor accounting for the millions who gave up the fight readily in defiance of the oppressive Stalin regime. Hitler paid dearly for his cruel and inhumane treatment of the Red Army capitulants as the resistance had eventually stiffened substantially granting Stalin time to regroup with the ultimate satisfaction of being in position to claim victory through the unwitting assistance of his nemesis, Hitler.
The film plot presentation is comprized of a fictional battle commanded by Gen. Georgi ZHukov -- in a semi-documentary forrmat -- portrayed in realistic colors by invoking tactics intrinsic to the noted WWII general in the typical to him manner. The irony and novelty in the film production springs out of the fact that the "fictional battle" employs the nonfictional Zhukov style which in official documrmentaries is absent through censoring out and embellishing the "politically compromising and bereft of the glorified heroism" contents. As an example, the favorite tactic [very well known anedcdotally] of Gen Zhukov was to command the foot soldiers to fan ahead of his advancing armored column for creating a safe path across the suspected minefield.
Numerous episodes in the film are used as a testimonial to the horrifyingly chaotic conduct of the Red Army units in the defense against the German Blitz on the Eastern Front.where both the foe and the friend were facing the intolerable elements of fall mud and winter freeze.in addition to the man-to-man cruelties. With the battle conditions stripped of their heroic encounter weneer, the Great Patriotic War [GPW] combatants faced the odds of survival with the tenacity equal to that of any UPA unit. That they both might have been blood brothers -- yet fighting for distinctly different causes -- it did not overtly enter into the picture until the present time. The cited film is making it a point to underscore that Bandera and his circle were not spared a multi-year detention in a German concentration camp while the UPA action was taking place, thus,.confirming the contention that the struggle was being waged on both fronts.
Further research points to the battle in question -- known as the Battle of Rzev -- actually took place near the end of 1942 preparatory to the planned decisive push at Stalingrad in March of 1943. Evidently at the Rzev Battle the Red Army forces under the command of Gen. Zhukov sustained a thorough drubbing from the battle-weary Wehrmacht divisions. Quite naturally, the defeat facts remained squelched at the time by the USSR authorities. Even the collapse of the USSR failed to remove completely the secrecy veil with the objective of maintaining the invincibility myth of the Great Patriotic War.
Ultimately it took the courage of the film producers to put the past in an undistorted light by presenting the battle sans political or any other shading of the facts. It is that principle that led the creative circle of Russian film-makers to hint that the OUN-UPA cannot be stripped of its historic legacy by merely monopolizing on the Great Patriotic War myth.
30.03.09. A new view of a famine that killed millionsMarch 16, 2009
KYIV, Ukraine: A quarter century ago, a Ukrainian historian named Stanislav Kulchytsky was told by his Soviet overlords to concoct an insidious cover-up. His orders: to depict the famine that killed millions of Ukrainians in the early 1930s as unavoidable, like a natural disaster. Absolve the Communist Party of blame. Uphold the legacy of Stalin.
Professor Kulchytsky, though, would not go along.
The other day, as he stood before a new memorial to the victims of the famine, he recalled his decision as one turning point in a movement lasting decades to unearth the truth about that period. And the memorial itself, shaped like a towering candle with a golden eternal flame, seemed to him in some sense a culmination of this effort.
"It is a sign of our respect for the past," Professor Kulchytsky said. "Because everyone was silent about the famine for many years. And when it became possible to talk about it, nothing was said. Three generations on."
[...]
In the Soviet Union, the authorities all but banned discussion of the famine, but by the 1980s the United States and other countries were pressing their own inquiries, often at the urging of Ukrainian immigrants.
In response, Communist officials embarked on a propaganda drive to play down the famine and show that the deaths were caused by unforeseen food shortages or drought. Professor Kulchytsky said he had been given the task of gathering research but concluded that the famine had been man-made.
[...]
Professor Kulchytsky said it was undeniable that people all over the Soviet Union died from hunger in 1932 and 1933 as the Communists waged war on the peasantry to create farming collectives. But he contended that in Ukraine the authorities went much further, essentially quarantining and starving many villages.
"If in other regions, people were hungry and died from famine, then here people were killed by hunger," Professor Kulchytsky said. "That is the absolute difference."
[...]
Last month, Russian historians and archivists sought to bolster the Kremlin's case, issuing a DVD and a book of historical documents that they said demonstrated that the famine was not directed at Ukraine. Many of the documents were translated into English, underscoring how the two countries are waging their fight on an international stage.
Professor Kulchytsky said the Kremlin feared that if it conceded the truth, Russia, considered the successor to the Soviet Union, could face claims for reparations. ...
Complete article:
http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/03/16/europe/16kiev.php
30.03.09. How the West turned from Kyiv
http://www.newsweek.com/id/190389
March 21, 2009
Denis MacShane
Just five years ago Ukraine was the toast of pro-democracy politicians the
world over. The Orange Revolution seemed to be the next strand of the thread
going back to the 1989 Velvet and other peaceful European transitions.
Despite the bullying of Moscow, the Ukrainians stood their ground and said
they wanted to become another Euro-Atlantic nation.
But now, like parents with a sulky, wayward child who just won't grow up,
the world's democracies are turning their back on Ukraine. U.S. President
Barack Obama will clink glasses with Russian and European leaders in London,
Strasbourg and Prague and drop in to say hello to Turkey. But Ukraine,
Turkey's Black Sea neighbor, is off his radar. Silvio Berlusconi openly
supports Russia every time there is a dispute over gas. Angela Merkel used
to visit Ukraine regularly and hold annual Berlin-Kyiv summits, but now she
ignores the country. Russia's ambassador to NATO, the ultranationalist
Dmitry Rogozin, boasted to France's Nouvel Observateur that French President
Nicolas Sarkozy "opposed America's desire to see Ukraine join the Atlantic
alliance," adding that the French president was "Moscow's ally in Europe."
That may be just Russian bombast, but increasingly Kyiv looks west and sees
no alternative.
[...]
Ukraine has its oligarchs who wheel and deal and buy influence, but they
live in their own country and not (as has happened to some of their Russian
counterparts) in exile in London waiting for a dose of plutonium to arrive
with the coffee or banged up in a Russian prison. There is no state police,
journalists at last are free, and Kyiv sparkles and looks more energetic and
full of well-dressed people, bustling stores, offices and public spaces and
new cars despite the recession. Unlike neighboring Georgia, which remains a
favorite of the West, Kyiv avoids provocation. It has abolished nuclear
weapons. It has sent troops to all NATO missions. Ukrainians have remained
calm about Russia's Black Sea fleet, and they are fed up with being linked
to Georgia as if they were a double act, when Ukraine has a stand-alone
claim to be taken seriously as a European nation that wants to fit in with
the Euro-Atlantic community.
There was once real hope that Europe meant it when a procession of visitors
from Brussels and other EU capitals said Ukraine was en route to a European
future. But the West got frightened last August, after the Russian invasion
of Georgia, and bought into the Russian line that plans to admit Ukraine to
NATO meant trouble and strife though this had also been the Russian line on
NATO membership for Poland, the Baltic states and Black Sea nations like
Bulgaria and Romania.
[...]
... obviously, Russia matters more than Ukraine to both Obama and Europe. On
Iran, on nuclear-weapons treaties, on transit access to Afghanistan, Russian
cooperation is the goal of post-Bush foreign policy. But help for Ukraine
can come in the form of soft power. EU leaders can visit more and encourage
trade and investment. Brussels might end a repressive EU visa regime that
means a Ukrainian university professor who used to need only a
multiple-entry visa to go repeatedly to universities in Western Europe must
now apply for each single trip. The Ukrainian military needs help to
modernize, and it should get that help as a thank-you for taking part in
NATO missions.
Indeed, with Russia breathing down its neck, the last thing Kyiv needs is
for Paris and Berlin and Washington to create a new axis of complacency that
uses the incoherence of Ukrainian politics to justify accepting the Moscow
world view that places Ukraine firmly in Russia's sphere of influence.
What's needed now is a new policy that treats Ukraine, warts and all, as a
European nation. Instead of listening to the nyet from Moscow, the United
States and the EU need to start saying da to Kyiv's moderate and modernizing
politicians. Certainly this will be hard for Moscow to accept, but bringing
Ukraine into Europe in the full sense of a path toward EU and NATO
membership might even help encourage Russia to see itself as a future
partner of the EU and the United States, in place of the scratchy rivalry
Moscow now creates in the Euro-Atlantic community.
Complete article:
http://www.newsweek.com/id/190389
30.03.09. Ukraine's modern history and NATO
Ukrainian Embassy newspaper
March 25, 2009
by Ihor Ostash
The contemporary history of Ukraine is the history of a European state
which is committed to sharing and protecting the common values and
responsibilities of its European family, promoting peace and security, and
further strengthening the Euro-Atlantic area.
A course towards integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structures and
future NATO membership is one of the key foreign policy priorities of
Ukraine. This strategic course is written in the Ukrainian laws and has no
alternatives, as has been repeatedly emphasized by Ukrainian President
Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. This is our way to
ensure our sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and prosperity.
Ukraine started its dialogue with NATO soon after getting independence when,
in March 1992, it joined the North-Atlantic Co-operation Council. Later,
this dialogue was significantly expanded and is currently developing within
the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and NATO-Ukraine
Commission, established according to the NATO-Ukraine Charter signed in
1997.
Ukraine became the first post-Soviet country to join the Partnership for
Peace Framework Document on Jan. 10, 1994, and is successfully using the
NATO experience and aid to reform its defence and security sectors to reach
military compatibility with NATO allies' armed forces, as well as deepening
co-operation in other spheres of mutual concern.
Ukraine is the only non-NATO country that participates in every alliance
peacekeeping activity. Kyiv has been and will remain a reliable partner for
Western efforts to build regional stability.
We make our contribution to fight terrorism and keep public order under the
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Ukraine has also
opened its air space for NATO aircraft within the framework of this
operation, and has pledged to provide military and technical assistance to
Afghanistan. We suggest using Security Service of Ukraine facilities to
instruct and train Afghan special forces and services. As well, Ukraine is
committed to further increase its capabilities in Afghanistan.
Other Ukrainians continue their efforts in the NATO Kosovo Force, as well in
the anti-terrorist Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea.
Ukraine is considering an opportunity to increase the number of its
personnel in the NATO training mission in Iraq.
All this is nothing less than solid proof that our country remains committed
to providing strong support for the alliance's peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions and operations.
Nowadays, Ukraine pays serious attention to the development of practical
co-operation with NATO, widening the spheres of interaction, demonstrating
that we are an active contributor to the collective security rather than
merely a consumer.
We joined the Air Situation Data Exchange program, which will assist the
joint fight against terrorism, while last year, the decision was made that
our country will take part in the NATO Response Force.
Active work is underway to widen our co-operation with NATO in the spheres
of cyber defence, the fight against piracy, and implementation of the United
Kingdom/France initiative to strengthen the alliance's helicopter
capabilities. Ukraine constantly provides its services for the strategic
airlift needs of the alliance.
We consistently develop co-operation in combating trafficking in human
beings, drugs, weapons and money laundering. There is also fruitful
interaction in the fields of ammunition destruction, civil emergency
response, environmental security and civil emergency planning, technology
and environmental rehabilitation of the former military facilities,
retraining and social adaptation of the discharged military personnel.
As you see, it takes some time just to enumerate the different aspects of
our co-operation with NATO.
Without exaggeration, last year was crucial for the development of relations
between Ukraine and NATO. The Bucharest summit decision on Ukraine's future
membership in the alliance and December's ministerial decision about the
Annual National Program (ANP) gave us the effective and sufficient ground to
move forward on our Euro-Atlantic course.
Nowadays, we concentrate our efforts primarily on the elaboration of the
first ANP. We look at the ANP as an effective and sufficient format for our
preparation and meeting the criteria for future NATO membership.
At the same time, we are taking into account the importance of public
support for our move towards Euro-Atlantic integration. With this in mind,
the government of Ukraine is providing the necessary information and is
educating the people about the role and place of NATO in the modern system
of international relations, as well as on Ukraine's relations with the
alliance within the framework of the 2008-2011 State Program on Informing
the Ukrainian Society on Euro-Atlantic Integration. Active work in this
sphere has already brought about some positive results. Latest polling shows
that 30 per cent of Ukrainians stand for joining NATO as soon as possible.
This number shows the rise in support of the Euro-Atlantic course by 10 per
cent compared to the previous survey in April-June 2008.
We hope that the reinforced NATO information and liaison offices in Kyiv
will also play an active role in the popularization of NATO in Ukraine.
Last year saw efforts at all levels become more active than ever to prove
that Ukraine's NATO aspirations are not fake but a vital foreign policy
priority of our country. Active consultations at different levels have been
more evidence of the true nature of our course. That could be seen in the
unprecedented political activity of Ukrainian and NATO officials. This
dialogue has been constantly deepened and strengthened by increasing the
number of high-level contacts at NATO-Ukraine Commission meetings, visits of
the Ukrainian prime minister, vice-prime minister, ministers and deputy
ministers for foreign affairs and defence, emergency and other top officials
to Brussels.
The NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting on March 5 of this year showed that our
intentions to maintain an active dialogue with NATO and our progress towards
NATO membership remain unchanged.
Now we are on the eve of the NATO Jubilee Summit in April. NATO's new
Strategic Concept, which will be discussed at the summit, is aimed to
strengthen the role of NATO in the world. We are sure that the policy of
enlargement -- the so-called "open-door policy" -- is one of the key
elements of NATO's success today and in the years to come. And we are
confident that Ukraine's membership in the alliance will contribute to
further stability in the region as well as in the world as a whole.
Our path towards NATO membership is a challenging one, but we are deeply
inspired to walk it until reaching our goal, shoulder to shoulder with our
NATO partners.
Canada has been a strong supporter of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
This could be seen in a number of statements from senior government
officials, in particular Prime Minister Stephen Harper's statement during
the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008, as well as in Canada's letter to
support Ukraine's accession to MAP.
Ukraine highly appreciates this support and the support of all NATO
member-states who share a view that further enlargement of the alliance with
Ukrainian membership will only strengthen the geopolitical weight of the
organization and help it address common issues for the mutual benefit of the
Euro-Atlantic community.
We have already done a lot on our way. We are ready for further persistent
work. And I am sure that in the result we will achieve our goal --
membership in NATO.
Ihor Ostash is Ukraine's ambassador to Canada.
http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/ukraine-3-25-2009
30.03.09. EU-Ukraine pipeline agreement piques Moscow
By Bruce Pannier
[...]
Ukrainian
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, President Viktor Yushchenko, EU External
Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and European Commission
President Jose Manuel Barroso (left to right) got too chummy for Moscow's
liking in Brussels on Marc
"If Russia's interests are going to be ignored, we will be compelled to
begin reviewing the principles of our relations with our partners," Putin
said.
If Russia's sentiments needed clarification, the following day Putin and
President Dmitry Medvedev announced that a planned meeting next week
between Putin and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko had been
postponed indefinitely.
[...]
Putin's warning suggests that relations between Russia and the EU and
Ukraine, at least concerning gas supplies, may once again be entering rough
waters. Tensions calmed only recently after a dispute this winter over
Ukrainian debts to Moscow and gas and transit prices led to temporary cuts
in Russian gas supplies to the EU.
Moscow miffed
... Kyiv's pipeline system is in desperate need of modernization, and for
years Gazprom has assumed it would do that work and become at least a
part-owner. But Kyiv has been clear about not wanting to hand over any part
of its pipeline system to any Russian company.
On March 23, the EU and Ukraine announced that the EU would provide 2.5
billion euros to upgrade Ukraine's 13,500 kilometers of natural-gas
pipelines. While the deal did not explicitly say it, analysts appear
convinced that EU companies are likely to carry out that work. The deal also
raised speculation that EU firms may become operators of Kyiv's pipeline
system.
[...]
Russian criticism of the EU-Ukraine deal has focused on Moscow's involvement
in the project, given that the pipelines carry Russian gas. Politics is
clearly part of Russia's calculation, but economics is also in the equation.
Gazprom this year will pay Ukraine some $2.3 billion euros in transit fees
($1.70 per 1,000 cubic meters per 100 kilometers).
That pricing structure was part of a deal Russia and Ukraine reached in
January to help end their recent gas dispute. Now it's at risk.
Russian Internet newspaper gazeta.ru
<http://gazeta.ru> reported on March 24 that if Ukraine's pipeline
system comes under the ownership of EU companies, the transit fee will rise
to the average European fee -- $3 per 1,000 cubic meters per 100 kilometers.
According to gazeta.ru
<http://gazeta.ru>, "then [Gazprom] would need to pay some $3.9 billion
per year" in transit fees.
[...]
"Our joint declaration states clearly that in accordance with Ukrainian law,
Ukraine's gas transit system is and will remain state property," Tymoshenko
said.
'Transfer of Control'?
Some in the EU, and of course in Russia, believe that is not the case --and
that the EU will want some control over the Ukrainian system to ensure
Russian gas reaches its destination in the EU.
[...]
At the same time, Russia is signaling interest in improving ties with the EU
enough to realize two alternative gas pipeline projects that avoid Ukrainian
territory -- Nord Stream under the Baltic Sea and South Stream under the
Black Sea.
Nord Stream is due to start operations in 2011 and has EU support,
particularly from Germany. When completed, Nord Stream will be capable of
exporting about half the amount of Russian gas that now transits Ukraine.
The EU, while seemingly securing a victory in the Ukrainian pipeline battle,
is now set to wade deeper into the treacherous waters of Ukrainian politics.
Tymoshenko and President Viktor Yushchenko were both at the signing ceremony
in Brussels, but each has worked to marginalize the other in recent months.
Trying to retain some distance from that domestic power struggle is likely
to prove challenging to the EU and any EU-based firms that take on the task
of upgrading, and possibly managing, Ukraine's export pipeline system.
Complete article:
http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Ukraine_Pipeline_Agreement_Piques_Moscow/1516786.html
by Roman Kupchinsky
On March 23, 2009 the Moscow City Court ruled that Semion Mogilevich, also known as Sergiy Shneider, will remain in prison until May 23 while investigators continue to examine his case. (Kommersant Daily, March 24). This is the third extension of his detention the court has ordered since Mogilevich was arrested on January 23, 2008 and charged with abetting in a tax evasion scheme. What makes this case highly sensitive is that Mogilevich has been suspected of having close links to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the opaque gas trade between Gazprom and Ukraine and RosUkrEnergo.
Mogilevich is a former Ukrainian citizen, now residing in a prison cell in Moscow. He is wanted by the FBI on major fraud charges for his role in what is known as the "YBM Magnex Scam." Numerous police sources claim that he is one of the leaders of the Russian mafia, a charge he denied in an interview with the BBC in 1999 when he was still at liberty living in an exclusive neighborhood in Moscow (BBC, June 12, 1999).
Mogilevich is alleged to be a secret billionaire linked to Vladimir Putin and is reputed to be a hidden business partner of Dmytro Firtash,? the 50 percent owner of RosUkrEnergo, the Swiss-based gas trader, 50 percent owned by Gazprom. Firtash has consistently denied any criminal links to Mogilevich, yet he admits knowing him (Vedomosti, 27 June, 2006). Mogilevich has also been described by Leonid Derkach, the former head of the Ukrainian security service, the SBU, as a close friend of Vladimir Putin's during a conversation with former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma.
The questions surrounding the Putin-Mogilevich relationship - if indeed there is one - are not simply theoretical; the answers touch on the nature of power in the Kremlin; how it functions and which players serve its purposes. Part of the answer can be found in the Kuchma-Derkach dialogue held in Kuchma's office on February 8, 2000. According to a recording of the conversation made by a member of Kuchma's security detail, Mykola Melnychenko:
Kuchma: "Have you found Mogilevich?"
Derkach: "I found him."
Kuchma: "So, are you two working now?"
Derkach: "We're working. We have another meeting tomorrow. He arrives incognito.
Later in the discussion Derkach revealed a few details about Mogilevich.
Derkach: "He's on good terms with Putin. He and Putin have been in contact since Putin was still in Leningrad."
Kuchma: "I hope we won't have any problems because of this."
Derkach: "They have their own affairs" (The transcript appears in theforthcoming book by J.V. Koshiw, The Politics of Kuchma ? the Melnychenko Recordings August 1999 to September 2000).
[...]
In December 2005, a confidential Austrian police report noted that:? In August 2005 the FBI gave their Austrian counterparts a confidential report on frauds committed by the SMO (Semion Mogilevich Organization) in connection with gas deliveries from Turkmenistan to the Ukraine and the illegal kickback payments to [a] member of the organization...
According to the FBI the actual control of ETG [Eural Trans Gas] ?and RUE [RosUkrEnergo] is held by Ivan Fursin and Oleg Palchikov. Hungarian police reported about an April 2005 meeting in Vienna between Ivan Fursin, Oleg Palchikov and Dmitri Firtash The FBI described Ivan Fursin, Oleg Palchikov and Dmitri Firtash as? senior members of the SMO (Austrian Federal Criminal Investigation Agency Report on the Semion Mogilevich Criminal Organization, December 1, 2005).
Another document linking Mogilevich to Andras Knopf, the executive director of Eural Trans Gas, the Hungarian gas intermediary company created by Firtash to act as the middleman in the transit of Turkmen gas to Ukraine, is a letter allegedly written by MVD Major-General Alexander Mordovets on November 14, 1998 to the former first Deputy Head of the Department for the Struggle Against Organized Crime of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in which Mordovets described the close criminal relationship between Knopf and Mogilevich.
[...]
Mogilevich was arrested in late January 2008 on charges of abetting a tax evasion scheme by Vladimir Nekrasov, the owner of "Arbat Prestige," a chain of Russian cosmetic stores and has remained in jail while the investigation continues to this day. The Russian police insisted that they had been unable to find and arrest Mogilevich in Moscow earlier - ?yet his photograph, attending services in a Moscow Synagogue appeared on the front page of Izvestia on December 7, 2004.
The official Kremlin version of Mogilevich's role in tax evasion is difficult to believe and it could well turn out to be that Mogilevich was arrested as part of a cover up operation by the Kremlin designed to distance Putin from Firtash and Mogilevich. Putin has remained silent on his links to Firtash and Mogilevich and this might prove to be an opportune moment for western intelligence agencies to shed some light on this murky and far reaching affair.
Complete article:
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=34753&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=13&cHash=f47940c50c