A key sore point is the involvement of middleman companies in the gas trade between the two countries -- RosUkrEnergo, half-owned by Gazprom; and UkrGazEnergo, owned by RosUkrEnergo and Ukraine's state gas company, Nafothaz.

Ukraine's prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, has been campaigning for the elimination of what she says is an opaque mechanism to embezzle vast fortunes at the expense of Ukrainian consumers.

Moscow has consistently demurred, a stance widely seen as dictated by a small group of elites profiting directly from the scheme. Roman Kupchinsky, an RFE/RL energy analyst, says Moscow could also be using the intermediaries as a bargaining chip with Ukraine.

"The intermediaries are not in Russia's interest either, as a country. Russia loses taxes because of intermediaries, it gives away money for no good reason to intermediaries, and it doesn't really fulfill any role," Kupchinsky says, adding that there must be a reason why Russia insists on the intermediaries.

"Gazprom wants to get into the Ukrainian domestic market, it wants 50 percent of the market," Kupchinsky notes. But he says that "Ukrainians won't allow that," because it would bankrupt their own Naftohaz.

Playing Politics

Gazprom has spared no effort to convince the world that its recurrent gas standoffs with Kyiv are purely economic. In reality, few doubt they have strong political overtones.

The latest dispute dealt a blow to the already fragile coalition between President Viktor Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, who both rose to power in the 2005 Orange Revolution after reversing the presidential victory of Moscow's anointed candidate.

[ ... ]

The row has also prompted fresh charges that Moscow is using its vast energy resources as a political weapon. Federico Bordonaro, a Rome-based analyst with the "Power And Interest News Report," an independent organization studying international relations, says: "Gazprom's moves are not entirely due to business problems. I think Gazprom is striking back at Europe, firstly because Europe recognized Kosovo's independence without listening to Russia's concerns, and secondly because Ukraine is heading toward NATO integration."
 

[ ... ]

Bordonaro says the bad blood between Moscow and Kyiv is pushing Europe to seek alternative energy routes. This includes efforts to breathe new life into the Nabucco project, a pipeline that would bypass Russia by pumping gas from the Caspian and Central Asian regions to Europe via Turkey and the Balkans.

Complete article: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/3/e080d871-0236-4baf-b4d1-7e89f9c87160.html 

14.03.08. Ukrainian parliament unblocked, NATO dispute off agenda

http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372878
March 12, 2008

By Pavel Korduban

The opposition Party of Regions (PRU) of former prime minister Viktor Yanukovych has finally backed off its brinksmanship games over Ukraine’s application for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). The PRU and their allies, the Communists, had blocked the parliamentary rostrum since the end of January, protesting against a letter in which President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and Parliamentary Speaker Arseny Yatsenyuk asked NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to give the green light to Ukraine joining MAP. The PRU returned to the session hall on March 6, realizing that Yushchenko would consider dissolving parliament. The Ukrainian parliament is now back to normal operations.

The opposition had demanded that Yatsenyuk recall his signature from the MAP letter, arguing that parliament did not authorize him to sign it, and that parliament should set the date for a NATO membership referendum (see EDM, February 14). As support for membership in the Alliance has hardly ever been higher than 25%, the opposition believed that a referendum would postpone the membership issue indefinitely. The blockade of parliament suspended the process of forming Tymoshenko’s cabinet, and an early election could even threaten the prospect of WTO entry for Ukraine this year.

The coalition of Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense (NUNS) and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) did not bow to pressure. They declared their readiness for a dissolution of parliament and another early election, despite the fact that Yushchenko dissolved the previous parliament less than a year ago. Yanukovych increased pressure on the coalition, threatening to take his followers to launch popular protests against NATO membership.

The constitution allows the president to dissolve parliament if it fails to assemble for 30 days. Yushchenko said on February 27 that he was not ready to dissolve the assembly, although he admitted that he might eventually do so. Yanukovych responded to that message on March 4, saying that if the opposition’s demands on NATO were not met, the PRU “will address the Ukrainian people and start mass protests.”

This was followed within hours by a warning from National Security and Defense Council Secretary Raisa Bohatyryova, who is ironically still formally a member of the PRU, that Yushchenko might launch the process of parliamentary dissolution if the lawmakers did not resume working within “the next couple of days.” Bohatyryova accused both the coalition and the opposition of disrupting parliament’s work, and she warned against giving ultimatums to the president.

This warning worked. On March 6, all parliamentary caucuses but the Communists agreed to resume normal work. The agreement that they reached read more like an act of capitulation by the PRU, rather than a compromise solution, as Vladyslav Kaskiv, one of the leaders of NUNS, noted. The PRU withdrew its demands regarding the MAP letter and for a resolution saying that “a decision on an international agreement on Ukraine joining NATO shall be taken only as a result of a national referendum,” was passed by 248 votes in the 450-seat body.

Both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko had asserted earlier that Ukraine would join NATO only after a referendum. Yushchenko accepted this PRU demand in 2006, when he signed the National Unit Declaration (Universal in Ukrainian), and Tymoshenko has never been against a referendum. Thus the PRU did not achieve anything by disrupting parliament’s work for more than a month, but its relations with its main partner in parliament, the Communists, worsened, as the Communists did not accept the March 6 resolution and were not against another early election.

Although all of the three major parties – the PRU, NUNS, and BYuT – in February declared readiness for an early election, none of them really wanted it. BYuT is satisfied with its current status as senior coalition partner. The NUNS bloc, weakened by an internal dispute that culminated in an exodus of several influential members from the bloc’s main party, Our Ukraine, including Yushchenko’s main aide Viktor Baloha (see EDM, February 20), was probably the least ready for an election. The PRU is not in the best shape either: public opinion polls show that it is currently less popular than BYuT, and the March 1 congress of deputies in Severodonetsk confirmed that several influential PRU members do not support Yanukovych’s line (see EDM, March 5).

A “Protocol of Understanding” released by parliament’s press service on March 6, stipulated that parliament would shortly consider a new bill on the Cabinet of Ministers, bills for completing WTO entry, and bills limiting deputy immunity from prosecution, it will also discuss an action plan for the Tymoshenko cabinet. Parliament on March 7 voted against including the deputy immunity bill on the agenda, although during last year’s early election campaign canceling deputy immunity was one of the main promises of most of the parties now represented in parliament.

(Interfax-Ukraine, February 27, March 4, 6; UNIAN, Channel 5, March 6, www.rada.gov.ua, March 6, 7)

14.03.08. Ukraine, Gazprom reach agreement on 2008 gas deliveries

Mr. Dubyna became Yulia Tymoshenko's successor in 2001, right after she had been forced to resign from her post as a Vice Prime Minister in Viktor Yushchenko's government.
 

The newcomer was personally introduced into big Ukrainian politics by Leonid Kuchma, who was impressed with Mr. Dubyna's results achieved at KGMK (Mining and Metallurgy Kombinat) Kryvorizhstal JSC: back in that time the enterprise produced its first major revenue. Mr. Kuchma once stated in his interview with “Vyluchne Telebachennya” (“Street Television”) that he would place Mr. Dubyna “under his personal protection” and referred to him as an example to others.
 

In the mid 90's Mr. Dubyna used to work at the Dzerzhysnky metallurgical complex. This is where he first became acquainted with Viktor Pinchuk and could not come to an understanding with Ihor Kolomoysky and his partner Vadym Shulman. And there, at the complex, according to some sources, Mr. Dubyna was once attacked with a knife, but was lucky not to receive any serious injuries.
 

The President's future son-in-law took Mr. Dubyna to Alchevsk metallurgical complex, where the situation was indeed grave. Mr. Dubyna was literally accompanied by armed security personnel.
 

He was later transferred to the management of Kryvorizhstal JSC, the leader of Ukrainian metallurgy, and managed to succeed in overcoming the crisis owing to, as they say, a “strict financial discipline”. As a matter of fact, Kryvorizhstal JSC simply avoided paying off many creditors' debts.
 

Mr. Dubyna enjoyed the support of Leonid Kuchma and from time to time, still being a director of the metallurgical complex, was called to breakfast with him. Perhaps, back then the ex-President saw his younger self 20 years ago in the red-haired manager.
 

In 2000 there was an incident with the participation of Mr. Dubyna and Slovyansky bank, which later fell first victim of the abolishment of the future coalition financial backing.
 

Slovyansky bank had been financing Kryvorizhstal JSC long before Mr. Dubyna's appearance, and the bank had managed to return the loans before the new director was appointed. Having settled at the enterprise, Mr. Dubyna demanded that all the agreements be cancelled. On being refused, he gave a warning: “Then I will let the Father know”.
 

Yes, “Father” must have probably thought for the first time that Ukraine did not need such a bank as Slovyansky.
 

In winter 2001 Mr. Kuchma visited Kryvorizhstal JSC, where Oleh Dubyna managed to strengthen the ex-President's confidence in the efficiency of the enterprise management. Mr. Kuchma, who was already involved in Gongadze case back in that time, was also to face a public demonstration, initiated by the enterprise workers.
 

Being deeply moved by such an order at the enterprise, Mr. Kuchma stated that he personally removed Kryvorizhstal JSC from the privatization list. A couple of years later Leonid Danylovych understood that Kryvorizhstal JSC was destined to collapse and eventually fall into oblivion without the financial backing of such investors as Viktor Pinchuk and Rinat Akhmetov.
 

When Mr. Dubyna was appointed Vice Prime Minister, Viktor Yushchenko confessed that after the personal meeting with the new deputy, he took quite a ‘shine' to him. After Viktor Yushchenko's resignation Mr. Dubyna was promoted to the first Vice Prime Minister in Anatoliy Kinakh's government.
 

By a twist of fate, that very time Mr. Dubyna had an assistant Ihor Voronin, the present head of UkrGazEnergo Company, the subsidiary of RosUkrEnergo at the Ukrainian market.
 

And, by another twist of fate, it was Mr. Dubyna, who took measures in order to transfer Yuriy Boyko, the future godfather of all the further gas schemes in Ukraine, to the position of Naftogaz's head.
 

Today Mr. Dubyna is at the head of Naftogaz with a mission to prevent the implementation of this company destruction scenario.
 

In the middle 2007, Mr. Dubyna, being head of the Dzerzhysnky metallurgical complex, was indignant over the actions of UkrGazEnergo, which consisted in increasing the gas prices without prior notification and “being practically backdated”.
 

The current appointment of Oleh Dubyna to Naftogaz was not supposed to meet with the resistance of Mr. Yushchenko, who is on very intimate terms with Serhiy Taruta, another shareholder of the Industrial Union of Donbass. The latter, together with Mr. Dubyna, welcomed President Yushchenko during his official visit to the Alchevsky metallurgical complex one month ago.

But this is how the only explanation to Mrs. Tymoshenko's decision sounds: in compliance with this decision the legal millionaires Serhiy Buryak and Valeriy Khoroshkovsky have been appointed to the management of the State Tax Administration of Ukraine and the State Custom Service of Ukraine.
 

Though, apart from this one, there is yet another factor: it was of great importance to Mrs. Tymoshenko to show that people, who had voted for her, now have a return in the form of certain appointments to the ‘golden' offices in the government.
 

So, Serhiy Buryak is the son of the last State Bank of the Ukrainian SSR head Vasyl Buryak, who is deeply respected in financial circles and considered to be a figure of Vadym Hetman's level.
 

And again, by a twist of fate, it was Buryak's father, who, as a principal banker of the Ukrainian SSR, signed protocols, in compliance with which it is now impossible to file claims to Russia on the devalued deposits to the Oshchadbank (Savings Bank) of the USSR.
 

Serhiy and his younger brother Oleksandr, in accordance with the BrokBusinessBank last year's report, are the chief shareholders of the afore-mentioned financial establishment.
 

The elder brother possesses 44.7% of the statutory capital, whereas the younger possesses 43.3%. They both are the richest deputies according to the declared income scale. Serhiy declared UAH 521 million, Oleksandr – UAH 525 million.

In his 25 years the elder Buryak used to run BrokBusinessBank, which has a very simple explanation: this financial establishment was founded in place of Orendcoopbank in 1991, to which the father of the young bankers put his hand.
 

Today the Buryak bank is developing strategic partnership with the Ukravto Corporation, owned by Tariel Vasadze. According to some sources, the bank owns a minority shareholding in this corporation. Among the bank shareholders in 2005 there was also a chemical giant Styrol, situated in Horlivka.
 

In 2001-2002 Buryak brothers made closer acquaintance with Viktor Yushchenko. Mr. Yushchenko's brother, Petro Andriyovych, also interceded for the brothers.
 

Moreover, Serhiy Buryak is Viktor Yushchenko's godfather. It turns out that the future President together with another famous person, well-known in the Kyiv circles – Oksana Hunt, the owner of Sanahunt luxury fashion brand store, was a godparent to the banker's child.
 

Finally, before the parliamentary election of 2002, the younger Buryak brother appeared in the Our Ukraine party list and by a strange coincidence the bloc's fund increased by USD 1.5 million.
 

The elder Serhiy, who back in that time stood for the election in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, interceded for his brother. Our Ukraine considered this to be Buryak brothers' intention to join Viktor Yushchenko's faction in the future parliament.
 

However, these illusions faded after the first voting results had been announced. Oleksandr Buryak was excluded from the Our Ukraine faction since he went against the party line and supported the Volodymyr Lytvyn's candidacy for the Speakership. Serhiy Buryak was not on Viktor Yushchenko faction list at all, but also voted for Mr. Lytvyn.
 

In the rebellious year of 2004 the Buryak brothers did not excel in anything special: for instance, both brothers supported Viktor Medvedchuk's political reform.
 

After the Orange Revolution the brothers joined the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc, in which they both were directly responsible for the Khmelnytskyi oblast headquarters.
 

If there is truth to a certain rumor, the BYuT's fund received USD 5 million for each brother.
 

After Yulia Tymoshenko failed to become Prime Minister in 2006, the brothers resisted the temptation to join the anti-crisis coalition, which made Mrs. Tymoshenko to hold them in high esteem. She even paid a special visit to the National Bank council meeting in order to defend the elder Buryak's positions.
 

However, the recent appointment of the head of the State Tax Administration of Ukraine looks somewhat unfair towards Tariel Vasadze, who failed to become a Minister of Transport, most likely because of being unprepared to “completely give up the business to the country's benefit”.
 

One would need to be absolutely naïve to believe that Mr. Buryak is ready for this and will actually strike his favorite financial establishment, founded by common effort of the whole family from generation to generation, out of his life.
 

However, it is customary among banking circles to believe that Mr. Buryak's true purpose is to step into his father's shoes and become the head of the National Bank of Ukraine. And the State Tax Administration is just another step on his way to the cherished ambition.

Mr. Khoroshkovsky is the outstanding personality of today.
 

His habit of taking good care of his appearance has already become an object of derision aroused by business rivals. He pays due attention to the displays of his status. For instance, during working days Mr. Khoroshkovsky drives the enhanced 6.25 m Maybach. During the weekend he drives cherry-colored Bentley sports car. Both cars have the same snazzy numbers, which only differ in one letter.

And, at first glance, taking all the absurdity into account, there is still some logic in the appointment of Mr. Khoroshkovsky to the State Custom Service of Ukraine.
 

Being an ambitious person, Mr. Khoroshkovsky stakes on Yulia Tymoshenko as a possible head of state in either 2010 or 2015.
 

Maybe, this will make him one of her closest team-mates in the future. It is known that during the last election Mr. Khoroshkovsky had regular meetings with Yulia Tymoshenko with a view, as he says, “to be well informed of all the political processes taking place in the country”.
 

Taking Yulia Tymoshenko's intention to renew the ‘Stop the Smuggling' program into account, Mr. Khoroshkovsky's appointment to the State Custom Service will pave the way for a) being constantly informed of the latest events; b) being in everyday touch with Mrs. Tymoshenko and c) regular being on TV in person.
 

It is quite obvious that such a partnership is mutually profitable.
 

First, Mrs. Tymoshenko will obtain the loyalty of the Inter TV channel despite the mixed-up story with the purchase of its assets. But Mr. Khoroshkovsky is its shareholder, though his rivals keep on asserting that he is not a sole proprietor.
 

Second, Mrs. Tymoshenko may hope that if the corruption at customs does not disappear once and for all, it will at least generate a structure, and the bribetakers' rates will appear to be beyond the strength of the minor smugglers.
 

Third, the fact that Mr. Khoroshkovsky is in the money, lets us hope that the minor abuse of power (USD 1,000-2,000) will finally be eradicated.
 

The information that Mr. Khoroshkovsky is a member of Viktor Pinchuk's team is some five years out of date.
 

The reasons, as always, lie in the money. Mr. Khoroshkovsky was forced to sell Ukrsotsbank at a lower price. He sold the bank that is now worth USD 3 billion, to Leonid Kuchma's son-in-law for USD 80-100 million.
 

Today Mr. Khoroshkovsky is actually the third figure in a triangle with Vitaliy Hayduk and Yulia Tymoshenko.
 

It was Mr. Hayduk one year ago who brought Mr. Khoroshkovsky to Viktor Yushchenko to take the office of the first deputy secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. And when Mr. Hayduk refused to be a tool in Viktor Baloha's hands, they left together.
 

That is why, Mr. Khoroshkovsky can be considered as another proof of closer relationships established between Yulia Tymoshenko and the owners of the Industrial Union of Donbass.
 

However, besides Mr. Hayduk, Mr. Khoroshkovsky can be useful for Mrs. Tymoshenko as a guarantor in the relationships with another influential figure, a Russian metallurgical billionaire of ‘Eurasia Group' Aleksandr Abramov, who once staked on Viktor Yushchenko back in 2004, but only got a headache and no benefit at all.
 

It seems that Mr. Khoroshkovsky himself does not consider the position of a chief customs official to be the top of his career. Once in 2002, having become a frontman in the Team of Winter Generation (Komanda Ozimogo Pokolinnja), he said that in 2004 he would reach the age which allowed him to run for the Presidency.
 

It is obvious that this card will be played by some other people during the next decade. But still, everybody is always free to dream of becoming a real oligarch.

Serhiy Leshchenko, UP

27.03.08. Police officers found guilty in death of journalist Georgy Gongadze

Kyiv -- A Ukrainian court convicted three former police officers on Saturday of killing an investigative journalist whose unsolved slaying nearly eight years ago became a rallying cry of the Orange Revolution that eventually ousted the government.

The journalist, Georgy Gongadze, who crusaded against official corruption, was killed and his beheaded body was discovered in a forest outside Kyiv. His head was never found.

One of the former officers, Mykola Protasov, was sentenced to 13 years in jail. The other two, Valeriy Kostenko and Oleksandr Popovych, each received 12-year sentences.

IInvestigations have not identified those who ordered the killing.

Mr. Gongadze's wife and her two children received political asylum in the United States and have lived there since 2001.

Many Ukrainians have looked upon the Gongadze case as a test for the government of pro-Western President Viktor A. Yushchenko, who swept to power in the Orange Revolution in 2004.

Mr. Yushchenko has come under harsh criticism from human rights groups for failing to solve the crime.

Mr. Gongadze's killing set off months of protests in 2000 and 2001 after Mykola Melnychenko, a former bodyguard of President Leonid D. Kuchma, released tapes on which a voice resembling Mr. Kuchma's is heard conspiring with others against the journalist.

Lt. Gen. Oleksey Pukach, former chief of the Interior Ministry's surveillance department, where the three defendants all served, is also wanted in the murder and is being sought on an international warrant.

In September 2000, Mr. Gongadze got into what he thought was a taxi, and was then joined by three others and driven outside Kyiv, according to the defendants. He was beaten and strangled, his body doused with gasoline and burned. Experts said he was dead before the was decapitation.

29.03.08. Ukrainsk hæder til tidligere MF'er

"Liberalt overblik", marts 2008:

03.04.08. NATO: Ukraine vil få MAP-status snarest

20.04.08. Tre politifolk dømt for Gongadze-mordet, men sagen er ikke slut

Otte år efter drabet på den ukrainske journalist har en appelret i Kijiv afsagt fængselsstraffe i sagen, men bagmændene er på fri fod

 Af Henrik Døcker

 Journalister i de tidligere Jerntæppe-lande lever livet farligt, for de tidligere diktaturer dér har ofte kun et tyndt lag demokratisk fernis. Der skulle således gå otte år mellem det tidspunkt, hvor det hovedløse lig af den 31-årige ukrainske journalist Georgij Gongadze blev fundet i Tarastsjanskij- skoven uden for Kijiv og hans gerningsmænd blev dømt. Det skete ved appelretten i Kijiv den 15. marts i år og tre år efter at de tre politiofficerer, der blev fundet skyldige, var blevet anholdt.

 Politiobersterne Valerij Kostenko og Mikola Protasov idømtes hhv.12 års og 13 fængsel, mens politimajor Oleksandr Popovitj fik 12 års fængsel. De tilhørte alle det ukrainske indenrigsministeriums afdeling for overvågning og kriminel efterforskning. Popovitj førte den bil, Gongadze, chefredaktør for netavisen Ukrainskaja Pravda, blev bortført i den 16. september 2000. Sammen med de to andre politiofficerer og deres chef, politigeneral Aleksej Pukatj, kørte de ud til skoven, hvor Pukatj angiveligt skal have kvalt Gongadze med hans eget bælte, mens politifolkene holdt ham.

 Hvad der oprører mange ukrainske politikere i dag er, at Pokatj havde held til at flygte ud af landet i 2003. Forinden skal han have haft held til i 2002 at gøre det af med en anden ukrainsk journalist, Aleksej Podolskij, denne gang i Tjernihiv-regionen. To politifolk, der medvirkede ved dette drab, også tilføjet ved kvælning, idømtes sidste år fængselsstraffe på tre år. Der var en overgang kriminel efterforskning rettet mod Pokatj for at have destrueret vigtigt bevismateriale i sagen. Men en dommer  indstillede  del af sagen i 2004. Pukatj menes i dag at befinde sig i Israel. Han er internationalt efterlyst.

 De egentlige bagmænd, dem, der beordrede og politisk bar ansvaret for drabet på den oppositionelle journalist Gongadze, der havde berettet om magtmisbrug i den unge ukrainske republik, er altså stadig på fri fod. Ministerpræsident Julia Timosjenko kritiserer den måde, efterforskningen i sagen har fundet sted på. ”Som sædvanlig har man fundet frem til dem, der befandt sig i det yderste led af kæden [af ansvarlige] i Gongadze-sagen, mens dem, der beordrede drabet…, herunder politikere og embedsmænd, bestemt ikke er blevet straffet”, siger hun.

 Socialistlederen Aleksandr Moroz, som aktivt deltog i de nationale protester mod den daværende præsident Leonid Kutjmas styre i kølvandet af Gongadze-drabet, har rettet mistanken mod sine gamle politiske kolleger i Organge-revolutionen. ”Det er højest mistænkeligt, at dem, der besluttede mordet, ikke kan findes”, siger han. Nogle hemmelige båndoptagelser af samtaler med Kutjma blev i 2001 smuglet ud af Ukraine af en tidligere vagtmand, optagelser som i højeste grad kastede mistanke om medansvar for drabet på Kutjma selv. Dette medvirkede til, at der opstod bevægelser som ”Ukraine uden Kutjma”og ”Vågn op Ukraine” foruden for Orange-revolutionen.

 Gongadzes enke, Miroslava, så sig på grund af  trusler mod hende nødsaget til at flygte ud af Ukraine og søge asyl i USA, idet hun også på forskellig vis blev groft chikaneret af ukrainske myndigheder. Hun vandt endog en sag mod staten Ukraine, rejst for Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol i Strasbourg, som pålagde Ukraine at yde hende en godtgørelse for den ydmygende og umenneskelige behandling, hun havde været udsat for.

20.04.08. Menneskerettigheder: Ukraine dømt i to sager i Strasbourg

UBERETTIGEDE FORHINDRINGER FOR UKRAINSK NATURVÆRNSFORENING

Fire ukrainere, der ville oprette en naturværnsforening måtte helt til Strasbourg-domstolen for at få gennemtrumfet deres ret til det.  Den ukrainske hovedstad Kijivs særlige justitsdepartement havde afslået at give tilladelse til foreningen, men det krænkede efter denne domstols opfattelse foreningefriheden som knæsat i den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions art. 11, hvorfor der tilkendtes de fire en godtgørelse på 1500 euro (10.750 kr.) for tort.

 De fire ukrainere Sergej Petrovitj Koretskij (Koretskyj), Andrej Vasiljovitj Tolotjko, Andrej Mykolajovitj Gorbal og Oleksij Grygorovitj, anmodede i 2000 de ukrainske myndigheder om registrering af Borgerkomiteen for Bevaring af de oprindelige naturområder i Berezniakij. Men Kijivs bystyre gav afslag, fordi foreningens vedtægter ikke var udfærdiget i overensstemmelse med gældende lov. Ukrainske domstole ville ikke behandle sagen, eftersom de fandt det lovligt at afslå registrering.

 Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol påpegede, at hverken den ukrainske regering eller de lokale domstole havde givet tvingende grunde til at begrænse en forenings ret til at uddele propagandamateriale eller at lobby’e  myndigheder. Det viste sig, at den ukrainske lov om borgernes foreningsfrihed var alt for vag og i realiteten gav myndighederne en vid ret til at skønne over hvorvidt denne og hin forening var berettiget til registrering.

 Der var intet odiøst i at foreningen havde forudset at danne afdelinger under sig i andre ukrainske byer eller områder. Der var intet presserende socialt behov for at forbyde sammenslutningen.

KIRKESAMFUND I UKRAINE MÅTTE HELT TIL STRASBOURG FOR AT FÅ SIN KIRKE

Et græsk-katolsk kirke i den ukrainske landsby Sosulivka har måttet mobilisere Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol for at få gennemtrumfet sin ret til ind imellem at benytte det ortodokse kirkesamfunds kirke i byen, til trods for at regionen Ternopil havde givet dem ret hertil. Det var en krænkelse af den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions art. 6, eftersom det græsk-katolske kirkesamfund ikke kunne gå til ukrainske domstole og få retten gennemtrumfet.

 Græsk-katolikkerne underskrev en aftale om brug af kirken med  distriktsforvaltningen i Tjortkiv-distriktet i juli 1997, men den ortodokse kirke afslog alligevel det kirkesamfund at bruge kirken. Det hjalp ikke græsk-katolikkerne, at de gik til de ukrainske domstole, idet disse fandt, at de ikke havde jurisdiktion i sagen. Efter Strasbourg-stolens opfattelse indebar dette reelt retsnægtelse eller sagt på en anden måde: retten til domstolsprøvelse. Det græsk-katolske kirkesamfund tilkendtes en godtgørelse for tort på 1500 euro (11.250kr.) .

16.05.08. Yushchenko, Tymoshenko clash over privatization

06-May-2008
Jane's Foreign Report

Key Points

Deteriorating relations between Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and President Viktor Yushchenko over a constitutional realignment have placed the future of Ukraine's Orange coalition government in doubt.

As well as presenting the risk that Ukraine could again be beset by political infighting and paralysis, the collapse of the government is also likely to presage a move towards a parliamentary constitution, limiting the powers of the president.

Internal political and constitutional crises will negatively affect Ukraine's integration into NATO and the EU.

The popular revolutions that have arisen in post-Soviet states in recent years held great promise for states beset by corruption, economic mismanagement and failing democracy. Yet they have experienced a mixed bag of success.

Despite early promise and undoubted progress in certain areas, the forces behind Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution have faced a series of crises in recent months, culminating in simmering domestic protest and the imposition of a state of emergency in November 2007. Meanwhile Kyrgyzstan's 2005 Tulip 'revolution' quickly began to more closely resemble a coup that simply swapped one ruling autocratic elite for another.

But perhaps the most chaotically divisive of them all has been Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution. The bifurcation of political interests, both within the Orange Revolutionary powers and the wider political environment, has led to near continual infighting, deep partisan divisions and prolonged political paralysis.

Hopes had been raised that a unified government had been formed with the reformation of an Orange coalition following the September 2007 parliamentary elections. However, tensions between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko threatened to boil over on 25 April when the prime minister ordered her government to ignore presidential decrees, leaving the future survival of the government in doubt and Ukraine looking over the precipice into another political morass.

Constitutional chaos

The current source of antagonism regards attempts to re-align the constitution and disagreement over whether this should lead to the government being led by the president or parliament. Following the Orange Revolution, constitutional reforms were agreed during round-table discussions brokered by the EU. Yushchenko agreed that these reforms would go into effect in 2006, with the entire parliament apart from the Tymoshenko Bloc voting in favour of the compromise. However, the 2006 semi-parliamentary constitution this created has never been satisfactory to President Yushchenko, who has sought to re-gain lost presidential powers, most recently through the creation of a parliamentary commission in December 2007 to move Ukraine back to a semi-presidential system. Yet these attempts are being thwarted by two significant problems. First, only one out of the five parties represented in parliament supports the president's strategy. The opposition Party of Regions is boycotting the commission and the Tymoshenko Bloc is merely attending but not participating in its deliberations. Second, in April the constitutional court ruled that reforms have to be first adopted by parliament before they can go to a referendum.

This disagreement has opened up barely contained fissures in the ruling coalition between the Tymoshenko Bloc and the pro-presidential Our Ukraine-People's Self Defence Union. The two parties maintain a razor thin majority of just three seats in parliament, holding 228 of the 450 available seats. The president has long had ideological and personal difficulties in working with Tymoshenko, whose government he previously removed in September 2005.

In response, Tymoshenko has gone on the offensive, even supporting a de facto alliance of convenience with her arch enemy, the Party of Regions, in supporting a reduction in presidential powers. The two factions, who command a majority in parliament that can also draw on the support of two other parties, will initiate constitutional reforms in the current parliamentary session where they need a simple majority to adopt a new parliamentary constitution.

For the government, an alliance of convenience between the Tymoshenko Bloc and the Party of Regions is likely to split Our Ukraine-People's Self Defence Union into pro-Tymoshenko and pro-Yushchenko wings, putting the sustainability of the Orange coalition in jeopardy. The imposition of constitutional reform by Tymoshenko and the Party of Regions is also likely to lead to pre-term parliamentary (due in 2012) and presidential elections in 2009. In the presidential elections, Tymoshenko, with 30 to 40 per cent ratings in opinion polls, would be the most likely candidate to win, assuming she decided to run instead of retaining an enhanced prime minister's position.

Foreign and security policy

The political-constitutional crisis is now likely to last for much of the remaining year and will negatively affect Ukraine's drive to join NATO and deepen its co-operation with the EU. At NATO's April summit in Bucharest, despite strong support from the US, Kiev was not offered a Membership Action Plan (MAP) and had to make do with a promise that it would eventually join NATO, albeit with no formal timetable, and that its progress towards a MAP will be reviewed in December 2008.

As Western diplomats have pointed out to Jane's , what 'progress' will exactly constitute remains both contentious and unclear. Western European states are putting forward very stringent criteria for progress towards a MAP for Ukraine and Georgia. Constitutional instability in Ukraine will provide additional arguments for Western Europe to continue to claim that the country is not ready for entry into a MAP. The German Ambassador to Ukraine has emphasised stability as a key marker of progress against which Ukraine will be judged.

Domestic instability in Ukraine will also give the EU grounds for not acceding to Kiev's main demands during negotiations for a new agreement to replace the 1997 to 2006 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. This 'enhanced agreement' is likely to give Ukraine a higher status than that accorded under the 2005-2007 European Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels remains adamant that it cannot recognise Ukraine's membership aspirations, as Kiev demands.

FORECAST

The Orange coalition is likely to become increasingly fractured as Tymoshenko seeks a constitutional realignment favouring parliament. This is likely to lead to the sidelining of President Yushchenko whose aspirations for re-election will face a serious challenge. Although these developments do not bode well for Ukraine's political stability and hopes of Western integration over the coming year, in the longer term, such constitutional reform could begin to help solve the fundamental weaknesses at the heart of Ukrainian politics and perhaps allow the development of more mature institutions.

21.05.08. Tymoshenko og Jusjtjenko konkurrerer om magten i Kiev (eng.)