14.05.03. Hanne Severinsen foreslår at drøfte EU-medlemskab

14.05.03. Økonomiministeriet afviser synkronisering af WTO-medlemskab

14.05.03. Ukraine between the elections (2002-04): Opportunities and pitfalls ahead

13.05.03. 3,2% af ukrainerne går ind for at forlænge Kutjmas embedsperiode

13.05.03. Ukraine vil opfylde forpligtelser overfor Europarådet til efteråret

13.05.03. Severinsen: for tidligt at stoppe Ukraine-monitorering

12.05.03. Udenrigsminister sikker på EU-medlemskab for Ukraine

10.05.03. Ukrainsk deltagelse i Irak kræver invitation fra regering

10.05.03. Mulighed for fornyet dynamik i relationerne mellem Ukraine og NATO

10.05.03. Ruslands gasaftaler med SNG-lande isolerer Ukraine 

09.05.03. Parlamentsmedlem beskylder skattevæsnet for at overvåge oppositionen
09.05.03. Prospects for the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine
08.05.03. "Vores Ukraine" kritiserer styret for manglende dynamik i forhold til NATO-medlemskab
08.08.03. Baggrunden for Volyn-massakren var undertrykkelsen af ukrainerne (eng.)
08.05.03. USA foreslår, at Ukraine opstiller mindst ét brigadehovedkvarter i Irak
 07.05.03. Nu står kun det ukrainske folk i vejen for hurtigt NATO-medlemskab
 07.05.03. Vejen for Ukraines medlemskab af NATO står næsten åben
07.05.03. Ukraines parlament skal godkende stabiliseringsstyrke til Irak
06.05.03. Kutjma presset af Putin under 5-dages "ferie" på Krim
06.05.03. Ukraine sender freds-og stabiliseringsstyrke til Irak
05.05.03. April 2003: 43,6% af ukrainerne anser NATO for at være "en aggressiv militærblok"
05.05.03. Freedom House: Ukraine er "et ufrit land", hvad pressefrihed angår
05.05.03. Pulitzer har ikke tænkt sig at følge krav fra protestkampagne (eng.)
05.05.03. USA: Ukraine er den værste overtræder af ophavsretsloven i verden
05.05.03. Brzezinski gentager sine velkendte teser i en tale på The George Washington University
02.05.03. Taras Protsyuk: Reporter in a floating world
02.05.03. U.S. Ambassador Pascual notes improvement in relations with Ukraine
02.05.03. Omkring 15.000 til venstreoppositionens 1. maj demonstration i Kyiv
02.05.03. Pulitzer-pris  kræves tilbageleveret
01.05.03. Menneskerettighedsdomstolen i Strasbourg giver seks ukrainere medhold i erstatningskrav
01.05.03. Parlamentsformand Lytvyn går imod tokammer-parlament
01.05.03. John Edward Herbst bliver De forenede Stater nye "guvernør" i Ukraine

01.05.03. John Edward Herbst bliver De forenede Stater nye guvernør i Ukraine

USAs nuværende ambassadør i Ukraine, Carlos Pascual, skal arbejde i Washington som koordinator for USA hjælp til Europa og Euroasien, opyste USAs ambassade i går.
    Pascual har arbejdet i Ukraine siden oktober 2000, og derfor lakker hans mission mod enden. Allerede til sommer agter han at vende tilbage til Washington.
    USAs præsident George Bush har som hans afløser udpeget John Edward Herbst, der er karrierediplomat fra den absolutte elite indenfor USAs diplomati. USAs Senat skal godkende præsident Bush's udnævnelse.
    Hr. Herbst blev født den 12. september 1952 i Rockwill-center i staten New York. Han blev bachelor i diplomati med udmærkelserne "Cum Laude" og "Fi-Beta-Kappa" fra den diplomatiske skole ved Georgetown-universitetet i 1974 og blev magister i jura og diplomati i Fletcher-skolen for jura og diplomati i 1978. Han har desuden studeret ved John Hopkins-universitetets center for udvidede internationale studier. Han taler flydende russisk og behersker arabisk på forhandlingsniveau.

01.05.03. Parlamentsformand Lytvyn går imod tokammer-parlament

Et tokammer-parlament i Ukraine vil forsinke logvivningsprocessen og skade landets territoriale helhed, siger parlamentsformand Volodymyr Lytvyn.
    Indførelsen af et tokammer-parlament i Ukraine er uhehsigtsmæssig, mener formanden for Verkhovna Rada, Volodymyr Lytvyn. Ifølge ham vil sådanne reformer forsinke lovgivningsprocessen og skade landets territoriale helhed.
    Det udtalte Volodymyr Lytvyn i et interview med BBC's ukrainske afdeling.
    Indførelsen af et tokammer-parlament er et af nøglepunkterne i den politiske reform, som præsident Kutjma har taget initiativ til. BBC. Hromadske Radio.

01.05.03. Menneskerettighedsdomstolen i Strasbourg giver seks ukrainere medhold i erstatningskrav

Seks ukrainske fanger, som havde klaget over elendige forhold under deres fængselsophold, har fået delvist medhold ved Den europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol. Domstolen har forpligtet Ukraine til at udbetale sagsøgerne erstatninger på mellem 1.000 og 3.000 euro. Ifølge Deutsche Welle havde de ukrainske sagsøgere i sin tid fået erstattet dødsdom med fængsel på livstid. Det skete efter at Ukraine havde afstået fra at eksekvere dødsstraf.
    Sagerne har varet i over fem år. Retten i Strasbourg gav ukrainerne delvist medhold i deres klager. Dommerne medgav blandt andet, at fængslet i Ivano-Frankivsk
havde overtrådt religionsfriheden, idet to af fangerne var blevet nægtet at tale med en præst. I fængslet i Simferopol havde den ene af fangerne fået nægtet intimt samvær med sin hustru - retten fastslog, at der her havde været tale om overtrædelsen af retten til et familieliv.
    Retten slog desuden fast, at samtlige fangers fængselsophold var foregået under umenneskelige betingelser. Strasbourg-domstolen gav imidlertid ikke sagsøgerne medhold i, at fangerne var blevet slået i fængslet i Ivano-Frankivsk, og afviste at kende ledelsen af fænglset i Khmelnytskyj skyldige i, at den ene af sagsøgerne fik tuberkulose under sit fængselsophold. Deutsche Welle. Hromadske Radio.

02.05.03. Pulitzer-pris  kræves tilbageleveret

En række ukrainske organisationer i Canada, Storbritannien, Australien og USA har iværksat en international kampagne for at få Pulitzer Pris-Komiteen
til at trække én af sine pristildelinger tilbage - den til den amerikanske journalist Walter Duranty helt tilbage i 1932.
    Duranty berettede dengang i sit blad, New York Times, at der overhovedet ikke var hungersnød i Ukraine, som dengang var en del af Sovjetunionen. Kun
få andre vestlige journalister befandt sig dengang i landet, og alene den britiske journalist Malcolm Muggeridge beskrev den blodige undertrykkelse.
    Gennem væbnet nedkæmpelse af selvejerbønderne og hårdhændet tvangskollektivisering udløstes en menneskeskabt hungersnød, som førte til
omkring 10 millioner menneskers død. Der er tale om en international postkortkampagne rettet til Pulitzer Pris-Komiteen i New York. Ritzau.

02.05.03. Omkring 15.000 til venstreoppositionens 1. maj demonstration i Kyiv

Omkring 15.000 tilhængere af Det kommunistiske parti, Det socialistiske parti samt partiet "Fædrelandet" deltog i mødet i centrum af Kyiv i anledning af 1. maj. Partiernes ledere opfordrede i deres taler på mødet først og fremmest til at afvise præsident Leonid Kutjmas forslag til en politisk reform. De pegede blandt andet på, at det nuværende styre vil brugde den politiske reform til at forlænge sit eget liv samt aflede befolkningens opmærksomhed fra de eksisterende problemer.
    "Hvis vi bider på (Kutjmas) attraktive slogans, så vi det betyde, at valget af deputerede vil finde sted i 2007, samme år som lokalvalgene, og at præsidentvalget først finder sted i december 2007", - sagde KPUs 2. sekretær Adam Martynjuk.  
    Deltagerne i mødet gav også deres støtte til en nødvendig forening af oppositionen med henblik på en sejr ved det kommende præsidentvalg. "Lad os forenes under det fælles slogan "Ud med Kutjma!", - sagde parlamentsmedlem fra Julia Tymoshenkos blok Mykhajlo Pavlovskyj. Mødet støttede denne opfordring og råbte i takt "Ud med Kutjma!".
    Talerne udtalte sig positivt om det memorandum, som lederne af KPU, SPU, Julia Tymoshenkos blok og "Vores Ukraine" har underskrevet. "Ledernes - Symonenkos, Moroz', Tymoshenkos og Jusjtjenkos underskrivelse af memrandummet - er starten på Ukraines nye historie", - sagde en af lederne af SPU, Josif Vinskyj.
    Martynjuk lovede desuden på mødet, at hvis deres repræsentant vinder præsidentvalget, så vil samtlige manglende lønninger blive udbetalt i løbet af et år, arbejdsløsheden vil blive afskaffet i løbet af tre år og i løbet af fem år vil man give borgerne deres arbejdsopsparinger tilbage. "Og det vil vi gøre i fuldt omfang", - understregede Martynjuk.
    Efter mødets afslutning vedtog man en resolution, hvori mødets deltagere fordømte det nuværende styre med præsident Leonid Kutjma i spidsen og opfordrede ukrainerne til at forenes i kampen mod det.
    Efter afslutningen af mødet på Den europæiske Plads gik den forenede kolonne ned ad Kreshtjatyk-gaden. Herefter drejede tilhængerne af Julia Tymoshenkos parti ned på Bohdan Khmelnytsky-gaden og gik ned ad Volodymyrovska-gaden, hvor de lagde blomster ved mindesmærket for Mykhajlo Hrushevskyj og derefter - ved Taras Shevtjenkos statue.
    Kolonnen med KPUs tilhængere gik ned ad Shevtjenko-boulevarden, hvor de nedlagde blomster ved Lenin-monumentet. Herefter fortsatte KPU og Socialistpartiets tilhængere ned ad Shevtjenko-boulevarden til Volodymyrivska-gaden, hvor de også lagde blomster ved mindesmærket for Shevtjenko.Podrobnosti. Ukrajinski Novyny. 

02.05.03. U.S. Ambassador Pascual notes improvement in relations with Ukraine

The improvement in Ukrainian-US relations started before Ukraine sent its decontamination battalion to Kuwait, although the USA greatly appreciated it, the US ambassador to Ukraine, Carlos Pascual, has said in an interview. There is little prospect of reaching understanding on the question of Kolchuga radar systems that Ukraine allegedly supplied to Iraq, according to the ambassador. Ukraine has a chance, but no guarantee, of taking part in post-war reconstruction of Iraq, Pascual said. The following is an excerpt from an interview Pascual gave to Anatoliy Martsynovskyy, published in Holos Ukrayiny on 23 April. 23 Apr 03, p. 5
BBC Monitoring
US Envoy Notes Improvement in Relations with Ukraine
Source: Holos Ukrayiny
Kyiv
in Ukrainian
[Newspaper intro]: Despite the anti-American sentiment following the Iraqi campaign, experts and the media say there have been a notable improvement in US-Ukrainian relations. No one is talking now about the Kolchuga scandal, which had triggered an unprecedented crisis in bilateral ties. "Should we assume that the critical period in relations between Kiev and Washington is over?" That was our first question to US Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Carlos Pascual.

Pascual:There has indeed been a certain improvement in relations, and both sides are striving to develop this. In December last year, I proposed a so-called strategy of small steps, consisting of continuing interaction and defining concrete possibilities for mutually beneficial solution of a number of questions. This in turn might open the doors to further progress. We started to implement that strategy, and there have already been some positive results. Ukraine took serious measures to improve the system of combating money laundering, which led to the lifting of FATF sanctions. We achieved certain results in talks about Ukraine's accession to the WTO and resolving some bilateral trade issues. We are deepening cooperation in the area of export control. Ukraine has agreed to send its radiation, chemical and biological protection battalion to Kuwait. We are also continuing to cooperate in the development of a civic society in Ukraine and independence of the media.

Small steps in improving relations

Martsynovskyy: There is however, a view that the change in Washington's attitude to Kiev was caused primarily by the decision of the Ukrainian authorities to send the battalion to Kuwait.

Pascual: No, that's not right. Of course, we viewed very positively and with gratitude the fact that President Leonid Kuchma, the National Security and Defence Council and a number of parliamentary political parties approved the dispatch of the battalion. But our cooperation in those specific directions that I already mentioned started before that. For example, the FATF decision to rescind its recommendations on applying sanctions was taken in the middle of February. Our common actions regarding the WTO started at negotiations in Geneva at the end of February. Mind you, the question of the battalion was, of course, another very concrete example of how work can be conducted jointly in solving serious international problems and strengthening peace and security in the region. But, I repeat, this was far from the only factor leading to the improvement in our relationship.

Martsynovskyy: So, is the previously declared review of American policy regarding Ukraine fully completed?

Pascual: Its completion was officially announced back in January. The process again confirmed the long-term strategic goals that we were pursuing from the very start of our bilateral relations. The USA supports the transformation of Ukraine into a democratic market country, fully integrated with the Euroatlantic community. As for the question of the Kolchugas radar systems allegedly supplied by Ukraine to Iraq , we have recognized that it is highly unlikely that Ukraine and the USA will find mutual understanding here. And for this reason, it is better to draw constructive lessons from this situation and apply them in practice. It was precisely in this context that we proposed to Kiev to expand our cooperation in the area of non-proliferation and export control. And we are managing to make certain positive steps in this direction. Kolchuga issue

Martsynovskyy: Kolchugas were not found in Iraq. Is the USA still convinced that their supplies were approved by the highest Ukrainian leadership?

Pascual: We have always said that there are two separate issues here. First, was approval given to sell Kolchugas, and second, were they delivered. As far as the latter is concerned, the USA has stressed that we do not know whether that took place, since we do not have sufficient information. As for the first question, differences of view with the Ukrainian side remain.

Martsynovskyy: Have the American authorities changed their attitude to President Kuchma?

Pascual: The USA has always recognized Leonid Kuchma as the president of this country, elected by its people. We recognize and respect the constitutional role of President Kuchma in leading the state, in particular in leading policy in questions of international security. And we believe that the line regarding Ukraine must be oriented at the long-term strategic goals I mentioned earlier. I think that the USA and Ukraine see that the strategy of small steps is already producing concrete results, and it is precisely along this road that we should move ahead.

Martsynovskyy: Is a meeting between the US and Ukrainian presidents possible in the foreseeable future, say within the next 12-18 months? Pascual: That question is not currently under discussion. Reconstruction of Iraq

Martsynovskyy: It was announced that through Ukraine's participation in the coalition to disarm Iraq (although the Ukrainian authorities publicly avoided the use of the term "coalition membership") our companies might take part in the reconstruction effort in Iraq. Is this a guaranteed participation, or merely a possibility?

Pascual: There is a chance, but no guarantee. The basic funding for the reconstruction of Iraq today is being allocated precisely by the USA. In effect, the relevant contracts will be funded by American taxpayers. Therefore, naturally, they will be carried out through our general contractors. However, our legislation contains points making it possible to bring in non-American subcontractors in this case. Serious competition is now developing between firms of various countries, primarily those that were participants in the coalition. In Ukraine we are making every effort to inform interested structures and companies about the relevant possibilities. As far as Ukraine's membership of the coalition is concerned, I stress once again: before President Bush named your country in his speech at the end of March, we contacted the Ukrainian side and asked whether Ukraine would like that or not. Ukraine replied positively. And if later on it was decided that there had been some sort of misunderstanding, then either I should have been informed here, or the State Department in Washington should have been informed.

Martsynovskyy: Is it not paradoxical that a country suspected of illegally arming the Husayn [Hussain] regime at the same time should join a coalition to disarm that same regime?

Pascual: We gave all countries the opportunity to make their contribution to strengthening global and regional security. And if a state acted in that way, then that can be viewed only positively. This does not mean that we cannot have differences of opinion on certain things. But if we are capable of finding constructive ways of resolving those differences (in the case of Ukraine this is the above-mentioned cooperation on issues of export control for ensuring the security of leading Ukrainian technologies and materials), then such a development of events is satisfactory to us.

02.05.03. Taras Protsyuk: Reporter in a floating world

Ukrainian cameraman Taras Protsyuk captured some of this region's worst moments before he was killed in Baghdad. UKRAINE REPORT 2003, No. 31
Ukraine Market Reform Group
South Lake Tahoe, California
April 21, 2003
By Inessa Kim
Transitions on Line (TOL) Correspondent in Poland TOL, Prague, Czech Republic
April 17, 2003
WARSAW, Poland--Covering death and violence is the stock-in-trade of war journalists. Everyone who knew Reuters Warsaw-based war correspondent and TV cameraman, Taras Protsyuk, realized that stints in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Macedonia, the Middle East, and Afghanistan must have been full of ghastly sights and personal danger.

But when death came to Taras Protsyuk in Baghdad on 9 April, the shock was huge for all who knew him, including myself. His character seemed unscarred by the violence. He did not like to talk about war or his job on the front lines. He did not give his fellow journalists to understand that he might be better and more professional than them. He did not seek to impress as a tough man or a real war correspondent. Instead, Taras was always ready to help. Everyone could count on him.

Taras, your tragic death affected all of us, his friends from Warsaw Reuters office wrote in his obituary. We remember you as an admirable, always smiling, humble and lovely man. From the joy that flowed from your eyes nobody could have guessed what dramatic situations you witnessed. We still cannot believe it.

The shock, though, was also because he died in what should have been one of the safest places in Baghdad, the Hotel Palestine, where most foreign journalists were being housed. For some reason, a U.S. tank commander decided that Taras room should be shelled. He died along with a Spanish cameraman, Jose Couso, from the Spanish television channel Telecinco. Three other Reuters staff members were wounded.

By the time he was killed, Taras was one of our most experienced TV journalists, said Reuters editor in chief Geert Linnebank. He stood out as an extremely professional reporter on the most bloody conflicts of the last decade, Linnebank said.

The road to Baghdad was a long one, 10 years in the making and very literally a world away from Taras's first interest, outer space. Born in 1968 in Ivano-Frankovsk in western Ukraine, his dream of flying in space took him to the aviation engineering department of the Military Academy in Leningrad. But the last year of his studies--1990-91--was also the last year of the Soviet Union. Space exploration plans fell to earth, and Taras dropped his studies and picked up a camera.

School did, though, leave Taras fluent in Arabic, making him an even more obvious choice for stints in some of the world's worst war zones.

Taras, who became a correspondent for Reuters in 1993, moved his base, and his wife and son, from Kiev to Warsaw in 1999. He kept in constant contact with his Ukrainian friends, however, and he was well remembered in Ukraine. Hundreds attended his funeral on 13 April, and the Ukrainian parliament in Kiev observed a minute of silence in his memory.

Taras became fluent in Polish, and was supposed to gain Polish citizenship soon. He worked with Reuters, contributed to the Polish TV stations TVN and TVN24, and found many friends in Poland. Cezary Sokolowski, an AP photoreporter, told the Polish daily Rzeczpospolita that everybody loved Taras.

Brave but never reckless, Taras seemed always ready to capture the moment. In 1997 there was a flood disaster in Poland, Sokolowski recalled. I was going to Wroclaw and in front of me there was a car with a pontoon on the roof. Who was it? Taras.

When war loomed in Iraq, Taras knew he would be going. According to a colleague, even at the New Year's Eve party he was constantly checking his mobile phone to check whether he had been called to leave for Baghdad immediately.

Was this eagerness, anxiety, or just professionalism? Anna Brzezinska, chief photo editor of the newspaper Rzeczpospolita, recalls that Taras, always joyful and smiling, had been unusually serious before leaving for Iraq. My husband and I both had the same impression, she said. He was different, as if it was not him.

Eventually, in February, Taras and a group of 18 Reuters journalists set off for Iraq. According to Reuters, Taras wanted at all costs to show to the world how years of sanctions and then the war had affected the lives of Iraqs people.

Another Polish war journalist, Wojciech Jagielski, wrote in Gazeta Wyborcza that though both he and Taras lived in Warsaw, they met more often in Tbilisi, Grozny, or Kabul. This time he remained in Warsaw, while Taras went out on the beat. I encouraged him to write down his thoughts in breaks between shootings and dictate them to me as notes from Baghdad for Gazeta [Wyborcza], he recalled. He said that he didn't have time, that he was working at night filming air raids and sleeping during the day.

He was not asleep, though, when he was hit by the tank shell. He was filming from the balcony of the Hotel Palestine. War is cruel, as Taras knew better than most.

05.05.03. Brzezinski gentager sine velkendte teser i en tale på The George Washington University

Johnson's Russia List #7150
22 April 2003

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
"CIVIL SOCIETY IN UKRAINE"
SPEAKER: DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Elliott School of International Affairs,
The George Washington University
Washington, D.C.
Monday, April 7, 2003

Transcript by: Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
JIM GOLDGEIER: I'd like to welcome you all. I'm Jim Goldgeier, director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the George Washington University, part of the Elliott School of International Affairs, and I want to welcome you all to the George Washington University. It's been a wonderful day at the Carnegie Endowment and we're delighted to have you here. And we have so many distinguished guests that it would be difficult to distinguish among them, but we're certainly delighted with the representatives - the diplomatic corps who are here: Congresswoman Kaptur, members of parliament from Ukraine, and others who are here. As I said, you are all distinguished guests and we're delighted to have you here. I have a couple of words of thanks and then I know that you are all eager to hear our speaker, so I will get off the podium as quickly as I can. I, of course, first have to thank the people who truly made this possible -- my staff at George Washington University: Jennifer Sieck, Suzanne Stephenson, who made the plane reservations for many of you, and especially Vedrana Hadzialic, who has been working night and day - grateful to them and to Marina Barnett at the Carnegie Endowment. (Applause.)

A special welcome to Jessica Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment, and to Harry Harding, the dean of the Elliot School, who are representing our cosponsoring entities for this conference, and we're delighted that they are here. (Applause.) And I do have to tell you that George Washington president, Stephen Joel Trachtenberg, is chairing a meeting in New York this evening, which is why he couldn't be here, but he sent me a very nice note reminding me that both of his parents and all four of his grandparents are from Ukraine. (Applause.) You have to stop clapping or I'm going to be here longer. (Laughter.)

A few other quick words. One, we're very grateful to the International Renaissance Foundation for their support. Grigorian Amirian (ph), Yevhen Bystrytskyy graciously agreed to help support some of those coming here from Ukraine, and we're grateful to them. The United States Department of State has brought 20 Muskie and Fulbright Scholars here for the conference. And working with the staff of the State Department has been a real pleasure, and also working with Sarah Lenti at the NSC, who unfortunately could not make it tonight because she's working. (Applause.) And then just finally, it's been a great pleasure to work with my old friend, Andy Kuchins, with whom we have put this conference together, and it's been a lot of fun. And it's been so much fun that we're going to have to do it again sometime. (Applause.) This conference is made possible in large part because of a gift to the university that was made several years ago. This is the William and Helen Petrach Endowment for Ukrainian Exchanges and Programs at the George Washington University. This endowment supports a special relationship with Lviv State University, bringing scholars from Lviv here. We have two this spring, and also our faculty go to Lviv and teach classes over at Lviv State. We also this year introduced Ukrainian language at George Washington University with the endowment, which we're very pleased about. (Applause.) And we also have a graduate class this spring called Geopolitics of Ukraine. It meets on Monday evenings, and so the professor brought her class to dinner tonight, and I just want to say to the students I can't promise you I can do this again for you for the remaining part of the semester.

None of this conference would have really been possible without the vision provided by U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Carlos Pascual. As you all know, he's an extraordinary individual. He's extremely disappointed that he is not able to be here, and he would be here if he could be here. But he called me this morning to again say how disappointed he is, but of course with wishing all of us well, and I told him that I would provide him regular reports on how things were going. And he was especially important in helping with getting our dinner speaker this evening. We knew who we wanted, and Ambassador Pascual said to me, well, do you want to ask him or should I? And I said, well, you ask him because I think we'll have a much better chance of getting him to agree. As you know, he's a very persuasive guy.

Well, our speaker, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, I don't need a long introduction since you all are familiar with all he has done. And of course he's most well known for his work as national security advisor and then his tremendous influence on American foreign policy since he served as national security advisor. But particularly since we are at a university, at an academic institution -- and since some of our younger students may not realize this -- I have to also add that in addition to the extraordinary career he has had in the world of policy, he had an extraordinary career in the world of academia. And the works that he produced as a scholar, including the very massive and incredibly detailed work, "The Soviet Bloc," are really extraordinarily influential in the scholarly world, and so as an academic it's also a great pleasure to be able to introduce him here. He's been just an extraordinary voice for freedom, for human rights, for all the things that we are discussing here at this conference, and it's just a great privilege and a pleasure to welcome him to the George Washington University. (Applause.)

DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen, first of all, thank you for that very generous introduction. I am always somewhat embarrassed by introductions and I don't know really how to thank the person who has introduced me. But recently I attended an evening in honor of President Carter where he was introduced with similar very great generosity, and President Carter stood up and said, "Thank you so much for that introduction. Of all the introductions I have ever heard, this one was the most recent." (Laughter.)

Let me begin first of all by saying that I am very delighted to be here among many Americans who have an interest, a genuine interest, in Ukraine. I'm also delighted to be here with many friends from countries which are neighbors of Ukraine and therefore have to have an interest in Ukraine. (Laughter.) And last but not least I am delighted to see many of my Ukrainian friends who have a truly significant personal interest in Ukraine.

Now, some of you may not have attended dinners of this kind here in Washington and therefore I'd like to begin by explaining to you that there is a certain almost eccentric protocol for official evening dinners in Washington. They usually begin with one of three procedures, and sometimes more than one but two or even three. The first is that there is a religious blessing given to the dinner. I notice that this must be an atheistic group because that wasn't followed. (Laughter.) But the usual procedure is for some venerable clergyman to stand up, give a very elaborately worded prayer to God that he bless this dinner, using phraseology which very carefully does not cross theological boundaries. (Laughter.)

The second protocol, which also was not observed here tonight, involves what's called in Washington the presentation of the colors. Our Ukrainian friends might have been surprised, if it had been followed, by the sudden appearance of a number of American soldiers carrying flags who would very formally march in here and then present the flags to you and then very formally march out. This procedure was also not followed tonight, which means that this dinner is not only atheistic but non-patriotic. (Laughter.)

There is a third procedure left, and this one is being followed. It is to have someone speak after a full day's conference to people who have had drinks and food, and you call his speech a keynote address. (Laughter.) Now, I was already told that my keynote address doesn't preface the conference but is in the middle of it, and therefore it is a little difficult to set the necessary keynotes. (Laughter.) So let me just say a few words to you about the progressive evolution of the American attitude towards Ukraine.

In a nutshell - but not as a keynote - in a nutshell, and oversimplifying, I would say it has evolved from ignorance through arrogance to perseverance. It is not such a long time ago when, if I were addressing an American audience of this size and if I was speaking of the Soviet Union, everyone in the room would have assumed that I speak of Russia and that Russia is the Soviet Union. Even slightly more than a decade ago, the predominant American perception of the Soviet Union was that it is a nation state and that it is essentially Russia, and that Russia is the Soviet Union.

When I was in the White House I proposed to the president the formation of what is called an interagency group, a group of officials from different departments, to develop policies addressed to the national problems of the Soviet Union. I was convinced that the national problems of the Soviet Union were the Achilles' heel of the Soviet Union. The State Department protested in writing, saying that there is no national problem in the Soviet Union because there is now a Soviet nation. The president approved the proposal, the interagency group was established, and one of its products was the development of an action program designed to assist national movements within the Soviet Union, a program which was very elegantly called "a program for the delegitimization of the Soviet System."

Slightly more than a decade ago, the citizens of Kiev, assembled in one of its major squares, were publicly warned to beware of excessive nationalism, at a time when the Soviet Union was falling apart. Within the last decade, there was still considerable doubt as to whether the Ukrainian people feel themselves to be truly European. There were predictions that Ukraine would split in half between Eastern and Western Ukraine. All of that, in my view, reflected a very fundamental ignorance about Ukraine's history and its national identity, an ignorance which fortunately has very much faded in the course of the last two years.

But it has been followed at times with a rather arrogant attitude towards the newly independent Ukraine. I have read many analyses to the effect that Ukraine is an economic basket case. These analyses were written at a time when a very close neighbor of Ukraine was very much a petro state. We were told repeatedly that Ukraine is unusually corrupt, and the question of course necessarily had to arise, corrupt as compared to whom? One would not necessarily even have to mention any city close to Kiev; one could mention some cities very far from Kiev, including some on this continent where corruption also politically manifests itself.

There has also been a tendency to politically ostracize Ukraine for shortcomings which, in the case of analogous shortcomings elsewhere, did not lead to similar ostracism. There is no doubt that from a moral point of view, the killing of an individual or the sale of arms to a criminal state are troubling developments, but are they different, for example, from mass killings in Chechnya or from export of arms, also to a criminal state, from that source? Fortunately, that phase too is gradually fading, and it is giving way to increasingly dominant indications that there is perseverance in the development of America's relationship with Ukraine.

My sense is that there is growing awareness within the American elite, within the American government, and more vaguely in the American public that Ukraine has been successful in overcoming enormous historical handicaps that it confronted when it became independent. And like its post-communist neighbors to the west, Ukraine has not had an independent state in effect since Kievan Rus, except for a very brief period in the late nineteen-teens and the early twenties. Not only did it not have an independent state, but much of its intellectual elite was physically decimated in the course of this century. Nonetheless, a state has emerged and a state has consolidated itself, and a state today exists that functions as an independent state.

One of the most critical accomplishments in that respect was the prompt nationalization of the Soviet army stationed on Ukrainian territory. The full history - the dramatic history of how that occurred, in essence in just a few weeks, has not yet been written, but that was absolutely essential to the emergence - to the survival and emergence of a state. Some scholar ought to undertake an interview project with the key players - several key officials, some senior officers who played a truly historic role in the course of a very concentrated period of time in very dramatic circumstances. Moreover, it is quite evident that national unity has been preserved and preserved successfully, transcending linguistic differences, the importance of which was often politically exaggerated.

We know now that about eight million Ukrainians consider themselves to be Russians by nationality, a much smaller number than previously assumed, but even then there is no ethnic conflict between the Ukrainians and the Russians. Crimea, despite enormous tensions, has avoided serious ethnic conflicts. Moreover, in terms of foreign policy, despite some zigzags in the course of the last several years, the general trend is towards the West. That process has become clearer in the course of the last year or so. The multi-vector policy, which was proclaimed earlier, in fact no longer has any meaning because the direction of history is indeed towards the West. And that is possible because among the Ukrainian people there is no nostalgia for empire because they were never in charge of that empire. And there is certainly no desire just to be a part of an empire.

All of that, in my view, creates a situation which involves genuine preconditions for significant change in the course of the not-too-distant future. To me the question is not so much whether that sense of direction will be continued but rather whether it will be slow or more rapid. Within the top leadership, within some vested interests, there is still lingering ambivalence. Among the younger generation I sense a very significant shift and almost an ultimaticity of identification with the West. And on a very superficial level - very superficial - one sees the increasing commonality between Ukrainians and the West. Ten years ago I would have had no difficulty identifying Ukrainians in this room. Today I can't really tell who are Americans and who are Ukrainians. And that would be true also of Germans or Poles or French. Ukraine naturally, by history, by culture, is European; it is not Eurasian. And that makes for a fundamental difference. And that has implications also for what we do.

After the end of the Cold War and the defeat of the Soviet Union, the first phase was the strategic enlargement of NATO. The inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary was a strategically significant step taken immediately in the wake of the victory in the Cold War. It had strategic significance vis-à-vis a Russia that was changing but still problematical. The second phase was the political enlargement of Europe through NATO. The admission of the seven to NATO defines the new political frontiers of Europe because it's going to be accompanied also by the enlargement of the European Union. The next phase after that is going to be the historic enlargement of Europe through NATO and the European Union. And obviously, in that third phase, Ukraine has to be an object of serious commitment on the part of the West.

As I said earlier, I have no doubt that this is the direction in which history is marching, both from here and from Kiev. The real issue for us is with what rapidity can the obstacles be overcome? Creation of an enduring civil society, an established, well working democracy is one of the critical preconditions for participation in the larger Europe, in the Atlantic community, in the democratic world. The people that I see here tonight are engaged in that enterprise and I feel myself very much committed to it as well.

Thank you for your attention. (Applause.)

MR. GOLDGEIER: Dr. Brzezinski has graciously agreed to take a couple of questions. I was wondering if we had any Muskie Scholars or GW graduate students who had a question. We would like to - I would like to have the first question come from one of our younger scholars.

Q: Thank you. We're definitely flattered and just knocked down with this opportunity. And I'm really sorry that I didn't bring the Ukrainian version of Grand Chessboard with me. (Chuckles.) My name is Serhiy Kostyuk. I'm a Muskie Scholar from Ukraine at Georgia State University, Atlanta. On behalf of our Muskie family, I'd like to thank you to George Washington University, to the United States Department of State, to Dr. Brzezinski, to all Americans for inviting us to this country. And we're very proud -- and myself I am very proud that all of my friends, we're going back home to Ukraine. (Applause.) I'm curious, Dr. Brzezinski, have you ever traveled to Russia and delivered a speech to a Russian audience, and what's their reaction to your pro-Ukrainian policy? It would be nice to hear. Thank you.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I've traveled many times to the Soviet Union, probably the first time before you were born -- (laughter) -- and my travel to the Soviet Union included travel to Russia. In more recent times I have been asked by some Russian friends as to what are the sources of my Ukrainian deviation -- (laughter) -- and I have told them that it comes out of my love for Russia. (Laughter, applause.) I have said to them - and I'm serious, actually - that Russia will never be free if it is an imperial state. It will never be part of Europe if it is an imperial state. It cannot take to Europe its imperial baggage, whether it be in Ukraine or in Chechnya.

And I have often said also to my American friends that if we want a good relationship with Russia and if we want Russia to be part of the West, we have to make sure that it is discouraged from any imperial nostalgia. And therefore, the earliest feasible, practical entry of Ukraine into NATO, into the European Union, is actually an act of friendship towards Russia as well.

Q: My name is Lana Sedritskaya and I'm a graduate student in the class of geopolitics of Ukraine here, and I have a question for you. You've talked about Ukraine's foreign policy orientation -

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Could you speak just a little slower? (Laughter.)

Q: Sorry, I'm a little nervous. You've talked about Ukraine's foreign policy orientation towards the West. How does Ukraine's presidency of CIS affect its foreign policy orientation today?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, you know, in a way, the answer to that is somewhat dialectical. (Laughter.) The symbolism is not attractive, but the reality is not threatening. First of all, to have a non-Russian as a chairman of the CIS, a president of another country, emphasizes the fact that the existence of that other country and then others later on, is legitimate. In general, if you have normalization of relations between Russia and Ukraine, demarcation of borders, legally binding agreements regarding the Russian presence in Sevastopol, you are de facto legitimizing and consolidating the separate statehood of Ukraine.

Q: Could it just be a ploy to bring Ukraine towards Russia and away from the West?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, but what does that mean? You know, how can Ukraine be moved towards Russia? What does that mean in practice other than, for example, increased Russian participation in ownership of some Ukrainian resources? That, as of itself, might be occasionally difficult, but it's not decisive for the existence of the Ukrainian state.

Yet Russia faces truly enormous internal problems. It is facing a demographic catastrophe. It is undergoing de-industrialization, which is obscured only by the fact that it is a petro state. Its population is shifting from the east to the center of Russia because Russia can no longer subsidize the population in the far east. To the east of Russia there is now a state with a population nine times that of Russia and an economy six times that of Russia. To the west of Russia, and to the west of Ukraine, there is emerging an economic entity that is beginning to acquire political identity. For Ukraine, normalization of relations with Russia makes sense, and movement towards Russia in any serious fashion makes no practical sense whatsoever.

So in that sense I don't think there really is a choice. There may be some misguided individuals, very often connected with somewhat dogmatic parties, that have some nostalgia of that sort, but by and large, one might almost make the hazardous statement that anyone whose IQ is above average doesn't entertain that point of view. (Laughter.)

Thank you very much. Good night.

MR. GOLDGEIER: I'd just like to say again thank you to Dr. Brzezinski for joining us. Thanks to all of you for joining us this evening. [...]
 

05.05.03. USA: Ukraine er den værste overtræder af ophavsretsloven i verden

Ifølge den amerikanske regering er Ukraine den værste i verden til at overtræde ophavsretslovgivningen. "Fraværet af fremskridt i sikringen af den nødvendige beskyttelse af intellektuel ejendomsret truer den ukrainske ledelses bestræbelser på at opnå landets optagelse i WTO og mindsker det nationale markeds tiltrækningskraft i forhold til handel og investeringer", - hedder det i en rapport, som USAs regering har udarbejdet.
    I dokumenterne påpegedes det endvidere, at USA i 2004 vil skærpe den individuelle kontrol med situationen omkring produktion af piratkopier af video- og audioproduktion i landene i Eurounionen samt i 10 andre lande, herunder i Polen, Rusland og Taiwan.  
    Egypten bliver derimod i rapporten omtalt som et af de lande, hvor ophavretten er beskyttet på behørig vis. Desuden konstaterer man fremskridt indenfor denne sfære i Kolumbia, Ungarn og Israel. Podrobnosti. RBK.

05.05.03. Pulitzer har ikke tænkt sig at følge krav fra protestkampagne (eng.)

VICTOR MALAREK
May 2, 2003, The Globe and Mail
National
Page A7
More than 45,000 postcards were mailed yesterday to the Pulitzer Priz committee demanding that it posthumously revoke a New York Times journalist's award because of his reports that a man-made famine that killed millions of peasants in Ukraine in 1932-33 never happened.

The postcard campaign, spearheaded by the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association in Toronto, points out that New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty lied about the famine in his dispatches from Russia, saying that "any report of a famine is today an exaggeration or malignant propaganda." The campaign was launched to mark the 70th anniversary of the Ukrainian famine.

Lubomyr Luciuk, research director for the association, said Mr. Duranty was "a consummate liar whose reports covered up a brutal genocide. The Pulitzer Prize committee should maintain its integrity by revoking posthumously the prize it awarded to a man who lied."

Mr. Duranty, who was the Times's Moscow correspondent from 1921 to 1934, won the Pulitzer for a series of reports in 1931 about Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin's five-year plan to reform the economy. However, archives turned up years later reveal that Mr. Duranty admitted privately to a high-ranking diplomat at the British embassy in Moscow in September, 1933, that "it is quite possible that as many as 10 million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during the past year." Sig Gissler, administrator for the Pulitzer prizes, said that the board is aware of the complaints. "They've come up from time to time through the years."

He noted that the board gave the issue "substantial consideration" in 1990 and "after careful consideration of the issue, it decided not to withdraw the prize that was given over 70 years ago in a different time under different circumstances." He added that the board is not considering reversing its stand.

Mr. Gissler also pointed out that Mr. Duranty, who died in 1957, received the award for his reporting in 1931 on Stalin's five-year plan. "It is inaccurate to say the prize was given for his reporting on the famine, which occurred in 1932-33."

Mr. Luciuk countered that throughout his stint in Moscow, Mr. Duranty was nothing more than a propagandist for Stalin. "How can he be honest one year and a liar the very next? He is a stain on the Pulitzer Prize and he should not be honoured as an outstanding journalist in any way."

Mr. Luciuk said Mr. Duranty betrayed the most fundamental principle of journalism by "not truthfully reporting on what he witnessed. Over many years, in fact, he did just the opposite, and viciously smeared as propagandists those honest journalists who dared tell the truth."

He said the prize should be revoked to preserve the integrity of journalism and the stature of the Pulitzer Prize.

"Those who say that his prize was earned for what he wrote before 1932 are being disingenuous," he said.

"Duranty was used as a shill for the Soviets before, during and after the Great Famine. Perhaps those who honoured him with a Pulitzer in 1932 did not fully know just how dishonest he was. Now we, and the jurors of the Pulitzer Prize committee, and the editors, writers and owners of The New York Times, know better." In his dispatches, Mr. Duranty, one of the first Western journalists allowed to interview Stalin, repeatedly dismissed reports of the famine in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, peasants in the countryside were starving to death by the millions while Soviet authorities confiscated crops, grain and livestock in an effort to force collectivization on the independence-minded farmers.

British writer Malcolm Muggeridge, who reported on the famine for The Manchester Guardian, once called Mr. Duranty "the greatest liar of any journalist I have ever met in 50 years of journalism."

Catherine Mathis, vice-president of corporate communications for The New York Times, said the newspaper has criticized Mr. Duranty's reporting. In a display of its Pulitzer Prize winners, the Times points out that "other writers in The Times and elsewhere have discredited this coverage."

05.05.03. Freedom House: Ukraine er "et ufrit land" hvad pressefrihed angår

Freedom House - den amerikanske organisation, som monitorerer situationen omkring ytringsfriheden i hele verden, har lige offentliggjort resultatet af sine undersøgelser, som konkluderer, at Ukraine, Rusland og Venezuela er de lande, hvor man har konstateret de værste tendenser til overgreb mod den frie presse.
    Freedom House bedømmer situationen i landene som enten fri, delvist fri eller ufri, oplyser organisationens polske repræsentantskab. Bedømmelsen sker efter en skala, hvor 0-30 point giver et "frit" land, 31-60 - et "delvist frit" land og 61-100 - et "ufrit" land.
    Monitoreringen har vist, at situationen i 11 lande - Armenien, Columbia, Den dominikanske Republik, Jordan, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Rusland, Thailand, Ukraine og Venezuela - er blevet værre, mens den er blevet bedre i kun to lande - Fiji og Sri-Lanka.
    "Freedom House er meget bekymret over den betydelige indskrænkning af pressefriheden", - siger organisationens leder, Jennifer Windsor.
    Ud af 27 lande i Central- og Østeuropa samt det tidligere USSR anses 9 for at være frie hvad pressefrihed angår, 8 som værende delvist frie mens 10 af landene anses for at være ufrie.
    Ruslands og Armeniens placering er faldet fra "delvist frie" til "ufrie" efter at begge lande har lukket den fremtrædende uafhængige Tv-station.
    Ukraine er kommet i kategorien af "ufrie" lande, efter at der af politiske grunde blev rejst tiltaler efter straffeloven mod en række journalister, mens andre blev forfulgt af skattevæsnets kontrol, skriver Freedom House.
    Organisationen påpeger endvidere, at ukrainske og russiske journalister, som efterforsker korruption i staten, bliver udsat for forfølgelse og ind imellem bliver udsat for vold.
    Ukraine har fået 67 point. Det forklares i rapporten, at staten censurerer Tv-udsendelser, fortsætter forfølgelser af og lægger hindringer i vejen for uafhængige massemediers arbejde, og at styret ikke er i stand til at lave den fornødne efterforskning af overgreb mod journalister.
    Ytringsfriheden i Ukraine, hævder Freedom House, bliver hele tiden mindre p.a. vedvarende politisk pres mod styrets censur.
    Forfatningens §34 og loven om trykte massemedier, som blev vedtaget i 1991, garanterer ytringsfrihed, skriver Freedom House, men i praksis har journalisterne ikke den mulighed.
    Administrationen, hedder det i rapporten, instruerer jævnligt journalister ved hjælp af "temniki", hvor de får direktiver omkring temaer og nyhedsudsendelser.
    Ifølge Det europæiske institut for massemedier førte det statslige Tv under valgkampen i 2002 helt åbenlyst kampagne for det regerende parti.
    Selvom de elektroniske og trykte massemedier i Ukraine overvejende tilhører staten, skriver Freedom House, kontrollerer staten de vigtigste trykkerier og centre for distribution.
    Rapportens forfattere henviser desuden til en erklæring fra organisationen "Raportere uden grænser", som hævder, at ti jouralister indenfor de seneste fire år er omkommet under mistænkelige omstændigheder, mens 41 andre er kommet alvorligt til skade som følge af overfald.
    I oktober sidste år fandt man i Hviderusland liget af direktøren for nyhedsbureauet "Ukrajinski Novyny" Mykhajlo Kolomijets, en uge efter han var forsvundet i Kyiv. Det nyhedsbureau, som Kolomijets stod i spidsen for, offentliggjorde indimellem kritiske materialer om styret. I slutningen af året var sagen om hans død stadig åben.
    Det meget omtalt mord på journalisten Georgij Gongadze er heller ikke blevet opklaret. Interfaks-Ukrajina. BBC.

05.05.03. April 2003: 43,6% af ukrainerne anser NATO for at være "en aggressiv militærblok"

43,6% af Ukraines borgere mener, at NATO er en aggressiv militærblok. Det viser en meningsmåling, som blev foretaget i april 2003 af den sociologiske afdeling af Ukraines center for økonomiske og politiske studier opkaldt efter Oleksandr Razumkov.
    Ifølge Razumkov-centret havde dets melingsmålinger mellem juni 2000 og juni 2002 vist, at andelen af respondenter, der anså NATO for at være aggressiv militærblok, var mindsket fra 46,2% til 34,8%, samtidigt med, at antallet af dem, som anså alliancen for at være en forsvarsunion, var vokset fra 21,5% til 24,8%. Mens andelen af de respondenter, der anså NATO for at være en fredsskabende organisation reelt ikke havde ændret sig (hhv. 16,5% og 17,7%). Samtidigt var antallet af dem, som ikke kunne beslutte sig for, hvad de mente om NATO, vokset fra 15,8% til 22,7%.
    I april 2003 nåede vurderingen af NATO ned i nærheden af det negative niveau fra 2000 med 43,6%, der altså anså NATO for at være en aggressiv militærblok, mens kun 18,1% anså alliancen for at være en forsvarsunion og 12,5% - for at være en fredsskabende organisation. En fjerde del af de adspurgte (25,7%) afstod fra at svare på spørgsmålet.
    Ifølge eksperterne fra Razumkov-centret er det åbenlyst, at en væsentlig del af respondenterne, der i det store hele identificerer NATO med alliancens leder - USA - og amerikanernes handlinger i Irak, i deres vurdering af alliancen formentlig først og fremmest er underlagt en anti-krigsstemning, uden samtidig at tage hensyn til, at holdningen til Irak-operationen ikke er entydig blandt alliancens medlemslande.
    Ligeledes bør man tage hensyn til, at antallet af dem, som ikke accepterer alliancens brug af militærmagt, forbliver højt i samfundet. Lige nu er halvdelen af de adspurgte (50,5%) overbevist om, at NATO ikke har ret til at blande sig i et suverænt lands anliggender, selv hvis det sker for at løse humanitære problemer.
    Ifølge eksperterne ved Razumkov-centret har den forværrede holdning til NATO i det ukrainske samfund snarere en forbigående karakter. Man bør minde om, at
en tilsvarende opblussen af negative holdninger til Alliancen efter operationen på Balkan ikke førte til en styrkelse af disse holdninger i samfundet på mellemlang sigt. Derefter tabte "den jugoslaviske faktor" sin effekt, og holdningen til NATO ændrede sig langsomt til det bedre.
    Undersøgelsen er blevet gennemført af Razumkov-centret mellem den 2. og den 7. april 2003, hvor 2013 personer over 18 år i alle Ukraines regioner deltog. Podrobnosti. UNIAN.

06.05.03. Ukraine sender freds-og stabiliseringsstyrke til Irak

Ukrainske soldater skal deltage i den internationale styrke i Irak, oplyser Lenta.ru med henvisning til Associated Press.
    Ifølge den plan, som er blevet godkendt på konferencen for den antiirakiske koalitions stabiliserende operationer, som fandt sted i London, skal den ukrainske styrke arbejde i en af de militære sektorer, som man regner med at inddele Irak i.
    Ifølge AP skal ukrainerne befinde sig i en sektor enten under Storbritanniens eller Polens kommando. Målet med de ukrainske soldaters tilstedeværelse vil være at støtte fred og orden i den del af landet, hvor de skal være, samt gennemførelse af humanitære operationer.
    Udover Ukraine vil også Italien, Spanien, Danmark, Nederlandene og Bulgarien sende væbnede styrker til Irak. Soldaterne fra disse lande vil også blive placeret enten i den britiske eller den polske sektor.
    Alle landenes delinger vil være underlagt de amerikanske styrkers øverstbefalende i Irak, general Tommy Franks, - oplyser nyhedsbureauet.
    Tidligere har CNN oplyst, at amerikanske militære kilder havde sagt, at Irak ifølge en plan udarbejdet sammen med de britiske kolleger, skal deles op i  mindst tre militære sektorer under USA, Storbritanniens og Polens ledelse.
    Planen blev ifølge Lenta.ru godkendt på den antiirakiske koalitions konference for stabiliserende operationer, som fandt sted i London onsdag den 30. april. I konferencen deltog desuden repræsentanter for Italien, Spanien, Ukraine, Danmark, Bulgarien, Holland, Albanien, Filippinerne, Australien, Sydkorea og Qatar.
    Det forventes at der i løbet af maj vil finde endnu to møder sted for de lande, der er med i koalitionen. Møderne afholdes i Storbritannien og Polen. UP. UNIAN.

06.05.03. Kutjma presset af Putin under 5-dages "ferie" på Krim

"I går sluttede Vladimir Putins besøg på Krim, hvor han mødtes med sin ukrainske kollega Leonid Kutjma. I løbet af de 5 dage drøftede to landes præsidenter alle de mest brandaktuelle emner i relationerne mellem Moskva og Kyiv - lige fra gastransportkonsortiet og indtræden i WTO til de fælles projekter indenfor flyindustrien. Publikum fik kun den allermest behagelige side af mødet at se", skriver den russiske avis Kommersants journalist Rita Mishneva.
    Vladimir Putins rejse til Ukraine begyndte den 30. april. Han ankom til Simferopol, hvorfra han sammen med Leonid Kutjma kørte til Jalta. Præsidenterne besøgte Foros, hr. Kutjmas residens i "Zarja" samt vinfabrikken "Massandra", hvor de prøvesmagte diverse vinsorter, samtidig med at de drøftede alle de vigtigste emner i de bilaterale relationer. Præsident Putin var meget interesseret i etableringen af gastransport-konsortiet. Det viste sig, at han var ganske tilfreds med måden, som forberedelsen til etableringen af denne joint-venture havde foregået på. "Eksperterne har allerede analyseret en stor del af informationen om dette tema, og fornylig fik en repræsentant for "Ruhrgas" på et treparts møde overbragt denne information, som han var tilfreds med", - oplyste Vladimir Putin på en pressekonference i Jalta. Ifølge ham afholdes den næste forhandlingsrunde mellem de tre parter den 7. maj i Kyiv. I slutningen af maj vil der finde et afgørende møde sted mellem Ruslands og Ukraines præsidenter samt den tyske forbundskansler.
    Selvom mødet på Krim ifølge de ukrainske politologer havde en "festlig" karakter, så var den simpelthen en nødvendighed lige inden de tidligere omtalte forhandlinger "om gassen", fordi Ukraine og Rusland endnu ikke har løst en række problemer. Den russiske præsident berørte dette tema og bemærkede: "Vi mener, at vi til efteråret vil kunne nå bestemte aftaler. Vi ville gerne forberede det transnationale projekt og nå til en forståelse om omkostningssiden af alle parters deltagelse i projektet".
    Desuden viste det sig, at Rusland endnu ikke er helt præcist klar over, hvor meget benyttelsen af det ukrainske gastransportsystem komme til at koste. Vladimir Putin sagde, at det efter en analyse af dette systems tilstand vil være "nødvendigt at bestemme sig for, hvor mange midler man skal skyde ind i det, for ikke kun at     vedligeholde disse net, men også udvide dem med henblik på at øge eksporten af russisk gas til Vesteuropa".
    Det er reelt første gang at Rusland præsident begyndte at tale med sin ukrainske kollega om transitten af ikke alene russisk gas, men også olie og el-energi. "Det giver os grund til at antage, at vi og vore EU-partnere vil kunne nå frem til udformningen af en enig energipolitik, hvor Rusland, Ukraine, EU og de asiatiske lande vil blive inddraget", - sagde Vladimir Putin. Vi går ind for, at man ikke trækker afslutningen af konsortiets oprettelse i langdrag, men tværtimod for, at dette projekt ser dagens lys", - sagde Leonid Kutjma. Efter hans opfattelse er forhandlingerne om konsortiets etablering begyndt at bevæge sig med større succes efter at Tyskland er blevet inddraget. Ifølge den ukrainske præsident har lederen af Den europæiske bank for genopbygning og udvikling, Jean Lemier, også sagt, at banken var parat til at yde lån til projektet.
    Det andet tema i samtalen var forberedelsen til det næste SNG-topmøde og etableringen af et fælles økonomisk rum på Ukraines, Ruslands, Belarus' og Kazakhstans territorium. Ifølge hr. Kutjma ser "Ukraine ingen alternativer til en udbyggelse af vores relationer til Rusland og udviklingen af samarbejdet indenfor rammerne af et økonomisk enhedsrum på SNGs territorium". Men hr. Kutjmas udenrigsøkonomiske program ender ikke her. "Ukraine er nødt til at tænke på den fremtidige etablering af et økonomisk enhedsrum med Eurounionen. Det er vores fremtid", - sagde han.
    Det tredje vigtigste spørgsmål er de to landes kommende indtræden i WTO. Leonid Kutjma fremhævede, at Ukraines bevægelse mod WTO "ikke forløber sådan, som man kunne ønske det". Efter hans mening bør Ukraine og Rusland "i højere grad afstemme bevægelsen mod denne organisation". Vladimir Putin gav sin ukrainske kollega ret. "Jeg tror, at vi allerede i september vil nå frem til bestemte paramentre. I den forbindelse bestræber vi os på at synkronisere arbejdet med vores indtræden i WTO", - sagde han og præciserede, at det vil blive svært at træde ind i WTO for alle fire p.a. visse uoverensstemmelser. "Men hvis nogle uoverensstemmelser bliver bevaret, så vil det ikke nulstille vores bestræbelser henimod at etablere det økonomiske enhedsrum", - beroligede hr. Putin.
    Det fjerde punkt var drøftelsen af samarbejdet med EU. Vladimir Putin sagde med det samme, at Rusland og Ukraine har store lovgivningsmæssige uoverensstemmelser ikke kun med Eurounionen, men også indbyrdes. "Rusland har mange problemer med Ukraine: den sanitære kontrol, de tekniske parametre ved grænsen o.s.v., - oplyste den russiske leder. Han foreslog at etablere en arbejdsgruppe mellem de to regeringer, som skal udarbejde forslag til harmonisering af Ruslands og Ukraines lovgivning til de to landes parlamenter. Korrespodnent.net.

07.05.03. Ukraines parlament skal godkende stabiliseringsstyrke til Irak

Ukraines udenrigsministerium har modtaget forslag om ukrainske soldaters deltagelse i stabiliseringsstyrkerne i Irak. Det oplyste lederen af Ukraines pressetjeneste Markian Lubkivskyj i tirsdags.

Vi har allerede de nødvendige forslag, som vi studerer nøje. Fra vores side generaliserer vi forslagene og studerer mulighederne for en sådan deltagelse. I forbindelse hermed foregår der intensive konsultationer med den amerikanske side. Ukraine har utvivlsomt noget at tilbyde, og det ved vores partnere", - sagde han.    

Lubkivskyj oplyste på pressemødet i udenrigsministeriet, at initiativet ikke var kommet fra polsk side.

Den 30. april deltog Ukraine i et koordinationsmøde i London for repræsentanterne for de lande, som er potentielle deltagere i stabiliseringsstyrkerne i Irak.

En række massemedier har oplyst, at Irak efter planen skal inddeles i minimum tre zoner - under henholdsvis USAs, Storbritanniens og Polens ledelse. Polens præsident Aleksander Kwasniewski har fortalt pressen, at Polen forhandler om ukrainske soldaters deltagelse i stabiliseringsstyrkerne.

Samtidig forklarede Ukraines forsvarsministerium, hvilken procedure man skal igennem for at sende de ukrainske soldater til Irak som led i en stabiliseringsstyrke.

Først skal den interesserede part rette henvendelse til Ukraines udenrigsministerium. Såfremt der kommer en accept af afsendelsen af de ukrainske styrker til Irak, så skal beslutningen godkendes af Verkhovna Rada. "Derfor er det endnu for tidligt at tale om afsendelsen af yderligere delinger til lande udover de, hvor de ukrainske fredsbevarende styrker allerede befinder sig" - sagde lederen af forsvarsministeriets pressetjeneste Kostjantin Khivrenko ifølge BBC. 
    Samtidig påpegede sekretæren for det nationale sikkerheds- og forsvarsråd Jevhen Martjuk, at Kyiv vil tage stilling til hvad dets holdning er efter, at NATO har taget stilling til det. Det sagde han efter en konference om Alliancens relationer til Ukraine, som fandt sted i Washington bag lukkede døre. 

NATOs generalsekretær George Robertson sagde, at Alliancen ikke har udformet sin holdning til, hvorvidt den skal spille en eller anden rolle i Irak efter krigen. UP. Interfaks-Ukrajina.

07.05.03. Vejen for Ukraines medlemskab af NATO står næsten åben

NATOs generalsekretær George Robertson siger, at de værste hindringer for Ukraines medlemskab af NATO er ryddet af vejen. Robertson sagde: "Samarbejdet mellem Ukraine og NATO har altid ligget højt på listen over Alliancens strategiske prioriteringer. I løbet af det sidste år har der været visse problematiske situationer i relationerne mellem Ukraine og NATO, men for øjeblikket er denne vanskelighed overvundet, og vi bevæger os fremad. Jeg vil gerne sige, at den ukrainske regering gør en stor indsats for at opnå målet på vej til den euroatlantiske integration".
    Som tidligere omtalt afholdes der i Washington en konference som omhandler relationerne mellem Ukraine og NATO. Den ukrainske delegation består af sekretær for det nationale sikkerheds-og forsvarsråd, Jevhen Martjuk, formanden for Det nationale center for Ukraines euro-atlantiske integration, Volodymyr Horbulin, næ    sstformand for Verkhovna Rada, Oleksandr Zintjenko, samt forsvarsminister, Volodymyr Shkidtjenko.
    Deltagerne i konferencen tager stilling til spørgsmålet om NATOs og Ukraines indsats i opbygningen af fred og sikkerhed, overvindelse af vanskeligheder i forbindelse med gennemførelsen af forsvarsreformen, transformationen af Ukraines væbnede styrker, opfyldelsen af opgaverne indenfor handlingsplanen Ukraine-NATO, herunder den del, der vedrører sikkerheds-og forsvarsspørgsmål.
    Den nordatlaniske alliance er repræsenteret ved konferencen af USAs forsvarsminister, Donald Rumsfield, formanden for NATOs militære komite, Harald Kujat, medlem af Center for strategiske og internationale studier William Cohen, medlem af bestyrelsen og rådgiver for Center for strategiske og internationale studier Zbigniew Brzezinski, Storbritanniens forsvarsminister Adam Ingram samt Polens forsvarsminister Jerzsy Szmajdzinski. Podrobnosti. UNIAN.

07.05.03. Nu står kun det ukrainske folk i vejen for hurtigt NATO-medlemskab

De allerstørste hindringer for Ukraines vej til NATO er ryddet af vejen, sagde Alliancens generalsekretær, George Robertson, under mødet med de ukrainske politikere i Washington. Og han lovede Kyiv at hjælpe på landets vej imod den euroatlantiske integration, hvis ukrainerne vil gennemføre deres militære reform mere aktivt. Hverken George Robertson eller Jevhen Martjuk, som står i spidsen for den ukrainske delegation i USA, kunne nævne nogle mulige frister for indgivelsen af den ukrainske ansøgning om et medlemskab af Alliancen. Men begge parter var enige om, at Kyiv endnu har meget det skal nå for at opfylde "målplanen" for samarbejdet med NATO. Podrobnosti.
George Robertson og Jevhen Martjuk




08.08.03. USA foreslår, at Ukraine opstiller mindst ét brigadehovedkvarter i Irak

USA foreslår Ukraine at opstille mindst ét brigadehovedkvarter og to bataljoner i Irak, siger lederen af Det ukrainske center for økonomiske og politiske studier     opkaldt efter Oleksandr Razumov, Anatolij Hrytsenko.
    Lederen af Razumkov-centret befinder sig i øjeblikket i Washington som en del af den delegation, som skal forhandle med den amerikanske regering. Det fortalte han i et interview med "Novyj Kanal".
    Ifølge eksperten "er det det reelle", som De forenede Stater gerne vil se fra Ukraine. "Fra amerikansk side ser man det som et reelt skridt for at imødekomme Amerika, og som en mulighed for bagefter at yde en alvorlig politisk støtte til Ukraine på vej mod en indtræden i NATO.
    Amerikanerne stiller spørgsmålet på følgende måde: hvis I har et ønske, så skal I lede efter mulighederne. Hvis man ikke udnytter en sådan chance, så ved vi endnu ikke, hvornår den næste byder sig", - påpegede eksperten.
    Som tidligere oplyst har Ukraines udenrigsministerium modtaget et forslag om ukrainske soldaters deltagelse i en stabiliseringsstyrke i Irak, hvilket blev meddelt af lederen af ministeriets pressetjeneste, Markijan Lubkivskyj.
    Ifølge en række massemedier planlægger man at opdele Irak i mindst tre zoner - under USAs, Storbritanniens og Polens ledelse. Man regner med, at de ukrainske soldater skal være under enten britisk eller polsk overkommando. UP. Interfaks-Ukrajina.

08.08.03. Baggrunden for Volyn-massakren var undertrykkelsen af ukrainerne (eng.)

Kyiv Post
By Marcin Wojciechowski
Apr 23, 2003 23:42
Zbyszek, Yaroslav discover the way

Many Poles don't know exactly what happened in Volhynia in 1943 and they are not aware how many Ukrainians and Poles died. But they learned in school, at home and in books, that we, and only we, were victims during this tragic conflict.

Passing over in silence the truth about tragic events in Volhynia in 1943 won't help to fight against stereotypes between the Poles and Ukrainians. Only an open, frank and sometimes mutually painful dialogue can bring our two nations together.

A couple of days ago I was traveling from Warsaw to Lviv by bus. There were only a few passengers in the coach. Two young guys took a seat just beside me. They were about 30 years old. The first was a Pole, Zbyszek, and the second, Yaroslav, a Ukrainian. They had never met before. Just after we departed, they opened their bags and at the same time pulled out and cracked open two cans of beer. They laughed, shook hands, clinked their cans, and started a conversation, which was to continue all the way to Lviv.

"How do you like Poland?" Zbyszek asked.

"Poland is cool. I've been working here for three years," Yaroslav answered. "But I can't understand why the Poles so often call me a Rusek." I always explain I'm Ukrainian, but for you all the people east of the Bug River are Russians."

Zbyszek laughed and apologized. He started to talk about the Polish fascination with the West, especially in most recent years, and their total disrespect for the East, something that goes back centuries.

"We were always in opposition to the Russian empire, we were the last country in "Catholic Europe,'" Zbyszek explained. "We always felt we were Europeans, and we endeavored to feel and be fully European like the French, Germans or British. Disrespect for countries to the east is a typical Polish complex. We look to Ukrainians and other nations in the former Soviet Union in the same manner like French, Germans or Austrians see the Poles: they are poor people from a poor country."

Yaroslav seemed to be satisfied by this answer. After the third beer, Zbyszek and Yaroslav started to talk about history.

"Why do the Poles think we are cruel and aggressive? Why are you always calling us rezuny (rebellious peasants)? I don't know anyone more peaceful than Ukrainians," Yaroslav said.

Zbyszek at once mentioned the Volhynia events. He mentioned the burned villages, the bloody massacres, people who were axe murdered, as if he had been there. Many Poles don't know exactly what happened in Volhynia in 1943, how many people died on the Polish and Ukrainian sides, but they learned in school, at home and in books that Poles and only Poles were the victims of this conflict.

Talking to my newly made friends I try to explain to them that not all in Volhynia was black-and-white, but Zbyszek would hear nothing of it. His ignorance made his manner of speech increasingly animated.

"Banderowcy [as Poles often refer to the Ukrainian Insurrectionist Army] were bandits and idiots," Zbyszek said. "They wanted to remove all the Poles from the region. Can you imagine what they did in Volhynia? I will remember that forever. This is an unforgivable crime."

"They were heroes," Yaroslav replied. "They fought for Ukraine. The Poles occupied our territory and for many years oppressed Ukrainians. This is our land. They were right to start fighting."

I braced myself for the worst scenario. I was sure Zbyszek and Yaroslav would re-enact the battle fought 60 years ago. The old bus could not contain such fury. Several passengers quickly moved in expectation of a fierce scuffle. The driver was clearly nervous and unsure what to do.

Suddenly Zbyszek and Yaroslav went silent. A suspicious calm followed.

"Yaroslav, forgive me. I didn't want to offend you. You have the right to your own vision of your history. I never thought about Volhynia from a Ukrainian perspective," Zbyszek said.

"That's OK. I can imagine what happened there. I'm really sorry. I don't want to justify crimes, but in general Ukrainian nationalists are not bandits, as I heard dozens of times in Poland. Poles take the incidents in Volhynia and treat them as indicative of everything that is Ukrainian and all of Ukraine," Yaroslav said.

Throughout the rest of the trip they chatted in a friendly manner about Poland, Ukraine, their jobs, salaries, women and family. In Lviv they shook hands and each went his own way.

I'm telling this simple story because of a lesson it contains. I have participated in several Polish-Ukrainian seminars about Volhynia. I have talked to the historians from both countries, and with Polish and Ukrainian participants of these tragic events. But for the first time I could hear what ordinary people, small businessmen from Warsaw and Lviv, think about this tragedy. And I must say I'm positively surprised. For the first time I realized that the Volhynia incidents do not have to cause an inevitable rift between our nations.

The Poles want to commemorate the Volhynia massacres after 60 years to begin the healing of painful wounds, wounds which were marginalized and passed over in silence for many years. The families of the victims and people who left Volhynia in 1943 have the right to moral satisfaction, to commemorate their relatives, and to pray over their graves. For many it will be the final opportunity; come the 65th or 70th anniversary many witnesses and victims may no longer be with us.

In the last several months some Polish veterans' organizations have used unacceptable language of hate and revenge. Using words like genocide, crime against humanity, and planned mass killing doesn't serve the cause of reconciliation and confidence-building. It was a big mistake by a couple of Polish officials to speak in similar terms in speeches or letters. To their credit they almost immediately recognized their mistake and corrected their tone.

The Volhynia tragedy should be analyzed in the context of pre-war Poland's discriminatory policies towards the Ukrainian minority. Poles should understand that the Ukrainians in Volhynia and Halychyna not only could feel they were discriminated against, but that they were victims of organized and planned oppression by the Polish state and local administrative structures. At the same time, there is no justification for attacking civilians, burning entire villages, and the campaigns of terror conducted by some UPA units.

I would like President Aleksandr Kwasniewski to apologize for Ukrainian victims in Volhynia during the commemoration ceremony in July. He should mention the mistakes Poland made towards Ukrainians and Ukraine throughout our history. I don't know how Leonid Kuchma should react, what words he should use. This will depend on his conscience and political vision.

After the Polish roundtable talks in 1989, an independent Poland initiated the process of reconciliation with all its neighbors. We have a very good dialogue with Germany and Lithuania, and we have encouraging results with Russia. In 1996, Presidents Kwasniewski and Kuchma issued a common declaration on Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation which is a good base to go ahead with this process. We know by experience that commemoration of painful events is difficult, but also that ultimately it helps alleviate the pain.

I don't agree with Taras Kuzio that commemorating the massacres in Volhynia will increase anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Poland. To the contrary, and the best proof of this was provided by Zbyszek and Yaroslav during the bus ride to Lviv. We need dialogue on all painful issues, and many people in Poland and Ukraine are convinced the time has come. Let's take the lead in this dialogue and let's look to the future, lest the debate be conducted by extremists on both sides.

Last November I participated in an unforgettable ceremony at Lviv's Lychakiv Cemetery, home to graves of victims of the 1918-1919 Polish-Ukrainian war for Lviv and Halychyna. The ceremony was organized, without any governmental support, by leading supporters of reconciliation of our two nations under the leadership of former Solidarity activist Jacek Kuron. A common prayer ceremony was led by two cardinals: Lubomyr Husar and Marian Jaworski, both of whom were born in Lviv before World War II. We prayed in both languages, we lit candles on Ukrainian and Polish graves.

"It was a miracle!" said Kuron (also from Lviv) after the ceremony. "You see? And some people say there are no miracles," the cardinals replied. It's not too late to make the commemorating of the Volhynia events another miracle in Polish-Ukrainian relationships.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marcin Wojciechowski is a journalist for the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza, where he covers Ukraine and the former Soviet Union. This article was made possible through assistance from the Poland-America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative.
 

08.05.03. "Vores Ukraine" kritiserer styret for manglende dynamik i forhold til NATO-medlemskab

Den tidligere udenrigsminister Borys Tarasyuk betegnede de ukrainske lederes holdning som "koketteri", fordi de endnu ikke havde indgivet en ansøgning om et medlemskab i NATO.
    På en pressekonference i mandags kritiserede Tarasyuk Sikkerhedsrådets sekretær, Jevhen Martjuk, for hans forklaring om, at årsagen til den manglende ansøgning var, at man skulle gennem visse faser.
   "Det hele bliver vendt på hovedet. Ifølge Martjuk skal vi først opfylde målplanen, som vedtages for et år ad gangen. Dernæst skal vi træde ind i programmet MAP
(Membership Action Plan), og derefter - en intensiveret dialog. Og så vil vi kunne ansøge om et medlemskab af NATO", - påpegede Tarasyuk.
    Tarasyuk sagde, at Martjuk havde byttet rundt på de forskellige faser: en intensiveret dialog er en form for forberedelse af kandidaterne til at indtræde i NATO, som kommer før MAP og ikke omvendt, som Martjuk fik fremstillet det.
    "Desuden er alle lande, herunder dem fra Central- og Østeuropa, som allerede er medlemmer af NATO, og dem, som gør klar til at blive det, begyndt med at indlevere en ansøgning om et medlemskab, og ikke med en intensiv dialog og dernæst МАР.
    "Er det måske meningen, at man skal tilbagelægge alle faserne før man kan gøre op med sig selv, om man skal ansøge eller ej? Hvad kan man kalde det? At skabe plads til et tilbagetog? - understregede Tarasyuk.
    "Der er ingen, der har nogen som helst proceduremæssige begrænsninger i indgivelsen af en ansøgning. En ansøgning er et tegn på den ukrainske politiske ledelses faste beslutning. Fraværet af en ansøgning og forsøg på at forklare, hvorfor denne ansøgning ikke er blevet indgivet, er netop tegn på inkonsekvens og manglende oprigtighed", - tilføjede Tarasyuk, som er formand for parlamentets udvalg for eurointegration.
    Som tidligere oplyst havde Jevhen Martjuk sagt følgende omkring den dato, hvor Ukraine vil kunne ansøge om et NATO-medlemskab: "Ukraine kan indgive en ansøgning efter, at man først har opfyldt målplanen, dernæst er overgået til МАР, gennemført en intensiveret dialog, afholdt en intern procedure, opnået en konsensus indenrigspolitisk og en støtte i befolkningen på mindst 51% og så en lang række yderligere procedurer; altså der er tale om en langvarig vej".
    NATOs generalsekretær George Robertson sagde på Washington-konferencen mellem NATO og Ukraine, at NATO endnu ikke havde modtaget en eneste ansøgning fra Ukraine om medlemskab af alliancen. UP.

09.05.03. Prospects for the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine

Russia and Eurasia Review
Volume 2, Issue 8, April 15, 2003
By Taras Kuzio
The crucial event in Ukraine's political evolution will be the presidential election scheduled for October 2004. A study of previous elections from the past decade reveals some underlying patterns in Ukraine's electoral politics that will likely shape the outcome of this pivotal vote. Despite his high popularity ratings, a victory for the national-liberal leader Viktor Yushchenko in 2004 is not a certainty. His best chance for winning is to enter a second round facing Piotr Symonenko, the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU). For this to happen the opposition would do better to submit separate candidates in the first round of the race, especially as Yushchenko's Our Ukraine and the KPU will never agree on a single candidate to challenge the nominee of the "party of power." The current incumbent, Leonid Kuchma, is barred from running for a third term, and his centrist backers do not have a candidate with any public following. The Kuchmagate crisis destroyed the legitimacy of the oligarch ruling class, which makes it difficult for them to organize a Russian style succession. Hence 2004 will see an open and fiercely contested race.

1991 and 1994: National democrats marginalized

Ukraine's first presidential elections in December 1991 were an anomaly, as they did not go through to the second round, an occurrence not likely to be repeated in 2004. In 1991 Rada speaker Leonid Kravchuk won with a high majority of 62 percent. Three national democrats won a total of 29 percent while two liberals scored a combined 4.68 percent. The national democrats did not have candidates in the 1994 presidential elections, unless one counts Petro Talanchuk (0.5 percent) and Rada speaker Ivan Pliushch (1.3 percent), a well-known sympathizer of the liberal Yushchenko. The liberal economist Volodymyr Lanovyi (9.3 percent) and independent businessman Valeriy Babych (2.4 percent) were non-"party of power" centrists. With 13 percent of the vote, Socialist Party (SPU) leader Oleksandr Moroz obtained the best result of any candidate, other than those from the "party of power."

The main competition in the June-July 1994 race was between former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma and the incumbent, Kravchuk. The incumbent led in the first round by 37.7 percent to Kuchma's 31.3 percent. But Kuchma edged him out in the second round by 52.1 percent to 45.1 percent. Kuchma's victory was hardly a landslide when one considers that he had the backing of Russia (diplomatically, financially, and through the media), and that Kravchuk was betrayed by many of his colleagues in the "party of power." Still, Kravchuk's play on defense of statehood and patriotism won him nearly half of the votes and clear majorities in Western and Central Ukraine (including Kyiv).

1999 elections: Ukraine copies Russia

In the October-November 1999 presidential elections the national democrats were again under-represented. The leaders of the two wings of Rukh together obtained a paltry 3.4 percent of the vote, although some national democratic votes did go to former Security Service Chairman Yevhen Marchuk, who obtained 8.1 percent.

Marchuk's pre-election anti-corruption and anti-Kuchma rhetoric was very reminiscent of that which has been deployed by Yulia Tymoshenko since 2000. Many of Tymoshenko's active supporters are former Marchuk allies (for example, long-term former political prisoner Levko Lukianenko). Marchuk sold out his voters when he agreed to become secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (NRBO) just prior to the second round of elections. This directly copied the way Boris Yeltsin coopted rival Aleksandr Lebed in the 1996 Russian elections by appointing him secretary of the Russian Security Council. Since then the NRBO and Marchuk have become marginalized. With 11.3 percent of the vote, Moroz obtained a result similar to his 1994 performance (13 percent). Moroz's popularity as a politician is greater than that of his party, the SPU. The same is true for Yushchenko, who has higher ratings than his party, Our Ukraine. In Ukraine personalities are more important than party politics, a factor affirmed in the 2002 elections when blocs named themselves after their leaders.

The For the Truth, For the People, For Ukraine! (SPU-Peasant Party) bloc in the 1998 Rada elections obtained 8.6 percent of the vote, up from the 6.9 per cent obtained by the SPU in 2002. Both totals are still far less than the votes received by Moroz in the first rounds of the 1994 (13 percent) and 1999 (11.3 percent) presidential elections.

The two main candidates in the 1999 elections were incumbent Kuchma and KPU leader Piotr Symonenko, who obtained 36.5 and 22.2 percent of the votes, respectively. Besides Symonenko and Moroz, the third left-wing candidate was Natalia Vitrenko, leader of the Progressive Socialists (PSP), an offshoot of the SPU. The PSP, which obtained 11 percent, plays a fake opposition role in Ukrainian politics similar to that played by Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

Kuchma had always wanted to repeat Yeltsin's 1996 victory over Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov by facing Symonenko in the second round. Kuchma won by a comfortable 56.3 to Symonenko's 37.8 percent, which was less than the combined left vote of 44.5 percent in the first round. Kuchma would have possibly lost if he had faced Moroz, as there would have been less negative voting.

The incumbancy advantage

There are two certainties in Ukrainian presidential elections. First, the incumbent will get to the second round. His access to "administrative resources" and the advantages of office makes this a certainty. Second, a run-off is inevitable, since no candidate will score more than 50 percent in the first round. In the 1991 election, Kravchuk, the ideology secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) until August 1991 and Rada speaker from 1990, was the de facto incumbent.

In 2004 there will be no incumbent candidate, as Kuchma cannot stand for a third term. The position of Rada speaker is not a good springboard to victory in the elections (as seen by Pliushch in 1994 and Oleksandr Tkachenko, Rada speaker in 1999, who dropped out before the elections after finding little support). This suggests that current Rada speaker and former head of the presidential administration Volodymyr Lytvyn has little chance of success if he decides to become a presidential candidate in 2004. The same is probably true for the current presidential chief of staff Viktor Medvedchuk, who does harbor presidential ambitions.

As we have seen in Russia with Vladimir Putin, the best springboard to victory in the presidential elections is the position of prime minister. The government of Viktor Yanukevych came to power in November and has eighteen months grace before the Rada can initiate a vote of no confidence. Yanukevych's government will therefore remain in place, at a minimum, until July 2004--that is, up to the summer recess on the eve of the 2004 elections.

A single opposition candidate?

During his February visit to the United States, Yushchenko called for the "consolidation" of forces opposed to oligarchic clans and authoritarianism. But is opposition unity possible and, if so, is it likely to succeed? Secret Ministry of Interior documents dated November and leaked to Ukraiinska Pravda in February supported a single opposition candidate in the 2004 elections, which implies that Yanukevych does not see it as a threat. Ukraine's opposition is not united. A major divide exists between Our Ukraine and the radical three--the SPU, KPU and Tymoshenko. Our Ukraine is unsure whether or not it is part of the opposition. In February 2001 Prime Minister Yushchenko offered Kuchma immunity from prosecution, a step opposed by the radical opposition.

As with Rukh since 1992, Our Ukraine is divided into moderate derzhavnyky (statists), willing to compromise with the authorities, and anti-oligarch radicals closer to Tymoshenko. Yushchenko himself is a moderate, more at home negotiating compromises than leading demonstrators. Our Ukraine has also ruled out working with the KPU. The inability of the KPU to come to terms with the artificial famine of 1933, as seen by Symonenko's refusal at the February Rada hearings to accept it as a crime directed against Ukrainians, means that the gulf between national democrats and the KPU will remain wide.

The KPU refused to support the anti-Kuchma protests that grew out of the Kuchmagate crisis of November 2000. The KPU supported pro-presidential oligarchs in removing the Yushchenko government in April 2001. Another drawback for the opposition is that the KPU and Tymoshenko have high negative ratings, countering their relatively high positive ratings. The KPU's high negative ratings stem from its inability to disassociate itself from the Soviet past. Tymoshenko's come from her oligarchic links to Pavlo Lazarenko, arguably one of Ukraine's most corrupt prime ministers.

2004 election scenarios: Yushchenko versus Communist or centrist

The only two factors that are certain in the second round of the 2004 elections are that there will be no incumbent and that Yushchenko will be there. Yushchenko's popularity has remained steady at 25-30 percent since he became prime minister in December 1999. And as a presidential candidate, Yushchenko has no competition in Western and Central Ukraine. Nevertheless, the core one-third national democratic vote (29.5 percent in the 1991 presidential elections and 30.8 percent in the March 2002 Rada elections) is enough to secure passage to the second round but insufficient to guarantee victory. Yushchenko will get Tymoshenko's votes, but to win in the second round he will need to woo votes from the SPU and some centrists. In appealing to non-national democratic voters, Yushchenko has two choices. Either he seeks votes from those close to him (Democratic Initiatives, Agrarians and People's Democratic Rada factions). Or, he adopts Tymoshenko's populist, anti-oligarch and anti-corruption rhetoric in Eastern Ukraine. The first option would neutralize some oligarch opposition and provide access to "administrative resources." The second would antagonize the oligarchs but might overcome the Eastern Ukrainian distrust for his national democratic allies.

Yushchenko will face either KPU leader Symonenko or a pro-Kuchma centrist in the second round. Prime Minister Yanukevych could be the centrist. Yanukevych's advantage is that he can draw upon support from Donetsk, where he was governor from 1997-2002 and allied to Ukraine's wealthiest oligarch, Renat Akhmetov. In the 2002 elections, the pro-Kuchma For a United Ukraine (ZYU) bloc came in first only in Donetsk oblast, where it garnered 36.8 percent of the vote. Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, together with the city of Sevastopol, are the only three regions where Our Ukraine failed to cross the 4 percent threshold.

Yanukevych would be backed by Russia, and he could draw also on the one fifth of Ukraine's population in the Donbas to ensure that he enters the second round. If Yushchenko faces Yanukevych in the second round he could lose. The KPU would see the oligarchs as the lesser of two evils and probably back Yanukevuch, as in 2001 when it joined forces with pro-Kuchma centrists to remove the Yushchenko government. Factors working in Yushchenko's favor are that not all centrists would back a man from Donbas as Ukraine's President, and that Medvedchuk's Social Democratic United Party (SDPUo) is a serious business rival to the Donbas clan.

Yushchenko's best chance for victory would be to enter the second round facing Symonenko in a repeat of the 1999 elections. In opinion polls since 2000 Symonenko has always come in second to Yushchenko. If the second round were a contest between Yushchenko and Symonenko, pro-Kuchma centrists would back Yushchenko, fearing a Communist victory even more than Yushchenko's reforms.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies and adjunct professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto. 

09.05.03. Parlamentsmedlem beskylder skattevæsnet for at overvåge oppositionen

Parlamentsmedlem fra "Vores Ukraine" Oleh Tyahnibok beskylder Ukraines skattevæsen i Lviv-regionen for ulovlig overvågning af lederen af "Vores Ukraine", Viktor Jusjtjenko, lederen af Julia Tymoshenkos blok af samme navn samt lederen af Det socialistiske parti, Oleksandr Moroz, med det formål at kortlægge de kilder, der finansierer oppositionens aktiviteter. Det fortalte Tyahnibok i torsdags på en pressekonference i Lviv. "Jeg har ikke i loven om skattevæsnet fundet nogen paragraffer om, at skattevæsnet skal virke som en efterretningstjeneste", - sagde Tyahnibok.
    Ifølge ham er han i besiddelse af en rapport fra lederen af Lvivs skattevæset, Serhij Medvedtjuk, til sin overordnede Jurij Kravtjenko, hvori Medvedtjuk aflægger rapport om finansieringen af oppositionen fra udlandet. Ifølge Tyahnibok hedder det i rapporten, at lederne af oppositionen Jusjtjenko, Tymoshenko og Moroz i oktober sidste år holdt et møde med Polens premierminister Leszek Miller, hvor de drøftede spørgsmålet om finansieringen af oppositionens aktioner.
    "Velunderrettede kilder har fortalt os, at man bag kulisserne rejste spørgsmålet om økonomisk støtte til oppositionen", - citerede Tyahnibok rapporten. Ifølge Tyahnibok hedder det endvidere i rapporten, at visse polske forretningsfolk foreslog at finansiere den ukrainske oppositions aktioner gennem Kredit Bank (Ukraine). Samtidig sagde Tyahnibok ikke noget om, hvorvidt der i rapporten var nævnt konkrete eksempler på finansiering af oppositionen fra udlandet.
    Tyahnibok sagde, at Jusjtjenko, Tymoshenko og Moroz har afvist den information, som var indenholdt i Medvedtjuks rapport. Tyahnibok tilføjede, at Millers assistent ear blevet gjort bekendt med rapportens tekst, som inden længe vil blive sendt til rigsadvokaturen og udenrigsministeriet. 
    Julia Tymoshenkos Blok, Socialistpartiet og Det kommunistiske parti arrangerede indenfor rammerne af aktionen "Rejs dig Ukraine!" omfattende gadeoptog i Kyiv og de regionale hovedstæder, som fandt sted den 16. september 2002 og den 9. marts 2003. Hovedformålet med aktionen "Rejs dig Ukraine!" var afholdelsen af et ekstraordinært præsidentvalg. Senere sluttede blokken "Vores Ukraine" sig til aktionen.
    Tidligere har deputerede fra "Vores Ukraine"s fraktion i Radaen beskyldt skattevæsnet i Lviv-regionen for at udøve politisk motiveret pression mod selskaber, som var forbundet med "Vores Ukraine".
    Kredit Bank (Ukraine) er den største bank med vestlig kapital efter Raiffeisenbank (Ukraine). Podrobnosti. Ukrajinski Novyny.

10.05.03. Ruslands gasaftaler med SNG-lande isolerer Ukraine 

RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report
Vol. 5, No. 16, 29 April 2003

Ukraine has ended a three-year argument with the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom, but the solution may cost the Russian budget $700 million. So far, Moscow appears willing to forgo an enormous amount of budget revenue in order to close the books on one of the longest-running disputes in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as it consolidates control over the region's gas supplies. Earlier this month, officials announced that the Ukrainian state petroleum company Naftohaz Ukrayiny had agreed with Gazprom to pay $1.4 billion in debt for Russian gas with eurobonds. Ukraine ran up the huge bill in 1999 and 2000 by diverting gas from the former Soviet pipelines that cross its territory on the way to Europe, which relies on Russia for one-fourth of its gas. The problem of Ukraine's gas debt has ruffled relations with Russia for years. Officials previously announced they had settled the issue in October 2001, but eight months passed before they disclosed that they had overlooked a massive tax liability that stopped the debt deal dead in its tracks.

But Gazprom's $700 million in taxes may be written off in the midst of a sweeping consolidation from which Russia may emerge as master of nearly all the region's gas. This month, Russia signed a 25-year import and cooperation deal with Turkmenistan that seems likely to dominate that country's gas sector.

Last week, Naftohaz's Boyko gave assurances that Ukraine would also sign a 25-year gas pact with Ashgabat, but Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov said that Kyiv's supplies will depend on building a new $1 billion pipeline, because commitments to Russia will fill all existing lines. Russia's move may again raise questions of energy security for Ukraine, making it eager to put the debt and consortium issues to rest.

Russia's deal with Turkmenistan follows a 10-year gas cooperation pact with Kazakhstan signed in late 2001 and the formation of a Gazprom joint venture last June for transit and foreign sales. In December, Uzbekistan also signed a cooperation and sales agreement with Gazprom, which is good through 2012. In one sense, the consolidation may be a natural product of the geography that the Soviet Union left behind, making it hard for CIS countries to export without Russia. But there are also signs that Moscow wants to maximize its role in tangential spheres. One example is President Vladimir Putin's recent call for CIS countries to coordinate policies on joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) as they move toward creating a unified economic space. Speaking at a meeting of officials from Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, Putin said, "We know how to reach the goal, but there are major obstacles on our road to it," the RIA-Novosti news agency reported. "I mean the four countries must coordinate their stances as they join the WTO," Putin added.

The EU's demand that Russia raise its domestic gas prices to world levels remains the biggest roadblock to Russian membership. The EU is upset that its gas prices are kept high so that Russia's can stay low. But Russia's growing control over gas in all the neighboring countries could turn into a unified front to resist the EU's demand.

If Russia can hold the line on gas prices, $700 million in lost taxes might be a small price to pay. RFE/RL correspondent Michael Lelyveld wrote this report.

After nearly two years of negotiating the agreement, someone at Gazprom apparently realized that if it accepted Ukraine's bonds as payment, the company would owe $700 million in taxes to the Russian state. The discovery caused Gazprom to refuse acceptance of the bonds for more than a year.

It has taken that long for officials to figure out how Gazprom can collect Ukraine's debt while ducking the tax. On 18 April, Yuriy Boyko, Naftohaz's chief executive, told reporters in Kyiv: "We will transfer the papers by 1 July. We have found a scheme which is convenient for Gazprom."

The scheme involves transferring the bonds to Gazprom at a discount, while Gazprom will pay for much of its gas transit to Europe through Ukraine with gas instead of cash. The murky details may matter less than the results, because the debt problem has been holding up the formation of an international consortium that will manage Ukraine's gas-transit system. The pipelines are Russia's main export route for gas to the European Union and a lifeline for EU energy supplies. The consortium plan could end a decade of tension over Russia's ability to secure its export routes after the Soviet breakup, when Ukraine gained unexpected leverage through control of the pipelines.

The consortium plan will fudge the control question because neither country will hold a majority of the shares, although the group will be organized under Ukrainian law. If the gas companies of Germany and France join the consortium, as expected, it can be argued that Gazprom's power will be diluted even more, while billions of dollars in investment can be channeled to improving the Ukrainian lines.

On the other hand, Ruhrgas of Germany and Gaz de France are also top Gazprom customers and partners, making it a close call as to who will wield power. Fifty-one percent of Gazprom shares are owned by the Russian state and Gazprom itself. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma seems to see the benefit of proceeding anyway, in part because Russia has spent years planning bypass routes for gas transit around Ukraine.

Moscow now seems to be as ready to gloss over the tax question as Kyiv is willing to fudge the control issue. Both may see overriding benefits in going ahead.

RFE/RL correspondent Michael Lelyveld wrote this report.

11.05.03. Mulighed for fornyet dynamik i relationerne mellem Ukraine og NATO

Sekretær for Ukraines nationale sikkerheds-og forsvarsråd, Jevhen Martjuk, siger, at det vigtigste ved forhandlingerne i Washington var det, at alle deltagerne støttede Ukraine i landets euroatlantiske bestræbelser, og at næsten alle foreslog at yde landet støtte i den forbindelse.
    Det sagde Martjuk til BBCs ukrainske afdeling, som havde bedt ham om at kommentere resultatet af det fælles møde i Washington for NATO-landenes forsvarsministre og ukrainske repræsentanter.

De lande, som var blevet inviteret ind i Alliancen for nylig, sagde, at de gerne ville dele deres erfaring med Ukraine. Sekretæren mener, at det er et alvorligt signal om muligheden for en ny dynamik i relationerne Ukraine-NATO.

Martjuk fortalte, at der under mødet med de amerikanske repræsentanter blev givet et signal om, at Kyiv vil kunne bevæge sig alvorligt fremad i de ukrainsk- amerikanske relationer. I denne situation skal Kyiv selv afgøre, hvorvidt landet vil tage de i stabiliseringsstyrken i Irak. I givet fald skal man handle hurtigt, mente Martjuk.

Ifølge Martjuk blev det i Washigton understreget, at der var en ny interesse for Ukraine, og der blev demonstreret et ønske om en genoptagelse af dialogen og samarbejdet.

Men Martjuk påpeger, at man ikke bør forledes til at tro, at problemerne er glemt: de er bare rykket i baggrunden. 

Sekretæren for sikkerhedsrådet mener, at der er kommet et alvorligt signal om muligheden for en ny dynamik i relationerne Ukraine-NATO. Men Ukraine står i dag foran udfordringer, som landet for det meste selv må overvinde, siger Martjuk.
Det er ikke kun en forsvarsreform, men også problemet med en politisk reform, ytringsfriheden, en fri presse samt udviklingen af et civilsamfund.

10.05.03. Ukrainsk deltagelse i Irak kræver invitation fra regering

Sekretær for Ukraines nationale sikkerheds-og forsvarsråd, Jevhen Martjuk går ind for Ukraines deltagelse i stabiliseringsstyrker i Irak.

I et interview til BBCs ukrainske afdeling siger Martjuk, at nu må Ukraine selv afgøre dette spørgsmål, herunder på lovgivningsplan. Og hvis landet ikke gør det, så vil man klare sig uden Ukraine, siger han.
    Adspurgt om de mulige former hvorunder deltagelsen i stabiliseringsstyrkerne kan komme på tale, så udelukkede Martjuk, at de ukrainske styrker vil påtage sig politimæssige funktioner. Men han mindede om nødvendigheden af fredsskabende bestræbelser, herunder med henblik på at forhindre religiøse stridigheder i Irak.
    Samtidig taler Martjuk om, at der er nogle juridiske sten, der skal ryddes af vejen, idet han minder om, at der er to love, bl.a. en lov om fredsskabende styrker og afsendelse af delinger til udlandet, som forudsætter, at der foreligger en indbydelse fra en regering og en bilateral aftale.
    Ifølge Jevhen Martjuk kan Ukraine ikke sende folk til Irak, så længe man ikke ved, hvem der skal være ansvarlig for deres sikkerhed. Den bør høre ind under den part, som modtager styrkerne; men i Irak har man endnu ikke dannet en regering.

"Det er ønskeligt med en beslutning i FNs Sikkerhedsråd, og det ville være det bedste for os. Indenfor en måned skal der dannes en irakisk overgangsregering med nogle elementer af valgbarhed... Hvis disse to spørgsmål bliver løst hurtigt, så vil vi have flere chancer set ud fra et retsligt synspunkt", - sagde Martjuk.

Hvis den ukrainske regering og parlament finder en konsensus i forhold til nødvendigheden af at afsende ukrainske soldater til Irak, så vil man ifølge sekretæren konkret skulle aftale den form, hvorunder indsatsen vil finde sted.

12.05.03. Udenrigsminister sikker på EU-medlemskab for Ukraine

Udenrigsminister Anatolij Zlenko er sikker på, at Ukraine en gang i fremtiden bliver medlem af Den europæiske Union. Det sagde Zlenko i fredags i byen Antalija i Tyrkiet.
    "Allerede i dag er jeg overbevist om, at Ukraine ikke vil komme til at stå udenfor Den europæiske Union", - sagde han.
    Ifølge Zlenko er det vigtigste for EU i dag at anerkende Ukraines plads og rolle i den fremtidige Union. 
    "Det er lige nu det vigtigste spørgsmål for Den europæiske Unions overvejelser. At tænke over, hvordan man kan tilpasse så kæmpestort et land til de europæiske kriterier, og hvordan man kan udnytte mulighederne og det enorme industrielle og landbrugsmæssige potentiale i Den europæiske Unions interesse", - påpegede Zlenko. 

Ifølge ministeren bør EU også afgøre, hvordan man vil udnytte Ukraines militær-teknologiske potentiale med henblik på skabelsen af en europæisk forsvars-og sikkerhedspolitik.  "Jeg har allerede beregnet det og draget mine egne slutninger. Jeg vil råde alle til at udvise tålmodighed og arbejde ansvarsfuldt på sagen", - kommenterede Zlenko muligheden af Ukraines indtræden i EU.
    Zlenko var ondsag-fredag på officielt besøg i Tyrkiet.
    Tidligere på ugen erklærede EUs udvidelseskommissær Günter Verheugen, at han ikke ville udelukke muligheden af, at Ukraine kan få tildelt status som associeret medlem, hvilket kan blive det næste stade efter landets status af nabo. UP.

13.05.03. Severinsen: for tidligt at stoppe Ukraine-monitorering

Referent ved Europarådets parlamentariske forsamlings (PACEs) monitoreringskomite Hanne Severinsen foreslår,  at man venter med at indstille monitoreringen af Ukraine. Det sagde hun den 12. maj til pressen under pausen i det lukkede møde i PACEs monitoreringskomite, som fandt sted i Kyiv. 

Ifølge Severinsen kan det næste møde i komiteen allerede finde sted i begyndelsen af juni, og her vil man behandle en resolution vedrørende Ukraine.

Hun sagde, at hun indtil videre ikke kunne give nogle datoer for afholdelsen af mødet, men udtrykte et håb om, at man på mødet kunne vedtage at høre en beretning om Ukraine på den parlamentariske forsamlings session i juni.

Severinsen er overbevist om, at der er sket en "indiskutable fremskridt" i Ukraine indenfor de seneste år i forhold til opfyldelsen af forpligtelserne overfor Europarådet. "Vi mener, at Ukraine har opfyldt sine forpligtelser i forhold til Europarådet for 90% vedkommende", - sagde hun, men tilføjede, at der stadig er nogle forpligtelser, som Ukraine mangler at opfylde til fulde; nemlig i første række sikringen af massemediernes frihed og valgenes gennemskuelighed. Podrobnosti, UNIAN.

13.05.03. Ukraine vil opfylde forpligtelser overfor Europarådet til efteråret

Formanden for Verkhovna Rada, Volodymyr Lytvyn, siger, at Ukraine til efteråret vil kunne opfylde sine resterende forpligtelser overfor Europarådet, som landet påtog sig, da det trådte ind i Europarådet. Det sagde Lytvyn under sit møde med de 22 medlemmer af PACEs monitoreringskomite, som er ankommet til Kyiv.

I den forbindelser fremhævede Lytvyn, at Ukraine mangler at vedtage en Retsplejelov, en lov om anklagemyndigheden samt at overflytte kriminalforsorgen til justitsministeriets ressortområde.

Ifølge Lytvyn skal Ukraine desuden ratificere det europæiske charter for de regionale sprog og mindretallenes sprog.
    I den forbindelse konstaterede formanden for parlamentet, at Ukraine havde gjort væsentlige fremskridt under løsningen af de endnu ikke opfyldte forpligtelser.

PACEs delegation skal være i Kyiv indtil den 14. maj.

Den 12. maj skal PACEs medlemmer desuden mødes med lederne af grupper af deputerede samt fraktionerne i Radaen, og på tirsdag skal de holde et møde med præsident Leonid Kutjma.

Som tidligere omtalt, så indgår der 45 lande i Europarådet, som blev oprettet i 1949. Europarådets parlamentariske forsamling har en rådgivende funktion.

Tidligere har Ukraine opfyldt følgende forpligtelser - vedtaget en ny forfatning, et dokument om retspolitikken indenfor menneskerettighedsbeskyttelsen, en ny straffelov og civilretslig lov, en valglov, samt fået løst spørgsmålet om udleveringen af lovovertrædere og hjælp i straffesager.  Podrobnosti, Ukrajinski Novyny.

13.05.03. 3,2% af ukrainerne går ind for at forlænge Kutjmas embedsperiode

Ukrainerne mener, at det ikke er den nuværende, men kommende præsident, som skal gennemføre den politiske reform. Det oplyste direktør for Institut for politik og medlem af "Vores Ukraine", Mykola Tomenko, på en pressekonference, idet han henviste til resultatet af en meningsmåling gennemført i april 2003. 
    56,5% af de adspurgte mener, at det er den præsident, som bliver valgt i 2004, som skal gennemføre reformen.  15,7% går ind for at give den nuværende præsident lov til at stå for opgaven. 27,6% er i tvivl om svaret.
    "Borgerne ønsker en politisk reform, og det taler lederne af samtlige partier også om. Spørgsmålet er bare, hvem der skal gennemføre den, og hvad indholdet bliver", - sagde Tomenko.
    Han fremlagde også resultatet af en rundspørge om støtten til afholdelsen af præsidentvalg og parlamentsvalg samme år - hvilket ifølge Tomenko var den egentlige tanke bag reformen: 3,2% går ind for at forlænge Leonid Kutjmas magtbeføjelser til 2006 samtidig med det næste parlamentsvalg. 19,7% går ind for, at der afholdes et parlaments- og præsidentvalg i 2004. Tomenko offentliggjorde desuden tal, der viste omfanget af støtte til andre varianter:

43,1% går ind for et ekstraordinært præsidentvalg i 2003. 26,5% går ind for et ekstraordinært valg til Verkhovna Rada i 2003.  39,5% går ind for, at præsidentvalget finder sted efter planen i 2004. Mens 31,4% går ind for, at valget til Verkhovna Rada skal afholdes i 2006 i overensstemmelse med planen. 
    Meningsmålingen blev gennemført i dagene den 11-22. april af "Den ukrainske demokratiske kreds" og var bestilt af Institut for politik. 2000 respondenter deltog i målingen. 

Ifølge meningsmålingen er der ikke sket nogle ændringer i, hvordan de forskellige aspiranter til præsidentposten står. Hvis valget fandt sted på næste søndag, så ville Jusjtjenko få støtte fra 23% af de adspurgte (27,8% af dem, som ville stemme),

Symonenko - 14,2% (17,9%)
Tymoshenko – 7% (8,4%)
Janukovytj – 5,8% (6,3%)
Моroz – 5,3% (6,1%)
Меdvedtjuk – 3,5% (4,3%)

I anden valgrunde ville Jusjtjenko kunne besejre samtlige hypotetiske modstandere med 16-42%. Den mindste sejr ville Jusjtjenko kunne vinde over Petro Symonenko. 46,6% ville i 2. runde stemme på lederen af "Vores Ukraine", mens 30,1% ville stemme på kommunisternes.
    Hvis Jusjtjenko skulle op mod Jannukovytj, ville han i 2. runde opnå 48% mod 19,7%. Hvis modstanderen blev Tymoshenko, så ville han vinde med 46,2% mod 16,5%. UP.

14.05.03. Ukraine between the elections (2002-04): Opportunities and pitfalls ahead

Johnson's Russia List, #7163
1 May 2003
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project www.cdi.org
#8
Kennan Institute event summary
April 7, 12:00

In a recent meeting at the Kennan Institute, Sergiy Komisarenko, President of the Ukrainian Institute for Peace and Democracy discussed recent developments in Ukrainian politics. According to Komisarenko, Ukraine still does not have an effective, stable political system. He explained that as evidenced by the results of the latest parliamentary election, opposition parties in Ukraine have very few legal rights and suffer from a lack of structure.

Komisarenko discussed the leading candidates for the upcoming presidential election, and explained President Kuchma's attempts to introduce constitutional reforms that could influence the election. Komisarenko attributed the instability of the Ukrainian political system, in part, to the country's ineffective economic policy. He posited that "an optimal and effective macroeconomic policy can only be realized under the conditions of a stable political system with proper leadership, principle market institutions that work properly, national self-esteem, and an open and public society."

In Komisarenko's opinion, Ukraine's political system is ineffective because the language of the constitution severely limits the constructiveness, structure, and legal rights of the political opposition. Komisarenko explained that following the 2002 parliamentary elections, many of the opposition parties encountered difficulties during and after the elections. He noted that the "so-called opposition" or the Our Ukraine faction in the parliament is composed of nearly fifty different political parties. Keeping this mixed coalition together has proven to be a difficult task for party leader and leading presidential candidate, Viktor Yushchenko.

According to Komisarenko, the instability of the Ukraine political system makes it nearly impossible to predict who will be the next president of Ukraine. He listed approximately ten different people who could possibly win the upcoming election, but also warned that there are no guarantees that any of them would make it that far. He noted that Yushchenko remains the most popular person in Ukraine, but many citizens have voiced their concerns about his ability to govern effectively.

Komisarenko stated that there is still a chance that the current Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma, may attempt to lengthen his presidential term. Komisarenko explained that according to the Ukrainian constitution, Kuchma must step down because he has served two terms. However, Kuchma has suggested several constitutional reforms to the parliament and the possibility still exists that he will try to extend his term or go onto a third term. According to Komisarenko, President Kuchma's original plan was to find a candidate who could guarantee him security and immunity (similar to the Russian case of Yeltsin and Putin). Because no suitable candidate was found, Komisarenko continued, it appears that Kuchma has decided to [word missing] constitutional reform as his next strategy. Komisarenko warned that among the many reforms proposed by Kuchma, his suggestion of making national referendum an instrument of legislation would be "disastrous for the development of democracy in Ukraine."

Komisarenko posited that another possible candidate might be former president, Leonid Kravchuk, who could be president for a third term because the constitution only stipulates that the president cannot serve for more than two consecutive terms. Komisarenko noted that Mr. Kravchuk is not very popular in eastern Ukraine, but "under the current circumstances where there is no clear candidate for the presidency, he can be such a candidate."

Komisarenko concluded by saying that while the immediate outlook does not looks positive for Ukrainian democracy, he hopes that the country can build upon its economic, agricultural and intellectual potential and introduce balance and stability into its political system.

14.05.03. Økonomiministeriet afviser synkronisering af WTO-medlemskab

Det er en almindelig international praksis, at man bevarer fortroligheden i bilaterale aftaler om adgang til WTO-medlemslandenes markeder for varer og tjenester, og den har heller ikke Ukraine ikke tænkt sig at give afkald på.

Sådan kommenterede det ukrainske økonomi- og eurointegrations- ministeriums statssekretær Valerij Pyatnytskyj muligheden af, at de to lande - Ukraine og Rusland - synkroniserer deres indtræden i WTO.

Ruslands vice-premierminister Viktor Khrystenko beskyldte tidligere Ukraines regering for at bryde aftalerne mellem Ruslands, Ukraines, Hvideruslands og Kazakhstans præsidenter og koordineringen af indtræden i WTO, fordi landet bl.a. havde indgået en række aftaler med Den europæiske Union uden at konsultere de andre lande.
    "Det er nemmest for os at føre forhandlinger og underskrive et eller andet uden at vi på forhånd afslører vores holdning", - oplyses det på økonomiministeriets hjemmeside med henvisning til Pyatnytskyj.
    Han oplyste, at WTOs sekretariat inden afslutningen af forhandlingerne ville modtage samtlige mellemprotokollerne i fortrolighed, og anbefalede samtlige lande at gøre det samme, og for regnede ikke med, at reglerne om adgangen til databasen for alle forhandlinger ville blive ændret i den nærmeste fremtid.

Statssekretæren understregede, at aftalernes fortrolighed også hang sammen med nødvendigheden af at bevare de landes interesser, som aftalerne er underskrevet med.
    Som eksempel anførte han Ukraines forhandlinger med EU, som sideløbende fører forhandlinger med Rusland, Kazakhstan og Hviderusland. Ifølge ham vil Ukraines ensidige afsløring af deres resultater til en vis grad influere på deres holdning og vil kunne skade en mulig ændring af Ukraine-EU aftalens betingelser på initiativ af Kyiv. 

"Hvis vi forinden offentliggør resultatet af forhandlingerne, så vil disse udenlandske partnere ganske logisk kunne svare: "Gode venner, hvis I havde overholdt fortroligheden, så kunne man godt have gjort det, men når det er kommet til offentlighedens kendskab, og I har svækket vores forhandlingsposition, hvorfor skal vi så gå Jer i møde?", - påpegede Pyatnytskyj.
    Han understregede, at alle aftaler vil blive sammenkørt, og der vil være en samlet protokol, som skal danne grundlaget for indgåelsen af den endelige aftale, kun ved afslutningen af processen.
    Ukraine fører bilaterale forhandlinger med 25 ud af 46 der indgår i arbejdsgruppen om indtræden på deres markeder for varer-og tjenesteydelser og håber på at træde ind i WTO inden udgangen af 2004. Ukraine har allerede underskrevet 13 bilaterale protokoller med Mexico, Uruguay, New Zealand, Canada, Sydkorea, Slovenien, Letland, Georgien, Indien, Ungarn, EU, Tjekkiet og Slovakiet.

Regeringen vurderer, at forhandlingerne med Tyrkiet, Cuba, Japan, Polen og Norge befinder sig i den afsluttende fase. Forhandlingerne med Bulgarien er allerede afsluttet. Der tilbagestår visse uløste spørgsmål i forhold til Australien, USA, Schweiz, Kirgisistan, Litauen og Moldova. UP, Interfaks-Ukrajjina.

14.05.03. Hanne Severinsen foreslår at drøfte EU-medlemskab

Europarådets parlamentariske forsamlings referent Hanne Severinsen foreslår at drøfte spørgsmålet om Ukraines indtræden i Eurounionen. Det sagde hun under mødet med udenrigsminister Anatolij Zlenko. Lederen af udenrigstjenesten understregede, at eurointegrationen er hovedprioriteten i Ukraines udenrigspolitik.

I løbet af de tre dage, hvor hele monitoreringskomiteen for første gang var samlet her i landet, havde den muligheden for at se de ukrainske realiteter med deres egne øjne. Besøgsprogrammet var traditionelt - møder med den ukrainske ledelse, journalisterne og parlamentarikerne. Iagttagernes indtryk var også ret traditionelle. Gæsterne roste de fremskridt, der er opnået i forskellige sfærer, men forlangte en 100% opfyldelse af de forpligtelserne. Zuzette Durue - formand for PACEs monotoreringskomite: "Reformerne i Ukraine skrider fremad, selvom der endnu er mange problemer her i sammenligning med mit land. Vi kan se, at landet bliver stadig mere frit og åbent; det er nødvendigt at føre reformerne til ende". 

Den forestående politiske reform er i særlig grad genstand for PACEs bevågenhed. Europæerne vil se til, at den bliver gennemført indenfor rammerne af forfatningen. Iagttagere råder til at færdiggøre ændringerne inden det næste præsidentvalg. Kun derefter vil Kyiv ifølge referent Hanne Severinsen kunne regne med at få afsluttet monitoreringen. Til september vil europaparlamentarikerne endnu en gang tage stilling til det ukrainske spørgsmål. Podrobnosti.