Ukrainsk modstand mod tyskerne under krigen (dokumentation)
Det ukrainske sikkerhedspoliti
SBU har offentliggjort dokumenter, som viser, at ukrainerne
ydede aktiv modstand mod den tyske besættelse, og at den øverste
ledelse af de ukrainske nationalister nægtede at deltage i
nedslagtningen af jøder. Dokumenterne bringes her for første
gang i en dansk oversættelse.
"Den dag krigen brød ud (juni 1941) myrdede
bolsjevikkerne ca. 10.000 ukrainske politiske fanger i byen
Lvivs fængsler. I hvert af fængslerne i byerne Lutsk, Rivne,
Stanislav, Drohobytj, Dubno, Sambir, Ternopil, Vinnytsa,
Berditjev og andre steder myrdedes på samme tidspunkt flere
tusinde ukrainske politiske fanger. I de efterfølgende dage
myrdedes ca. 50.000 ukrainske politiske fanger.
frontlinjer gennemførte medlemmer af Organisationen af Ukrainske
Nationalister (OUN) aktioner, som gik ud på at forhindre
ungdommen i at blive tvangsudskrevet til Den røde Hær som
kanonføde, at skaffe sig våben fra Den røde Hær, som var i
opløsning, at yde aktivt modstand mod det sovjetiske
sikkerhedspoliti (NKVD), samt forberede en ukrainsk
magtovertagelse, inden de fremrykkende tyskere fik etableret
Den 29. og 30. juni
1941, efter Den røde Hærs tilbagetog og umiddelbart inden
tyskernes indtog, lykkedes det OUNs undergrundsbevægelse i byen
Lviv at etablere kontrol med Lviv. I nogen af gaderne stod der
endnu sovjetiske kampvogne, mens der i andre gader allerede hang
ukrainske faner og var malet ukrainske slagord på husmurene,
plantet og skrevet af de ukrainske revolutionære kræfter. De
ukrainske delinger etablerede også kontrol med radiostationen.
Den 30. juni holdt
det ukrainske samfund i byen Lviv et stormøde under ledelse af
OUNs hidtige undergrundsledelse. På mødet valgtes byen Lvivs nye
ukrainske styre, hvis medlemmer svor troskab til Ukraine. Denne
beslutning blev taget for at komme tyskerne i forkøbet, hvis
tropper allerede var ved at rykke ind i byen. Desuden blev det
besluttet at indkalde til et nationalt råd, som skulle udråbe
Den uafhængige ukrainske stat, der skulle overtage hele magten i
Om aftenen den 30.
juni 1941 trådte det nationale råd sammen i Lviv og udråbte
genetableringen af Den uafhængige ukrainske stat og den
uafhængige ukrainske regering med Jaroslav Stetsko i spidsen.
Udråbelsen af den ukrainske stat kom efterfølgende til at få
stor betydning for det ukrainske folks holdning til den tyske
Allerede om aftenen
den 30. juni begyndte Lvivs radiostation opkaldt efter
nationalistlederen Jevhen Konovalets at kringkaste sine
Kort tid efter tvang
Gestapo, som var ankommet i kølvandet på den fremrykkende tyske
hær, ukrainerne til at lukke deres radiostation, og standse
udgivelsen af uafhængige ukrainske aviser, som var begyndt at
udkomme i Lviv. Tyskerne forbød også manifestationer i
forbindelse med begravelsen af de ukrainere, som var myrdet af
Tyskerne stillede den
nye ukrainske leder Jaroslav Stetsko overfor et ultimatum og
forlangte en tilbagekaldelse af udråbelsen af den ukrainske
stat, samt en selvopløsning af den ukrainske regering.
der afholdt en konference med deltagelse af ledelsen af OUN og
nogle af medlemmerne af regeringen. Konferencen godkendte
Stetsko-regeringens afvisning af det tyske ultimatum. Jaroslav
Stetsko udtalte: ”Om så jeg bliver skudt, vil jeg opfylde min
pligt overfor det ukrainske folks vilje og vil ikke gå med til
en selvopløsning af den ukrainske regering”. Konferencen
besluttede at stå urokkeligt fast på den historiske udråbelse af
den ukrainske stat den 30. juni, afvise tyskernes krav,
fortsætte med at overtage en stadig større del af myndigheden
over landet og mobilisere de brede folkelige masser til kamp for
Ukraines fuldstændige uafhængighed.
udførte efterfølgende et attentat mod den ukrainske
regeringschef, Jaroslav Stetsko, mens denne sad i sin bil.
Kuglerne sårede regeringslederens chauffør.
Gestapo foreslog ad forskellige kanaler ukrainerne at
foranstalte en tre dage lang pogrom mod jøderne. Tyskerne
foreslog: ”I stedet for at afholde storstilede begravelser af
ukrainske politiske fanger myrdet af bolsjevikkerne, er det
meget bedre at foranstalte en hævnaktion mod jøderne. De tyske
myndigheder vil ikke stå i vejen for det”.
Da lederne af OUN
blev gjort bekendt med dette forslag, meddelte de til
medlemmerne af det ukrainske samfund, at der er tale om en tysk
provokation beregnet på at kompromitere ukrainerne og give det
tyske politi et påskud for at ”etablere ro og orden” og, hvad
der var værre, at aflede ukrainernes kræfter fra de politiske
problemer og kampen for det statslige uafhængighed for Ukraine.
Den 2. alukrainske
OUN-kongres fordømte enhver form for jødepogromer og
besættelsesmagtens forsøg på at bortlede folkemassernes
opmærksomhed fra frihedskampens grundlæggende udfordringer. Fra
starten af den tyske besættelse forbød OUN ukrainerne at deltage
i jødepogromer, og opfordrede dem til i stedet aktivt at
modsætte sig de tyske provokationer. Kun takket være
OUN-folkenes beslutsomhed lykkedes det at forhindre et massemord
på jøderne i Lviv og andre ukrainske byer de første dage efter
bolsjevikkernes tilbagetog på baggrund af bolsjevikkernes drab
på 80.000 ukrainske politiske fanger og på trods af det tyske
hemmelige politi Gestapos talrige forsøg på at anspore
ukrainerne til at begå overgreb på jøderne som hævn for
bolsjevikkernes drab på de ukrainske politiske fanger.
I de første dage af
juli, lige efter den ukrainske uafhængighedserklæring,
arresterede Gestapo OUNs leder, Stepan Bandera, og førte ham til
Berlin, hvorfra han blev sendt i KZ-lejr.
I første halvdel af
juli arresterede Gestapo den nyudnævnte ukrainske
regeringsleder, Jaroslav Stetsko, og nogle af hans nærmeste
medarbejdere. Sammen med mange andre prominente ukrainske
eksilledere forblev de i KZ-lejr resten af krigen.
I første halvdel af
juli udsendte egnskommandanten for OUN og medlem af OUNs
eksekutivkomite Ivan Klymiv-Legenda et direktiv til medlemmerne
om ikke at rette sig efter de tyske militære myndigheders
befalinger til ukrainerne om at aflevere våben, men i stedet at
sørge for at skaffe sig nye forsyningerne af våben og gemme de
eksisterende. Samtidig med dette hemmelige dekret til
medlemmerne af OUN udsendte han en åben appel til det ukrainske
folk om ikke at aflevere deres våben til tyskerne, men bruge dem
til forsvaret for den ukrainske stat.
I første halvdel af
juli indbød tyskerne Ivan Klymiv-Legenda til en ”vigtig
konference”. Denne afslog invitationen og svarede i et brev, at
han var godt klar over, at der var tale om et forsøg på at lokke
ham i en fælde. I brevet protesterede han mod den tyske
besættelse af Ukraine og forsikrede om, at det ukrainske folk
ikke ville acceptere den tyske besættelse, ligesom det ikke
ville acceptere den bolsjevikkiske ditto. ”Hvis I insisterer på
at føre denne form for politik -, skrev han i brevet, - så vil
I snart blive nødt til at flygte fra Ukraine over stok og sten,
som I gjorde det i 1918, da det ukrainske folk rejste sig mod
den tyske besættelse under ledelse af Overhøvding Semjon
Petljura”. ”I er kommet til os som besættere, men den ukrainske
sorte muld, som I så begærligt tragter efter, vil opsluge jer og
blive jeres grav”, skrev egnskommandanten for OUN til de nye
Yushchenko looks to grand coalition to replace Tymoshenko
e-POSHTA March 7, 2008 / e-POSHTA 5 bereznia 2008On March 15 the government of Yulia Tymoshenko will mark its
first 100 days in office, a period that has been a baptism by
fire. Not only has the government faced relentless attacks from
the opposition Party of Regions (PRU), it has also faced a
parliamentary lockout and an antagonistic Russia. As former
National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) secretary Volodymyr
Horbulin noted, each time Tymoshenko heads the government,
Russia deploys energy pressure against Ukraine.
But this period has also been plagued by blatant attempts to
undermine the government from its own coalition partners and
ostensible allies. Six days after Tymoshenko was confirmed as
prime minister on December 18, President Viktor Yushchenko
appointed Raisa Bohatyryova as NSDC secretary. Bohatyryova was
head of the Regions parliamentary faction and shared a
parliamentary office with Regions campaign manager Borys
The six-day gap between Tymoshenko’s confirmation and
Bohatyryova’s appointment was no coincidence, but part of what
Kyiv insiders have dubbed “Operation Baloga.” The alleged
mastermind, presidential chief of staff Viktor Baloga, is more
ruthless than his predecessors, Oleksandr Zinchenko (both were
members of the hard-line, anti-Yushchenko Social Democratic
Party-United) and Oleh Rybachuk.
Operation Baloga grew out of the spring 2007 constitutional
crisis, which collapsed when the PRU agreed to pre-term
elections on September 30. Yushchenko’s side of the bargain was
a promise to Regions to support a grand coalition with his Our
Ukraine party after the elections. During the elections
Yushchenko actively campaigned for a “democratic” (i.e. Orange)
coalition.” But when his Orange Revolution ally, the Tymoshenko
bloc (BYuT) drew to within 3% of Regions, Yushchenko could not
follow through on his grand coalition promise. BYuT’s improved
election results, coupled with the static performance Our
Ukraine-People’s Self Defense (NUNS) bloc, was further
complicated by increased hostility within NUNS to such a grand
coalition. Leading NUNS members had suffered under the Viktor
Yanukovych government in fall 2006.
Yushchenko therefore decided to continue his multi-vector
policies of supporting both Orange and grand coalitions, a
position that he has espoused since Our Ukraine’s foundation in
2001. Following the 2006 parliamentary elections Yushchenko
negotiated a grand coalition through Yuriy Yekhanurov and an
Orange coalition through Roman Bezsmertny.
The result of Yushchenko’s post-2007 maneuvering has been an
Orange coalition inside parliament and a grand coalition
ensconced in the NSDC and presidential administration. Since
Yushchenko came to power in 2005 the NSDC has been continually
used as a counter-weight to governments seen by Yushchenko as
hostile,” whether headed by Tymoshenko (2005 and 2007) or
Baloga and seven allies from NUNS resigned from Yushchenko’s
bloc as part of a larger strategy to undermine the Tymoshenko
government. This five-point strategy was drawn up during a
secret February meeting between Yushchenko and Yanukovych and is
planned to be completed by April 1. The Russian leadership
endorsed the plan when Yushchenko visited Moscow in January. The
basic steps are:
1. NUNS withdraws from the Orange coalition. Baloga
reportedly has 22 allies within NUNS’s 72 deputies, seven of
whom have already resigned. For a faction to withdraw from a
coalition requires a majority vote which, in the case of NUNS,
is a minimum of 37 deputies. An additional 15 deputies will to
be pressured to defect.
2. A vote of no confidence in the Tymoshenko government. The
parliamentary blockade has prevented a vote on the government’s
program, which would have legally prevented a vote of no
confidence for 12 months.
3. The acting government will be sidelined by a new
government headed by Baloga and with Yanukovych as parliamentary
speaker. The Baloga government would be backed by a re-organized
grand coalition that includes a wing of NUNS.
4. The Baloga government and grand coalition would support
Yushchenko’s version of constitutional reforms that give back
powers to the president.
5. The Baloga government and grand coalition would ensure
Yushchenko’s re-election for a second term and Yanukovych would
agree to not stand.
These five components are inherently unstable, irrational,
and incompatible. However, Yushchenko is dominated completely by
his chief of staff, who has convinced him of two key factors:
First Tymoshenko is disloyal and has decided to stand as a
presidential candidate. Second, Baloga can “guarantee”
Yushchenko’s re-election through an alliance with Regions, whose
political machine can ensure his win in eastern Ukraine. But
with a public approval rating of 6-10%, Yushchenko could not win
an election even through fraud.
Tymoshenko’s personal and BYuT’s ratings are three times as
high as those of Yushchenko and NUNS. If pre-term parliamentary
elections were held today, BYuT would place first with an
increase of 50 seats, bringing it to over 200. NUNS and Regions
would secure fewer seats than in 2007. The only way Yushchenko
can be re-elected in a free election is through an alliance with
Tymoshenko as his prime minister, repeating their successful
A wide-ranging discussion in the respected weekly Zerkalo
nedeli showed that Yushchenko’s campaign to re-take presidential
powers through further constitutional reforms is backed by only
one out of the five factions in parliament, NUNS, which is also
the most unstable faction.
In the meantime, Yushchenko’s continued inability to choose
between grand and Orange coalitions or to reconcile himself with
a Tymoshenko government, combined with his desperation to get
himself re-elected is undermining his own policies, including
his goal of receiving a NATO Membership Action Plan at next
month’s summit in Bucharest.
(Zerkalo nedeli, March 1-7, Ukrayinska pravda, February
19-29, glavred.info, February 15, vvnews.info, February 21-22)
Ukraine: Gas Crisis Averted, But Underlying Problems Remain
March 6, 2008
By Claire Bigg
Russia on March 5 resumed natural-gas supplies
to Ukraine, ending the latest gas feud between the ex-Soviet
[ ... ]
A key sore point is the involvement of middleman
companies in the gas trade between the two countries --
RosUkrEnergo, half-owned by Gazprom; and UkrGazEnergo, owned
by RosUkrEnergo and Ukraine's state gas company, Nafothaz.
Ukraine's prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, has been
campaigning for the elimination of what she says is an
opaque mechanism to embezzle vast fortunes at the expense of
Moscow has consistently demurred, a stance widely seen as
dictated by a small group of elites profiting directly from
the scheme. Roman Kupchinsky, an RFE/RL energy analyst, says
Moscow could also be using the intermediaries as a
bargaining chip with Ukraine.
"The intermediaries are not in Russia's interest either,
as a country. Russia loses taxes because of intermediaries,
it gives away money for no good reason to intermediaries,
and it doesn't really fulfill any role," Kupchinsky says,
adding that there must be a reason why Russia insists on the
"Gazprom wants to get into the Ukrainian domestic market,
it wants 50 percent of the market," Kupchinsky notes. But he
says that "Ukrainians won't allow that," because it would
bankrupt their own Naftohaz.
Gazprom has spared no effort to convince the world that
its recurrent gas standoffs with Kyiv are purely economic.
In reality, few doubt they have strong political overtones.
The latest dispute dealt a blow to the already fragile
coalition between President Viktor Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko, who both rose to power in the 2005 Orange
Revolution after reversing the presidential victory of
Moscow's anointed candidate.
[ ... ]
The row has also prompted fresh charges that Moscow is
using its vast energy resources as a political weapon.
Federico Bordonaro, a Rome-based analyst with the "Power And
Interest News Report," an independent organization studying
international relations, says: "Gazprom's moves are not
entirely due to business problems. I think Gazprom is
striking back at Europe, firstly because Europe recognized
Kosovo's independence without listening to Russia's
concerns, and secondly because Ukraine is heading toward
[ ... ]
Bordonaro says the bad blood between Moscow and Kyiv is
pushing Europe to seek alternative energy routes. This
includes efforts to breathe new life into the Nabucco
project, a pipeline that would bypass Russia by pumping gas
from the Caspian and Central Asian regions to Europe via
Turkey and the Balkans.
Ukrainian parliament unblocked, NATO dispute
March 12, 2008
By Pavel Korduban
The opposition Party of Regions (PRU) of former prime
minister Viktor Yanukovych has finally backed off its
brinksmanship games over Ukraine’s application for a NATO
Membership Action Plan (MAP). The PRU and their allies, the
Communists, had blocked the parliamentary rostrum since the
end of January, protesting against a letter in which
President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko,
and Parliamentary Speaker Arseny Yatsenyuk asked NATO
Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to give the green
light to Ukraine joining MAP. The PRU returned to the
session hall on March 6, realizing that Yushchenko would
consider dissolving parliament. The Ukrainian parliament is
now back to normal operations.
The opposition had demanded that Yatsenyuk recall his
signature from the MAP letter, arguing that parliament did
not authorize him to sign it, and that parliament should set
the date for a NATO membership referendum (see EDM, February
14). As support for membership in the Alliance has hardly
ever been higher than 25%, the opposition believed that a
referendum would postpone the membership issue indefinitely.
The blockade of parliament suspended the process of forming
Tymoshenko’s cabinet, and an early election could even
threaten the prospect of WTO entry for Ukraine this year.
The coalition of Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine – People’s
Self-Defense (NUNS) and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) did
not bow to pressure. They declared their readiness for a
dissolution of parliament and another early election,
despite the fact that Yushchenko dissolved the previous
parliament less than a year ago. Yanukovych increased
pressure on the coalition, threatening to take his followers
to launch popular protests against NATO membership.
The constitution allows the president to dissolve
parliament if it fails to assemble for 30 days. Yushchenko
said on February 27 that he was not ready to dissolve the
assembly, although he admitted that he might eventually do
so. Yanukovych responded to that message on March 4, saying
that if the opposition’s demands on NATO were not met, the
PRU “will address the Ukrainian people and start mass
This was followed within hours by a warning from National
Security and Defense Council Secretary Raisa Bohatyryova,
who is ironically still formally a member of the PRU, that
Yushchenko might launch the process of parliamentary
dissolution if the lawmakers did not resume working within
“the next couple of days.” Bohatyryova accused both the
coalition and the opposition of disrupting parliament’s work,
and she warned against giving ultimatums to the president.
This warning worked. On March 6, all parliamentary
caucuses but the Communists agreed to resume normal work.
The agreement that they reached read more like an act of
capitulation by the PRU, rather than a compromise solution,
as Vladyslav Kaskiv, one of the leaders of NUNS, noted. The
PRU withdrew its demands regarding the MAP letter and for a
resolution saying that “a decision on an international
agreement on Ukraine joining NATO shall be taken only as a
result of a national referendum,” was passed by 248 votes in
the 450-seat body.
Both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko had asserted earlier that
Ukraine would join NATO only after a referendum. Yushchenko
accepted this PRU demand in 2006, when he signed the
National Unit Declaration (Universal in Ukrainian), and
Tymoshenko has never been against a referendum. Thus the PRU
did not achieve anything by disrupting parliament’s work for
more than a month, but its relations with its main partner
in parliament, the Communists, worsened, as the Communists
did not accept the March 6 resolution and were not against
another early election.
Although all of the three major parties – the PRU, NUNS,
and BYuT – in February declared readiness for an early
election, none of them really wanted it. BYuT is satisfied
with its current status as senior coalition partner. The
NUNS bloc, weakened by an internal dispute that culminated
in an exodus of several influential members from the bloc’s
main party, Our Ukraine, including Yushchenko’s main aide
Viktor Baloha (see EDM, February 20), was probably the least
ready for an election. The PRU is not in the best shape
either: public opinion polls show that it is currently less
popular than BYuT, and the March 1 congress of deputies in
Severodonetsk confirmed that several influential PRU members
do not support Yanukovych’s line (see EDM, March 5).
A “Protocol of Understanding” released by parliament’s
press service on March 6, stipulated that parliament would
shortly consider a new bill on the Cabinet of Ministers,
bills for completing WTO entry, and bills limiting deputy
immunity from prosecution, it will also discuss an action
plan for the Tymoshenko cabinet. Parliament on March 7 voted
against including the deputy immunity bill on the agenda,
although during last year’s early election campaign
canceling deputy immunity was one of the main promises of
most of the parties now represented in parliament.
(Interfax-Ukraine, February 27, March
4, 6; UNIAN, Channel 5, March 6, www.rada.gov.ua, March 6,
Ukraine, Gazprom reach agreement on 2008 gas deliveries
Mar 13 2008
MOSCOW (AP) - Russian state-controlled natural gas monopoly
OAO Gazprom and Ukraine on Thursday announced an agreement on
gas deliveries for the rest of the year, apparently putting an
end to a dispute that had been watched nervously in Western
The agreement, according to a statement from Gazprom,
specified prices for future deliveries and for gas delivered in
the first two months of this year. The announcement comes after
talks between Gazprom President Alexei Miller and Oleg Dubina,
head of the Ukrainian natural gas company Naftogaz.
The Russian company previously cut shipments by up to 50
percent for several days last week.
That reduction caused anxiety in Western European countries
that get much of their Russian gas by pipelines that cross
Ukraine. However, no downstream supply problems were reported.
The agreement takes a step toward streamlining the
complicated gas trade with Ukraine, where supplies come from
several countries and have gone through a web of intermediary
companies that critics say are essentially mechanisms for
siphoning money into private pockets.
Ukraine buys gas both from Russia and from former Soviet
Central Asian states; all the gas is delivered to Ukraine in
pipelines controlled by Gazprom. Previously, the gas has been
purchased from RosUkrEnergo, a middleman company half-owned by
Gazprom, and then resold to UkrGazEnergo, another intermediary,
which delivered some of the gas itself and sold the remainder to
However, the new agreement specifies that from now on "the
purchaser at the border with Ukraine will be Naftogaz."
The statement did not specify whether Switzerland-based
RosUkrEnergo will continue to be involved in the trade. Gazprom
officials could not immediately be reached for clarification.
The agreement says Ukraine will pay $179.5 per 1,000 cubic
meters for Central Asian gas, but will pay nearly double that
amount - $315 - for Russian-origin gas that was delivered in the
first two months of this year.
It also says Gazprom-affiliated companies will be guaranteed
sales of at least 7.5 billion cubic meters of gas to Ukraine in
"This is a big improvement for both Gazprom and Ukraine.
Commonsense prevailed. Any solution that avoids a disruption of
European supplies is positive, but this appears to suggest that
relations between the two in the future will be much more
transparent than they have been," said Geoff Smith, deputy head
of research at the Renaissance Capital investment bank in Kiev.
However, the agreement notes that negotiations on prices for
next year are continuing, hinting that Ukraine faces a
significant hike in 2009.
Yushchenko plots his premier's removal
Gazprom announced this week that it had reached agreement with
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to purchase gas next
year at "European prices," which Gazprom has said are expected
to be around $350 per 1,000 cubic meters.
March 11 2008
Tymoshenko government completes its first 100 days in
office on March 15
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has been under continuous
pressure from her supposed ally, President Viktor Yushchenko.
His inability to work with her since he entered politics in late
2001 is due to their differences over ideology, how to deal with
corruption and the traditional role of women. The situation is
complicated by the president's search for a partner who will
ensure his re-election for a second term.
Since the coalition government's parliamentary confirmation
on December 18, the president and his chief of staff, Viktor
Baloha, have launched a relentless barrage of denunciations,
threats and demands against the government. Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko and President Viktor Yushchenko's public
disagreements allowed Russia to play them off during the gas
crisis (see RUSSIAIUKRAINE: Internal rivalry could undo gas deal
- February 19, 2008).
In February, Baloha and six other deputies resigned from the
Our Ukraine (NU)-People's Self Defence (NS) bloc, while
remaining in the NU-NS parliamentary group. The 'Orange'
coalition, established after the September 30 pre-term elections,
has 228 deputies in the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada, 156 from the
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) faction and 72 from NU-NS. This
slim majority of three is really lower, as not all NU-NS
deputies signed the coalition agreement. Further resignations
could lead to the disintegration of the coalition.
Ukrainian legislation requires a majority of deputies in a
parliamentary group to approve withdrawing from a coalition. For
NU¬NS, withdrawing from the Orange coalition would require a
minimum of 37 deputies to support such a step. Currently, just
22 NU-NS deputies support Baloha and his dissidents (see
UKRAINE: Indiscipline spoils political effectiveness - February
Divided loyalties. Since Yushchenko
established NU in 2001, following the parliamentary vote of
confidence in his government, it has been divided into two
One wing, aligned with BYuT, draws on such traditional
national-democratic parties as Rukh.
The other, aligned with the Party of Regions, which is
currently in opposition, draws on pragmatic businessmen and
centrists, many of whom worked for former President Leonid
Since the 2002 parliamentary elections, Yushchenko and NU
have switched between Tymoshenko and the Kuchma camp (embodied
since 2005 in Regions):
2002-03. Yushchenko and NU alternated
between allying with the radical opposition -- BYuT and the
Socialists (SPU) --and joining pro-Kuchma centrists.
2004. At 'Orange Revolution' round tables
brokered by the EU, Yushchenko negotiated a compromise with
Kuchma that led to his election on December 26 in exchange for
constitutional reform and elite immunity.
2006. Following the March elections, the
president authorised NU campaign leader Roman Beszmertny to
negotiate an Orange coalition with BYuT and SPU, while Prime
Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov negotiated a 'grand coalition' with
Regions. Yushchenko would not support Tymoshenko's return as
prime minister -- the price of an Orange coalition.
2007. To resolve the constitutional crisis,
Yushchenko and Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych came to an
agreement to hold fresh elections. After the September poll and
protracted negotiations, an Orange coalition was formed with
Tymoshenko as prime minister. Tymoshenko was confirmed at a
second vote on December 18, after a first vote seven days
earlier failed to garner sufficient support.
Parallel coalition. Six days after
Tymoshenko's confirmation, Regions parliamentary group leader
Raisa Bohatyriova was appointed secretary of the National
Security and Defence Council (NSDC), creating an
extra-parliamentary grand coalition of the presidential
secretariat and NSDC to counter-balance the Orange government (see
UKRAINE: President's plots vs premier will backfire - January 4,
2008). Bohatyriova is a close ally of Borys Kolesnikov who, as
head of the Regions election campaign, negotiated the spring
2007 compromise. Yushchenko has used the NSDC largely to
counter-balance governments he does not control -- Tymoshenko in
2005 and since 2007, and Yanukovych in 2006-07.
The creation of coalitions inside and outside parliament
reflects four factors:
has long been unable to choose between aligning with, or
Ideological differences. In
UK terms, BYuT is closer to Margaret Thatcher's radical
reform 'dries', while Yushchenko is closer to moderate
Conservative one-nation 'wets'.
Corruption. Tymoshenko and
Yushchenko differ in their attitudes to battling corruption,
particularly in the energy sector. Tymoshenko seeks to
remove such non-transparent gas intermediaries as
RosUkrEnergo, while Yushchenko supports them. Yekhanurov's
government included RosUkrEnergo in the January 2006 gas
agreement; BYuT backed a no-confidence motion in the
Yushchenko remains undecided with whom -- Tymoshenko or
Regions -- he will align himself for the January 2010
Rapprochement with Regions. Yushchenko is
increasingly inclined to cooperate with Regions because only
they would agree to give up the prime minister's position to an
NU technocrat acceptable to Yushchenko. An Orange coalition
would inevitably propose Tymoshenko as prime minister, as in
recent elections BYuT has gained more votes than NU (2006) and
In 2006, Yushchenko and Yanukovych negotiated a deal with
Yekhanurov continuing as prime minister; the grand coalition now
being negotiated would replace Tymoshenko with Baloha. In both
deals, Yanukovych becomes Rada speaker.
Yushchenko's increasing alignment towards Regions for the
presidential election would require the removal of the
Tymoshenko government through a parliamentary vote of no
confidence. The presidential strategy seeks to increase support
for such a step by lobbying within NU-NS to obtain the required
majority among businessmen and centrists, forming a new
pro-presidential 'party of power'. Oleh Rybachuk, Baloha's
predecessor as chief of staff in 2005-06 and a long-term
Yushchenko ally, was removed as presidential adviser on March 4
after he criticised Baloha's aggressive strategy.
Outlook. The strategy has four pitfalls:
It assumes that Yushchenko's re-election for a second term
may be best ensured through an alliance with Regions negotiated
through Baloha and Kolesnikov. Success depends on persuading
Yanukovych not to stand as a candidate, as Regions' political
machine and Baloha's control of regional governors brings out
the east Ukrainian vote for Yushchenko. This would require a
return to the abuse of the state's 'administrative resource' in
Pushing Tymoshenko into opposition a second time would
transform her into a martyr who would position herself as the
only leader still loyal to the Orange Revolution. Tymoshenko
excels in opposition and her personal ratings are three times
Yushchenko's. The 2007 elections showed that, within the Orange
camp, only BYuT has any following in eastern Ukraine, while in
the 2006 and 2007 elections, NU and NU-NS took first place in
only four and one of the west Ukrainian regions respectively.
Regions and BYuT, whose parliamentary groups together
comprise 74% of Rada deputies, both oppose Yushchenko's plans to
overturn the 2006 constitutional compromise and return to a
presidential system. Ukraine's current parliamentary system has
strong support from Ukraine's political and business elites.
The strategy would lead to an irrevocable split in NU-NS,
with BYuT picking up most of its deputies. Beszmertny's poor
track record in creating presidential parties of power since
1998, when the People's Democratic Party was his first failure,
coupled with Baloha's failure to revitalise NU, which obtained
just 14% of the vote in both the 2006 and 2007 elections, does
not inspire confidence in the success of the latest attempt to
set up a pro-presidential party.
CONCLUSION: Yushchenko's seeming preference
for an alliance with Regions over an Orange coalition will force
Tymoshenko into opposition, from where she will be well placed
to win the 2010 presidential election.
Keywords: EE, RUCIS, Ukraine, Russia, politics, constitution,
corruption, election, government, legislation, opposition,
party, economy, industry, corporate, energy, gas, reform,
Link til Hanne Severinsens sidste Europarådsrapport om Ukraine
Hanne Severinsen var i Kiev i
januar for at lave sin sidste rapport for Europarådets
parlamentariske forsamling om Ukraine. Rapporten er nu
færdig og er lagt ud på Europarådets hjemmeside:
by Serhiy Leshchenko, UP
Original article in Ukrainian by Serhiy Leshchenko, UP
Translated by Anna Platonenko
Mr. Dubyna became Yulia Tymoshenko's successor in 2001,
right after she had been forced to resign from her post as a
Vice Prime Minister in Viktor Yushchenko's government.
The newcomer was personally introduced into big Ukrainian politics by
Leonid Kuchma, who was impressed with Mr. Dubyna's results
achieved at KGMK (Mining and Metallurgy Kombinat)
Kryvorizhstal JSC: back in that time the enterprise produced
its first major revenue. Mr. Kuchma once stated in his
interview with “Vyluchne Telebachennya” (“Street
Television”) that he would place Mr. Dubyna “under his
personal protection” and referred to him as an example to
In the mid 90's Mr. Dubyna used to work at the
Dzerzhysnky metallurgical complex. This is where he first
became acquainted with Viktor Pinchuk and could not come to
an understanding with Ihor Kolomoysky and his partner Vadym
Shulman. And there, at the complex, according to some
sources, Mr. Dubyna was once attacked with a knife, but was
lucky not to receive any serious injuries.
The President's future son-in-law took Mr. Dubyna to
Alchevsk metallurgical complex, where the situation was
indeed grave. Mr. Dubyna was literally accompanied by armed
He was later transferred to the management of
Kryvorizhstal JSC, the leader of Ukrainian metallurgy, and
managed to succeed in overcoming the crisis owing to, as
they say, a “strict financial discipline”. As a matter of
fact, Kryvorizhstal JSC simply avoided paying off many
Mr. Dubyna enjoyed the support of Leonid Kuchma and from
time to time, still being a director of the metallurgical
complex, was called to breakfast with him. Perhaps, back
then the ex-President saw his younger self 20 years ago in
the red-haired manager.
In 2000 there was an incident with the participation of
Mr. Dubyna and Slovyansky bank, which later fell first
victim of the abolishment of the future coalition financial
Slovyansky bank had been financing Kryvorizhstal JSC long
before Mr. Dubyna's appearance, and the bank had managed to
return the loans before the new director was appointed.
Having settled at the enterprise, Mr. Dubyna demanded that
all the agreements be cancelled. On being refused, he gave a
warning: “Then I will let the Father know”.
Yes, “Father” must have probably thought for the first
time that Ukraine did not need such a bank as Slovyansky.
In winter 2001 Mr. Kuchma visited Kryvorizhstal JSC,
where Oleh Dubyna managed to strengthen the ex-President's
confidence in the efficiency of the enterprise management.
Mr. Kuchma, who was already involved in Gongadze case back
in that time, was also to face a public demonstration,
initiated by the enterprise workers.
Being deeply moved by such an order at the enterprise,
Mr. Kuchma stated that he personally removed Kryvorizhstal
JSC from the privatization list. A couple of years later
Leonid Danylovych understood that Kryvorizhstal JSC was
destined to collapse and eventually fall into oblivion
without the financial backing of such investors as Viktor
Pinchuk and Rinat Akhmetov.
When Mr. Dubyna was appointed Vice Prime Minister, Viktor
Yushchenko confessed that after the personal meeting with
the new deputy, he took quite a ‘shine' to him. After Viktor
Yushchenko's resignation Mr. Dubyna was promoted to the
first Vice Prime Minister in Anatoliy Kinakh's government.
By a twist of fate, that very time Mr. Dubyna had an
assistant Ihor Voronin, the present head of UkrGazEnergo
Company, the subsidiary of RosUkrEnergo at the Ukrainian
And, by another twist of fate, it was Mr. Dubyna, who
took measures in order to transfer Yuriy Boyko, the future
godfather of all the further gas schemes in Ukraine, to the
position of Naftogaz's head.
Today Mr. Dubyna is at the head of Naftogaz with a
mission to prevent the implementation of this company
In the middle 2007, Mr. Dubyna, being head of the
Dzerzhysnky metallurgical complex, was indignant over the
actions of UkrGazEnergo, which consisted in increasing the
gas prices without prior notification and “being practically
The current appointment of Oleh Dubyna to Naftogaz was
not supposed to meet with the resistance of Mr. Yushchenko,
who is on very intimate terms with Serhiy Taruta, another
shareholder of the Industrial Union of Donbass. The latter,
together with Mr. Dubyna, welcomed President Yushchenko
during his official visit to the Alchevsky metallurgical
complex one month ago.
In the meantime, both Yulia Tymoshenko and Vitaliy Haiduk,
who lobbied his present position of Naftogas head, do not
conceal Mr. Dubyna's role in the modern history of Ukraine:
being a ‘cudgel' (Ukrainian ‘dubyna') for RosUkrEnergo.
A once popular thesis that if the rich are admitted to the
authorities, they will never steal has been completely
refuted right after Leonid Chernovetskyi became the mayor of
But this is how the only explanation to Mrs. Tymoshenko's decision
sounds: in compliance with this decision the legal
millionaires Serhiy Buryak and Valeriy Khoroshkovsky have
been appointed to the management of the State Tax
Administration of Ukraine and the State Custom Service of
Though, apart from this one, there is yet another factor:
it was of great importance to Mrs. Tymoshenko to show that
people, who had voted for her, now have a return in the form
of certain appointments to the ‘golden' offices in the
So, Serhiy Buryak is the son of the last State Bank of
the Ukrainian SSR head Vasyl Buryak, who is deeply respected
in financial circles and considered to be a figure of Vadym
And again, by a twist of fate, it was Buryak's father,
who, as a principal banker of the Ukrainian SSR, signed
protocols, in compliance with which it is now impossible to
file claims to Russia on the devalued deposits to the
Oshchadbank (Savings Bank) of the USSR.
Serhiy and his younger brother Oleksandr, in accordance
with the BrokBusinessBank last year's report, are the chief
shareholders of the afore-mentioned financial establishment.
The elder brother possesses 44.7% of the statutory
capital, whereas the younger possesses 43.3%. They both are
the richest deputies according to the declared income scale.
Serhiy declared UAH 521 million, Oleksandr – UAH 525
In his 25 years the elder Buryak used to run
BrokBusinessBank, which has a very simple explanation: this
financial establishment was founded in place of
Orendcoopbank in 1991, to which the father of the young
bankers put his hand.
Today the Buryak bank is developing strategic partnership
with the Ukravto Corporation, owned by Tariel Vasadze.
According to some sources, the bank owns a minority
shareholding in this corporation. Among the bank
shareholders in 2005 there was also a chemical giant Styrol,
situated in Horlivka.
In 2001-2002 Buryak brothers made closer acquaintance
with Viktor Yushchenko. Mr. Yushchenko's brother, Petro
Andriyovych, also interceded for the brothers.
Moreover, Serhiy Buryak is Viktor Yushchenko's godfather.
It turns out that the future President together with another
famous person, well-known in the Kyiv circles – Oksana Hunt,
the owner of Sanahunt luxury fashion brand store, was a
godparent to the banker's child.
Finally, before the parliamentary election of 2002, the
younger Buryak brother appeared in the Our Ukraine party
list and by a strange coincidence the bloc's fund increased
by USD 1.5 million.
The elder Serhiy, who back in that time stood for the
election in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, interceded for his brother.
Our Ukraine considered this to be Buryak brothers' intention
to join Viktor Yushchenko's faction in the future parliament.
However, these illusions faded after the first voting
results had been announced. Oleksandr Buryak was excluded
from the Our Ukraine faction since he went against the party
line and supported the Volodymyr Lytvyn's candidacy for the
Speakership. Serhiy Buryak was not on Viktor Yushchenko
faction list at all, but also voted for Mr. Lytvyn.
In the rebellious year of 2004 the Buryak brothers did
not excel in anything special: for instance, both brothers
supported Viktor Medvedchuk's political reform.
After the Orange Revolution the brothers joined the Yulia
Tymoshenko bloc, in which they both were directly
responsible for the Khmelnytskyi oblast headquarters.
If there is truth to a certain rumor, the BYuT's fund
received USD 5 million for each brother.
After Yulia Tymoshenko failed to become Prime Minister in
2006, the brothers resisted the temptation to join the
anti-crisis coalition, which made Mrs. Tymoshenko to hold
them in high esteem. She even paid a special visit to the
National Bank council meeting in order to defend the elder
However, the recent appointment of the head of the State
Tax Administration of Ukraine looks somewhat unfair towards
Tariel Vasadze, who failed to become a Minister of
Transport, most likely because of being unprepared to
“completely give up the business to the country's benefit”.
One would need to be absolutely naïve to believe that Mr.
Buryak is ready for this and will actually strike his
favorite financial establishment, founded by common effort
of the whole family from generation to generation, out of
However, it is customary among banking circles to believe
that Mr. Buryak's true purpose is to step into his father's
shoes and become the head of the National Bank of Ukraine.
And the State Tax Administration is just another step on his
way to the cherished ambition.
If the employment of Oleh Dubyna and Serhiy Buryak provides
more or less adequate explanations, then Valeriy
Khoroshkovsky is a real surprise for Yulia Tymoshenko.
Mr. Khoroshkovsky is the outstanding personality of today.
His habit of taking good care of his appearance has
already become an object of derision aroused by business
rivals. He pays due attention to the displays of his status.
For instance, during working days Mr. Khoroshkovsky drives
the enhanced 6.25 m Maybach. During the weekend he drives
cherry-colored Bentley sports car. Both cars have the same
snazzy numbers, which only differ in one letter.
Maybe it is right now that Mr. Khoroshkovsky has got the
chance to break stereotypes, assigned to him in the course
of the last years.
And, at first glance, taking all the absurdity into account, there is
still some logic in the appointment of Mr. Khoroshkovsky to
the State Custom Service of Ukraine.
Being an ambitious person, Mr. Khoroshkovsky stakes on
Yulia Tymoshenko as a possible head of state in either 2010
Maybe, this will make him one of her closest team-mates
in the future. It is known that during the last election Mr.
Khoroshkovsky had regular meetings with Yulia Tymoshenko
with a view, as he says, “to be well informed of all the
political processes taking place in the country”.
Taking Yulia Tymoshenko's intention to renew the ‘Stop
the Smuggling' program into account, Mr. Khoroshkovsky's
appointment to the State Custom Service will pave the way
for a) being constantly informed of the latest events; b)
being in everyday touch with Mrs. Tymoshenko and c) regular
being on TV in person.
It is quite obvious that such a partnership is mutually
First, Mrs. Tymoshenko will obtain the loyalty of the
Inter TV channel despite the mixed-up story with the
purchase of its assets. But Mr. Khoroshkovsky is its
shareholder, though his rivals keep on asserting that he is
not a sole proprietor.
Second, Mrs. Tymoshenko may hope that if the corruption
at customs does not disappear once and for all, it will at
least generate a structure, and the bribetakers' rates will
appear to be beyond the strength of the minor smugglers.
Third, the fact that Mr. Khoroshkovsky is in the money,
lets us hope that the minor abuse of power (USD 1,000-2,000)
will finally be eradicated.
The information that Mr. Khoroshkovsky is a member of
Viktor Pinchuk's team is some five years out of date.
The reasons, as always, lie in the money. Mr.
Khoroshkovsky was forced to sell Ukrsotsbank at a lower
price. He sold the bank that is now worth USD 3 billion, to
Leonid Kuchma's son-in-law for USD 80-100 million.
Today Mr. Khoroshkovsky is actually the third figure in a
triangle with Vitaliy Hayduk and Yulia Tymoshenko.
It was Mr. Hayduk one year ago who brought Mr.
Khoroshkovsky to Viktor Yushchenko to take the office of the
first deputy secretary of the National Security and Defense
Council of Ukraine. And when Mr. Hayduk refused to be a tool
in Viktor Baloha's hands, they left together.
That is why, Mr. Khoroshkovsky can be considered as
another proof of closer relationships established between
Yulia Tymoshenko and the owners of the Industrial Union of
However, besides Mr. Hayduk, Mr. Khoroshkovsky can be
useful for Mrs. Tymoshenko as a guarantor in the
relationships with another influential figure, a Russian
metallurgical billionaire of ‘Eurasia Group' Aleksandr
Abramov, who once staked on Viktor Yushchenko back in 2004,
but only got a headache and no benefit at all.
It seems that Mr. Khoroshkovsky himself does not consider
the position of a chief customs official to be the top of
his career. Once in 2002, having become a frontman in the
Team of Winter Generation (Komanda Ozimogo Pokolinnja), he
said that in 2004 he would reach the age which allowed him
to run for the Presidency.
It is obvious that this card will be played by some other
people during the next decade. But still, everybody is
always free to dream of becoming a real oligarch.
Serhiy Leshchenko, UP
Police officers found guilty in death of journalist Georgy
Kyiv -- A Ukrainian court convicted three former
police officers on Saturday of killing an investigative
journalist whose unsolved slaying nearly eight years ago
became a rallying cry of the Orange Revolution that
eventually ousted the government.
The journalist, Georgy Gongadze, who crusaded against
official corruption, was killed and his beheaded body was
discovered in a forest outside Kyiv. His head was never
One of the former officers, Mykola Protasov, was
sentenced to 13 years in jail. The other two, Valeriy
Kostenko and Oleksandr Popovych, each received 12-year
IInvestigations have not identified those who ordered the
Mr. Gongadze's wife and her two children received
political asylum in the United States and have lived there
Many Ukrainians have looked upon the Gongadze case as a
test for the government of pro-Western President Viktor A.
Yushchenko, who swept to power in the Orange Revolution in
Mr. Yushchenko has come under harsh criticism from human
rights groups for failing to solve the crime.
Mr. Gongadze's killing set off months of protests in 2000
and 2001 after Mykola Melnychenko, a former bodyguard of
President Leonid D. Kuchma, released tapes on which a voice
resembling Mr. Kuchma's is heard conspiring with others
against the journalist.
Lt. Gen. Oleksey Pukach, former chief of the Interior
Ministry's surveillance department, where the three
defendants all served, is also wanted in the murder and is
being sought on an international warrant.
In September 2000, Mr. Gongadze got into what he thought
was a taxi, and was then joined by three others and driven
outside Kyiv, according to the defendants. He was beaten and
strangled, his body doused with gasoline and burned. Experts
said he was dead before the was decapitation.
hæder til tidligere MF'er
"Liberalt overblik", marts 2008:
"Ukrainsk hæder. Tidligere MF for
Venstre, Hanne Severinsen,
har modtaget "order of merit of II
degree" af ukraines president victor jutchenko. ordenen er
givet for hendes mangeårige indsats, hvor hun som
europarådets rapporteur i 12 år har fulgt udviklingen i
ukraine tæt - herunder som valgobservatør. i januar var der
en personlig tak fra premierminister julia tymoshenko, der
har bedt hende fortsætte som rådgiver. hanne severinsen, der
i 2007 ikke genopstillede efter 23 år i folketinget, er også
udnævnt til æresmedlem af europarådets parlamentariske
forsamling, som hun var medlem af i 17 år."
Ukraine fik ikke den ønskede MAP-status i NATO, som er
en slags handlingsplan for lande, der vil træde ind i
Samtidig med det besluttede NATO-medlemslandenes
ledere at indlede intensive politiske konsultationer med
Ukraine og Georgien på politisk topplan med henblik på
at løse de problemer, som står i vejen for en beslutning
om at gå over til MAP (membership action plan).
NATOs generalsekretær Jaap de Hoop Scheffer sagde på
en pressekonference i Bukharest i tirsdags, at NATO har
besluttet, at Ukraine og Georgien vil blive medlemmer af
alliancen, oplyser "Interfaks-Ukraine".
"Begge lande har gjort en stor indsats for at blive
medlemmer af NATO", sagde NATOs generalsekretær Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer sagde på en pressekonference i Bukharest i
"Vi hilser alle demokratiske reformer velkommen og
hylder det demokratiske valg, som finder sted i Georgien
i maj. Og et medlemskab af NATO bliver den næste fase. I
dag understreger vi, at vi er faste i vores støtte til
disse to staters ansøgninger om NATO-medlemskab",
"Ukraine har ikke fået en invitation til en
handlingsplan for et NATO-medlemskab. Samtidig med det
har stats-og regeringscheferne truffet beslutning om at
indlede intensive politiske konsultationer med Ukraine
og Georigen på topplan med henblik på at løse problemer
som står i vejen for overgangen til en implementering af
MAP", oplyste NATOs generalsekretær.
"Det er også besluttet at pålægge udenrigsministrene
at komme med den første vurdering af det opnåede
fremskridt under mødet i december 2008", sagde Scheffer.
"Vi er allerede på vej mod en intensiv dialog, og det
er vejen til et medlemskab... NATO er enig i at vedtage
en beslutning om at lade Ukraine og Georgien træde ind i
den nærmeste fremtid", sagde generalsekretæren.
Associated Press, at de Hoop Scheffer påpegede, at
alliancen er parat til engang at optage Ukraine og
Georgien som sine medlemmer. Men Frankrig og Tyskland
blokerede USAs bestræbelser på at indlede den formelle
del af denne proces, idet de mente, at dette ville skade
det i forvejen anspændte forhold til Rusland. UP.
PACE Monitor Hanne Severinsen becomes Yulia Tymoshenko's
11.04.2008 | 15:37 |
Ex-rapporteur on Ukraine for
the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe, Hanne
Severinsen, has become a
free-lance adviser to Ukrainian Prime Minister
This was announced in the April 9 resolution of the
Cabinet of Ministers, which was placed on the Government
Tre politifolk dømt for Gongadze-mordet, men sagen er ikke
år efter drabet på den ukrainske journalist har en appelret
i Kijiv afsagt fængselsstraffe i sagen, men bagmændene er på
Af Henrik Døcker
Journalister i de
tidligere Jerntæppe-lande lever livet farligt, for de
tidligere diktaturer dér har ofte kun et tyndt lag
demokratisk fernis. Der skulle således gå otte år mellem det
tidspunkt, hvor det hovedløse lig af den 31-årige ukrainske
journalist Georgij Gongadze blev fundet i
Tarastsjanskij- skoven uden for Kijiv og hans gerningsmænd
blev dømt. Det skete ved appelretten i Kijiv den 15. marts i
år og tre år efter at de tre politiofficerer, der blev
fundet skyldige, var blevet anholdt.
Politiobersterne Valerij Kostenko og Mikola
Protasov idømtes hhv.12 års og 13 fængsel, mens
politimajor Oleksandr Popovitj fik 12 års fængsel. De
tilhørte alle det ukrainske indenrigsministeriums afdeling
for overvågning og kriminel efterforskning. Popovitj førte
den bil, Gongadze, chefredaktør for netavisen Ukrainskaja
Pravda, blev bortført i den 16. september 2000. Sammen
med de to andre politiofficerer og deres chef, politigeneral
Aleksej Pukatj, kørte de ud til skoven, hvor Pukatj
angiveligt skal have kvalt Gongadze med hans eget bælte,
mens politifolkene holdt ham.
Hvad der oprører mange ukrainske politikere i dag er, at
Pokatj havde held til at flygte ud af landet i 2003.
Forinden skal han have haft held til i 2002 at gøre det af
med en anden ukrainsk journalist, Aleksej Podolskij,
denne gang i Tjernihiv-regionen. To politifolk, der
medvirkede ved dette drab, også tilføjet ved kvælning,
idømtes sidste år fængselsstraffe på tre år. Der var en
overgang kriminel efterforskning rettet mod Pokatj for at
have destrueret vigtigt bevismateriale i sagen. Men en
dommer indstillede del af sagen i 2004. Pukatj menes i dag
at befinde sig i Israel. Han er internationalt efterlyst.
egentlige bagmænd, dem, der beordrede og politisk bar
ansvaret for drabet på den oppositionelle journalist
Gongadze, der havde berettet om magtmisbrug i den unge
ukrainske republik, er altså stadig på fri fod.
Ministerpræsident Julia Timosjenko kritiserer den
måde, efterforskningen i sagen har fundet sted på. ”Som
sædvanlig har man fundet frem til dem, der befandt sig i det
yderste led af kæden [af ansvarlige] i Gongadze-sagen, mens
dem, der beordrede drabet…, herunder politikere og
embedsmænd, bestemt ikke er blevet straffet”, siger hun.
Socialistlederen Aleksandr Moroz, som aktivt deltog
i de nationale protester mod den daværende præsident
Leonid Kutjmas styre i kølvandet af Gongadze-drabet, har
rettet mistanken mod sine gamle politiske kolleger i
Organge-revolutionen. ”Det er højest mistænkeligt, at dem,
der besluttede mordet, ikke kan findes”, siger han. Nogle
hemmelige båndoptagelser af samtaler med Kutjma blev i 2001
smuglet ud af Ukraine af en tidligere vagtmand, optagelser
som i højeste grad kastede mistanke om medansvar for drabet
på Kutjma selv. Dette medvirkede til, at der opstod
bevægelser som ”Ukraine uden Kutjma”og ”Vågn op Ukraine”
foruden for Orange-revolutionen.
enke, Miroslava, så sig på grund af trusler mod hende
nødsaget til at flygte ud af Ukraine og søge asyl i USA,
idet hun også på forskellig vis blev groft chikaneret af
ukrainske myndigheder. Hun vandt endog en sag mod staten
Ukraine, rejst for Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol
i Strasbourg, som pålagde Ukraine at yde hende en
godtgørelse for den ydmygende og umenneskelige behandling,
hun havde været udsat for.
Menneskerettigheder: Ukraine dømt i to sager i Strasbourg
UBERETTIGEDE FORHINDRINGER FOR UKRAINSK NATURVÆRNSFORENING
ukrainere, der ville oprette en naturværnsforening måtte
helt til Strasbourg-domstolen for at få gennemtrumfet deres
ret til det. Den ukrainske hovedstad Kijivs særlige
justitsdepartement havde afslået at give tilladelse til
foreningen, men det krænkede efter denne domstols opfattelse
foreningefriheden som knæsat i den europæiske
menneskerettighedskonventions art. 11, hvorfor der
tilkendtes de fire en godtgørelse på 1500 euro (10.750 kr.)
fire ukrainere Sergej Petrovitj Koretskij (Koretskyj),
Andrej Vasiljovitj Tolotjko, Andrej Mykolajovitj Gorbal
og Oleksij Grygorovitj, anmodede i 2000 de ukrainske
myndigheder om registrering af Borgerkomiteen for
Bevaring af de oprindelige naturområder i Berezniakij.
Men Kijivs bystyre gav afslag, fordi foreningens vedtægter
ikke var udfærdiget i overensstemmelse med gældende lov.
Ukrainske domstole ville ikke behandle sagen, eftersom de
fandt det lovligt at afslå registrering.
Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol påpegede, at hverken
den ukrainske regering eller de lokale domstole havde givet
tvingende grunde til at begrænse en forenings ret til at
uddele propagandamateriale eller at lobby’e myndigheder.
Det viste sig, at den ukrainske lov om borgernes
foreningsfrihed var alt for vag og i realiteten gav
myndighederne en vid ret til at skønne over hvorvidt denne
og hin forening var berettiget til registrering.
var intet odiøst i at foreningen havde forudset at danne
afdelinger under sig i andre ukrainske byer eller områder.
Der var intet presserende socialt behov for at forbyde
KIRKESAMFUND I UKRAINE MÅTTE HELT TIL STRASBOURG FOR AT FÅ
græsk-katolsk kirke i den ukrainske landsby Sosulivka har
måttet mobilisere Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol
for at få gennemtrumfet sin ret til ind imellem at benytte
det ortodokse kirkesamfunds kirke i byen, til trods for at
regionen Ternopil havde givet dem ret hertil. Det var en
krænkelse af den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions
art. 6, eftersom det græsk-katolske kirkesamfund ikke kunne
gå til ukrainske domstole og få retten gennemtrumfet.
Græsk-katolikkerne underskrev en aftale om brug af kirken
med distriktsforvaltningen i Tjortkiv-distriktet i juli
1997, men den ortodokse kirke afslog alligevel det
kirkesamfund at bruge kirken. Det hjalp ikke
græsk-katolikkerne, at de gik til de ukrainske domstole,
idet disse fandt, at de ikke havde jurisdiktion i sagen.
Efter Strasbourg-stolens opfattelse indebar dette reelt
retsnægtelse eller sagt på en anden måde: retten til
domstolsprøvelse. Det græsk-katolske kirkesamfund
tilkendtes en godtgørelse for tort på 1500 euro (11.250kr.)
Yushchenko, Tymoshenko clash over privatization
April 28, 2008
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko have demonstrated that they
would not stop short of open confrontation when big
property is at stake. Yushchenko cancelled Tymoshenko’s
orders to replace the head of the privatization body,
the State Property Fund (FDM), and to privatize one of
the last big factories still remaining in state
ownership, the Odessa Portside Plant (OPZ). Tymoshenko,
with the courts on her side, disobeyed and instructed
her subordinates, perhaps for the first time ever, to
ignore Yushchenko’s orders. Yushchenko sent his guards
to protect the FDM from Tymoshenko’s team, and
confrontation between the Presidential Guard and police
was barely avoided.
Yushchenko opposes Tymoshenko’s efforts to privatize
big industry assets in 2008. Tymoshenko makes no secret
of her plan to spend money raised from privatization on
compensations to those Ukrainians who lost their savings
in the defunct Soviet state savings bank and on other
social programs. Yushchenko says that Tymoshenko’s plan
is tantamount to squandering national wealth. His team
suspects that Tymoshenko wants to use privatization
proceedings to buy popular support for the 2010
The Tymoshenko cabinet approved a privatization plan
for 2008 in February. It provides for raising some $1.8
billion by privatizing assets in electricity companies,
the Ukrtelekom fixed-lines operator, the Turboatom
manufacturer of equipment for nuclear plants, and OPZ,
which is the key producer of ammonia and carbamide. OPZ
is probably the most attractive of those assets.
Tymoshenko plans to sell it for over $500 million. From
February to April 2008, Yushchenko issued several
decrees suspending Tymoshenko’s privatization orders,
including OPZ privatization.
Tymoshenko tried to replace FDM head Valentyna
Semenyuk, who has survived several cabinets from 2005 to
2008 in this position. She believes that Semenyuk has
been torpedoing her privatization efforts on orders from
Yushchenko. On February 6 Tymoshenko suspended Semenyuk
and appointed Andry Portnov, a member of her party, to
replace her. However, Yushchenko decreed on February 7
to suspend Semenyuk’s dismissal and requested the
Constitutional Court (KS) to check the legality of
Tymoshenko’s order. He recalled that in 2007 he had
decreed that the FDM was not part of the executive, so
Tymoshenko could not replace its head.
Yushchenko lost to Tymoshenko in the KS, which threw
out his appeal on April 17; but Yushchenko appealed
again on the same day. Tymoshenko argued that Yushchenko
could not appeal on the same matter twice, and she
reportedly decided to replace Semenyuk by force.
Yushchenko warned her against this at his press
conference on April 24. He said that only parliament
could replace Semenyuk.
Yushchenko slammed Tymoshenko’s privatization policy.
“What’s happening to privatization in Ukraine now
reminds me of a seasonal sale at a Kyiv supermarket,” he
said, “but in our case national security is at stake.”
He warned against “sweet populism.” He said that he was
not against OPZ privatization but that OPZ should be
privatized without its transshipment facility, which was
also used by other companies in the region. Therefore,
according to Yushchenko, it was of strategic importance
On April 23 Yushchenko ruled to replace the Interior
Ministry’s security guards at the FDM with the
Presidential Guard in order to prevent the FDM’s
takeover by force. The Interior Ministry reportedly had
not been warned of that decision so that its security
could offer resistance; but common sense prevailed. The
FDM passed under Yushchenko’s armed control without
violence. When a district court in Kyiv confirmed
Semenyuk’s suspension on April 24 and Tymoshenko arrived
at the FDM on April 25 personally to install Portnov in
Semenyuk’s place, Semenyuk, protected by Yushchenko’s
guards, did not move.
The same court ruled to continue OPZ privatization,
but on April 25 Yushchenko decreed it suspended again.
Tymoshenko instructed Portnov to disobey Yushchenko’s
decrees and to carry on with OPZ privatization. This
time the Prosecutor-General’s Office intervened,
canceling Semenyuk’s suspension by Tymoshenko. In
response, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc threatened to launch
a no-confidence motion against Prosecutor-General
Oleksandr Medvedko in parliament.
First Deputy Prime Minister Oleksandr Turchynov,
speaking in a TV interview, accused Yushchenko of
pursuing “private interests” in privatization. Turchynov
did not specify what those interests were. Zerkalo
Nedeli quoted “rumors” suggesting that OPZ was contested
by the Ukrainian tycoons Kostyantyn Zhevaho and Ihor
Kolomoysky. Zhevaho is a member of Tymoshenko’s party,
while Kolomoysky pledged in a recent interview that he
would back Yushchenko in a presidential election.
Speaking at a talk-show on Inter TV, Semenyuk said
that she would not go until parliament replaced her.
Semenyuk knows that parliament will not do that any time
soon, as the biggest caucus in it, the opposition Party
of Regions, will hardly back Tymoshenko in her dispute
with Yushchenko. Semenyuk accused Tymoshenko of trying
to sell OPZ “for a song” in order to “pay the oligarchs”
for political support. Semenyuk also said that OPZ
should not be privatized at a time when “world prices
and the Ukrainian stock market are falling” (Ukrainska
Pravda, April 2, 26; UT1 TV, April 24; Channel 5, Inter
TV, April 25; Zerkalo Nedeli, April 26).
Ukrainian politics stands on the brink, again
Jane's Foreign Report
Deteriorating relations between Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko and President Viktor Yushchenko over a
constitutional realignment have placed the future of
Ukraine's Orange coalition government in doubt.
As well as presenting the risk that Ukraine could again
be beset by political infighting and paralysis, the collapse
of the government is also likely to presage a move towards a
parliamentary constitution, limiting the powers of the
Internal political and constitutional crises will
negatively affect Ukraine's integration into NATO and the
The popular revolutions that have arisen in post-Soviet
states in recent years held great promise for states beset
by corruption, economic mismanagement and failing democracy.
Yet they have experienced a mixed bag of success.
Despite early promise and undoubted progress in certain
areas, the forces behind Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution have
faced a series of crises in recent months, culminating in
simmering domestic protest and the imposition of a state of
emergency in November 2007. Meanwhile Kyrgyzstan's 2005
Tulip 'revolution' quickly began to more closely resemble a
coup that simply swapped one ruling autocratic elite for
But perhaps the most chaotically divisive of them all has
been Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution. The bifurcation of
political interests, both within the Orange Revolutionary
powers and the wider political environment, has led to near
continual infighting, deep partisan divisions and prolonged
Hopes had been raised that a unified government had been
formed with the reformation of an Orange coalition following
the September 2007 parliamentary elections. However,
tensions between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko threatened to boil over on 25
April when the prime minister ordered her government to
ignore presidential decrees, leaving the future survival of
the government in doubt and Ukraine looking over the
precipice into another political morass.
The current source of antagonism regards attempts to
re-align the constitution and disagreement over whether this
should lead to the government being led by the president or
parliament. Following the Orange Revolution, constitutional
reforms were agreed during round-table discussions brokered
by the EU. Yushchenko agreed that these reforms would go
into effect in 2006, with the entire parliament apart from
the Tymoshenko Bloc voting in favour of the compromise.
However, the 2006 semi-parliamentary constitution this
created has never been satisfactory to President Yushchenko,
who has sought to re-gain lost presidential powers, most
recently through the creation of a parliamentary commission
in December 2007 to move Ukraine back to a semi-presidential
system. Yet these attempts are being thwarted by two
significant problems. First, only one out of the five
parties represented in parliament supports the president's
strategy. The opposition Party of Regions is boycotting the
commission and the Tymoshenko Bloc is merely attending but
not participating in its deliberations. Second, in April the
constitutional court ruled that reforms have to be first
adopted by parliament before they can go to a referendum.
This disagreement has opened up barely contained fissures
in the ruling coalition between the Tymoshenko Bloc and the
pro-presidential Our Ukraine-People's Self Defence Union.
The two parties maintain a razor thin majority of just three
seats in parliament, holding 228 of the 450 available seats.
The president has long had ideological and personal
difficulties in working with Tymoshenko, whose government he
previously removed in September 2005.
In response, Tymoshenko has gone on the offensive, even
supporting a de facto alliance of convenience with her arch
enemy, the Party of Regions, in supporting a reduction in
presidential powers. The two factions, who command a
majority in parliament that can also draw on the support of
two other parties, will initiate constitutional reforms in
the current parliamentary session where they need a simple
majority to adopt a new parliamentary constitution.
For the government, an alliance of convenience between
the Tymoshenko Bloc and the Party of Regions is likely to
split Our Ukraine-People's Self Defence Union into
pro-Tymoshenko and pro-Yushchenko wings, putting the
sustainability of the Orange coalition in jeopardy. The
imposition of constitutional reform by Tymoshenko and the
Party of Regions is also likely to lead to pre-term
parliamentary (due in 2012) and presidential elections in
2009. In the presidential elections, Tymoshenko, with 30 to
40 per cent ratings in opinion polls, would be the most
likely candidate to win, assuming she decided to run instead
of retaining an enhanced prime minister's position.
Foreign and security policy
The political-constitutional crisis is now likely to last
for much of the remaining year and will negatively affect
Ukraine's drive to join NATO and deepen its co-operation
with the EU. At NATO's April summit in Bucharest, despite
strong support from the US, Kiev was not offered a
Membership Action Plan (MAP) and had to make do with a
promise that it would eventually join NATO, albeit with no
formal timetable, and that its progress towards a MAP will
be reviewed in December 2008.
As Western diplomats have pointed out to Jane's , what 'progress'
will exactly constitute remains both contentious and unclear.
Western European states are putting forward very stringent
criteria for progress towards a MAP for Ukraine and Georgia.
Constitutional instability in Ukraine will provide
additional arguments for Western Europe to continue to claim
that the country is not ready for entry into a MAP. The
German Ambassador to Ukraine has emphasised stability as a
key marker of progress against which Ukraine will be judged.
Domestic instability in Ukraine will also give the EU
grounds for not acceding to Kiev's main demands during
negotiations for a new agreement to replace the 1997 to 2006
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. This 'enhanced
agreement' is likely to give Ukraine a higher status than
that accorded under the 2005-2007 European Neighbourhood
Policy. Brussels remains adamant that it cannot recognise
Ukraine's membership aspirations, as Kiev demands.
The Orange coalition is likely to become increasingly
fractured as Tymoshenko seeks a constitutional realignment
favouring parliament. This is likely to lead to the
sidelining of President Yushchenko whose aspirations for
re-election will face a serious challenge. Although these
developments do not bode well for Ukraine's political
stability and hopes of Western integration over the coming
year, in the longer term, such constitutional reform could
begin to help solve the fundamental weaknesses at the heart
of Ukrainian politics and perhaps allow the development of
more mature institutions.
Tymoshenko og Jusjtjenko konkurrerer om magten i Kiev (eng.)
May 15 2008
Zenon Zawada, Kyiv Post Chief Editor
Unless a last-minute political breakthrough is reached by Ukraine’s
pro-Western forces, led by the Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko, they are on the cusp of suffering a
humiliating defeat in the May 25 election for Kyiv’s
[ ... ]
An unprecedented event happened today, when the
parliamentary majority, responsible for the Ukrainian
parliament's work, began blocking it, a visibly stunned
Yushchenko said afterwards.
What will be more embarrassing is oncoming mayoral
election debacle. It was the Tymoshenko-led pro-Western
forces themselves which voted to call the pre-term
mayoral election in the first place, in order to unseat
Leonid Chernovetskiy, who stands accused, but not
convicted, of rampant corruption during his two years as
Regardless, Chernovetskiy is on his way to victory,
and the lack of unity among Ukraine's pro-Western forces
is to blame. President Viktor Yushchenko is engaged in
an all-out war with Tymoshenko, who is threatening their
[ ... ]
Three basic conclusions can already be drawn.
1. More than three years after the Orange Revolution,
Ukraine's proWestern forces have failed to convince a
definitive majority of Ukrainians they offer a better
vision for the nation. Chernovetskiy, the ultimate
pragmatist with few political principles, has mustered
far more support among Kyiv residents than any of the
other proWestern candidates competing. Meanwhile, polls
reveal the Russianoriented Party of the Regions of
Ukraine, and Viktor Yanukovych, remain just as popular
as the Tymoshenko Bloc.
2. The mayoral election campaign has further damaged
the Orange forces' credibility. In supporting
Chernovetskiy, a politician reviled by Kyiv's
intellectuals and middle class, by threatening to veto a
second round, Yushchenko has once again demonstrated,
barring any breakthroughs, that he is more interested in
keeping power and manipulating the levers of government
than unseating an incumbent widely accused of corruption,
particularly in allegedly misappropriating government
funds and improperly redistributing thousands of
hectares of land, allegedly worth hundreds of millions
of dollars, as political tribute. Meanwhile, Tymoshenko
could suffer her first big defeat that threatens to be
the first major blow to her popularity.
3. Ukraine's proWestern forces face their biggest
crisis yet. Revealing their hubris in hastily launching
preterm elections, their failure will only reinforce
Chernovetskiy's grip on the Kyiv City Administration and
bolster his authority. While that may serve Yushchenko's
shortterm goals as president, it doesn't help his Our
UkrainePeople's SelfDefense bloc, which is likely to
collapse after he likely loses the presidential election
of 2010. In fact, both of Ukraine's leading proWestern
forces, the Tymoshenko and Our UkrainePeople's
SelfDefense blocs, hinge entirely on their leaders ¨C
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. Either bloc would
disintegrate if either personality failed in politics.
How tragic it is that two forces so dependent on each
other are causing each other¡'s demise.
7And the Russians didn't even need to lift a finger!
Yushchenko will be marginalized by constitutional and
political instability in Ukraine
May 15, 2008
e-POSHTA May 20, 2008 / e-POSHTA 20 travnia 2008
The three holiday breaks (Easter, May Day and World
War II Victory Day) gave only a short respite before the
two main figures in Ukrainian politics, President Viktor
Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, resumed
their fight to the bitter end. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko
are ostensibly members of the same democratic (i.e.
"Orange") coalition established after the September 2007
pre-term elections. The conflict within the "Orange"
camp was evident on May 13, when the Tymoshenko bloc
blockaded parliament to protest what it described as
"sabotage" of government policies. It prevented the
president from giving his annual address, which was
unprecedented in Ukraine's 17 years of independence.
The center of the conflict is the head of the
presidential secretariat Viktor Baloha, little known
until the 2002 elections except in his home border
region of Trans-Carpathia. The majority of Western
embassies, a large share of Ukrainian politicians (even
from Our Ukraine-Peoples Self Defense [NU-NS] and the
opposition Party of Regions), think tanks, journalists
and the public are united in their view that Baloha's
strident antagonism to Tymoshenko does more harm than
good to the president and to the NU-NS, of which Baloha
is honorary chairman. Most observers of Ukrainian
politics cannot understand how the president can let his
chief of staff make daily denunciations and demands to
its government, without a moral or constitutional basis
on which to do so. Yushchenko appears oblivious to the
negative effect this has on his own and the NU-NS's
A May poll found that for the first time the hero of
the Orange Revolution had higher negative approval
ratings than positive. Only 13 percent trust Yushchenko,
while 26.5 percent distrust him (the respective figures
are 30 and 26 percent for Tymoshenko and 24 and 26
percent for Viktor Yanukovych). The same poll found that
the Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT) continues to have greater
support (25 percent) than the Party of Regions (23
percent) with NU-NS support collapsing from 14 percent
in the 2007 elections to 5.4 percent (See EDM March 20).
In a May 6 statement Baloha continued to lambaste the
government's policies. The major bone of contention
remains privatization, but the roles have been reversed
since the 2005 Tymoshenko government.
As Yushchenko and Baloha repeatedly stress, they do
not agree that a portion of the proceeds from
privatization should continue going toward the repayment
of lost or stolen Soviet bank savings, the first tranche
of which was paid in January. Baloha complained that the
costs from the privatization of the Odessa Port
Terminal, which the president is repeatedly attempting
to halt, should go toward economic growth and societal
needs and not for a "one-off PR ploy" for Tymoshenko.
The repayment of Soviet era savings lost in Russia's
nationalization of Soviet banking assets in 1991 and
Ukraine's 1993 hyperinflation has become hostage to the
January 2010 presidential elections. President
Yushchenko is threatened by Tymoshenko's high ratings,
one reason for which is the popularity she has gained
from fulfilling her 2007 electoral pledge to repay the
The repeated non-fulfillment of election promises has
had a negative impact on both Yushchenko's and the
NU-NS's ratings. Yushchenko's 2004 election program
supported the government's repayment of savings. If
elected, Yushchenko promised to "make the oligarchs
really pay all their taxes. I am against a re-division
of property, but oligarchs will be made to pay a real
price for the enterprises that they have grabbed during
privatization (prykhvatizatsiya grab-ization)
practically for nothing and the billions of hryvni from
this will go toward repaying the stolen savings of
The continuing attacks by Yushchenko and Baloha on
Tymoshenko have also had four important ramifications.
First, they have continued to demonstrate that
Yushchenko does not comply with the rule of law. This
was exemplified by his legally questionable April 2,
2007, decree disbanding parliament. A wide variety of
commentaries have pointed to the lack of
constitutionality for the majority of the president's
interferences in the work of Tymoshenko's government.
The president, let alone a state bureaucrat who heads
his secretariat, has no legal right, for example, to
intervene in economic affairs and privatization. BYuT
Deputy Mykola Tomenko wondered on what grounds the
secretariat "teaches the Ukrainian people and government
how to work."
Second, the attacks and rivalry have eroded the
president's support to such an extent that nearly all
commentators agree that Yushchenko cannot be elected to
a second term. His ferociously anti-Tymoshenko stance
immediately following her confirmation as prime minister
on December 18 of last year lost Yushchenko the
opportunity to align himself with her electoral prowess
and popularity to win a second term as an Orange
president while she would remain prime minister.
Third, the attacks have pushed Tymoshenko and BYuT
beyond tolerating interference and unrelenting criticism
on a greater scale than from even the opposition's
The situation came to a head in mid April in a week
that witnessed an anti-Tymoshenko pamphlet distributed
at a meeting between the president and governors,
Tymoshenko's speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, Yushchenko's two-hour diatribe
against alleged corruption in the Tymoshenko government,
threats by the presidential secretariat to launch
criminal proceedings against the government and a harsh
BYuT parliamentary response.
The outcome was again not to the president's
advantage. Ukraine's most pro-presidential political
force, the BYuT, which was the only faction to vote
against constitutional reforms on December 8, 2004, is
today in the vanguard in drawing up a parliamentary
constitution that severely reduces presidential powers.
The Party of Regions, which feared a Tymoshenko victory
under the 2006 constitution, cannot believe what luck it
now has in finding in the BYuT an unlikely ally in
parliament. Yushchenko's Constitutional Council, which
he hoped would bring in constitutional reforms that
would give him back powers, is for all purposes dead in
Finally, Yushchenko's unwillingness to abide by the
2006 constitution that he himself negotiated in December
2004 has led to two near-violent incidents. In May 2007
and April 2008 the president illegally ordered the
presidential guard to take control of the offices of the
prosecutor-general and the State Property Fund.
Government buildings are supposed to be protected by
Interior Ministry's Special Forces, not the presidential
The two months leading to the summer recess are
likely to determine Yushchenko's fate. If a new
constitutional process is set in motion in parliament,
next year will see pre-term parliamentary and
presidential elections, in which Yushchenko is likely to
be eclipsed from Ukrainian politics (Ukrayinska Pravda,
April 24-May 7,
www.president.gov.ua May 5, byut.com.ua, April 14,
Viktor Yushchenko, Viriu v Ukrayinu, 2004).
'Orange' allies fight over economic policy
May 20 2008
The government decided
yesterday to postpone indefinitely privatizing
Odessa Portside Plant until divisions within the
coalition over economic policy are resolved.
SIGNIFICANCE: Divisions within the
coalition, after a two-month blockade of parliament
by the opposition, are undermining the effectiveness
of the government's economic reforms and struggle
ANALYSIS: The 2004 'Orange
Revolution' was fuelled by popular anger at the
ruling elite's abuse of office under former
President Leonid Kuchma. Battling corruption,
separating business and politics, and reforming and
upholding the rule of law are the three central
policies Ukrainian citizens expect of Viktor
Yushchenko's presidency, but there has been little
progress in all three.
Three factors bedevil separating business and
the big business presence within each group in
the Orange coalition;
different approaches from big business to their
relationship with politics; and
divisions within the coalition over how to deal
with Kuchma-era abuses.
Business backers. Most 'oligarchs' backed both
sides in the 2004 presidential election, Yushchenko
and Viktor Yanukovych -- although Rinat Akhmetov
plumped for Yanukovych. The Orange parties would not
have succeeded without the financial, media and
networking resources provided by their big business
backers. Petro Poroshenko and Andrei Derkach made
their two television channels available to
Former Kuchma allies have maintained positions of
power under Yushchenko. Since 2004, the Industrial
Union of Donbas (ISD) and the Dnipropetrovsk-based
Pryvat group have been openly aligned with the prime
minister's Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) and
Yushchenko's Our Ukraine (NU), respectively (see
UKRAINE: Pryvat-Yushchenko tie spoils anti-graft aim
- August 28, 2007).
Some ISD leaders, notably Serhii Taruta and
Vitalii Hayduk, have joined such state and
government institutions as the National Security and
Defence Council, the presidential secretariat and
the second Tymoshenko cabinet, but have not run for
Other businessmen have limited their connection
to providing financial, advisory and other resources
to a political party or the government, including
Ihor Kolomoisky of Pryvat, who funded the NU 2006
and 2007 election campaigns, and RosUkrEnergo (RUE)
co-owner Dmitro Firtash, who has financed both
Yushchenko and Yanukovych's Party of Regions.
By contrast, Akhmetov has been a Regions
parliamentary deputy since 2006.
Approaches to politics. Those of
Ukraine's oligarchs who are most opposed to
Tymoshenko's policies, such as Akhmetov and former
Naftohaz Ukrainy CEO Yuriy Boiko, see Regions as
defending them from 'political repression', and
hence opted to start running for election after the
Other oligarchs have either stayed out of
parliament, resigned or failed to get elected.
Interpipe CEO Viktor Pinchuk and TasGroup CEO Serhiy
Tyhipko have withdrawn from politics and did not run
for parliament last time. However, in March, Tyhipko
became joint head (with Tymoshenko) of the
government's Council of Investors. The
Dnipropetrovsk clan's Labour Party has disintegrated;
in April, its remnants merged with Regions. The
former Kiev clan's Social Democratic United Party
failed to enter parliament in 2006 and did not run
Orange divisions. On the Orange
side, there have been persistent and deep divisions
between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko over post-Kuchma
During the short-lived 2005 Tymoshenko government,
they clashed over reprivatisation, immunity for
Kuchma and whether to bring criminal charges against
senior officials and the organisers of the 2004
election fraud. Yushchenko opposed Boiko's arrest in
July 2005, for abuse of office at Naftohaz in
2002-04. He criticised Tymoshenko for not being
interested in privatisation and preferring wholesale
reprivatisation, which he opposed. The single
exception was Kryvorizhstal, which had been sold in
July 2004 for 800 million dollars to two Ukrainian
oligarchs, with foreign bids excluded. It was
reprivatised in October 2005, in Ukraine's only
transparent privatisation, to a foreign company
offering 4.8 billion dollars.
Following Tymoshenko's removal from office in
September 2005, Yushchenko signed a memorandum with
Yanukovych, to secure Regions' backing for Yuriy
Yekhanurov as prime minister. It included an amnesty
for election fraud and immunity for local
Warm relations between Ukraine's business elite
and the Yekhanurov government emerged in an October
2005 meeting, at which Yushchenko offered
cooperative relations and an end to reprivatisations,
in exchange for a vague promise from the oligarchs
to separate business and politics, pay taxes and
move economic activity out of the shadow economy and
into the legal sphere. These agreements were
reiterated at two subsequent presidential-business
elite meetings in 2006 and 2007.
In 2004, Yushchenko's election campaign included
the pledge to charge oligarchs a one-off surcharge
(as an alternative to reprivatisation) to make up
the difference between the knock-down prices of
enterprises privatised under Kuchma, and the 'market'
price, but this was later forgotten. The surcharge
was to have been used to pay back depositors in the
Savings Bank (Oshadbank) who lost their savings in
the 1993 hyperinflation, a policy that he now
opposes. Georgia successfully introduced an oligarch
surcharge policy following the'Rose Revolution'.
Since the 2007 elections, Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko have continued to clash over business
Privatisation. The government's
privatisation programme for 2008 (see UKRAINE:
Privatisation promises to be large scale - March 17,
2008) includes 400 state-owned enterprises and is to
bring 8.6 billion hryvnia (1.8 billion dollars) in
budget revenue. Some was to be used to begin
repaying the Oshadbank depositors, the first tranche
being paid in January. In a reversal of 2005,
Yushchenko now blocks Tymoshenko's privatisation
programme. He uses socialist language to declare
sectors of the economy central to 'national security'
and so excluded from privatisation. The
privatisation programme has been suspended by
presidential decree, and he has prevented Tymoshenko
from replacing the Socialist head of the State
Savings. Privatisation has
become hostage to the use of privatisation receipts
to repay Oshadbank savers, a policy that has boosted
Tymoshenko's popularity. Yushchenko's national
security arguments are a pretext -- in 2007,
Yushchenko supported privatising the Odessa Portside
Plant (OPP), but his aim now is to stop
privatisation revenues going into the budget. OPP
was to have been privatised this week, but this was
postponed after Yushchenko issued instructions to
the prosecutorgeneral and Security Service to launch
criminal proceedings against Tymoshenko government
Gas. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko
have been at odds since 2005 over corruption in the
energy sector. Tymoshenko has opposed the use of
non-transparent intermediaries, such as RUE, while
Yushchenko supported them during the 2005-06
Yekhanurov government and in the recent gas
negotiations with Russia.
Energy exploration. The
government recently cancelled an exploration licence
that was awarded last October to Houstonbased Vanco
in October 2007 by the outgoing Yanukovych
government. Vanco has a small annual turnover of 7.5
million dollars, and unexpectedly beat the larger
Shell-ExxonMobil joint bid. Tymoshenko has accused
Yushchenko of betraying national interests in
agreeing to the Vanco contract, exercising his
presidential prerogative over energy and Ukraine's
continental shelf. Akhmetov's Donbas Fuel-Energy
Company is a Vanco partner.
CONCLUSION: The central demand
of the Orange Revolution for the separation of
business from politics has not been pursued by the
Yushchenko administration. Different attitudes to
this issue and macroeconomic policy generally are
again dividing and' undermining the Orange coalition,
and may lead to a second Tymoshenko exit from
government and her irreversible break with
Kiev [Kyiv] and Moscow in dispute over naval port
"There's one," says Gennady Basov, pointing to a
Russian flag on a car aerial in the Black Sea naval
port of Sevastopol. "There's another, and another."
It could be a children's game. But Mr Basov is 37
and has an entirely adult agenda – he is a
pro-Russia activist promoting a Russian sense of
identity in a city that Moscow lost to Ukraine with
the collapse of the Soviet Union.
He says: "Sevastopol really belongs to Russia, not
Ukraine. Documents prove it."
To many Ukrainians, Mr Basov's comments are highly
inflammatory. But in Sevastopol itself, with its
large ethnic Russian population and historic ties
with Moscow, these are mainstream views.
The city of 340,000 has become the latest focus of
tensions between Ukraine and Russia. Kiev this month
banned Yuri Luzhkov, Moscow's mayor and a strong
supporter of Russian claims to Sevastopol, over a
speech he made in the city.
Moscow responded by prohibiting Yevhen Korniychuk,
Ukraine's first deputy justice minister, from
travelling to Russia after he proposed a ban on
Vladimir Putin, the Russian prime minister, for
suggesting Ukraine was "not a proper country".
The war of words has escalated since Ukraine this
year announced its bid for a Nato membership action
plan, a formal step to joining the alliance. Nato
rejected the application but has promised to
reconsider later this year. Viktor Yushchenko,
Ukraine's pro-west president, has pledged to keep
banging on the door.
Moscow opposes Nato enlargement and is determined to
stop Kiev's accession because of the deep links
between Russia and Ukraine. It is flexing its
muscles in the ex-Soviet Union by supporting
Russia-oriented regions and populations in
neighbouring states, notably in breakaway Abkhazia
With 60 per cent of Crimea's 2m population ethnic
Russians, the entire region is of interest to Moscow.
Ukraine has accused Russian politicians of
interference, notably in relations between the
ethnic Russian majority and the 250,000-strong
Crimean Tartar minority, which is very loyal to
But Sevastopol matters most as it is home to the
Russian Black Sea fleet, which this month marked its
225th anniversary with rousing parades and rallies.
Under the agreements that split the Soviet Union,
the former Soviet Black Sea fleet was divided
between Russia and Ukraine, with Moscow securing the
lion's share and rights to remain in Sevastopol. In
1997, Kiev granted Moscow a 20-year lease on the
The Russian navy dominates the city, with scores of
ships moored in its harbours and an imposing
headquarters building on a promontory overlooking
Sevastopol bay. Russian naval buildings are
scattered across the city centre, including an
officers' club and a museum. Unlike many provincial
Russian and Ukrainian cities, central Sevastopol is
in good trim, the white-washed public buildings
standing proud against the blue waters and sky.
Russian officers stride about in full uniform;
off-duty, they drink in waterside bars.
Visiting Russian politicians gather large crowds.
Even in their absence, Mr Basov and his local
colleagues maintain the pressure with pro-Moscow
rallies staged in the central square named after
Admiral Pavel Nakhimov, a hero of the Crimean war.
Mr Luzhkov and other nationalist Russian politicians
say bluntly that all Crimea, including Sevastopol,
belongs to Moscow. They claim it was never historic
Ukrainian territory but was included in Ukraine only
in 1954, when Nikita Krushchev, the Soviet leader,
transferred Crimea from the Russian republic inside
the USSR to the Ukraine. In communist times, this
made little difference but it meant that with
Ukrainian independence in 1991, Crimea went to Kiev.
Mr Luzhkov's supporters further claim that
Sevastopol itself was not included in Khrushchev's
gift because, as a military city, it was ruled
directly from Moscow, even after 1954. Kiev counters
that Russia has acknowledged Ukraine's borders in
treaties since 1991 and explicitly recognised
Ukraine's ownership of Sevastopol, not least through
the 1997 lease.
Mr Putin has not publicly questioned Crimea or
Sevastopol's status. But he has said he wants the
fleet to stay after 2017 and he has implicitly
questioned Ukraine's sovereignty.
Mr Yushchenko, who generally keeps a low profile
over Sevastopol, this month proposed a draft law on
terminating the fleet agreement.
Mr Korniychuk, the banned Ukrainian official, says:
"It's very sad that relations between Russia and
Ukraine are deteriorating. We can settle the issues
between us. But now may not be the right time to
make these decisions."
Russian-Ukrainian relations reveal deeper problems
Volume 5 , Issue 115 (June 17, 2008)
By Taras Kuzio
President Viktor Yushchenko's first meeting with
newly elected Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
failed to resolve the outstanding issues between
Ukraine and Russia. Despite Yushchenko's optimism
that all of these issueswould be resolved, "the
negotiations taking everything into account
These issues cannot be easily dealt with, because
the growing range of problem areas between Ukraine
and Russia, Russia's assertive nationalism and the
divergent transition paths of both countries that
began during Vladimir Putin's first and Leonid
Kuchma's second terms in office and accelerated
following the 2004 Orange Revolution.
Eleven areas bedevil Ukrainian-Russian relations
showing a close interconnection between domestic and
First, energy. Ukraine has absorbed Russian gas
price increases from $50 to $179.50 per 1,000 cubic
meters over the last four years with a threat to
double this price in 2009. Nevertheless, annual
negotiations over gas contracts continue to be
over-shadowed by anger and accusations. The energy
sector continues to be very corrupt, and this factor
reduces the ability of Ukraine's elites to act in
unison toward Moscow. Ukraine has three strategic
advanatages over Russia: pipelines carrying 80
percent of Russian gas to Europe, storage facilities
and World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. The
Yushchenko-Yulia Tymoshenko rivalry and corruption
undermine Ukraine's leverages and leads to angry
exchanges inside Ukraine and between Russia and
Second, CIS. The orange administration has
continued and deepened Ukraine's lack of interest in
CIS integration, including the Single Economic
Space(SES). Yushchenko does not follow Kuchma's
rhetorical lip service to the CISSES and CIS
integration. Interest in the CIS is overshadowed by
are orientation toward a Deep Free Trade Area with
the EU. The Party of Regions proposes not CIS
integration but "neutrality" as an alternative to
Third, Ukrainian exiles in Russia. High-level
officials accused of abuse of office (Igor Bakaj,
Ruslan Bodelan) or involvement in Yushchenko's
poisoning (Volodymyr Satsiuk) continue to remain in
exile in Russia. Russia has a longrecord of
harboring fugitives sought by countries such as
Fourth, Russian oppositionists unable to work
freely in Russia are increasingly settling in
Ukraine or working from it. Exiled Russian oligarch
Boris Berezovskiy not only gave financial assistance
to the Orange Revolution but also financed the
transcribing of the Mykola Melnychenko tapes.
Russians were convinced the Orange Revolution was
part of a "Western conspiracy" and could never
believe that Ukrainians were capable of undertaking
a revolution without a "guiding hand."
Fifth, the nature of the two countries'
relationship. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship has
always been bedeviled by Russia's unwillingness to
treat Ukraine (like Belarus) as a partner rather
than a vassal. Russia's unwillingness to treat
Kuchma, elected in 1994 on a "pro-Russian platform,"
with due respect turned him into an ardent supporter
of NATO. Yushchenko's demand for a change in the
Russian-Ukrainian relationship to one between two
independent states is even more demanding than that
proposed by Kuchma. As seen by Putin's comments made
during the NATO-Russia Council at the Bucharest NATO
summit, Russia is unable to treat Ukraine as a
foreign, serious and coherent entity.
Sixth, borders. The 2003 territorial claim on the
island of Tuzla showed to what degree border issues
continue to remain unresolved. On June 3 the State
Duma voted to seek the abrogation of the 1997 treaty
if Ukraine got a NATO Membership Action Plan. The
resolution followed Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov's
Crimean visit when he re-opened the
Ukraine has always had a cross-party consensus on
protecting its territorial integrity, and Russia's
territorial demands merely push Ukraine toward NATO,
whether under Kuchma or Yushchenko. Senior Party of
Regions leader Andriy Kluyev warned, "Anti-Ukrainian
statements by Russian politicians...are
strategically very bad for the interests of both
states," because they pit both peoples against each
other and give ammunition to "anti-Russian forces in
Seventh, Black Sea Fleet. The Fleet pays a low
rent of $100 million per annum, its personnel take
part in anti-NATO and anti-American protests and the
Fleet illegally occupies numerous buildings (lighthouses)
and land that are commercially used. The lack of
respect for Ukraine is evidenced in recent naval
troop exercises conducted on Crimean land without
offering prior notification to the Ukrainian
authorities. Based on Russia's unwillingness to
withdraw from Moldova and Georgia and Russian
officials' statements, Ukraine's major concern is
whether the Fleet will withdraw from Sevastopol in
Eighth, Church and language. During the
Yushchenko-Medvedev meeting the Russian side raised
the perennial issues of alleged "discrimination"
against the Russian language in Ukraine and attempts
at uniting the Ukrainian Autocephalous and Russian
Ninth, NATO enlargement. Because of Russia's
unreformed world view and historically unchanged
attitude toward Ukraine, it is unable to discuss
Ukraine's drive to join NATO rationally but only in
emotional and hysterical terms, using words such as
"treason." Such language was evident during Putin's
speech to the NATO-Russia Council, where he
challenged Ukraine's territorial integrity and right
Tenth, frustration. Russia has long been
frustrated by its inability to influence domestic
affairs in Ukraine. Attempts to use energy pressure
have always failed, notably in January 2006, when
the entire West backed Ukraine in the gas dispute. A
February 2007 Ukrainian parliamentary vote to block
privatization of the gas pipelines (i.e. transfer
them to Russian or joint control) received 420 of
450 votes. Outside of Sevastopol Russian nationalist
parties have never been able to establish Ukrainian
bases of support.
Eleventh, history. Ukraine and Russia?s views of
Soviet and pre-Soviet history radically changed
under Kuchma, and this divergence has accelerated
under Yushchenko. Whereas Ukraine has moved to a
Ukrainian national historiography, Russia has
maintained a Soviet Russophile interpretation of
history. School textbooks in both countries give
radically different perspectives on every aspect of
Russian-Ukrainian history over the last two
Yushchenko's campaign to obtain domestic and
international recognition of the 1933 artificial
famine as an act of "genocide," as seen during his
May 25 to 28 visit to Canada, has been heavily
criticized by Russia's President,Foreign Ministry
and State Duma. A continuing exhibition in Kyiv of
photographs from KGB files of the Ukrainian
Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought Nazi and Soviet
forces from 1942 to 1952, was countered by an
anti-UPA exhibition in Russia and threats by Russian
nationalists to attack the Kyiv exhibition. Russian
nationalists destroyed a famine exhibition in Moscow
In Kyiv there is a consensus among the elite and
public alike that relations between Ukraine and
Russia will likely continue to deteriorate.
(ZerkaloNedeli, June 7-13;
Ukrayinska Pravda, May 26-June 10).
Moscow ready for major confrontations with
By Pavel Felgenhauer
June 19, 2008
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili (L) and
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (R) In the past
Russia strongly protested the expansion of NATO to
include Central European states that were Soviet
clients and former Warsaw Pact members during the
Cold War, as well as the Baltic republics that were
part of the Soviet Union. In the end, however,
Russia backed down and accepted the inevitable
shrinking of its effective sphere of influence. Now
the rulers in Moscow seem to be ready for a major
confrontation that includes the threat of military
force against the pro-Western governments in Georgia
and Ukraine, which aspire to join the alliance.
After a recent meeting between Russian and
Georgian Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Mikhail
Saakashvili in St. Petersburg, Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov told journalists, "We told the
Georgians that their desire to join NATO will not
help solve the problems of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia; it will lead to renewed bloodshed" (RIA-Novosti,
June 6). Later Lavrov added in a radio interview, "We
will do anything not to allow Georgia and Ukraine to
join NATO" (Ekho Moskvy, April 8).
Speaking last week in Sevastopol in Crimea, the
main base of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, Russian
Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov warned Ukraine
that joining NATO would have serious consequences:
"A complete disruption of military-industrial ties
between Russia and Ukraine is inevitable, as well as
the reduction of other trade and economic ties and
an introduction of a visa regime." Ivanov implied
that NATO would "force Ukraine to introduce a visa
regime." Ivanov added, "More than 30 million
Russians live outside Russia, and we are morally
responsible for them" (RIA-Novosti, June 14).
Russian officials connect the possible future
Ukrainian NATO membership with the fate of the Black
Sea Fleet. Ivanov announced, "It is hard to imagine
the Russian Black Sea Fleet without its main base;
the fate of Sevastopol matters for all those who
lived in the Soviet Union, it is our city."
Ukraine's call for the withdrawal of the fleet from
Crimea was perilous, because "it is dangerous to
play not only with fire but also with history" (Itar-Tass,
Ivanov's rhetoric matches other recent official
statements. Russia's permanent representative to
NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, said in a TV interview: "The
Black Sea Fleet simply does not have any other home;
no Russian politician will agree for the fleet to
leave Sevastopol, and this will not happen" (Vesti
TV June 12). A rejection of Ukraine's NATO accession
or the possible future withdrawal of the Russian
fleet from Crimea after 2017, when the present lease
of the Sevastopol base expires, are today part of
Russia's official foreign policy. Western assurances
that Sevastopol will not be used as a NATO naval
base after the Russians withdraw are not taken
seriously. But there is a lot of time till 2017 and
the Ukrainian NATO accession may not be swift, since
today the majority of Ukrainians are against NATO
membership and the government in Kyiv has promised a
national referendum to decide on membership (RIA-Novosti,
Russia does not at present have the
infrastructure on its own Black Sea coast to house
the Black Sea Fleet, and building the needed
facilities will require lots of time and money. What
is worse, Russia does not have adequate military
shipbuilding or ship-maintenance facilities on the
Black Sea to keep a large fleet. The flagship of the
Black Sea Fleet, the cruiser Moskva, has been
repaired and modernized in Mykolaiv in Ukraine at a
naval shipyard where in Soviet times all the
aircraft carriers were built. Russia has managed to
build several relatively small naval ships since
1991 (frigates and coastal patrol boats) in St.
Petersburg and Kaliningrad, but not enough to
replace its rapidly aging navy. Without access to
the Mykolaiv yard, there may not be much fleet left
to withdraw from Sevastopol (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye
Obozreniye, June 12).
At present Moscow is using threats that
Ukrainians will suffer if their nation joins NATO or
if the Russian fleet is ousted from Sevastopol. At
the same time, Russia has been supporting
pro-Russian separatist feelings in Crimea and making
territorial claims on Sevastopol. Moscow needs a
pro-Moscow allied government in Kyiv or, if that is
impossible, a separation of Crimea and Eastern and
Southern Ukraine (with Mykolaiv), where millions of
Russian speakers may either want to join Russia or
form an allied protectorate.
The situation is different in Georgia, where a
vast majority voted to join NATO in a referendum on
January 5. There is no hope in Moscow that any
anti-NATO pro-Russian forces may come to power in
Tbilisi, and military action in support of
separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is being
seriously contemplated (see EDM, June 12). The
Russian Foreign Ministry has officially announced
that Moscow refuses to discuss with Tbilisi the
legality of the deployment of additional troops and
armaments in Abkhazia, because the troops "prevented
a Georgian blitzkrieg" (www.mid.ru, June 17). When
substantial talks are essentially stopped while
additional troops are deployed, it's more than just
a threat of the use of force.
High level NATO delegation in outreach visit to
June 23, 2008
By Vladimir Socor
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
headed a delegation of the North Atlantic Council
(NAC), the alliance's standing decision-making body
in Brussels, comprising the 26 member countries'
ambassadors, on a visit to Ukraine on June 16 and
17. The visit was the first high-level NATO-Ukraine
consultation since NATO 's Bucharest summit in
April, where the alliance postponed a decision on
Ukraine's application for a membership action plan (MAP)
pending further high-level meetings.
This visit revitalized the "Intensified Dialogue
on Ukraine's aspirations to membership and
relevant reforms," a process launched in 2005 by
NATO and Ukraine. This year's NAC visit was,
however, the first since 2005, a hiatus
reflecting the Ukrainian political forces'
immersion in factional struggles to the
detriment of national strategic priorities.
meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) in
the ambassadorial 26 + 1 format discussed recent
and planned steps to advance cooperation, which
should strengthen the case for a Ukrainian MAP.
With Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Minister
Volodymyr Ohryzko and Defense Minister Yuriy
Yekhanurov, the Commission took stock of
Ukraine's important contributions of airlift
capabilities to allied missions and significant
participation in the NATO-led Kosovo Force, as
well as token contributions to Operation Active
Endeavor in the Mediterranean and NATO Training
Mission Iraq. The Ukrainian side confirmed its
recently expressed willingness to participate in
the British-French Helicopter Initiative and in
the alliance's Air Situation Data Exchange.
Furthermore, Ukraine now offered to
participate in the NATO Response Force as the
first partner country to do so and also to
facilitate land transit through Ukraine for the
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
in Afghanistan (ISAF). The allies also welcomed
Kyiv's consideration of the possibility of
deploying additional personnel to ISAF. A
meeting of the NUC at the defense ministers'
level on June 13 had prepared the groundwork for
political decisions on these issues (NUC
communiqu?, June 17).
These issues are additional to the
NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plans for security
and defense sectors reforms, which aim at
gradual downsizing and modernization amid severe
The allied delegation encouraged Ukraine to
finance properly the 2008-2011 State Program to
Inform Ukrainian Society about the alliance and
about the government's own MAP aspirations.
Previous programs to educate the Ukrainian
public about NATO have suffered from financial
and political neglect.
Speaking at Kyiv's Mohyla Academy and in a
discussion organized by the Open Ukraine
Foundation and Pinchuk Art Center, de Hoop
Scheffer signaled in strongest terms that Russia
was not entitled to influence decisions on a
Ukrainian MAP or ultimate membership in the
alliance: "It is crystal clear that any policy
course Ukraine might wish to follow is strictly
a sovereign decision by the Ukrainian government
and finally the Ukrainian people." By the same
token, "Decision-making in NATO is by the 26
allies and by them only. Any decision regarding
Ukraine's application would not be subject to
the influence of third countries." De Hoop
Scheffer also "debunked the myths" that
Ukrainian membership in the alliance would
involve NATO bases on Ukrainian territory or
Ukrainian soldiers being forced to participate
in allied operations (NATO press release, June
President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko each held talks and
press briefings with de Hoop Scheffer in Kyiv.
On that occasion and in a follow-up speech in
Vynnytsya two days later, Yushchenko linked NATO
membership aspirations with the most basic
security of statehood: "We want to see Ukraine
politically independent and its territory whole."
"To preserve Ukraine permanently, it should be a
member of the common security system. It is
incumbent on our generation to ensure that
Ukraine remains sovereign and independent" (Interfax-Ukraine,
June 16, 19). For her part, Tymoshenko
de-dramatized the internal Ukrainian debate on
this issue by citing Party of Regions leader
Viktor Yanukovych's earlier endorsement of
Ukrainian membership in NATO. Tymoshenko
displayed a book published in 2004 in which
Yanukovych, prime minister at that time,
apparently envisaged Ukraine joining NATO by
2008 (Interfax-Ukraine, June 16).
On the second day of the visit, NATO
ambassadors fanned out in groups to three
regions of Ukraine for information and outreach
events. In the eastern cities of Dnipropetrovsk
and Kharkiv they were met, as on the first day
in Kyiv, by fringe protest groups from the
Communist and Progressive Socialist parties. The
Party of Regions did not seem to be involved.
The envoys merely commented that the freedom to
protest was a sign of democracy in Ukraine (Channel
Five TV, June 17).
NATO will next evaluate Ukraine's MAP
application at ministerial meetings in December
and early 2009, leading up to the alliance's
April 2009 summit. Ukraine and supportive
countries will have to work around four distinct
challenges: lack of enthusiasm among Ukraine's
populace (and opposition in some sensitive areas),
politicians' involvement in seemingly permanent
electioneering, Russian threats of reprisals
against the Ukrainian state, and indirect
Russian influence in certain European capitals,
potentially distorting NATO debates and
Tymoshenko ønsker folkeafstemning om
Ruslands premierminister Vladimir Putin støtter
den ukrainske premierminister Julia Tymoshenkos
holdning om, at et ukrainsk medlemskab af NATO kun
er mulig efter en folkeafstemning.
På en pressekonference i Moskva blev Tymoshenko
spurgt om, hvad der drev hende til at underskrive et
brev til NATO, hvori hun var med til at anmode NATO
om at tildele Ukraine en Membership Action plan.
Tymoshenko svarede, at et medlemskab af NATO kun
er muligt efter en folkeafstemning.
"Hvad NATO-medlemskab angår, så kan jeg sige med
sikkerhed, at det ukrainske folks holdning er
afgørende, og et hvilken som helst skridt i denne
retning vil kun ske efter en folkeafstemning", sagde
Hun understregede, at regeringen og hende som leder
af sit politiske parti er garanter for dette.
"Det vil jeg ikke kommentere, men det er den
eneste rigtige måde at løse problemet på", sagde
"Ingen nye trusler vil løse denne udvidelse, men
tværtimod kun styrke skillelinjerne", tilføjede den
Han understregede, at såfremt Ukraine træder ind
i NATO, vil landets militærindustrielle kompleks
miste konkurrenceevnen, og Rusland derfor vil være
nødt til at flytte de ordrer, som landet i dag har
placeret i Ukraine. UP.