02.07.09.
Janukovytj fører klart i
meningsmålingerne
Hvis der var valg i
morgen ville oppositionsleder Viktor
Janukovytj få 34,7% af stemmerne i
første runde af præsidentvalget, viser
en meningsmåling fra Kievs
internationale institut for sociologi.
21,5% ville stemme på premierminister
Julia Tymoshenko, 17,6% ville stemme på
tidligere parlamentsformand Arsenij
Jatsenjuk, 5,7% ville stemme på lederen
af Kommunistpartiet, Petro Symonenko,
3,8% ville stemme på den nuværende
parlamentsformand, Volodymyr Lytvyn og
3,5% ville stemm på den nuværende
præsident, Viktor Jusjtjenko. De øvrige
mulige præsidentkandidater ville få
under 3% af stemmerne. En meningsmåling
i maj viste den samme opbakning til
Janukovytj - 34,7%. Der skal være
præsidentvalget i Ukraine den 17. januar
2009. Podrobnosti.
06.07.09.
Crimean Tatars divide Ukraine and Russia
Eurasia
Daily Monitor
June 24, 2009
Taras Kuzio
President
Viktor Yushchenko has strongly condemned
the 1944 deportation of Crimean Tatars
on many occasions and ordered the
Security Service (SBU) to open a special
investigative unit examining crimes
against humanity committed by the Soviet
regime against them. Since the 1998
Ukrainian parliamentary elections, Rukh
and President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine
have included Tatar leaders within their
party lists.
The SBU
unit will investigate the 1944
deportation and the earlier persecution
of the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia. The
SBU has declassified 63 criminal cases
against Crimean Tatar members of the
Milly Firqa separatist organization that
operated from 1918-1928. SBU chairman
Valentyn Nalyvaychenko recently outlined
how the special unit would investigate
who was responsible for the
deportations. Crimean Tatars seek to
have all former KGB documents pertaining
to them declassified and made available
for public scrutiny on the internet. The
SBU promised the declassified documents
would be given to families who suffered
during the repressions.
On the 65th
anniversary of the deportation of
Crimean Tatars, Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko condemned it in no uncertain
terms: "This terrible and severe page in
our history we, as Ukrainians who
ourselves went through the
famine-genocide and repression, and for
a long period of time defended their
right to independence, feel the
sufferings and consequences of each and
every Crimean Tatar" (www.kmu.gov.ua
May 18).
The
anniversary coincided with the first
World Congress of Crimean Tatars
attended by 800 delegates from 11
countries. The congress, held in the
famous Bakhchysaray palace, the former
seat of the Tatar Khanate, was followed
by a procession to the historical
Zincirli Madrasah. The congress released
the pent up frustrations felt by Crimean
Tatars who are dissatisfied with the
manner in which they have been treated
by successive Ukrainian governments.
Throughout much of May the Crimean Tatar
protestors stood outside the cabinet of
ministers' office in Kyiv demanding
greater attention for their economic and
social plight.
Crimean
Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev, a
veteran Soviet dissident, complained
that no legislation has ever been
adopted in Ukraine to reinstate the
social and legal rights of his people (Voice
of America Russian service, May 18). The
World Congress called upon the Ukrainian
president and prime minister, "to take
urgent steps to deliver on all the
previously reached agreements, and your
instructions and promises regarding the
fair resolution of land disputes in
Crimea and providing Crimean Tatars with
land" (UNIAN, May 23).
All of the
infrastructure of the Crimean Tatars up
to their 1944 deportation - theaters,
schools, mosques, and other buildings -
were expropriated by the Soviet regime
and have not been returned. Crimean
Tatar place names were subsequently
Russified. Currently 15 out of 650
Crimean schools provide instruction in
Crimean Tatar, but only 13 of these do
so in the first three grades.
Land is the
major source of dispute, as many Tatars
live illegally as squatters, pushed into
rural areas by developers taking prize
urban real estate. High unemployment
forces many Crimean Tatars to eke out a
living within the shadow economy, as
shuttle-traders where they regularly
face violence from organized criminal
gangs who control the street markets.
The issue of the plight of the Crimean
Tatars is seen in diametrically opposite
ways by Ukrainians and Russians. Russian
nationalist and communist parties and
NGO's in the Crimea hold to the Russian
world view of Tatars as rabidly
anti-Russian and "Nazi collaborators."
They, and the Russian authorities, see
Tsarina Catherine as a great builder of
the Russian empire. Ukrainians and
Tatars see her as a destroyer of their
autonomy and independence in the last
two decades of the eighteenth century.
Following the Russian occupation of the
Crimea, between the 1780's to 1914
hundreds of thousands of Tatars
emigrated to Ottoman Tur key, where in
modern Turkey they remain a vocal lobby.
The charge
of "Nazi collaborators" was first raised
in May 1944 when the Soviet leader
Joseph Stalin ordered the deportation of
200,000 Crimean Tatars to Uzbekistan.
Between 25 percent (Soviet government
figure) and 46 percent (Crimean Tatar
estimate) died in the first year in
exile. Smaller numbers of Germans,
Armenians and Bulgarians were also
deported. The place of these four ethnic
groups was largely filled by ethnic
Russians. The autonomous status of the
Crimea within the Russian SFSR was
abolished in 1944 and only revived in
1991 in the Ukrainian SSR to which the
Crimea was transferred in 1954.
The USSR
unleashed ideological tirades against
Ukrainian, Baltic and Crimean Tatar
nationalist diasporas by equating "nazi
collaborationism" with "(separatist)
bourgeois nationalism." This linkage
escaped the anti-communist Russian
diaspora as it, like the majority of
Russian dissidents, never supported the
secession of the Russian SFSR from the
USSR. Russian nationalists and the
majority of Russian democratic
dissidents either supported the
transformation of the USSR into a "Russian
(or eastern Slavic) state" or the USSR's
democratization, not its dissolution. In
1967 the Soviet government dropped all
charges of "Nazi collaboration." But,
Tatars only began to return to the
Crimea in the late 1980's, where they
now number 300,000 (12 percent of the
population). The ethnic Russian majority
is in decline from 65 (1989) to 58
(2001) percent. Approximately 100,000
Crimean Tatars continue to live in
Uzbekistan.
Under
Vladimir Putin the positive steps taken
in the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras in
overcoming Soviet stereotypes and false
criminal charges have been reversed.
President Dmitry Medvedev's creation of
a "historical commission" coincides with
a bill "opposing the rehabilitation of
Nazism, Nazi criminals and their
accomplices" in the former USSR. The "falsification
of history" is better applied to Russian
leaders who have ordered school
textbooks to portray Stalin as an "effective
manager," and his mass crimes against
humanity explained away as the only
manner in which to overcome the USSR's
economic and security challenges.
However, as the Moscow-based political
analyst Yevgeny Kiselyov, recently
observed: "The worst 'falsifier' of
history, of course, has been the Kremlin"
(Moscow Times, June 3). Stalin came in
third place in the "Name of Russia"
nationwide television contest held in
November 2008.
Ukraine's
strategy of declassifying KGB documents
pertaining to Soviet crimes against
humanity began in the 1990's, and was
speeded up under Yushchenko. The policy
is diametrically at odds with Russia
under Putin, which continues to block
access to archives. Soviet documents on
the 1933 Ukrainian famine and other
Soviet crimes are being declassified in
Ukraine, while they remain a "state
secret" in Russia (Moscow Times, June
9).
06.07.09.
Constitutional
instability in Ukraine leads to 'legal
turmoil'
http://www.rferl.org/content/Constitutional_Instability_In_Ukraine_Leads_To_Legal_
Turmoil/1783341.html
June 26, 2009
By Taras
Kuzio
On June 28,
1996, Ukraine became the last Soviet
republic to adopt a post-Soviet
constitution, and that day was
designated Constitution Day, a national
holiday. Two years later, on October 21,
1998, the Crimean Autonomous Republic
adopted its own constitution,
recognizing the peninsula within
Ukraine.
Leonid
Kuchma's reelection as president in 1999
gave rise to Ukraine's first non-left
parliamentary majority that sought to
ditch the country's "semi-presidential"
constitution in favor of a full
presidential system. The relevant four
questions were put to a referendum in
April 2000 that was not internationally
recognized, and were approved by a
suspiciously high percentage of voters.
But
Kuchma's plans were undermined by the
onset of the Kuchma-gate crisis in
November of that year, when tapes made
illicitly in his office allegedly proved
that he ordered violence against
journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, who was
kidnapped on September 16 and found
decapitated on November 2, 2000.
Ukrainian
politicians traditionally approached
constitutional, and indeed all other
issues, from the standpoint not of
national interests, but personal
advantage. Following the 2002
parliamentary elections, Kuchma shifted
180 degrees from his constitutional
position two years earlier toward
support for a parliamentary system. The
architect of this strategy, which had
two objectives, was presidential chief
of staff Viktor Medvedchuk, leader of
the Social Democratic Party-united.
Disarming
Yushchenko
The first
objective was to split the opposition by
persuading the left, perennial
supporters of parliamentarism, to
support the constitutional reforms
advocated by pro-presidential centrists.
The second was to strip popular
opposition presidential candidate Viktor
Yushchenko, if he were elected, of the
extensive presidential powers enshrined
in the 1996 constitution.
The second
vote in April 2004 failed after some
pro-presidential centrists rebelled in
protest at the change earlier that month
of the election law from mixed to fully
proportional. That change had been a
condition of support by the left for the
constitutional reforms.
Ironically,
the reforms adopted on December 8, 2004,
in a parliamentary vote were identical
to those rejected eight months earlier.
During those eight months, the
authorities waged an all-out campaign to
prevent Yushchenko being elected with
the powers enshrined in the 1996
constitution. The widespread fraud that
marred the presidential ballot led to
the so-called Orange Revolution,
triggered by Europe's largest postwar
mass protests, in which one in five
Ukrainians participated.
Three
European Union-sponsored roundtables
resulted in the December 8 compromise
agreement that led to a repeat vote on
December 26 that Yushchenko won. In
return, Yushchenko granted verbal
immunity to his defeated rival Kuchma,
and Yushchenko's Our Ukraine supported
the vote on the constitutional reforms
to come into force in 2006. The Yulia
Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT) was the only
parliamentary force to vote against the
constitutional amendments.
Constitutional Questions
After being
elected president, Yushchenko complained
about, but failed to repeal, the
constitutional reforms. First, between
September 2005, when the Tymoshenko
government was removed, until February
2007 , when the Orange alliance was
reconstituted, the BYuT and Our Ukraine
were at loggerheads and divided.
Yushchenko and Our Ukraine did not
support the BYuT's call to invoke the
October 2005 Constitutional Court ruling
that constitutional reforms required a
national referendum. The BYuT campaigned
for such a referendum in the 2006 and
2007 elections.
Second,
Yushchenko did not establish his
National Constitutional Council until
December 27, 2007, and only presented
his reform proposals on March 31, 2009.
But by then he had no hope of
implementing them as his popularity
rating had collapsed to 2 percent and he
had no support in parliament. Our
Ukraine had voted to rejoin the
coalition in December 2008, against his
wishes.
The
conflict between the president and prime
minister continued throughout 2008, and
the onset of the global financial crisis
in the fall failed to dampen it. During
that time, legal and constitutional
experts and different political factions
all reached the conclusion that the
president's daily intervention in
economic and energy issues is
unconstitutional. (Under the 2006
constitution, the government reports to
the parliament, not to the president.)
In an April
2008 speech to the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe,
Tymoshenko announced a dramatic shift
within the BYuT towards support for
parliamentarism.
Their
second conclusion was that without
presidential support for the holding of
a referendum, the only way the
constitution could be changed was
through a constitutional majority. But
two successive attempts, in September
2008 and May 2009, to form a BYuT-Party
of Regions coalition with the aim of
pushing through constitutional reforms
that would strengthen the parliament
both failed, partly due to personal
mistrust but also to Party of Regions'
demands to have their cake and eat it.
While
supporting a president elected by
parliament (i.e. full parliamentary
system), Party of Regions Chairman
Viktor Yanukovych simultaneously sought
a "guarantee" of two presidential terms
with extensive powers similar to those
bestowed on the president in the 2006
constitution. German Chancellor Angela
Merkel pointed out to Ukrainians in May
that parliamentary presidents are
ceremonial.
Halfway To
Nowhere
Two further
factors are of direct relevance. "Semi"
political systems, whether presidential
(as in the 1996 constitution) or
parliamentary (as in the 2006
constitution), are recipes for
instability and conflict. If Ukraine
really wants political stability and an
escape from constitutional and legal
chaos, it should change the constitution
either to a full presidential system or
towards a full parliamentary system.
Prime Minister Tymoshenko acknowledged
the inevitability of that choice in the
course of a lengthy interview on Channel
5 on June 11. "Semi" systems do not
divide powers clearly and are therefore
recipes for "chaos," she stressed.
Nearly two
decades after the disintegration of the
Soviet empire, the 27 postcommunist
states are divided into two groups:
those in Central-Eastern Europe and the
Baltic states have parliamentary
systems, and those in Eurasia --
presidential systems. The two exceptions
are Ukraine and Moldova, with
semi-parliamentary and parliamentary
systems, respectively.
Parliamentarism and democratization went
hand-in-hand in Central-Eastern Europe
and the Baltic states, facilitating
their integration into NATO and the EU.
Parliamentarism could therefore further
integrate Ukraine into Europe.
Ukraine's
transition from a semi-presidential to
semi-parliamentarian constitution has
completely overshadowed Yushchenko's
presidency. Personality, ideological,
and gender factors have been compounded
by constitutionally unclear divisions of
powers. U.S. Judge Bohdan Futey noted
this month in a Ukrainian legal journal
that "these [constitutional] changes
interlaced the power of the executive
and legislative branches, leaving the
country in legal turmoil to this day."
Yushchenko's presidency has been
dominated by political crises,
governmental instability, elite
in-fighting, and constitutional chaos
that have combined to undermine the
potential generated by the Orange
Revolution. With the constitutional
question still unresolved as the
Yushchenko era nears its end, Ukraine
will enter the January 2010 election
campaign in the same state of
constitutional uncertainty as it did
five years ago.
Taras Kuzio is a
senior fellow in the Chair of Ukrainian
Studies, University of Toronto, and
research professor, Carleton University,
Ottawa. He edits the bimonthly "Ukraine
Analyst."
07.07.09.
Ukraine har betalt for juni måneds
gasforsyninger
Det statslige ukrainske olie- og
gasselskab Naftohaz Ukrajiny har
afregnet med det russiske gasmonopol
Gazprom for den russiske gas, som
Ukraine modtog i løbet af juni måned,
meddeler Naftohaz' talsmand, Valentyn
Zemljanskyj, til det ukrainske
nyhedsbureau, UNIAN.
"Problemet er løst. Vi har betalt
fuldt ud for de 1,1 mia. kubikmeter gas,
som vi fik leveret. Zemljanskyj kom dog
ikke nærmere ind på, hvilket beløb
Ukraine har betalt for den russiske gas,
landet fik i løbet af juni måned.
Som tidligere omtalt forpligtede
Naftohaz Ukrajiny ved underskrivelsen af
den russisk-ukrainske gasaftale den 19.
januar 2009 sig til at erlægge
betalingen for den af Gazprom leverede
gas senest den 7. i måneden efter
leveringsmåneden.
Første gang betalingsfristen
overskrides, skal parterne ifølge
aftalen gå over til ukrainsk
forudbetaling af de russiske
gasleverancer. UP.
Det
statslige
ukrainske
olie- og
gasselskab
Naftohaz
Ukrajiny
mener
ikke, at
regeringens
beslutning
om at
forhøje
det
statslige
selskabs
aktiekapital
med 18,6
mia. UAH
vil løse
selskabets
løbende
likviditetsproblem,
hedder
det i en
pressemeddelelse
fra
Naftohaz.
Ifølge
meddelelsen
medfører
beslutningen
ikke
nogen
reel
forhøjelse
af de
likvide
midler,
men gør
det
muligt
kun
delvist
at løse
de
problemer,
som har
hobet
sig op.
"Naftohaz'
indtægter
i løbet
af 2009
er
anslået
til 100
mia. UAH,
mens
aktiverne
udgør
mindst
50 mia.
UAH. Til
sammenligning
vil
aktiekapitalen
efter
forhøjelsen
udgøre
24,2
mia. UAH.
Indtægterne
er
dermed
betydelig
større
end
egenkapitalen,
hvilket
ikke gør
det
muligt i
at løse
problemet
med
betalingen
for at
få de
underjordiske
gaslagre
fyldt
med gas
og
kræver
yderligere
låntagning",
påpeger
man i Naftohaz.
Ifølge
det
staslige
olie- og
gasselskab
vil
regeringens
beslutning
dog
væsentligt
øge
chancerne
for, at
forhandlingerne
om at få
stillet
yderligere
midler
til
rådighed
for at
kunne
afregne
til
tiden
for
importeret
gas
kommer
til at
gå godt.
Selskabet
understreger,
at dets
primære
opgave i
dag er
at
sikre,
at
leverandørerne
af den
importerede
naturgas
får
deres
betaling
rettidigt
og i
fuldt
omfang,
hvilket
er
afgørende
i
forhold
til
Ukraines
energisikkerhed
og den
stabile
forsyning
til
EU-landene.
Hvis
Ukraine
og
Naftohaz
overskrider
de
betalingsfrister,
der er
aftalt
med det
russiske
olie-og
gasselskab
Gazprom,
vil man
fra
ukrainsk
side
være
nødt til
at
forudbetale
for den
importerede
naturgas,
hvilket
vil være
yderst
vanskeligt
for
Ukraine.
Ekonomichna
Pravda.
10.07.09.
Domstol
pålægger
Jusjtjenko
at
udskrive
folkeafstemning
om NATO
Præsident
Viktor
Jusjtjenko
vil
appellere
kendelsen
fra
Kievs
administrative
kredsdomstol,
som
pålægger
ham at
udstede
et
dekret
om
afholdelse
af en
folkeafstemning
om
Ukraines
indtræden
i NATO
og Det
fælles
økonomiske
rum,
meddelte
næstformanden
for
præsidentens
sekretariat,
Ihor
Popov i
aftes
til
Tv-stationen
Kanal 5.
"Vi
har
endnu
ikke
modtaget
den
officielle
afgørelse
og har
kun
kendskab
til den
fra
uofficielle
kilder.
Men
selvfølgelig
vil
præsidenten
appellere
denne
kendelse
til en
appeldomstol",
understregede
Popov.
Han
forklarede
beslutningen
med, at
"kendelsen
er
langtfra
pletfri
set med
juridiske
briller".
"Vi
havde
vores
forbehold
overfor
denne
domstol,
vi havde
også et
ønske om
en
tilbagekaldelse
af en
dommer,
som var
udnævnt
lige før
sagen
gik i
gang og
efter
indstilling
fra
Regionernes
partis
", sagde
Popov.
Desuden
tilføjede
han, at
det
rent
politisk
er
uhensigtsmæssigt
at
afholde
en sådan
folkeafstemning
på
nuværende
tidspunkt.
UP.
23.07.09.
General
har
afsløret
hvem der
stod bag
mordet
på
Gongadze
General
Oleskij
Pukach
har
indrømmet
sin
medvirken
i mordet
på
Georgij
Gongadze,
og at
han selv
var
direkte
indblandet
i
mordet.
Det
oplyste
det
ukrainske
sikkerhedspolitis
(SBU)
sous-chef
Vasyl
Hrytsak
på en
pressekonference.
Hrytsak
sagde,
at
Pukach
har
bekræftet,
at
højtstående
ukrainske
embedsfolk
medvirkede
til
mordet
på
Gongadze,
men
SBU-manden
ville
ikke
afsløre
deres
navne
med
henvisning
til
efterforskningen.
Ifølge
Hrytsak
lykkedes
det
SBU-medarbejderne
at
anholde
Pukach i
en af
landsbyerne
i
Zhytomyr-regionen,
hvor
denne
boede
sammen
med sin
samleverske
og
hendes
barn.
Hrytsak
understreger,
at
Pukach
ikke
havde
ændret
sit
ydre, at
han
havde
brugt
sine
originale
dokumenter,
og at
han
siden
2005
ikke
havde
forladt
Ukraine,
men kun
havde
skiftet
bopæl.
Ifølge
Hrytsak
samarbejder
Pukach
med den
ukrainske
offentlige
anklagers
efterforskere.
SBU-souschefen
ville
ikke
sige
noget
om, hvor
Pukach
opholder
sig,
fordi
dennes
liv er i
fare.
Adspurgt
om,
hvorfor
sikkerhedstjenesten
var så
længe om
at fange
Pukach,
svarede
han, at
det
skyldes,
at
pågældende
har et
godt
kendskab
til
politiets
efterforskningsarbejde
og
derfor
har
været i
stand
til i
lang tid
at
skjule
sig for
myndighederne.
RBK-Ukrajina.
23.07.09.
Lytvyn
advarer
mod
politisk
misbrug
af
Gongadze-morder
Formanden
for
Ukraines
parlament
Volodymyr
Lytvyn
håber på
en
objektiv
efterforskning
i sagen
om den
tidligere
leder af
det
ukrainske
indenrigsministeriums
hovedstyrelse
for
kriminalpolitiet,
Oleksij
Pukach,
som
beskyldes
for
medvirken
til
mordet
på
journalisten
Georgij
Gongadze.
Mordet
fandt
sted i
september
2000, da
Lytvyn
var chef
for den
daværende
præsident
Leonid
Kutjmas
administration.
"Som
alle
andre er
jeg
interesseret
i, at
sandheden
i denne
sag
kommer
for
dagens
lys. Men
det skal
bare
ikke
være en
"sandhed
der er
styret
af
øjeblikkets
politiske
hensigtsmæssighed",
som vi
har set
det så
ofte før
i
Ukraine.
Jeg
håber
på, at
efteforskningen
vil være
objektiv
og
alsidig",
understreger
Lytvyn i
en
pressemeddelelse.
Som
allerede
omtalt,
har SBU
-
sikkerhedspolitiet
-
meddelt,
at
Pukach
straks
efter
sin
anholdelse
opgav
navnene
på de
personer,
som stod
bag
mordet
på
Gongadze.
UP.
23.07.09.
Jusjtjenko
vil få
daglige
underretninger
om
efterforskningen
Præsident
Viktor
Jusjtjenko
har bedt
den
ukrainske
rigsadvokat,
Oleksandr
Medvedko,
om
dagligt
at holde
ham
orienteret
om,
hvordan
den
indledende
efterforskning
af sagen
om
mordet
på
Georgij
Gongdze
forløber,
oplyser
præsidentens
pressesekretær
Iryna
Vannykova
med
henvisning
til
præsidentens
brev til
rigsadvokaten.
"I
brevet
beder
præsidenten
rigsadvokaten
om at
komme
med en
retslig
vurdering
af de
personer,
som
havde
det
formelle
ansvar
for
eftersøgningen
af
Oleksij
Pukach",
sagde
pressesekretæren.
Ifølge
talskvinden
har
Viktor
Jusjtjenko
i den
første
beretning
bedt om
en
forklaring
på,
hvorfor
Pukach i
de 5 år,
der er
gået,
siden
han blev
eftersøgt
over
Interpol,
kunne
bevæge
sig frit
i
Ukraine,
og ikke
engang
var
tvunget
til at
forlade
landet.
"Oleksij
Pukachs
tidligere
kolleger,
som han
i årene
2004–2009
mødtes
med
eller
havde
telefonsamtaler
med, har
ikke
blot
undladt
at
pågribe
ham, men
har med
deres
passivitet
faktisk
dækket
over en
person,
som var
medvirkende
til en
alvorlig
forbrydelse",
understregede
præsidentens
talskvinde,
som
oplyste,
at
Jusjtjenko
har
henledt
rigsadvokatens
opmærksomhed
på disse
forhold
og bedt
ham om
at komme
med en
retslig
vurdering
af de
personer,
som
formelt
deltog i
eftersøgningen
af
Pukach.
UP.
24.07.09.
Statsadvokaten
har
rejst
sigtelse
mod
Pukach
Den
øverste
anklager
i
Ukraine
har
rejst
sigtelse
mod
general
Oleksij
Pukach
for
meddelagtighed
i mordet
på
journalist
Georgij
Gongadze,
oplyser
rigsadvokaten
Oleksandr
Medvedko.
"Han (Pukach)
sigtes
for en
række
forbrydelser.
Det
drejer
sig om
bortførelsen
af
Podolskyi,
mordet
på
Gongadze
og
tilintetgørelse
af en
række
papirer",
meddelte
rigsadvokaten
på en
pressekonference
i Kiev i
fredags.
Han
kunne
også
fortælle,
at
efterforskerne
lige nu
gennemgår
Pukachs
vidneforklaringer
i
forhold
til,
hvor den
myrdede
journalists
hoved
kan
befinde
sig,
oplyser
Interfaks-Ukrajina.
"Vi er i
gang med
arbejdet.
En
gruppe
er taget
ud til
stedet
og
arbejder
der",
sagde
rigsadvokaten
og
tilføjede,
at der
endnu
ikke var
noget
nyt,
oplyser
UNIAN.
Desuden
sagde
Medvedko,
at den
øverste
anklagers
kontor
efterforsker
nogle
oplysninger
om, at
Pukach
skulle
have
opholdt
sig i
Donetsk
og
Luhansk
regionerne.
Som
bekendt
forsvandt
Georgij
Gongadze
i Kiev
den 16.
september
2000. I
november
samme år
fandt
man et
hovedløst
lig
udenfor
Kiev.
Ifølge
ekspertudsagn
tilhørte
liget
journalisten.
I 2008
blev tre
tidligere
medarbejdere
ved det
ukrainske
indenrigsministeriums
departement
for ydre
overvågning
og
kriminalefterforskning
-
obersterne
Valerij
Kostenko
og
Mykola
Protasov
samt
major
Oleksandr
Popovych
- dømt
for
mordet
på
journalisten.
Endnu en
sigtet -
Pukach -
blev
anholdt
den 21.
juli
2009 i
Zhytomyr-regionen
i et
samarbejde
mellem
Ukraines
anklagemyndighed
og
sikkerhedstjeneste.
Det er
endnu
ikke
lykkedes
at
fastslå,
hvem der
beordrede
mordet.
UP.
25.07.09.
Ny
valglov
vil
sandsynligvis
blive
indbragt
for
forfatningsdomstolen
Præsident
Viktor
Jusjtjenkos
talskvinde,
Maryna
Stavnijtjuk,
der er
næstformand
for
præsidentens
sekretariat,
udtaler
her til
aften,
at den
valglov,
som
parlamentet
lige har
vedtaget,
på
systematisk
vis
forbereder
landet
til
svindel
ved det
kommende
præsidentvalg.
Udtalelsen
faldt i
et
interview
med
Tv-stationen
Kanal 5.
"Man
kan
hævde,
at selve
loven
vil
provokere
de
kandidater,
som har
planer
om at
vinde
valget,
til i
ret stor
udstrækning
at gøre
brug af
tekniske
kandidater",
sagde
Stavnijtjuk
og
tilføjede:
"Det er
vigtigt
at tale
om, at
den nye
lov har
afskaffet
muligheden
for at
indbringe
valgresultatet
for en
domstol.
Det er
uden
fortilfælde
og meget
kynisk
gjort".
Næstformanden
for
præsidentens
sekretariat
forudser,
at
præsident
Jusjtjenko
vil
nedlægge
veto mod
loven.
"Vi har
også
mulighed
for at
gå til
forfatningsdomstolen",
påpegede
Stavnijtjuk.
Parlamentsmedlem
for
Julia
Tymoshenkos
Blok,
Valerij
Pysarenko,
der også
var i
Kanal
5's
studie
siger,
at han
er
sikker
på, at
"præsidenten
vil
nedlægge
veto mod
loven,
og når
vetoet
bliver
overtrumfet
af over
2/3 af
parlamentets
deputerede,
så vil
der
komme en
henvendelse
til
forfatningsdomstolen".
"Vi
vil
afvente
forfatningsdomstolens
beslutning,
men
loven
vil være
gældende
fra det
øjeblik,
og her
vil det
afhænge
af,
hvorvidt
forfatningsdomstolen
vil
forholde
sig til
den lov,
som vi
har
vedtaget,
ud fra
et
retsligt
syn",
sagde
Pysarenko.
"Hvis
forfatningsdomstolen
eksempelvis
midt
inde i
valgkampen
afgør,
at visse
af
bestemmelserne
i loven
strider
mod
forfatningen,
vil det
få
indflydelse
på
processens
juridiske
renhed",
tilføjede
han.
Pysarenko
understregede,
at
lovændringerne
til
loven om
præsidentvalget
har
været på
den
ekstraordinære
parlamentssessions
dagsorden
og
"fuldt
ud
afspejler
den
nugældende
forfatnings
bestemmelser".
"En
så
nervøs
reaktion
fra
præsidentsekretariatets
side er
forståelig.
Med
lovændringerne
mister
præsidenten
de
rettigheder,
som gav
ham
mulighed
for at
manipulere
med
valgkommissionernes
sammensætning
osv.",
påpegede
parlamentsmedlemmet
fra BJuT.
"Det
er mit
indtryk,
at man i
præsidentens
sekretariat
prøver
at
gentage
det, som
skete i
2004.
Men nu
er det
bare
præsident
Jusjtjenkos
hold,
som
prøver
at gøre
brug af
de samme
metoder,
som den
daværende
præsidenten
brugte
mod ham
som
præsidentkandidat",
understregede
Pysarenko.
UP.
27.07.09.
Prisen
på
importeret
russisk
gas
falder
Prisen på den russiske gas, som Ukraine importerer i 3. kvartal 2009, vil være 198,34 USD for tusind kubikmeter, hvilket er 26,8% mindre end den pris, som Ukraine betalte i 2. kvartal 2009, oplyser det statslige ukrainske olie- og gasselskabs "Naftohaz'" talsmand, Valentyn Zemljanskyj til nyhedsbureauet
Interfaks-Ukrajina.
Ifølge Zemljanskyj vil Ukraine have importeret omkring 3 mia. kubikmeter gas i løbet af juli.
Den russiske gas, som Ukraine importerede i 1. kvartal af 2009, havde en maksimumpris på 360 USD for et tusind kubikmeter, mens prisen for 2. kvartal var faldet til 270,95 USD for et tusind kubikmeter.
I starten af juli oplyste det statslige russiske gasmonopol "Gazproms" talsmand, Sergej Kuprijanov, at Ukraine i juli har hævet den annoncerede gasimport fra 33 millioner kubikmeter i døgnet til 120 millioner kubikmeter i døgnet for juli måned.
Den kontrakt, som Gazprom og Naftohaz underskrev i januar 2009 om de russiske gasleverancer til Ukraine, opererede med, at Ukraine i løbet af 1. kvartal 2009 skulle have leveret 5 mia. kubikmeter gas, 10 mia. kubikmeter i 2. kvartal, 12 mia. kubikmeter i 3. kvartal og 12,5 mia. kubikmeter gas i 4. kvartal 2009. Den reelle ukrainske gasimport var i 1. kvartal gennemsnitligt 50% lavere end det planlagte og 40% lavere i 2. kvartal.
På den baggrund havde "Naftohaz" anmodet "Gazprom" om at mindske omfanget af den ukrainske import i 2009 fra 40 mia. kubikmeter til 33 mia. kubikmeter, men fik kun en mundtlig accept.
I juni 2009 importerede Ukraine russisk gas til to forskellige priser 270,95 USD og 272,22 USD for tusind kubikmeter. Ekonomichna Pravda.