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30.01.03. The killing of a journalist: new book on Heorhii Gongadze
29.01.03. Rusland og Ukraine underskriver en række vigtige dokumenter
29.01.03. How Ukrainians view their own history: results of latest poll
29.01.03. Macroeconomic report on Ukraine: Year end 2002
29.01.03. Official status for foreign-based Ukrainians
27.01.03. 1.vice-premierminister aflyser tur til USA p.a. akut sygdom
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21.01.03. Storbritannien, Tyskland og Canada indfører sanktioner mod Ukraine
20.01.03. USA-ambassadører: russisk gennembrud i skyggeprivatiseringen af strategiske objekter i Ukraine
20.01.03. Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic choice (Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) Report 2002/13)
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Kendt journalist fundet død på hotel i Vinnytsa
19.01.03. Litauen og Polen ønsker Ukraine ind i EU og NATO
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Ukrainian factory makes toys from land mines
17.01.03. The December 2001 census of Ukraine
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13.01.03. Kutjma nedsætter center for euroatlantisk integration
13.01.03. Europarådet vil se på sagen om Kolomijets
13.01.03. Link til DR-Orienterings udsendelsesrække om Ukraine - http://www.dr.dk/orientering/siukraine.htm (Real Player)
13.01.03. USA undersøger både "Koltjuga"-sagen og sagen om ponton-broerne
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11.01.03. The Times om nye beskyldninger mod Ukraine om våbensalg (eng.)
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President Kuchma's New Year speech
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Washington Post: "Scare Tactics On the Rise In Ukraine"
04.01.03.
Ukrainian Parliament to mull ratification of minority-language charter
04.01.03. Kuchma seeks Russian support amid Western isolation
04.01.03. Ukrainske journalister protesterer mod indskrænkning af ytringsfriheden (eng.)


04.01.03. Ukrainian journalists assess freedom of speech and political censorship in Ukraine

 Yuriy YAKIMENKO and Ihor ZHDANOV
The Twilight of Freedom of Expression (Expert Assessments of Freed om of Speech and Political Censorship in Ukraine by Ukrainian Journalists)

If politicians and journalists drew up annual rating lists of key problems in this country, the 2002 list would be topped by the problem of freedom of expression. To be more exact - political censorship. Just a few weeks after the election rage, Ukrainian journalists looked back on those elections almost as on a triumph of democracy.

The new staff of the Presidential Administration have made the govenrment's influence on the mass media more organized, centralized, systemic, methodical, efficacious We could give many other epithets that would be envied by any political manager, if it was not for one but - the goals of this influence and the means of reaching them have nothing to do with democracy, law or morality.

Talk started brewing among journalists and other aware people about political censorship in Ukraine being reanimated by the authorities through their pressure on the owners and managers of the mass media and journalists. The issue became the subject of hearings in Parliament, journalists set up a strike committee and an independent trade union, and now they are contemplating radical steps in defense of their rights. But that's only one side of the coin.

On the other, those who are directly accused of censorship claim that there is no political censorship, because it is prohibited by the Constitution, because there is no post of censor as such and because the very term censorship is not defined in the active legislation. Moreover, Ukrainians are denied explanations and the right to their own opinion. S.Vasiliev, a representative of the Presidential Administration, said that it is not correct to put a professional question to an unprofessional audience. So the fact that three-fourths of Ukrainians admit to the existence of censorship doesn't matter.

And what if those three-fourths had answered in the negative, unlike in October 2002, to the question Does political censorship exist in Ukraine? In order to leave no doubts as to the assessments and methods, we turned to those who are the most competent - journalists. From November 12 to 26 the sociological service of the Razumkov Center, assisted by the National Association of Journalists, the Charter-4 public organization and the Telekrytyka Internet newsletter, polled 727 journalists who represented printed, electronic, state-run, private, central, regional, district and local mass media, including those published by enterprises, in all 27 administrative regions of Ukraine. The poll showed the following:

One. Political censorship does exist in Ukraine, it has become the everyday reality of journalism. But it is indirect - the authorities have created a system in which a journalist himself is afraid to write on forbidden subjects, censoring himself. For the same reason or obeying directives from the authorities, his editor alters the political accent of his journalists' work, instructs them what and who they ought to write (speak) about and how. Small wonder that the majority of journalists are sure that the purely Ukrainian phenomenon - temniki [secret instructions to managers of mass media] from the Presidential Administration - does exist.

The overwhelming majority of journalists (86.2%) admit the existence of political censorship in Ukraine. 9.2% do not. The rest gave no definite answer.

Almost two-thirds of respondents (61.6%) have experienced facts of censorship personally. 38.4% have not. Most frequently it is self-censorship, for fear of negative consequences (57.3%); removal of politically undesirable parts from the original text by the editor, which alters its political accents (54.8%); the management's ‘recommendations' as to the way the journalists should cover political events, the leadership's or political figures' activities (54.5%). More than half the respondents (50.8%) have experienced cases of a manager or a journalist being directly instructed by a body of government.

According to the well-known TV journalist Andriy Shevchenko, who found enough courage to quit his job with a national channel because of political censorship there, in the past journalists were told what they must not write, now they are told what they must write.

So it is very wrong of the authorities to state that an editorial board's policy is a form of censorship, political censorship included, and that every editor-in-chief censors (edits) his journalists' materials before releasing them, since it is within his competence.

It is all too evident who exactly is to blame for the political censorship. It is not correct to substitute the problem of relationships between the government and the managers of the mass media (where the former censor the latter) by relationships between managers (owners) of mass media and journalists (where the latter are allegedly censored by the former). On the contrary.

If, before releasing news programs or newspapers, the owners or editors did not receive instructions from above, they could be liable. But since they are only tools in someone else's hands, the measure of their responsibility is different. The one who is to blame is the official who instructs the mass media who and how they should feature.

These assessments are made by those who know all too well what political censorship is and who can even give it their own definition. Although most of these definitions are evaluative, they demonstrate very clearly the journalists' attitude to censorship. They speak for themselves and need no comment. The journalists we polled called censorship death of democracy, violation of the truth, a noose on democracy's neck, editing of life. There were more definite description: censorship is what the Presidential Administration is doing, or when the authorities rape a journalist's conscience, making him sing their praises and fling mud at the opposition.

Two. It is dangerous to be a journalist in Ukraine. Especially to write about the criminal clans, the President, his administration office and the local authorities. The most likely result, according to Ukrainian journalists, is psychological pressure on them and their editors, economic sanctions on the mass media, physical removal. Nearly half the journalists we polled knew this from their own experience. In their opinion, of all the governmental and public institutions, the most negative influence on the mass media comes from the criminal clans, the Presidential Administration and the President himself. The bulk of Ukrainians (almost 80%) consider the profession of a journalist to be dangerous, and this opinion is strongest in the east of the country - 86.6%. We are not going to delve into the reasons for this regional specialty - they are obvious. The worst consequences are expected after publications about criminal clans (77.1%), about the President (71.7%), about local authorities (69.4%), about the Presidential Administration (68.4%). Such a neighborhood would seem shocking in a democratic country, but we have got used to everything, and we are not surprised. At the same time, journalists said they were less afraid to criticize the Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers - negative consequences were expected from them by 35.1% and 41.2% of respondents respectively. Moreover, these institutions are often scapegoats to another structure [the Presidential Administration office].

Almost every second journalist (48.3%) has experienced threats, connected with his or her professional activity. The most widely applied sanctions, according to them, are psychological pressure (79.2%), economic sanctions (75.7%), physical action. The general public rated the sanctions in a different way: physical action was rated first (63.1%), followed by psychological and economic pressure. Apparently, journalists, whose dangerous job is their living, take the economic consequences more seriously than health or life hazards.

Now, the influence on mass media. Respondents were asked to evaluate the influence of different institutions on the mass media according to a five-grade scale, where 1 stood for completely negative and 5 - for completely positive. Surprisingly enough, they acknowledged financial-economic groups as making the most positive influence on the mass media (judging from the number of grades 4 and 5) (19.2%). Apparently, they understand their economic dependence and hope for Western standards in their relationships with their employers. Next in that list came the State Committee for Information Policy (18.2%) and the Parliament (17.4%) - these are hoped to ensure more freedom of expression in general and provide guarantees for journalists' professional activity in particular. The Parliament's third place can be explained by the pluralism of opinions in the session hall, no matter how narrowly and selectively they are covered by some of the mass media.

At the bottom of the list (with the largest number of grades 1 and 2) are the criminal clans (58.1%), the Presidential Administration (51.2%) and the President (44.1%). These figures are difficult and even dangerous to comment on

Three. The general level of freedom of expression in Ukraine is low. So is the level of public access to information. Ukrainian journalists maintain that the country's information space is dominated by negative information, which aggravates the schism within society and compromises the authorities in the eyes of the people. There is a widespread practice of ordered articles.

Only 12% of the polled journalists evaluated positively the status of freedom of expression in Ukraine (by the number of grades 4 and 5). 44.4% chose the 1 and 2 grades. 42.2% marked it with a 3. 1.4% gave no answer. Thus, freedom of expression was evaluated at an average 2.6. The level of public access to information was evaluated a little higher - 2.9, but still lower than a C. With grades like these, Ukraine's political prospects - both internal and external - look rather grim. For freedom of expression and public access to information are key to any nation's democratic development, they are a laissez-passer to the club of European democracies which we are so eager to join (as our leaders claim). A significant fact: in the world rating of freedom of expression, drawn by Reporters Without Borders, Ukraine was placed 112th among 139 countries. 60.8% of Ukrainian journalists regard this as justified. Even a representative of the [pro-presidential] majority in Parliament illustrated the present condition of freedom of expression in this country with words from a pamphlet, in which television was called a condom for reality.

Concerning the contents of the information space, which is a mirror, albeit distorted, of our reality. More than half the respondents (53.6%) maintain that negative information prevails in the national mass media. Only 16.4% disagree. 42.1% are positive about the prevalence of information which aggravates schism within society (versus 16% who note the prevalence of information which facilitates its consolidation). 43.3% note the prevalence of information which compromises the authorities (versus 22.3% who disagree). And of course, it should be taken into account that some mass media work by the rule: bad news is good news.

Our journalists ought to be ashamed of their trade as a whole when it concerns written-to-order articles, a practice which is admitted to by 87.9% of respondents. TV journalist Roman Skripin called on his colleagues from the Parliament's rostrum to apologize to Ukrainians, since, as he said, journalists themselves have largely helped establish political censorship in this country.

Above all, such appraisals mirror the everyday realities of the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians who are fed with examples proving that not everything's bad in this house. Subsequently, this situation mirrors the performance of the authorities - previous and present, which compromises them even without journalists' help. Besides, some officials, who are more concerned about self-preservation than the far-reaching consequences of their steps for the nation, occasionally create information pretexts that may split society (for instance, by speculating on the language problem or by trying to picture the opposition as socially dangerous). So such evaluations of the contents of the national information space are quite justified - this is exactly the case of conscience determined by existence.

Four. Ukrainian journalists realize the need to fight against political censorship. But most of them have not fought against it yet, largely because of their economic dependence on their employers. The strike committee, set up by journalists, enjoys little support so far. A little more than one-third of journalists are ready to go on a national strike. The number of journalists who are not ready to testify in court in a political censorship case is bigger than the number of those who are. However, almost every journalist realizes that no governmental structure, courts included, can defend his rights better than he can.

The question Are you ready to work under censorship? was answered in the positive by 91.6% of journalists, while only 2.7% said they were not ready (5.7% gave no answer). 41.5% of journalists said that they fought against censorship, 58.5% did not. Three-quarters of respondents believe that the biggest obstacle to an effective fight against censorship is their economic dependence on the owners of the mass media, 48.8% believe that it is the absence of professional solidarity, 41.2% believe that the reason lies in their fear of reprisals by the authorities and criminal structures. That is, censorship actually lives on fear - of losing the job for good, of the authorities' reprisals, of criminals' wanton cruelty.

So who can defend the journalist? Here are some interesting figures: among the governmental institutions where a journalist could seek protection, a mere 8.3% of respondents named their mother office - the State Committee for Information Policy. 10.8% named local authorities and 13.2% named the police. The highest grade was given to the Security Service (21.2%), most probably because this body has not been involved in special political missions, and because it has given journalists the real help they asked for.

The biggest hope for protection is placed on the National Association of Journalists (27.6%), bodies of justice (23.8%) and the recently established Mass Media Trade Union (22.6%). But even this is well under one-third. It means that the majority of Ukrainian journalists see no governmental structure that can defend their rights, have little trust in the courts and so have to rely on themselves.

But the future success of public structures in the struggle for journalists' rights depends on the level of support for their actions and professional solidarity of journalists. So far, this level is low (which is admitted by journalists themselves). 46.4% of respondents feel positively towards the Mass Media Strike Committee, while almost every fourth (23.7%) is neutral (i.e. indifferent), and almost every tenth (9%) is negative to it. 37.5% of journalists are ready to take part in a national strike, should it be announced. 28.4% are not. One-third (34.1%) are undecided. But two-thirds (66.6%) are ready to contribute to the Strike Committee's future Journalist Support Fund.

Knowing that the authorities count on journalists' fear of testifying in court on the facts of political censorship, the authors of the poll put the question: Are you ready to testify in court as a witness in a political censorship case?. The returns were as follows: one-third (33%) of journalists were ready, a little more (34.1%) were not, the rest 32.9% were not definite. Of course, this one-third, like those 37.5% who are ready to go on strike, don't make a majority, and this resolve may not necessarily go further than words. But it is an obvious fact that Ukrainian journalists are at boiling point and a considerable number of them are ready to stand up against censorship. And in this fight they are going to be backed by nearly half the country's population - 49.9% of respondents said that they would welcome a strike staged by journalists, versus 4.4% who were against. (The attitude of 35.6% was neutral). One-third of Ukrainians (34.3%), despite their material problems, would be ready to support the strikers financially. So society is on the journalists' side in their struggle for their professional rights.

Five. Among the immediate measures that could remove the breeding grounds of political censorship, the journalists see legislative initiatives toward raising the economic independence of the mass media and reducing the levers of economic pressure on them. These measures are expected to break the economic axis of censorship: owners of mass media dependent on authorities - journalists dependent on owners.

The overwhelming majority of journalists (86.4%) insist on lowering the ceiling of moral damage lawsuits against the mass media. It is a recognized fact that politicians and government officials use such lawsuits as a means of ruining disagreeable elements of the mass media. The exorbitant compensation sums the latter often have to pay (in Ukrainian courts, the stronger side wins more often than not) actually finish them. A few figures: in 1999 the Ukrainian mass media were defendants in 2258 libel and moral damage cases, and were ruled to pay more than UAH 90 billion [$17 billion]. 55% of suits were initiated by public servants. According to Igor Lubchenko, the Chairman of the National Association of Journalists, every day such cases are heard in five or six courts. And according to the Glasnost Foundation, up to 70% of such suits are unfair and meant to tame the press by financial means.

The most widely supported steps that would make the mass media economically independent are: exemption of the national press from VAT on printing services and paper (92.8%); an open tender for selection of several companies that would deliver and sell the press (72%); creation of a public TV channel to be funded through subscription (69%).

However, despite the leadership's declarations of all-round support for the mass media, there is little room for optimism. The authorities are not interested in an independent mass media, since they also claim to be a branch of power. And who wants to share power in this country? So Telekrytyka manager Natalia Ligachova is right in saying that until the shadow mass media business, priced according to loyalty to President & Co., becomes less profitable than transparent business, maximally protected from unfair competition and the authorities' arbitrariness, nothing will really change in this information space. The phrase could be completed: It won't happen until this country has a system of government, providing for responsibility before and accountability to society, and hence - respect of the mass media. The majority of journalists who took the floor during the December 4 hearings in Parliament agreed with this idea. We think that most Ukrainian journalists agree with it, too.

A summary of the poll produces an ambiguous impression. On the one hand, freedom of expression in Ukraine is evidently in its twilight. And the history of the 20th century shows that such a tendency was often fatal.

On the other hand, it is evident that the bulk of Ukrainian journalists are aware of the seriousness of the problem and the scale of the threat to them and their country, posed by political censorship. They are ready to fight, to prevent freedom of expression from being further curbed, and they urge their colleagues to join in.

But we must realize: if those who are standing up today want to succeed, they need something more than professional solidarity. They need active support from the public, all those who are not satisfied with the opportunity to choose between one newspaper and one news program on TV. Such people make up the majority of Ukraine's population. The journalists hope for nationwide support. And we want to believe that they will get it.

The complete returns of the poll are published in the Razumkov Center's magazine National Security and Defense(#11, 2002), issued in preparation for the parliament hearings Society, Mass Media, Authorities: Freedom of Expression and Censorship in Ukraine.

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04.01.03. Kuchma seeks Russian support amid Western isolation

 Agence France-Presse
Dec. 9, 2002
by Miriam Elder
MOSCOW, Dec 9 (AFP) - Cold-shouldered in the West over alleged arms sales to Iraq, President Leonid Kuchma pledged closer ties with Ukraine's larger and powerful neighbour Monday at talks with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

"We don't have a bigger historical or economic bond with any country than we do with Russia," Kuchma said in Moscow after meeting Putin for the eighth time this year alone. Moscow is Kiev's "most strategic partner", he was quoted as saying by the Interfax news agency. Putin responded in kind, saying that Ukraine was "a priority -- a most important and fundamental partner."

Kuchma's rejection of US accusations that he personally approved the sale of an early warning radar system to Baghdad in violation of UN sanctions has further tarnished the image of a leader long mired in scandal over charges that he personally orchestrated the murder of an opposition journalist and heads an administration riddled with corruption. The United States has already cut its aid to the ex-Soviet country, once Washington's third largest aid recipient, and has threatened fresh sanctions if Kiev [Kyiv] continues to refuse to open an investigation. Kuchma has repeatedly denied the charges, pushing him further into international isolation and prompting him to turn to Moscow for support. His visit to Russia came just two weeks after he was given the cold shoulder at NATO's landmark expansion summit in Prague, where he showed up despite warnings by NATO leaders that he would not be welcome. Kuchma's arrival in Moscow coincided with that of NATO Secretary General George Robertson, in the Russian capital for talks on the war on terror and on cooperation following the alliance's eastward expansion as far as Russia's borders.

Ukraine's hopes of joining the European Union were all but squashed by European Commission President Romano Prodi who recently told a Dutch newspaper that he "saw no reason" to consider the country's candidacy. Analysts said that the increasingly severe charges against Kuchma coupled with Putin's newfound status as a key US ally in the war on terrorism had contributed to Ukraine's diminishing importance. The country is no longer needed to serve as a buffer zone between Europe and an unstable post-Soviet anti-Western Russia, the daily Kiev Post said. "Since September 11, Ukraine has lost its interest to the West. Letting go of Leonid Kuchma would never have happened if Russia hadn't joined the anti-terrorist coalition," a Western diplomat said on condition of anonymity. Ukraine's newly-appointed Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich also traveled to Moscow and was set to meet his Russian counterpart Mikhail Kasyanov for talks on boosting economic ties and the creation of a free trade zone. Russia is by far Ukraine's main trade partner, accounting for 26 percent of its export market and 37 percent of imports.

"Together, we will be stronger, I have no doubt -- but we need concrete steps," Yanukovich said before meeting Kasyanov, when he said the trade zone would top the agenda. "I believe over this year Ukraine and Russia have made sure that we are strategic partners," said the new prime minister, who was appointed last month.

But Ukrainian analysts warned that Kiev's rapprochement with Moscow should not come at the price of Ukraine falling under the domination of its former Soviet master. "With Poland, Ukraine's main ally in Europe, joining the EU in 2004, the Ukrainians will find themselves more isolated then ever -- and therefore, at Moscow's mercy," said analyst Igor Zhdanov. "We were always very close to Russia -- that's not the problem. But we don't want Ukraine to interact too much with Russia," he said. Welcoming snubbed leaders is not new to Putin, who last month met Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko in Moscow after the authoritarian leader was put on a travel blacklist by most of the European Union and the United States to protest his shoddy human rights record.

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04.01.03. Ukrainian Parliament to mull ratification of minority-language charter

RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report
December 3, 2002
Volume 4, Number 46
by Taras Kuzio
On 29 October, President Leonid Kuchma again submitted the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages for ratification by the Ukrainian parliament. The manner in which the charter would be applicable would be important to Ukraine's largest minority, Russians, as well as to smaller ethnic groups, such as Romanians, Hungarians, Poles, Tatars, and Jews. President Kuchma has backed ratification of 42 paragraphs of the charter, although only 35 are needed for it to be adopted. The 42 paragraphs contain provisions for protecting and promoting the linguistic and cultural rights of minorities in courts, as well as in cultural, educational, and state institutions.

Ukraine joined the Council of Europe in 1995 and promised to ratify the charter within 12 months. It was finally ratified by the parliament in December 1999, but the Constitutional Court declared its provisions unconstitutional. One constitutional clash concerned the question of which languages could be used by state officials.

One expert in attendance at a Council of Europe seminar held in Kyiv on 18-19 October tried to dissuade the fears of Ukrainian speakers that the charter would primarily promote Russian. According to that expert, Council of Europe officials claimed at the seminar "that the language charter is called to protect all languages. The bigger the ethnic group, the greater protection liabilities the state should assume to protect its language."

Nevertheless, opposition to the charter is again likely to come from national democrats who now possess the largest faction in the Verkhovna Rada: Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine. Especially as the new presidential push to ratify the charter follows a move allegedly instigated by the head of the presidential administration, Viktor Medvedchuk, during the Council of Europe seminar to make Russian a state language. In addition, protests will inevitably be submitted to the Constitutional Court.

Although the Council of Europe seminar claimed that the Ukrainian language would also benefit from the charter, this is unlikely. The newly submitted charter for ratification by Kuchma only refers to non-Ukrainian ethnic groups, although Ukrainians are designated constitutionally as the "titular nation." Ukrainophones often feel that they have a minority status in eastern Ukraine and Crimea where their linguistic rights are ignored. The Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe do not apply national-minority and linguistic rights to the titular nation, assuming that it is the duty of the state to promote its own dominant ethnic group. This, of course, is true theoretically, but in the case of Ukraine and, to an even greater extent, Belarus, this is not always the case.

The charter also promotes the use of minority languages by state officials, whereas the Constitutional Court ruled in December 1999 that all state officials should use only Ukrainian. Official documents produced in Kyiv, including during elections by the Central Election Commission, are only in Ukrainian regardless of whether they are sent to Lviv or Crimea.

Ukraine is not alone in debating the role of the charter as the entire subject of national-minority and linguistic rights is highly charged both in the West and in the East. The Council of Europe and the OSCE have de facto adopted the widely shared assumption that Western, "civic" states are consolidated, mature democracies and do not require active intervention in minority and ethnic problems.

The opposite is held to be true of the East, which is assumed to be less democratically advanced and more prone to ethnic discrimination and conflict. The EU has only demanded that postcommunist states that desire EU membership uphold good minority policies, a demand not made to Western European states that were invited to join earlier. The OSCE has only intervened in ethnic conflicts in postcommunist states, despite the fact there exist more and longer-running conflicts in the West. The United Kingdom, Spain, and Turkey have refused to sanction intervention by the OSCE because they have defined their ethnic conflicts as "terrorism."

Three other problems have rested on the question of how to define "national minorities" and whether migrants and linguistic groups also have rights. No common definition of "national minorities" exists in Europe among states or the OSCE, and each state has been left to its own devices either to define them or to deny their existence. The legislation of some states, such as the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Turkey, and Greece, denies that national minorities exist and prefers to support only civic rights provided to individuals, rather than collective rights to ethnic groups.

Most states deny that migrants, especially economic ones, should be able to claim state assistance to protect their cultures. Russia has defended the rights of Russian-speaking "compatriots" in the former Soviet Union, not Russians, although linguistic groups are not traditionally afforded protection as a group.

Ukraine is therefore not alone in having reservations about the Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. As of July 2001, only 15 states had ratified the charter. France refused to ratify it because it contradicted its constitution, which provides rights to individuals, regardless of ethnicity, language, or religion. Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Turkey had not even signed the charter while other Western European states ratified it with heavy revisions.

Most states have opposed any concept of collective rights, such as separate ethnic universities (which Albanians have demanded in Macedonia) and have allocated quotas in parliaments. They have also demanded that all citizens should learn the official (state) language. Some have opposed granting provisions to nonterritorial languages, such as Roma, and some states have insisted that they have a right to define to which languages the charter applies.

Most states have adopted a compromise policy of integration, in contrast to the provision of collective rights through multiculturalism (as in Canada) or full-blown assimilation, which was the most commonly held policy prior to the 1960s.

The dividing line between "integration" and moderate "assimilation" is, however, hazy. Moderate assimilation "is opposed not to difference but to segregation, ghettoization, and marginalization," the well-known U.S. scholar Rogers Brubaker concludes in the July 2001 issue of "Ethnic and Racial Studies." Integration of minorities into mainstream society, while providing for their rights, has always been the policy implemented by Ukraine.

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Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies and adjunct staff in the Department of Political Science, University of Toronto 


04.01.03. Washington Post: "Scare Tactics On the Rise In Ukraine"

 Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, December 17, 2002; Page A20
By Sharon LaFraniere
Scare tactics on the rise in Ukraine Kuchma government presses critics in legislature, media

KIEV [Kyiv], Ukraine -- Having built a multimillion-dollar enterprise over the last decade by making and selling shingles and tar paper, Volodmyr Shandra knows all there is to know about the business of roofing.

It's in the business of politics -- he is a new member of parliament and a critic of Ukraine's struggling president, Leonid Kuchma -- that the roof has come crashing down around his head.

The 39-year-old businessman was elected to the legislature in April as a member of the Our Ukraine faction, the leading opposition to Kuchma's increasingly autocratic rule. In July, he said, a friend passed along a message from a top official in Kuchma's government: If Shandra did not join the pro-Kuchma lawmakers, his factory would find itself in deep trouble.

Within a month, he said, a cadre of masked officers toting machine guns showed up at the factory in the western Ukraine city of Slavuta. They seized a dozen computers and 3,000 pounds of documents.

The factory was all but paralyzed during the critical summer construction season, he said, wreaking havoc with its clients and dealers. Now it faces a criminal investigation for supposed financial improprieties.

"I never imagined these things could happen," Shandra said.

Muscling legislators is just the most visible of a variety of hardball tactics that critics say have intensified here as Kuchma's government sinks deeper into scandal and loses popular support. Other methods include retaliating against insufficiently loyal businessmen and independent judges, and cowing the media.

"You get a sense of sustained pressure, across the board," said Markian Bilynskyj, director of field operations for the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation. Democracy in Ukraine, he said, "has boundaries delineated by the people in power. Democracy is something that is to be permitted and distributed in doses."

Kuchma, who is scheduled to leave office in two years, says Ukraine is on its way to becoming a modern European democracy and just needs time to develop. His aides deny the government engages in censorship or uses law enforcement and the courts for political ends.

For the moment, the strong-arm tactics are helping Kuchma maintain his grip after opposition forces managed their largest show of strength to date, drawing tens of thousands of protesters to the streets in September. Following what critics describe as a campaign of threats and hefty bribes, a razor-slim majority of legislators last week pledged to work with the executive branch.

Television news coverage of Kuchma is now relentlessly positive: When he was humiliated at last month's NATO summit in Prague, for instance, Ukrainian media painted it as a diplomatic victory for the 64-year-old leader.

But some analysts say the real beneficiary of Kuchma's crackdown is its architect: Viktor Medvedchuk, the president's new and increasingly powerful chief of staff and one of Ukraine's richest oligarchs.

"There is a real sense that this administration is being run by Medvedchuk, and that he is performing a kind of dress rehearsal for when he becomes president," said Bilynskyj. "I don't think Kuchma is controlling all of this. But he is not stopping it."

The trend worries Western leaders, who once dreamed that Ukrainian democracy would flourish. With nearly 50 million people, a territory the size of France and an arsenal that includes missile and nuclear technology, Ukraine was judged worthy of grooming for a democratic future. It has been one of the top recipients of U.S. aid and political support.

But that may be changing. The United States has given Kuchma the cold shoulder since determining this fall that he signed off on a clandestine plan to sell powerful Kolchuga aircraft tracking stations to Iraq in clear violation of an international embargo. U.S. Ambassador Carlos Pascual said last month that the Kolchuga affair and other disagreements have led to "a crisis of confidence" in Ukraine's top leadership. Kuchma denies approving the sale.

His administration is powerless to silence American grumbling. But the growing list of incidents involving political opponents, businessmen and journalists suggests domestic critics sometimes pay a steep price.

Take Serhiy Danylov, whose printing house last February published 900,000 copies of a book about Yulia Timoshenko, a leader of the opposition to Kuchma. Now on his press is another book, documenting what he says is the punishment tax authorities have meted out since then: more than 100 visits to his office and warnings to his clients. His business nearly ruined, he has cut his workforce from 304 employees to 25.

"I can say that the [Soviet] KGB [secret police] in 1988 was much kinder than the tax administration of Ukraine today," he said.

Or consider Yevhen Chervonenko, a legislator who spent the last decade building an international trucking firm. He said his support for Viktor Yushchenko, head of Our Ukraine and the country's most popular politician, has so far cost the firm at least $1 million in business after tax police this year froze bank accounts and seized trucks.

"I was an adviser of the president. I was a minister," he said. "When I was there, they did not touch me. But since I began to support Yushchenko . . . I am being told I will lose everything."

Yushchenko says two dozen companies with financial links to legislators from his party have been targeted.

If harassing legislators seems brazen, however, even some of Kuchma's advisers said they were stunned when police arrested Konstantin Grigorishin, a 37-year-old Russian businessman with more than $370 million invested in Ukraine's energy, metals and machine-building industries.

In an interview in Moscow, Grigorishin said officers pulled him out of his car after he left a restaurant in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, on Oct. 12, planted narcotics in his jacket and stuffed a gun in his back pocket. "They even buttoned the pocket," he said.

He blamed his arrest on Kuchma's aide, Medvedchuk, and Hryhory Surkis, who together with Medvedchuk leads the Social Democratic Party, the political arm of a business clan that controls much of Ukraine's wealth. For the previous two years, Grigorishin said, he had been trying to end a business partnership with the two men because of their financial demands.

Last summer, he said, they asked for $50 million to finance the party's parliamentary campaign. When he refused, he said, the two systematically took over his Ukrainian companies, one by one.

"I was told, 'We won't let you do business in the Ukraine,' " he said. "Surkis said, 'We will put you in the trunk of a car, drive you to the woods and bury you alive.' Medvedchuk said they would put me in jail."

Medvedchuk has denied any involvement in the businessman's arrest, saying he never interferes in law enforcement cases. Surkis dismissed Grigorishin's allegations as nonsense.

Grigorishin was freed after 10 days in jail after Viktor Pinchuk, his friend and Kuchma's son-in-law, intervened. A Kiev court later found his arrest and detention illegal.

Lawyers who have fought Kuchma's government in court say that although a fair verdict is possible, judges increasingly fear they will be penalized for political disloyalty. Yuriy Vasilenko, an appeals court judge, estimates that only 10 out of about 200 judges in Kiev are truly independent. "As soon as a judge takes an independent stand, a complaint will be filed with a judicial directorate or another body," he said.

Former district court judge Mykola Zamkovenko considers himself a prime example.

In March 2001, he released Yulia Timoshenko from jail, striking down fraud and bribery charges brought by Kuchma's prosecutors. Two months later, police illegally raided his house.

In July, Kuchma fired him for incompetence. He now faces criminal charges of abusing his position and forgery.

"When I was making the decisions they liked, they were silent," Zamkovenko said. Now, he said, "They are using me to scare off the other judges."

Television journalists say they -- and their stations, which are mostly controlled by pro-Kuchma oligarchs -- also face repercussions if they do not follow the government's increasingly strict line. While certain topics were always taboo, now opposition leaders such as Yushchenko are simply banned from the air, said Andriy Shevchenko, a leader of the new union of journalists.

And for the first time, permitted topics are now outlined in faxes from the presidential administration. Kiev Post, an independent, English-language newspaper, published a copy of the government's media directive from Sept. 13, three days before a planned opposition protest that turned into one of the largest ever held here.

"Please cover the day's events in the following order in all this evening's news bulletins," it said. High on the list was a judge's ban on holding the protest in Kiev's center and a union leader's recommendation that workers not participate.

Serhiy Vasyliev, Kuchma's aide for information, said the directives are only suggestions. "Some journalists interpret them as instructions because they come from the president," he said recently. "But that is wrong."

Shevchenko said the proof is on the screen. For instance, he said, no television network has aired a single minute of now notorious tapes on which hours of Kuchma's private conversations are purportedly recorded.

That could be why so few Ukrainians know the story of Alexei Podolsky, a 45-year-old former member of parliament.

On June 6, 2000, as Podolsky finished printing a sheaf of anti-Kuchma leaflets here, he said, he was abducted by three men and driven 78 miles to the rural area of Sumi, where he was severely beaten.

Before the assailants left him in a grove of trees, he said, one of them warned him: "If you continue, you will pay with your life." When he returned to Kiev, he said, he found his front door burned.

Months later, Podolsky said, he read about his own abduction and beating in what purports to be a transcript of yet another secretly taped conversation in Kuchma's office. The transcript was posted on the Internet site of Oleksandr Zhyr, a leader of an anti-Kuchma party.

"The day before yesterday, he ended up all the way in Sumi [Sumy] oblast, the one that distributed. And they gave it to him there in such a way," said a man whom Zhyr identified as then-Interior Minister Yuri Kravchenko.

Then Kravchenko told Kuchma about the burned door, according to the transcript.

"(Both laughing,)" the transcript says.

 

04.01.03. Industrial productivity in Ukraine

In November of this year productivity in Ukraine rose by 9.3%; during the first eleven months of 2002 it rose by 6.3%.

Source:
http://www.interfax.kiev.ua/ukr/

08.01.03. President Kuchma's New Year speech

Source: Ukrainian Television first programme
Kyiv, Ukraine
31 December 02
Published by BBC Monitoring Service
United Kingdom
January 01, 2003
Ukrainian president Kuchma hails political responsibility, reform in New Year's speech

BBC Monitoring Service: Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has said in his New Year's address to the nation that long-awaited political responsibility was finally established in 2002. Kuchma praised Ukraine's progress towards European integration and said the political basis has now been set for improved living standards and reform of the health and pension systems. The following is the text of the address from Ukrainian television on 31 December:

My dear compatriots! The year of 2003 is on the threshold of our homes. As always at this time, we recall what the outgoing year has been like for us and hope that the incoming year will bring joy and happiness to all of us. We believe that our most cherished dreams will come true. Saying farewell to the outgoing year is always a bit emotional and a bit sad. Time cannot be reversed. Each of us has beautiful and unique moments related to the past year that will never repeat themselves. For some, it is the joy of moving into a new house. For some, it is the birth of a child. For some, it is a new love. Someone was employed for the first time. Joy and sorrow always come hand in hand in life. So let us remember those who had to endure, against their own free will, both the pain of loss, hardships and bitter failures. Let us recall wise words: everything passes away, everything has its own time and its own hour under the sky. This is why we need to look towards the future with patience and optimism, hoping that bitterness and loss will pass by and that there will be more joyful events. Let us believe that the world will become more just and freer, more brotherly and humane for each and everyone.

Dear compatriots! Seeing the outgoing year out and the New Year in, it is common practice to sum up the results and talk about the prospects for each of us, for our families and for the whole country. Each of you cannot but be interested in what the coming year will be like for Ukraine, what can be relied on and what can be expected. I have to say that I do not pin such great hopes on every year as I am pinning on the coming year. All the political conditions have been created to improve the economic life of every Ukrainian, to put it simply, the wellbeing of each of you.

What are the reasons for this optimism of mine? For the first time since Ukraine's independence, a transparent system of power that is understandable to each of you was finally created during the outgoing year. You elected people's deputies [in the March 2002 general election]. The people's deputies created a [pro-presidential] majority. The majority formed the government. I have to say that we have spent unacceptably too much time to reach this transparency. But now that we have finally attained it, I hope that the eternal Ukrainian political ping pong will finally be over.

Everyone is doing something, but nobody is responsible for anything. From now on, those whom you have elected and who have formed the government will no longer be able to say: we have nothing to do with this government. This is because it is their government. From now on, the majority and its government will no longer be able to point to the president and say that he prevents them from doing their job. The president will indeed interfere when a political need for this arises. But the main responsibility rests with the majority and its government. From now on, you too, by taking a decision on whom to give your vote at elections, will orient yourselves not to sweet promises but to specific results.

You will definitely know whether the government and the parliamentarians which formed it did something beneficial for you. Whether it is worth electing those who were in opposition to them. And those who are in power, knowing how carefully you watch them, will do everything to justify your expectations and improve your wellbeing. Well, they want you to vote for them in the future too.

I am sure that this political logic is understood by each and everyone of you. I can only regret that it is only now that we have managed to achieve such transparency. The age-old Ukrainian problem of a lack of unity and the lack of desire to reach sensible compromise. I hope that next year, when parliament works on political reform and the move towards a parliamentary-presidential republic, there will be more understanding and compromise. You know the tasks which I have given to the government. These are ensuring a large increase in the minimum pension and the minimum wage, reform of the pension system and the health system and making sure the cost of medicines and tariffs for housing and utility services does not rise.

Economic growth allows us to do this. It allows us to ensure the best possible balance between the resources of the state and the needs of society. [Break in transmission due to technical reasons]

Dear fellow countrymen! The year that is passing consolidated the strategic plans of our country and confirmed its European choice. Step by step Ukraine moved towards its goal of integration into the European community. And this path has turned out to be a very difficult one. There were enough objective as well as artificially-created obstacles. We spent great efforts in order to overcome them. Well, to win a worthy place in the world, and one which our country deserves, is never an easy task.

In these moments just before the New Year I want to give a warm mention to all those Ukrainians who are far from their homeland at the present time. And those who protect the interests of our state beyond its borders and those who were forced by a difficult lot to look for their fortunes abroad. Ukraine appreciates you a great deal.

Dear friends! For us Ukrainians the New Year is a family holiday. I will also see the New Year in with my family, as a father and a grandfather. For tradition's sake, we will now fill our glasses to wish one another all the best in the New Year! At this very moment, the whole country is united by a unique feeling which can only be present in a New Year's eve. The feeling of a real holiday. Our hearts are made to do good and our thoughts are of a special light and honour.

The New Year will be with us in a few seconds. I sincerely hope that it will be a happy one for everyone of you. Dear compatriots, I wish you health, prosperity, peace in your families and mutual love and respect. Let every family, on weekdays as well as holidays, have an abundance of everything. Let children make their parents happy every single day and young people care about their elders. Peace to you all and success in all good matters. I raise this glass with you all for everyone of you, for our Ukraine. Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!

11.01.03. The Times om nye beskyldninger mod Ukraine om våbensalg

Ukraine sales 'a problem'
From Elaine Monaghan in Washington
 
IRAQ is suspected of a fresh breach of UN sanctions after buying military logistics equipment from Ukraine, a US official has told The Times. Earlier suspicions that President Kuchma of Ukraine had authorised the sale of an aircraft-detection system to Iraq have already infuriated Washington and prompted a freeze on aid and a policy review.
The US official said that a pontoon bridge had been transferred and that other Ukrainian transfers to Iraq were “a continuing problem”.

More evidence emerged of fresh sales on Monday, he said, but details were scarce. The row over the radar sale began after a former presidential bodyguard, released digital recordings he says were made in Mr Kuchma’s office. America said it had authenticated one section in which a voice like Mr Kuchma’s gives permission for the radar system to be sold.
 

11.01.03. NATO har ikke glemt beskyldningerne mod Ukraine

N ATO er 100% interesseret i at se Ukraine som medlem, men det er svært at tale om noget fremskridt i de bilaterale relationer, så længe spørgsmålet om salget af "Koltjuga"-radarerne til Irak ikke er blevet opklaret, sagde folkedeputeret Ihor Ostash fra "Vores Ukraine" under en pressekonference i Kyiv i starten af januar i anledning af en gruppe ukrainske politikeres besøg i NATOs hovedkvarter. NATOs holdning i "Koltjuga"-sagen forbliver uændret, oplyste Ostash..
    "Alliancen insisterer på, at Ukraine ikke har leveret en fyldestgørende information i "Koltjuga"-sagen. Samtidig sagde deputeret Mykola Katerynchuk, at man i alliancen trækker en klar skillelinje mellem Ukraine og "den kriminelle handling, som muligvis har fundet sted". 
    Ifølge folkedeputeret Anatolij Domanskyj fra KPU sagde NATOs generalsekretær, George Robertson, under mødet med de ukrainske folkevalgte, at der "er en krise" i relationerne mellem Ukraine og NATO. "Sålænge der ikke bliver sat et punktum i sagen om "Koltjuga", vil krisen blive uddybet", - sagde han.
    Domanskyj oplyste desuden, at NATO i den forbindelse "har en række spørgsmål til præsidenten".      
    Ifølge den folkedeputerede påpegede en række højtstående embedsmænd i NATO, at Ukraine vil kunne træde ind i NATO "måske om en ti års tid; men snarere om 20 år". "Indtil vi når op på europæiske standarder, vil de ikke invitere os", - understregede Domanskyj.
    Folkedeputeret Katerynchuk fra "Vores Ukraine" understregede, at NATO ikke knytter løsningen af "Koltjuga"-spørgsmålet sammen med det kommende præsidentvalg, fordi Ukraines præsident tidligere har erklæret, at han "ikke vil stille op til en tredje periode". "Dette spørgsmål er forbundet med tillidskrisen i forhold til statens ledelse, og dette spørgsmål vil være aktuelt, indtil man har fået svar på alle spørgsmål", - sagde han.

13.01.03. Ambassadør nævner 5 muligheder for en forbedring af forholdet mellem USA og Ukraine

De forenede Stater bevarer "de åbne døres politik" i forhold til Ukraine og nødvendigheden af at "genskabe tilliden". Det sagde De forenede Staters ambassadør i Ukraine, Carlos Pascual, under et møde i Center for strategiske og internationale studier i Kyiv.
    I sit indlæg sagde Pascual bl.a., at det er uklart, hvad Ukraine vil gøre i den nuværende situation. Ifølge diplomaten har visse ledende ukrainere sagt til ham, at "isolationen ikke er nogen udvej".
    Under sit over en time lange indlæg fremlagde Pascual et detaljeret billede over opnåede resultater og problemer i Ukraine i de senere år og kom med en række forslag som har til hensigt at overvinde de eksisterende vanskeligheder i Ukraines relationer med de euroatlantiske strukturer og De forenede Stater.
    Han påpegede bl.a., at man i Kyiv på baggrund af den seneste tids forværringer har fejlfortolket De forenede Staters hensigter i forhold til Ukraine: "Adskillige ukrainere mener, at De forenede Stater forsøger at undergrave Kutjmas autoritet og erstatte ham med Viktor Jusjtjenko eller en anden repræsentant for oppositionen. Det er forkert.
    De forenede Stater forsøger hverken at øve indflydelse på eller opnå ændringer i ukrainsk politik. Vores mål og håb er at fremme en åben, fri og gennemskuelig valgproces, som vil give det ukrainske folk mulighed for at vælge dem til de ledende embeder, som de ønsker. Og denne beslutning er vi ikke herrer over", - påpegede diplomaten.
    Under mødet med amerikanske eksperter forelagde Pascual 5 preliminære skridt eller forslag, som ville fremelske en forbedring af de ukrainsk-amerikanske relationer: "Følgerne af sagen omkring Koltjuga-radaren er åbenlyse, og det er i dag vanskeligt at antage, at Washington for slet ikke at nævne Kyiv ville ændre sin holdning i denne sag, som er koncentreret omkring Ukraines præsident..." Men det ville i denne kontekst være til en vis grad et konstruktivt skridt, hvis man etablerede et bedre samarbejde indenfor eksport-kontrol i Ukraine".
    Et andet skridt, som ville kunne forbedre forholdet, ville være afholdelsen af forhandlinger på regeringsniveau; nemlig ministerniveau: "På trods af vanskeligheder på topplan er vi åbne overfor et samarbejde på det niveau", - sagde den amerikanske diplomat og tilføjede, at en udbygning af samarbejdet mellem USAs Kongres og Ukraines Verkhovna Rada i den sammenhæng også ville være positivt.
    Et tredje skridt kunne være støtten til et demokratisk miljø og et stærkt civilsamfund, og en forudsætning for det er en anerkendelse af, oppositionen og uafhængige massemediers rettigheder anerkendes.
    Desuden er det nødvendigt at fortsætte samarbejdet mellem Ukraines og USAs væbnede styrker og forsvarsministerier, også indenfor rammerne af NATO.
    Det sidste skridt, som USAs ambassadør i Ukraine, Carlos Pascual, nævnte i Washington, var at støtte Ukraine i at blive medlem af regionale og internationale institutioner, så som NATO og WTO. UP, Radio Liberty.

13.01.03. USA undersøger både "Koltjuga"-sagen og sagen om pontonbroerne

George Bush's regering "fortsætter med at undersøge" spørgsmålet om de mulige leverancer af ukrainsk våbenudstyr til Irak, sagde det amerikanske udenrigsministeriums officielle talsmand, Richard Baucher, i lørdags.
    På et pressemøde i Washington oplyste Baucher, at gruppen af amerikanske eksperter, som arbejdede i Ukraine og undersøgte spørgsmålet om leveringen af radaranlægget "Koltjuga" til Irak, "ikke er blevet mødt med et helhjertet samarbejde fra de ukrainske myndigheders side". Derfor fortsætter "den tværinstitutionelle analyse af politikken i forhold til Ukraine, som Bush's regering gennemfører.
    Da han blev spurgt om den mulige leverance af ukrainske pontonbroer til Irak, sagde Baucher, at "leverancen af militært udstyr til Irak er et alvorligt spørgsmål", fordi det er "en overtrædelse af FNs sanktioner".
    "Vi arbejder med disse spørgsmål", - understregede udenrigsministeriets talsmand og føjede til, at USA "har forpligtelser" indenfor bestræbelserne på at undgå spredning, ifølge hvilken man skal "undersøge disse oplysninger".

13.01.03. Europarådet vil se på sagen om Kolomijets

Europarådets parlamentariske forsamlings (PACE) monitoring-komite vil på et møde den 14. januar i Paris drøfte situationen i Ukraine. Efter planen skal Hanne Severinsen og Renate Wolwendt holde oplæg.
    Europarådets Ukraine-rapporteur, Hanne Severinsen, oplyser til Deutsche Welle, at hovedemnet under behandlingen af "det ukrainske spørgsmål" på monitoring-komiteens møde bliver mordene på journalisterne Georgij Gongadze, Igor Aleksandrov samt Mikhajlo Kolomijets død under uopklarede omstændigheder.
    Ifølge Severinsen forventer hun og hendes kolleger, at Kyiv besvarer spørgsmålet om, hvad man i landet gør for at rette op på de mangler, som Europarådet har påpeget. Monitoring-komiteen har for en måned siden sendt den ukrainske ledelse en detaljeret information om situationen i Ukraine.
    Hanne Severinsen antager, at PACEs januar-session kan behandle spørgsmålet om ytringsfriheden i de europæiske stater, inklusive Ukraine, på initiativ af visse ukrainske deputerede.
    Severinsen oplyste, at en finsk parlamentariker allerede har færdiggjort en rapport om ytringsfrihed i hele Europa, som også indeholder en omtale af situationen i  Ukraine. UP.
 

13.01.03. Kutjma nedsætter center for euroatlantisk integration

Ukraines præsident, Leonid Kutjma, har nedsat et Nationalt center for euroatlantisk integration. Det oplyser præsidentens pressetjeneste med henvisning til et dekret, som Kutjma har underskrevet.
    Det hedder i præsidentens pressetjenestes meddelelse, at "Det nationale center for euroatlantisk integration er nedsat med henblik på en konsekvent realisering af Ukraines kurs henimod den euroatlantiske integration (en eufemisme for medlemskab af NATO, red.) og udarbejdelsen af forslag til koordineringen af den udøvende magts aktiviteter".
    Centeret er nedsat som et konsultativt og rådgivende organ ved præsidenten.
    Dekretet udpeger Volodymyr Horbulin, som er præsidentens sikkerhedspolitiske rådgiver, til formand for Det nationale Center, og det er ham som skal stå for opbygningen af centrets apparat.
    I slutningen af august 2002 nedsatte Kutjma Det statslige råd for europæisk og euroatlantisk integration, som skulle stå for koordinationen af myndighedernes aktiviteter henimod en integration af Ukraine i Europas politiske, økonomiske og retslige rum.
    I november 2002 vedtog Ukraine og NATO på topmødet i Prag en handlingsplan og en målplan for 2003. Podrobnosti, Ukrajinski Novyny.

14.01.03. Rukh beder Kutjma om ikke at afholde et SNG-topmøde i Karpaterne

Det fjerde uformelle topmøde blandt lederne af SNG-staterne finder sted den 28-29. januar i Ivano-Frankivsk regionen i præsidentens residens "Synehora", meddelte regionens guvernør, Mykhajlo Vyshyvanjuk. Samtidig anmodede en repræsentant for Rukh-partiet UNR præsident Kutjma om at aflyse stedet for det uformelle møde "uden slips".
    Præsidenterne for de 12 SNG-lande deltager i topmødet i Ivano-Frankivsk.
    Ukraines præsidents pressetjeneste kunne ikke bekræfte informationen om stedet for topmødets afholdelse, men kunne heller ikke afkræfte det. Tidligere forlød det fra pressetjenestens side, at stedet for afholdelsen af topmødet endnu ikke er endegyldig fundet, meddeler RIA Novosti.
    SNGs eksekutivkomite i Minsk i Hviderusland oplyser imidlertid, at præsident Leonid Kutjma havde foreslået at afholde et uformelt topmøde i Ukraine under mødet blandt SNGs statsledere den 7. oktober 2002 i Kishinau. Efter planen skal SNG-præsidenterne i Karpaterne fortsætte drøftelsen af de spørgsmål, som vedrører den videre udvikling af SNG-samarbejdet.
    Ifølge oplysninger fra Ukraines regering forventes det, at forbedringen af de økonomiske og handelsmæssige relationer mellem landene bliver hovedemnet på topmødet. Ifølge Ivano-Frankivsks guvernør er det "et yderst vigtigt spørgsmål", eftersom "alle har brug for at lede efter markeder, hvor de kan afsætte deres produkter".
    Samtidig har folkedeputeret Oleksandr Hudyma, der er medlem af partiet Ukraines folkebevægelse (UNR), rettet en appel til præsident Leonid Kutjma om at flytte stedet for afholdelsen af SNG-topmødet. Efter hans mening er afholdelsen af et sådant møde i Galicien (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk og Ternopil-regionerne, red.) "ikke den bedste ide", fordi over 90% af områdets indbyggere ifølge meningsmålinger støtter Ukraines indtræden i NATO og Den europæiske Union og ikke kan se det formålstjenlige i eksistensen af en organisation som SNG.
    Hudyma påpeger desuden, at såfremt mødet ikke bliver flyttet "vil de national-demokratiske partier ikke kunne garantere, at deltagerne får en hjertelig velkomst", oplyser man i UNRs pressetjeneste.
     Der bliver ikke underskrevet nogen mellemstatslige dokumenter under de uformelle møder blandt SNGs ledere, ligeså vel som at man ikke har nogen officiel dagsorden.
    Det sidste uformelle møde af slagsen fandt sted i marts 2002 på initiativ af Kazakhstans præsident, Nursultan Nazarbajev, på skisportsstedet Tjymbulak i nærheden af Alma-ata.
    Samtlige SNG-landenes præsidenter kom dengang til Kazakhstan med undtagelse af Azerbajdzhans leder, Gejdar Alijev, som udeblev af helbredsmæssige årsager.
    Som det var ventet, så handlede det sidste møde om problemet med bekæmpelsen af international terrorisme, reformen af SNGs organer og det mellemstatslige samarbejde i et bilateralt og et multilateralt format.
    Kazakhstans, Ruslands, Turkmenistans og Uzbekistans præsidenter vedtog en fælles erklæring om et strategisk partnerskab mellem deres landes gasselskaber med henblik på at sikre stabile gasleverancer til SNGs og det fjerne udlands markeder. korrespondent.net.

14.01.03. Højesteret giver Jusjtjenkos kone medhold

Ukraines Højesteret har omstødt Kyivs Shevtjenko-distriktetsrets afgørelse, som frikendte Tv-stationen Inter og avisen Kievskie Vedomosti for ansvaret for at skulle dementere informationer, som de havde viderebragt om Viktor Jusjtjenkos hustru - Kateryna Tjumatjenko.
    Kateryna Tjumatjenkos advokat, Mykola Poludjonnyj, oplyste, at Højesteret afsagde denne kendelse den 8. januar, meddeler "Vores Ukraine"s pressetjeneste.
    Kateryna Tjumatjenko havde indgivet et søgsmål mod den russiske journalist Mykhajlo Leontjev, som efter hendes opfattelse havde krænket hendes ære og værdighed. Søgsmålet blev desuden indgivet mod de medier, som havde viderebragt hans udtalelser. "Ansvaret blev i Shevtjenko-rettens første beslutning udelukkende placeret hos Leontjev som ophavsmanden til udtalelserne. I stedet blev Inter og Kievskie Vedomosti, som havde viderebragt den usandfærdige information, fritaget for ansvaret, dvs. for forpligtelsen til at dementere og give sagsøgersken erstatning for tort og æreskrænkelse", - forklarede advokaten.
    Ifølge ham har Højesteret sendt sagen til en fornyet behandling i Shevtjenko-distriktets domstol. "1. instans-domstolen skal nu fjerne alle mangler og tvinge de organisationer, som har udbredt usande oplysninger, der har krænket Kateryna Tjumatjenkos ære og værdighed og er en indblanding i privatlivet, til at dementere disse oplysninger", - sagde Mykola Poludjonnyj.

15.01.03. USAs NATO-ambassadør om det fremtidige samarbejde med Ukraine

Rusland, Ukraine og staterne i Centralasien og Kaukasus-regionen har ikke "udsigt til at blive medlemmer af alliancen i en forudsigelig fremtid", - sagde USAs permantente repræsentant i NATO, Nicholas Berns.
    Ambassadør Nicholas Berns understregede under et møde med amerikanske eksperter i John Hopkins universitetet i Washington, at landene øst for NATO er af afgørende betydning for den europæiske sikkerhed og stabilitet. Det gælder først og fremmest staterne i Centralasien, Kaukasus-regionen samt Rusland og Ukraine.
    Som Berns påpeger har Rusland ikke ytret noget ønske om at træde ind i NATO, men har takket være de meget gode relationer mellem præsidenterne Vladimir Putin og George Bush iværksat et samarbejde med alliancen i et hidtil uset omfang.
    De samme planer havde man for Ukraine, fremhæver Nicholas Berns. Men her kom NATO til at stå overfor problemet med den videre udbygning af forholdet til Kiev: "Vi havde de samme høje mål med hensyn til at løfte forholdet til ukrainerne til et lignende niveau. Men i forholdet til Ukraine er vi i løbet af 2002 havnet i en vanskelig situation".
    "Vi mener, at præsident Kutjma har godkendt beslutningen om at sælge radaranlægget "Koltjuga" til Irak, hvilket i realiteten betød en opbremsning af relationerne mellem Ukraine og NATO. For vi kunne ikke se nogen muligheder for at hæve relationerne mellem NATO og Ukraine til et nyt niveau og give dem en ny status, når Ukraine havde en så ansvarsløs holdning til sin egen våbeneksportpolitik overfor et land, som er den vigtigste destabilisator i Mellemøsten", - sagde Nicholas Berns.
    Ifølge Berns er der stadig et håb om, at det i en ikke fjern fremtid vil lykkes at arbejde sammen med Ukraine for at nå op på de relevante rammer for samarbejdet med NATO med henblik på at bevare stabiliteten i Europa.
    USAs repræsentant i NATO sagde endvidere, at NATO fortsætter et tæt samarbejde med Kiev; men at det ikke foregår på allerhøjeste niveau, men på ministerniveau. Det samme gælder Washingtons forhold til Kiev. Og det er et resultat af Ukraines præsidents handlinger, som med sin opførsel har undergravet tilliden til sig selv og har isoleret sig selv. For som Carlos Pasqual, USAs ambassadør i Ukraine, påpegede forleden dag, så er det nu ønskeligt for De forenede Stater, at de ukrainsk-amerikanske relationer udfolder sig på ministerniveau, og ikke på statsoverhoved-niveau.
    Ifølge Nicholas Berns vil NATO i 2003 arbejde i tre retninger for så vidt angår omdannelsen af forsvarsalliancen med henblik på bevarelsen af stabiliteten: for det første er der tale om en styrkelse af det eksisterende potentiale, for det andet - om en fuldstændig tilslutning af kandidatlandene, som blev inviteret på Prag-topmødet, og for det tredje - om en udbygning af relationerne med landene øst for det nye NATO. Radio Liberty, UP.

16.01.03. Ukrainerne er stadig blandt de folk, som polakkerne synes mindst om

Det polske center for undersøgelser af den offentlige mening "Cebos" (CBOS) har offentliggjort resultatet af endnu en undersøgelse af, hvilke andre folkeslag polakkerne henholdsvis elsker eller ikke bryder sig om.
    Cebos har gennemført undersøgelsen næsten hvert eneste år siden 1993. Amerikanerne, italienerne, franskmændene og englænderne fortsætter med at toppe listen over de folkeslag, som polakkerne holder allermest af. Samtidig er polakkerne konsekvente i deres antipatier overfor sigøjnere og rumænere. Hvad ukrainerne angår, så er polakkernes holdning snarere negativ, og den ændres meget langsomt, oplyser Radio Liberty
    I løbet af 1993-99 har ukrainerne indtaget en stabil tredjesidsteplads i polakkernes sympatier, idet de kun blev overhalet af rumænere og sigøjnere. Traditionelt har næsten 60% af de adspurgte givet udtryk for en antipati imod ukrainerne, mens ca.10% nærede en sympati.
    I løbet af de senere år har undersøgerne bemærket en tendens til mindskningen af antallet af respondenter, som havde en fjendtlig indstilling til ukrainerne, uden at der kom en stigning i antallet af sympatisører, mens antallet af ligegyldige og ubeslutsomme steg.
    Årets undersøgelse bragte omsider et nyt resultat. Procenten af de adspurgte, som indrømmede, at de sympatiserede med ukrainerne, er nærmest blevet fordoblet - til 22%, mens antallet af fjendtligt indstillede polakker mindskedes med 10% sammenlignet med 1999.
    Det har betydet, at ukrainerne er steget et trin i det polske sympatibarometer og har overhalet araberne. Nu ligger ukrainerne lige under jøderne og lige over araberne, sigøjnerne og rumænerne.
    Men ikke alle er tilbøjelige til at stole blindt på disse meningsmålinger. Historiker og tidligere leder af Sammenslutningen af Polens Ukrainere Jurij Rejt er enig i, at araberne i denne meningsmåling har hjulpet ukrainerne med at tage et skridt op i barometeret, fordi holdningen til dem er blevet stærkt forværret efter begivenhederne den 11. september.
    Ifølge hr. Rejt sker den virkelige ændring i den polske holdning til ukrainerne overvejende på eliteplan, mens denne proces kun langsomt finder sted hos den gennemsnitlige polske borger. UP.

16.01.03. Den ukrainske delegation udeblev fra mødet i Paris

Tirsdag den 14. januar blev der afholdt et møde i PACEs monitoring-komite i Paris, hvor Ukraine-rapporteur Hanne Severinsen endnu engang understregede, at Europarådet er bekymret over forholdene for ytringsfriheden i Ukraine og udtrykte beklagelse over, at repræsentanterne for den ukrainske delegation ikke tog del i mødet.
    "Ellers ville det, sandsynligvis, gøre det nemmere for os at vurdere situationen i Ukraine", - sagde Hanne Severinsen i et interview med Radio Libertys ukrainske afdeling, hvor hun blev bedt om at kommentere fraværet af Ukraines repræsentanter under behandlingen af det ukrainske spørgsmål på komiteens møde.
    "Jeg har modtaget mange breve fra Præsidentens administration, men jeg hører også meget tit journalisters klager, som føler, at det er farligt at gå imod myndighederne. Og derfor mener vi også fremdeles, at der er et problem her. Vi i den parlamentariske forsamling agter at analysere forholdene for ytringsfriheden i Europa i slutningen af januar, og jeg tror, at det vil være en god anledning til at diskutere Ukraine", - påpegede Severinsen.
    Hanne Severinsen fortalte opså, at de oppositionelle deputerede fra Ukraine foreslog at tage det ukrainske spørgsmål op særskilt på Europaparlamentets januarsession, men at denne organisations bureau besluttede, at det ikke var nødvendigt.
    Det er meningen, at journalist Georgij Gongadzes enke skal komme til sessionen i Strasbourg, hvor hun vil få mulighed for at mødes med de europæiske parlamentsmedlemmer. Europarådet sendte sidste år sin særlige repræsentant Hans-Christian Krüger til Ukraine med henblik på at afklare, hvilken ukrainsk myndighed er i gang med at undersøge denne meget omtalte sag. Hanne Severinsen håber på, at han vil offentliggøre sine første konklusioner på baggrund af de ukrainske rets-og ordensmyndigheders arbejde i slutningen af januar.
    I Strasbourg venter man stadig på en officiel reaktion fra Kyiv på Europarådets sidste rapport, og derfor finder en detaljeret undersøgelse af situationen i Ukraine først sted tidligst til sommer. UP.

17.01.03. Ukraine, Nauru face U.S. sanctions

The Washington Post
Washington, D.C.
Friday, December 20, 2002; Page A06
By Mike Allen
Countries' Banks Targeted in Terror War

The Bush administration plans to announce today that it has begun taking punitive steps against two countries that have been found to be doing too little to deter terrorists from using their banking systems. The Treasury Department plans to announce that Ukraine, a democracy that was part of the former Soviet Union, and Nauru, an island in the South Pacific Ocean, are "primary money-laundering concerns." The announcement was delayed by disputes within the administration, and follows prodding from both parties in Congress.

Nigeria had been a candidate for the list but has made progress and so will not suffer the countermeasures, which make it harder or impossible for U.S. financial institutions to do business with the countries, officials said. Officials said Ukraine and Nauru will be the first two countries singled out for financial countermeasures under the provisions of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, the antiterrorism legislation President Bush signed the month after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. "This is perhaps the most muscular financial tool in the Patriot Act toolbox," an administration official said. "This will send the message to the international financial community that they need to get their act together."

The decision comes as the White House comes under increasing pressure to show results in its financial war on terrorism. A United Nations report this summer concluded that efforts to cripple the finances of the al Qaeda network had stalled, allowing the terrorists to preserve money and move it around the globe in preparation for future attacks. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Paul S. Sarbanes (D-Md.) had repeatedly asked the administration why that part of the terrorism law, known as section 311, had not been used. Deputy Treasury Secretary Kenneth W. Dam acknowledged to Sarbanes at a hearing in October that debates within the administration had delayed use of the tool.

A Treasury official said that since then, Dam has held a series of internal meetings in which he called for aggressive use of the provision, pointedly asking at one of them, "Why have we not used section 311?'' Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), ranking Republican on the Finance Committee, praised the action and said it will help "eliminate financial safe havens for drug traffickers, terrorists and tax cheats." The Treasury Department is imposing different sanctions on the two nations, with Nauru facing much tougher action. An official said that when the special measure is fully in place, it "will formally cut Nauru off from the U.S. financial sector." There are few transactions between the countries now, but officials hope the publication of a list of suspect Nauru banks will prevent money launderers there from using U.S. institutions. The official called this "the first time that the U.S. has legally instructed its financial institutions to cut off an entire jurisdiction for anti-money laundering concerns."

In the case of Ukraine, U.S. banks will face additional requirements for doing business there, with the details to be worked out with financial institutions. Possibilities include disclosure to the government of all accountholders with a Ukraine address, as well as reporting of transactions in which $50,000 or more is wired between the United States and Ukraine. Treasury officials did not say when the final decisions would be made.

17.01.03. The December 2001 census of Ukraine

The Web site http://ukr.for-ua.com has reported some interesting results from the latest census of Ukraine. Ukrainians now constitute 77.8% of Ukraine's population (which is about 5% better than in 1989). There were 37,541,700 in December 2001. The number of Russians has decreased by about 3,000,000 since 1989. There are now some 8,334,100 (17.3% of the total, a diminution of 5%). The number of people, irrespective of ethnicity, who consider Ukrainian their mother tongue is 67.5% of the entire population (an increase of 2.8% since 1989). Russian is the declared mother tongue of 29.6% of the population (a decrease of 3.2% since 1989).

17.01.03. Ukrainian factory makes toys from land mines

"The project is based at the formerly top-secret Donetsk State Chemical Plant in eastern Ukraine, where workers packed explosives into artillery shells and missiles that the Soviet military targeted at the West."  Associated Press Writer,
AP Europe
Monday, Dec 16, 2002, 9:39 AM ET
By Tom Vickery
DONETSK, Ukraine - Next holiday season, Ukrainian children will find something new under their trees: plastic toy pelicans and sandbox tools. The toys themselves are unremarkable: scoop-billed birds the size of a shoebox and mini shovel-and-pail sets. But their history is something else: In their former incarnation, these toys were casings for anti-personnel land mines.

The mines-to-toys project evolved from an $800,000 NATO-sponsored program to help demilitarize this Texas-sized country of 48 million people. It aims to reduce Ukraine's stockpile of some 6.4 million anti-personnel mines - the fourth largest arsenal in the world after China, Russia and the United States - and help the country's massive defense complex retool for peaceful production.

The project is based at the formerly top-secret Donetsk State Chemical Plant in eastern Ukraine, where workers packed explosives into artillery shells and missiles that the Soviet military targeted at the West.

"I always used to ask myself, 'What can I tell my kids about my job?'" said Lena Kazakova, a 14-year veteran of the plant whose twins were born the same year she started working.

"I used to just make something up. But now I can tell my girls something positive - 'We're saving people's lives' - and that makes me happy." Kazakova is one of nine women who have been trained to shuck open mines and remove the explosives.

The mines are taken from a storage shed to a workroom, where a young woman carefully counts the boxes, checks that the mines haven't been destabilized in transit and removes the detonator. They then pass to a reassembly table where several women in lab coats and headscarves pry open the mines and remove the mechanical components.

The mine bodies, still armed, are then loaded into a pneumatic press that punches out the explosives. Two women then take the empty plastic mine bodies and explosive material off to be washed and recycled. The whole process takes about 10 minutes per mine.

"I never imagined I'd be doing this," said Natalia Voloulina, an explosives handler who's spent 23 years at the plant, adding that her new work was "the most satisfying job I've had."

All the mines stored at the plant, some 400,000 in all, are expected to be dismantled by September 2003. The Donetsk plant's Soviet experience working with explosives made it a good fit for NATO's project; so did its toy-making history. In addition to its weapons production, the plant manufactured toys until Ukraine split from the Soviet Union in 1991, but then lost state subsidies and couldn't find plastic cheap enough to compete with China.

The NATO mine destruction project prompted the plant's staff to use the mine bodies, mixed with higher-grade plastic, to resurrect its toy production.

Factory management plans to sell the toys, but will also donate many to the region's orphanages and kindergartens that struggle to survive on an ever-fraying shoestring after wrenching post-Soviet budget cuts.

"We have to think about social issues (and) what we can do ... kids need help," said Nikolai Potapchuk, the plant's director.

The plant's engineers also designed innovations to make the sticks of TNT that coal miners use in Ukraine's methane-infused mines safer and cheaper, reusing explosives from the disarmed land mines and other munitions. The region's coal miners need all the help they can get. More than 3,700 have died on the job in Ukraine since 1991 and some 240 have been killed this year alone. Safer industrial explosives are a big part of the factory's work, and are a natural complement for their toys.

"We need to save the lives of fathers (miners) so that they can buy toys for their kids," Potapchuk said, half jokingly. Project workers see the NATO project as a chance to position the plant to win work in what they hope will be a growing market.

"Who knows? Soon we may be helping America destroy its mines," chief engineer Grigoriy Volodchenko mused.
 

19.01.03. Litauen og Polen ønsker Ukraine ind i EU og NATO

Litauens nyvalgte præsident Rolandas Paksas siger, at han støtter Ukraines fulde medlemskab af Den europæiske Union og NATO og, at vejen til opfyldelsen af dette mål ligger i en styrkelse af samarbejdet indenfor trekanten Polen-Litauen-Ukraine.
    Rolandas Paksas, som tiltræder i embedet i næste måned efter Valdas Adamskus' afgang fra posten, siger i et interview med BBCs ukrainske afdeling, at hans første møde efter hans edsaflæggelse bliver med Aleksander Kwasniewski (Polens præsident, red.)
    "Ukraine er et alt for vigtigt land for Europa til at man kan efterlade det i en bufferzone. Landet skal være fuldgyldigt medlem af såvel EU som NATO", - sagde Rolandas Paksas. "De kan spørge mig, hvad Litauen får ud af det? Sagen er den, at vores sikkerhed vil være tilstrækkelig, når Ukraine træder ind i disse organisationer. De må give mig ret i, at det er en vigtig faktor for os".
    Jeg mener, at det arbejde vil være endnu mere frugtbart, hvis vi agerer samlet - Litauen, Polen og Ukraine", - sagde Paksas til BBC
    Han tilføjede, at han under møder med Aleksandr Kwasniewski ville foreslå et møde mellem de tre præsidenter for Litauen, Polen og Ukraine med henblik på at "drøfte fælles praktiske skridt for at sikre, at Kiev opfylder det strategiske mål - medlemskab af det europæiske fællesskab". UP

19.01.03. Kendt journalist fundet død på hotel i Vinnytsa

Den kendte Kyiv-journalist Serhij Naboka er fundet død på et hotel i Vinnytsa. Den regionale afdeling af indenrigsministeriet MVS (politiet, red.) siger til UP, at "den pludselige død indtraf ved 1-tiden natten til søndag".
    Ifølge ambulancelægernes foreløbige bedømmelse af dødsårsagen døde Serhij Naboka som følge en blodprop, fortæller den vagthavende hos politiet. Journalisten befandt sig på det tidspunkt på et hotel i Vinnytsa. Ifølge den vagthavende er der tale om et "tjenestehotel" som hører under et af fængslerne ІВ 301/176.
    Serhij Nabokas lig er blevet sendt til obduktion. Chefen for politiets regionale afdeling og regionens statsanklager begav sig kort tid efter ud til gerningsstedet. Den vagthavende i indenrigsministeriet kunne ikke sige til UP, om der i forbindelse med Nabokas død ville blive rejst en sigtelse efter straffeloven.
    Serhij Naboka har i lang tid arbejdet på Radio Liberty, hvor han blandt andet producerede politiske udsendelser og en serie af udsendelser om betingelserne for indsatte i ukrainske fængsler. UP.

20.01.03. Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic choice

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, a country of 50 million people, was seen as a crucial bulwark against any resurgence of Russian territorial expansionism. That honeymoon period was short-lived. In November, following the apparent sale of "Kolchuga" radar systems to Iraq and other scandals, President Leonid Kuchma was ostracized at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Prague Summit. A month later, the Bush administration accused Ukraine of being a "primary money-laundering concern" and--for the first time--moved to impose sanctions under the provisions of the anti-terrorist USA Patriot Act. According to James Sherr, however, Ukraine is far from being a disaster; recent troubles could give the West leverage to force reforms. Is this the moment to draw Ukraine closer to Europe? 
Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) Report 2002/13
By James Sherr
"Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic Choice: Is Failure Inevitable?"

Since 1991 Ukraine's independence has been predicated on the 'strategic course of entering Europe'. The first and only governments of a modern, independent Ukraine have placed such strong emphasis on 'integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures' that setbacks and failures have naturally been seen as setbacks for the state. This is true despite the fact that Ukraine has also pursued a 'multi-vector' policy since President Leonid Kuchma was first elected to office in 1994. Convincingly or otherwise, the state leadership has been publicly adamant that 'strategic partnership' with Russia is designed to complement, rather than qualify this paramount objective.

Well before the latest setback to relations brought about by the Kolchuga affair, it had become depressingly clear that Ukraine's state leadership lacked both the convictions and abilities required to bring their Euro-Atlantic declarations to fruition. Despite the depth and momentum of Ukraine's relationship with NATO, it cannot seriously be claimed that Ukraine is drawing closer to Europe, let alone the European Union, in any meaningful or beneficial sense. Whilst many feared that Russia would block Ukraine's progress in the post-independence period, today Russia is blocking nothing. Instead, under the 'pragmatic' stewardship of President Putin, it is providing 'brotherly' support for all the 'negative phenomena' in Ukraine 's economy and polity. It is cashing in on dependencies which the country has done little to diminish, reaping the benefits of the leadership's own blunders and profiting from the recriminations which the state authorities have brought upon themselves. Such is the dominant view of Western policy makers, and with good reason. Nevertheless, it is an incomplete view. For people who claim to be concerned about the role of citizens and society, the view of these policy makers is surprisingly top-down: excessively focused on the deficiencies of Ukraine's leaders, insufficiently encouraged by the standing of their domestic critics, the inroads they have made and the support they have received from the country at large. By comparison with the post-Soviet norm, civil society is becoming a reality in Ukraine. By comparison with Belarus, with which Ukraine is now ominously and wrongly compared, its politics are vigorous, pluralistic and very much alive. By comparison with the Russian Federation, with which Ukraine is almost always contrasted unfavourably, its citizens place a value on democracy and resent the unaccountability of the authorities; they are learning how to resist manipulation, and they attach more importance to the decency of the state than its 'effectiveness' or strength.

Where security is concerned, the Western perspective is equally short-sighted. Lip service is paid to the value of the NATO-Ukraine relationship, whilst its real value is routinely overlooked. Today this relationship is transforming a significant part of the country's security culture away from the pathological post-Soviet norm to one which provides genuine security. For a country whose armed forces, intelligence services, security and law enforcement structures were inherited from the USSR, expectations cannot be defined according to a NATO template. The NATO-Ukraine relationship is not primarily about geopolitics, peace-keeping contributions or the technicalities of 'interoperability' and budgeting. It is about bringing the security of the regime into balance with the security of the state and country.

Finally, the West continues to draw a simplistic distinction between internal and external affairs, neglecting the fact that in 'post-Soviet space', economic networks are power networks that remain tenaciously trans-national. Ukraine's internal affairs do not develop in a vacuum.

Western passivity will not be reciprocated by Ukraine's eastern partners, state or 'private'. Those who wait on events will not only fail to influence events; they will ensure that history is made by others at the expense of Western values and hopes.

Challenges, Obstacles and Changes: Politics

The overwhelming challenge for Ukraine is to escape from the political, security, administrative and economic culture of the former USSR. Ignorance and cynicism have produced more attention to the mechanics and 'technology' of democracy than the values of it. Unless this changes, 'Euro-Atlantic integration' will remain no more than a slogan. The obstacles to such a transformation are great in Ukraine, but they need to be understood in comparison to realities elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. The observations of Dmitriy Furman, a senior analyst in Moscow's Institute of Europe, about Russia's political system shed light on Ukraine's.

[O]ur [Russian] system, with its multiple external similarities to the Western one is based on the diametrically opposite principle: the principle of the inalterability of power. (It is alterable, but in the purely legal sense used by the elite [vlasti] to adhere to the 'rules of the game'). This very transition to a system of the Western type (affording the possibility of victory to some form of opposition) cannot be envisaged even as a distant prospect. And this is the most formidable obstacle on our path to the West.[1]

In Ukraine it cannot be said that 'the possibility of victory' of 'some form of opposition cannot be envisaged', even if it is far from certain. If there were 'no democracy' in Ukraine, as is widely alleged, the composition of the current parliament, elected in March 2002, let alone the heavily left-wing parliament elected in March 1998, would be inexplicable. Almost equally inexplicable would be the breakout of the reformists from a regional to a national force over the past four years.[2] Nevertheless, it is all too obvious that Ukraine is a new and flawed democracy with an inbred, opaque and authoritarian administrative culture.

In this democracy, business, power and the state collude comfortably, covertly and without fear of sanction. In spite of political and historical differences between Ukraine and Russia, in both countries the Soviet mentality is the gum that fouls every machine. No one should underestimate the suppleness and cunning of the current regime in Ukraine or its ability to rescue itself. The fact remains that a dynamic of change is present. Civil society is not only becoming a factor, but in the Marxist sense, becoming 'conscious' of itself: participating not so much in the established order as against it. Whilst at one level the growth of civic instincts is sharpening the divide between state and society, it is also creating points of friction within the state and hence, a process of evolution inside it.

This evolution of the state is another reality which Westerners, obsessed with presidential capers, tend to overlook. Not only in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces, but the Cabinet of Ministers, the National Security and Defence Council and other state structures, there is a growing number of officials who understand why change is needed and what type of change is required. Today, they are stymied by the political framework. But for how long?

Security

Defence reform is no longer a slogan in Ukraine but a fact. The fact reflects two critical strengths: the will of the Armed Forces to reform and the will of NATO to support them. Yet there is a considerable possibility that these efforts will come to nought. Without a steady increase in budgetary allocations, Ukraine could witness an uncontrolled disintegration of its national defences. The country already possesses a schizophrenic security culture. Unless the spirit and substance of reform are extended to military structures outside the Ministry of Defence, this condition will deepen.

Although Ukraine inherited 30 per cent of the military personnel of the former USSR, it did not inherit an army, let alone a Ministry of Defence or General Staff. It inherited powerful force groupings, equipped and trained for strategic offensive operations, incapable of providing national defence and largely ignorant of the non-military dimension of security. It faced--and will continue to face--the burden of converting, 'privatising' and dismantling a military-industrial complex of 1,840 enterprises organised on principles antithetical to the market. It also inherited 700,000 militarised forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB. All of these establishments--centralised, compartmented and opaque--were subordinated to a scheme of 'civilian' (Party) control designed to confine authority and knowledge to very small circles of people. It is this against this template, not NATO's, that progress needs to be measured. Where defence is concerned, several important thresholds have been crossed.

In January 1997 Ukraine adopted a National Security Concept, which marked a radical break from the Soviet era. The authors of the Concept recognised that state and society were weak in Ukraine. They warned that the country was threatened not by hostile coalitions and blocs, but internal vulnerability, mistrust between state and society and the de facto privatisation of the state. They focused attention on the risk that political actors--internal or external--might be able to transform these vulnerabilities into emergencies and conflicts that could threaten the integrity of the state, and they called for the creation of an integrated security system to address these challenges. The State Programme of Armed Forces Reform and Development 2001-2005 is the first programme to emerge which is broadly consistent with this Concept. The adoption of this programme and more recent ones has produced a subtle but highly significant change of emphasis in Ukraine's programme of cooperation with NATO. Previously, Ukraine's main motivation in strengthening cooperation had been geopolitical: to restrain Russia and support Ukraine's integration into Europe. Today it is military-political and military-technical: in the words of former Minister of Defence Oleksandr Kuzmuk, 'to support defence reform in the country'.

No one of significance in Ukraine's military establishment believes that Russia could 'support' this reform. In all the areas where progress is sought--low-intensity operations, joint operations, professionalisation, planning and budgetary transparency, civil-military collaboration--NATO is seen as a repository of experience and expertise. In contrast, Russia's inconsistent and internally contested reforms are a poor model, and the performance of Russian combat forces in Chechnya does not lend itself to imitation. In addition, Russia's aims are mistrusted and its methods regarded with suspicion. As noted by Leonid Polyakov, Director of Military

Programmes of the Razumkov Centre

So far, Russian officials, unlike NATO's, have never voiced their concern about the weakness of Ukraine's defence or the slow pace of its military reform. One might infer that Ukraine's problems in building its Armed Forces are simply more acceptable to Moscow than Ukraine's success in that area.[3]

Since the State Programme was approved by President Kuchma in July 2000, NATO-Ukraine cooperation has been transformed into a structured and institutionalised process of audit and consultation. Moreover, the Armed Forces are doing everything that can be done without money to bring these programmes to fruition. But without money, reform, not to say the forces themselves will be unsustainable. Nevertheless, a genuine cultural change is taking place inside the country's armed forces. To date, the same cannot be said of the interior, security and law enforcement establishments outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence.

Economics and Administration

The post-Communist business culture which dominates Ukraine's economy is not an extension of Communist economic culture, but a mutation of it. The mutation was well under way before the Soviet system collapsed. The Soviet 'command-administrative system', which officially denied any legitimacy to private interests, always camouflaged a tension between sectoral and clan rivalries, bureaucratic centralisation and Party authority. As perestroyka and decentralisation proceeded, clannish networks became the dominant stakeholders in the system, as well as powerful engines of its disintegration. Under the post-Communist banners of 'capitalism' and 'market reform', these networks have transformed bureaucratic into financial power, privatising not only the economy, but the state itself. Today it is generally recognised that the 'subjective' interests of state structures at best compromise, and at worst take over their official roles and their public responsibilities. Before their dissolution, the anti-corruption commissions established by Yeltsin and Kuchma provided abundant documentation of these trends.

Despite the 'capitalist' label, the post-Communist economy is based primarily on networks, rather than markets. It is a producer rather than a consumer orientated economy. Its 'new class' is predatory rather than entrepreneurial, more skillful at extracting wealth than creating it--and until recently exporting it. (It is estimated that $25 billion was illegally exported from Ukraine between 1991 and 1997). It benefits from a confusing and convoluted legal 'order' that confines competition to a closed circle and shuts out those who lack the connections and resources to buy immunity from it. Ties to security services, tax authorities and local officials are potent assets in this world, where success depends upon finansovaya-informatsionnaya bor'ba (financial-informational struggle) and where the norms of business are little different from the norms of conspiracy.

It is also a trans-national world. Trans-national (and Russian dominated) networks--in energy, banking, defence industry, security and intelligence--can give powerful reinforcement to local actors and undermine efforts to introduce transparent business practices, legal regulation and contract enforcement. Supporters of former Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko believe that her efforts to extend regulation and transparency to the energy sector were instrumental in her dismissal, arrest and (with Russian help) her prosecution.

It is often claimed that President Putin understands that this business culture is an obstacle to Russia's integration with Europe. Perhaps. But however critical he might be of this culture in Russia, he relies upon it in his efforts to create 'a good-neighbourly belt along the perimeter of Russia's borders'.[4] This duality is a contradiction at the heart of Putin's policy. Yet no such contradiction is perceived or admitted by Putin. In his relations with Ukraine, as with all former Soviet states, he has repeatedly tied economic concessions to the resolution of political disputes and vice versa. Prior to the first Putin-Kuchma summit in April 2000, he linked the lifting of Russia's oil embargo to the acquisition of 30 energy facilities by Russian entities, and there is some evidence that in August 2000, he linked other concessions to the dismissal of Ukraine's Foreign Minister, Borys Tarasyuk and several other 'unhelpful' officials.[5]

In February 2001 14 presidential agreements were concluded in Dnepropetrovsk on modalities of Russian energy supply and the privatisation of Ukraine's energy infrastructure--all of them unpublished. How do the proponents of an open economy, accountable government and European integration benefit from this policy? As Oleksandr Sushko has concluded, they don't, and they are not meant to. The culture of business is a powerful factor maintaining the linkage between Ukraine's dependency on Russia, its isolation from Europe and the 'dominance of authoritarian tendencies in the system of [Ukrainian] political power'.[6]

The European Union: Protagonist or Spectator?

Within a very few years, Ukraine will be the European Union's principal neighbour, its 'back yard' no less than Russia's. Has the EU behaved accordingly? The answer depends on the Union's aim: does it wish to be a magnet or a barrier? To this question it has given no clear answer. In the Common Strategy on Ukraine adopted at Helsinki in December 1999 and at the European Council at Göteborg in June 2001, the EU came close to defining itself as a magnet. At Göteborg the EU came enticingly close to accepting the possibility of Ukraine's eventual membership, placing its declarations on Ukraine under the heading, 'The Future of Europe', whilst pointedly consigning its commentary on Russia to the less intimate realm of 'External Relations'. It is not difficult to see why. For the Russian Federation, unlike Ukraine, EU membership has never been an official goal. Moreover, by 2001 Putin's 'far tougher' and more 'pragmatic' policy was raising anxieties that the EU might 'lose' Ukraine.

Today the EU seems resigned to losing Ukraine. The first clear demonstration of this change in attitude came at the European Council in Luxembourg (April 2002), which adopted the 'Special Neighbour' policy: a policy which groups Ukraine together with Moldova--a state with European aspirations but almost no capacity to realise them--and Belarus--a state (and society) with a fundamentally different set of aspirations from those of Ukraine. The second and apparently conclusive demonstration was provided on 15 October by EU Commission President, Romano Prodi, who asked 'Do we stop, or don't we stop?' The 'ultimate border' of the future European Union had become 'quite clear', and it would not include Ukraine.[7] Sushko is not exaggerating when he describes this as: worthy of being marked as the first public allowance made by a high official in favour of a principled institutional isolation of Eastern Europe from the European political process. The absence of reasoning here looks like an attempt to proffer such a position as an axiomatic one that needs no proof. (author's emphasis) [8]

EU discontent with President Kuchma and his supporters is certainly well founded, and in the wake of the Honhadze and Kolchuga affairs, so is anger. But resignation expresses an attitude about the future, rather than the present. If Ukraine's population responded to the behaviour of the authorities with resignation, then a resigned attitude about Ukraine's future would not be so puzzling. But instead of moot apathy, there has been ferment in the country. Inexplicably, the EU is treating this ferment as a sign of regression, rather than change. Even the 'lessons' drawn from real reverses such as Yushchenko's dismissal in April 2001 seem to be one-sided and superficial. Had Yushchenko failed because he failed--because he lost popularity, because his policies didn't eliminate debts, pay pensions, open markets and stimulate economic growth--then his dismissal would be a commentary on the intractability of Ukraine's economic problems. Instead, they are a commentary on something that is not intractable: the political correlation of forces. Is the EU taking positive steps to influence this correlation? Once again, Sushko is right. Instead of encouraging the EU's natural allies, Mr. Prodi has offered 'a priceless gift to anti-democratic, anti-European forces in Ukraine'. Well before the Prodi declaration, these forces were profiting from two reinforcing factors: a profound misunderstanding of the European Union on the part of Ukraine and a depressing imbalance between European and Russian engagement. Ukrainians broadly confuse the EU with 'Europe', which to many in Central and Eastern Europe represents a 'great' ethno-cultural civilisation united by a common heritage. Yet today's European Union has become a multi-cultural entity united less by heritage than by adherence to common values, principles, standards, procedures and institutions. After 70 years of Soviet socialism, Ukrainians are belatedly seeking to realise the modern, twentieth century ambitions which were denied to them: nationhood and 'membership of European civilisation'. Yet this 'modern' Europe no longer exists. The European Union is in large part a post-modernist project created by those determined to 'move beyond' the political building blocks of the modern world: the nation and the nation state. In essence, Ukraine and the EU perceive one another through different coordinates of time, and as a result, their dialogue is often a dialogue des sourdes.

The imbalance between the behaviour of an apolitical and often procedure bound EU and an emphatically geopolitical Russia is stark. The EU has limited interest in Ukraine's foreign policy, still less its 'aspirations'. Its focus is on Ukraine's internal policy, for it is internal changes which will define Ukraine's credentials as a 'European' (i.e. EU) state. Thus, when Ukraine speaks of integration with Europe, the EU erects 'conditionality' and standards. It does little to suggest that it regards Ukraine's 'return to Europe' as either welcome or natural. But when Ukraine seeks better relations with Russia, the Russian Federation responds with evident warmth, castigating the West for intruding in the internal affairs of 'brotherly Ukraine' and erecting no standards except 'firm good neighbourliness'. In addition, Russia assiduously cultivates Ukraine--not only at the state-to-state level--but at transnational level, by strengthening networks between a wide range of 'private' and very powerful interests enjoying privileged connections with the two states. By summer 2000, all of these asymmetries were pulling Ukraine east. Yet this fact, too, is somewhat misinterpreted. President Kuchma does not understand the West, and he is exasperated by it. He understands Russia, and he fears it. In his dealings with Russia, as with political forces at home, Kuchma is a man who seeks counterpoises and compensations, lines of retreat and room for manoeuvre. Then and since he has treated the NATO-Ukraine relationship as the final line of retreat, irrespective of Russian pressure, not to say NATO's decision to snub him at the Prague summit. What is more, most members of the movement 'To Europe with Russia' appear wedded to the multi-vector policy--a Western counterbalance to Russia--and apprehensive about events taking a course which turn their preferred 'primary' vector, Russia, into the only vector and leave Ukraine to confront Russian interests and ambitions alone.

The paradox is that the shocks and outrages which have undermined Ukraine's standing probably give the West and its institutions greater leverage today than they have had at any time since Kuchma first came to office. The reverberations of the Honhadze and Kolchuga affairs and the unsettled condition of the country have created apprehensions right across the Ukrainian political establishment. It is an uncertainty magnified by the events of 11 September 2001, the new NATO-Russia relationship, the change of strategic focus by the United States and the very real possibility of war with Iraq. The 23 May declaration identifying NATO membership as the 'ultimate goal' of Euro-Atlantic integration is the direct result of these apprehensions. The eclipse of this declaration by Kolchuga and the dispatch of Ukraine to the margins of the Prague summit have in some quarters transformed uncertainty to panic. State and society are not only changing in Ukraine, they are changing quickly. The moment needs to be exploited with delicacy and deliberation by the West. But it needs to be exploited.



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[1] Internet roundtable hosted by the internet programme of Moscow News [Vremya MN], 26 July 2002.
[2] For an analysis of the 31 March 2002 parliamentary elections, see James Sherr, 'Ukraine's Parliamentary Elections: The Limits of Manipulation ', CSRC Occasional Brief, April 2002.

[3] Leonid Polyakov, National Security and Defence, No 12 2000, pg 15.

[4] This is the objective defined in Russia's Concepts of Foreign Policy, signed by President Putin on 28 June 2000.

[5] James Sherr, 'The Dismissal of Borys Tarasyuk', CSRC Occasional Brief OB79, October 2000.

[6] Oleksandr Sushko, Monitoring: Occasional Report no. 3 (Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine), February 2001.

[7] 'The Balkans, whatever the timetable is, are destined to become part of the European family. They are a region we have to look after,,, As far as Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and countries of the Southern Mediterranean are concerned, including Israel, you can link together many things - but not institutions," La Stampa, 15 October (www.lastampa.it/redazione/Interni/prodi2.asp)

[8] Monitor, no 42 (Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine), 10-14 October 2002.

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Dr. James Sherr has been a Fellow of the Conflict Studies Research Centre at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst since 1995 and Lecturer at Lincoln College Oxford since 1986. He is a Specialist Adviser to the House of Commons Defence Committee, and a former Director of Services at the Royal United Services Institute. 

20.01.03. USA-ambassadører: russisk gennembrud i skyggeprivatiseringen af strategiske objekter i Ukraine

USA vil sandsynligvis afslutte en revision af den amerikanske politik i forhold til Ukraine og præsident Leonid Kutjma inden udgangen af januar. Det meddeler Radio Liberty fra Washington med henvisning til "troværdige kilder".
    "Det bør påpeges, at USAs præsident i begyndelsen af februar skal fremlægge sit finanslovsforslag for næste år i Kongressen, der som det har været tilfældet de senere år, også omfatter den amerikanske regerings hjælp til Ukraine", - fortæller Radio Liberty.
    Washington har i forbindelse med ændringen af politikken i forhold til Ukraine udtrykt sin bekymring for den ukrainske præsidents handlinger som salg af våben til Makedonien og især Irak, problemet med pressefriheden og de demokratiske og markedsmæssige forandringer. "Forleden dag er denne liste blevet udvidet med bekymringen for Ukraines stigende økonomiske, herunder energimæssige, afhængighed af Rusland", - oplyser radiostationen.
    I en tale til den indflydelsesrige amerikanske institution - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - sagde USAs ambassadør i Rusland, Aleksander Vershbou: "Rusland har til en vis grad opfattet de nuværende spændinger i de amerikansk-ukrainske relationer som et påskud til en øget styrkelse af forbindelserne mellem Rusland og Ukraine. I Rusland opfatter man fremdeles Ukraine som en del af det såkaldte nære udland, og man har allerede, inden spændingerne dukkede op, arbejdet på at styrke positionerne, overvejende ved hjælp af økonomiske instrumenter", - sagde den amerikanske diplomat.
    Han mindede desuden om, at der eksisterer meget tætte forbindelser mellem præsidentadministrationerne i Moskva og i Kyiv, og har ville ikke udelukke, at "Rusland ikke vil forholde sig helt passiv i forhold til den kommende ukrainske valgkamp".
    Vershbou antager, at russerne "vil koncentere opmærksomheden om økonomiske virkemidler som middel til at bevare og styrke deres indflydelse".
    "De forenede Stater betragter ikke et tæt russisk-ukrainsk samarbejde som et problem, hvis det baserer sig på den forudsætning, at Ukraine er en suveræn stat og at russerne respekterer den", - sagde USAs ambassadør i Rusland.
    USAs ambassadør i Ukraine, Carlos Pascual, var i sit indlæg i Washington noget mere bekymret i forhold til de mulige følger af Ruslands øgede økonomiske indflydelse i Ukraine.
    Ifølge ham har præsident Kutjma brug for præsident Putin, som han mødes med næsten hver tredje uge. Kyivs afhængighed af Moskva er vokset støt de seneste år. "Den politiske afhængighed er blevet en anledning til at skabe økonomiske muligheder for de russiske virksomheder. Hvis man ser på de officielle data for investeringer, så indtager de russiske selskaber tredje eller fjerdepladsen og har investeret ca. 400 millioner dollars. Men dem, som har haft mulighed for at være i Ukraine, forstår udmærket, at sådan forholder det sig ikke, at det ikke er i overensstemmelse med sandheden - den russiske økonomiske tilstedeværelse er jo meget større".
    Den amerikanske diplomat påpegede i denne forbindelse, at USA ikke er imod direkte russiske kapitaltilførsler i de ukrainske virksomheder. Men ifølge ham er visse af det ukrainske styres skridt ikke til fordel for Ukraine i strategisk forstand - og her drejer det sig først og fremmest om oliesektoren.
    I denne kontekst henviste Pascual til to aftaler, som er blevet underskrevet fornylig. For det første er der tale om den nylige hemmelige aftale mellem det russiske "Gazprom" og det ukrainske "Naftohaz", som har et punkt "om fælles beslutning omkring ændringer i ledelsen af det internationale konsortium", som skal kontrolere den ukrainske del af det internationale gastransportsystem. Med andre ord har det russiske "Gazprom" fået vetoretten i forhold til den ukrainske del af gasrørledningen. Ifølge Pascual kan Gazprom ikke være mere lykkelig - for russerne har forsøgt at opnå dette allerede siden 1992.
    Ifølge ambassadør Pascuals vurdering har den ukrainske part lavet lignende fejl indenfor olierørledningssektoren. Man har således givet det russiske selskab "Transneft'" samtlige rettigheder til kontrollen med transitten gennem ukrainsk territorium. Det er sket indenfor rammerne af forhandlingerne om den rørledning, som løber i adriatisk retning. Det skaber en potentiel trussel mod hele eksistensen af olierørledningen Odesa-Brody: "I løbet af de sidste tre måneder har Ukraine således gjort nogle radikale indrømmelser, som har øget den russiske indflydelse i Ukraine i olie-og gassfæren utrolig meget og kan potentielt berøve Ukraine muligheden for at få nye oliekilder i Det kaspiske Hav, som ikke er afhængige af Rusland", - sagde Pascual. Radio Liberty. UP.

21.01.03. Storbritannien, Tyskland og Canada indfører sanktioner mod Ukraine

Tre lande har på samme tidspunkt indført sanktioner mod Ukraine på grund af landets utilfredsstillende bekæmpelse af hvidvaskning af penge, der er skaffet ad kriminel vej. For en måned siden indførte den internationale organisation FATF sanktioner mod Ukraine, og samtidig med det forpligtede USA sine banker til nøje at overvåge operationer, der involverer Ukraine.
    Fra nu af  vil samtlige ukrainske transaktioner med tyske banker anses for at være mistænkelige. Overførsler til mere end 15.000 Euro, hvor kundens navn, adresse eller banknummer ikke fremgår, er underlagt særlig steng kontrol.
    Storbritanniens finansministerium gik et skridt videre, idet man har pålagt banker at stille informationer til rådighed for Den nationale efterretningstjeneste om mistænkelige operationer der involverer Ukraine. De britiske bankfolk er advaret om risikoen i forbindelse med betjeningen af ukrainske finansinstitutioners korrespondent-konti. Desuden vil samtlige kontrakter med private også blive revideret.
    Canadas myndigheder har i det hele taget anbefalet sine finansfolk at afholde sig fra pengeoperationer med ukrainske partnere. Nu er det i praksis blevet umuligt for ukrainske selskaber at åbne en bankfilial eller en repræsentation i disse lande. Vanskeliggørelsen af betalingsprocessen kan meget vel ende med brudte kontrakter og tilbageholdelser af lønninger.
    Det ser ud til, at den lov "om bekæmpelse af hvidvaskningen af sorte penge", som Verkhovna Rada vedtog i slutningen af november, ikke har ændret situationen. Det har heller ikke hjulpet, at man efter FATFs henstilling har indført ændringer, som opererer med tilvejebringelsen af fyldestgørende informationer og ændringer i retsplejeloven.
    Men i regeringen har man ikke mistet håbet. Økonomiminister Valerij Khoroshkovskyj siger, at de vigtigste spørgsmål, som Kyiv vil søge at fremme under det næste møde i den ukrainsk-amerikanske kommission for økonomisk samarbejde, vil være indtræden i WTO, ophævelse af sanktioner og tildelingen af status som et land med markedsøkonomi.
    Mødet i kommissionen finder sted i Washington i slutningen af januar. Men selv hvis sanktionerne bliver hævet, vil en tjeneste under navn Egmont Group, som er finansverdenens analog til Interpol, endnu i lang tid holde øje med Kyiv. Indtil videre vil eksperter ikke påtage sig at komme med prognoser omkring, hvor stort et tab ukrainsk økonomi vil lide.
    Regeringschefen, Viktor Janukovytj, har også en mening om emnet, og hans opfattelse er, at samtlige spørgsmål i forhold til FATF og de lande, som har annonceret santktioner, vil blive klaret.
    Viktor Janukovytj, Ukraines premierminister: "Vi vil arbejde på dette spørgsmål med andre stater, som nu skal til at træffe alle disse forholdsregler. Men vi har nu aftalt med FATFs ekspertgruppe, at vores ukrainske specialister vil arbejde sammen allerede i januar, og fra starten af februar, for den 20. februar er der møde i FATF. Vi håber på, at vi i den nærmeste fremtid vil have behandlet disse spørgsmål med FATF, og at de vil blive løftet".
        Premierministeren kommenterede også spørgsmålene til budgettet. Ifølge Viktor Janukovytj vil den af parlamentet planlagte forhøjelse af mindstelønnen tidligst kunne blive ført ud i livet af regeringen i andet halvår.
    Viktor Janukovytj, Ukraines premierminister: "Vi vil gøre alt, vil nedskære udgifterne, vi vil nu se på hver eneste styrelse, hvert eneste ministerium, for at nedbringe udgifterne og overføre dem til en forhøjelse af lønningerne. Men disse skridt vil blive trinvise".
    Mandag mødtes premierministeren med en delegation fra Vietnams folkeforsamling, Nguen Van Anom. Kyiv erklærede sin interesse i to store projekter i dette asiatiske land - det er byggeriet af et vandkraftværk samt etableringen af et sattelitsystem til Vietnam. Podrobnosti.

21.01.03. Jusjtjenko og Tymoshenko profiterer af fortsat faldende tillid til Kutjma og Medvedtjuk

Den national-liberale leder Viktor Jusjtjenko fastholder positionen som den politiker, der nyder størst tillid i den ukrainske befolkning. 26,8% af de adspurgte har fuld tillid til ham ifølge en meningsmåling fra januar 2003. På 2. pladsen kommer den radikale Julia Tymoshenko, som nyder fuld tillid blandt 18,4% af befolkningen, efterfulgt af kommunisten Petro Symonenko, som har 16,7% af de adspurgtes fulde tillid.
    Tallene stammer fra en meningsmåling fra fonden "Demokratiske initiativer", som blev præsenteret på en pressekonference i Kyiv i mandags. Ifølge sociologerne fra "Demokratiske initiativer" har samtlige ukrainske politikere en negativ saldo på tillidbarometret.
    Den mest negative balance på tillidsbarometeret har Ukraines præsident Leonid Kutjma (- 48%), hans stabschef Viktor Medvedtjuk (- 39%) og lederen af Det proggressive socialistiske parti Natalia Vitrenko. Disse politikere må stå model til, at henholdsvis 56,6%, 44,8% og 57,1% af de adspurgte overhovedet ingen tilllid har til dem.
    Ifølge meningsmålingerme oplevede Medvedtjuk, Vitrenko og Verkhovna Radas formand, Volodymyr Lytvyn, den største nedgang i tilliden på mellem - 19% og - 30%.
    Lederen af fraktionen BjUT, Julia Tymoshenko har en negativ tillidssaldo på - 32% (50% har ingen tillid til hende), sekretæren for Det nationale sikkerheds- og forsvarsråd, Jevhen Martjuk har en negativ saldo på - 31% (37,8% har ingen tillid til ham), lederen af socialistpartiet, Oleksandr Moroz, har - 27%, lederen af nationalbankens bestyrelse, Serhij Tihipko, står til en negativ saldo på - 27%, og det samme har lederen af kommunistpartiet, Petro Symonenko, mens premierminister Viktor Janukovytj har en negativ saldo på - 24%, udenrigsminister Anatolij Zlenko - 13%, og Viktor Jusjtjenko har den mindste negative tillidssaldo på - 6%.
    Samtidig påpeger videnskabelig leder af fonden "Demokratiske initiativer", Iryna Bekeshkina, at Tymoshenkos balance blevet væsentlig forbedret i løbet af den sidste måned (fra - 41% til - 32%). Det samme gælder Symonenko (fra - 32% til - 27%) og til en vis grad Moroz (fra - 30% til - 27%) og Jusjtjenko - fra - 9% til - 6%.
    Vitrenko har oplevet det største fald i tillidsbarometeret fra - 46% til - 51%.
    Ifølge sociologerne stoler Ukraines borgere nu meget mindre på præsidenten, De væbnede Styrker og Verkhovna Rada end de gjorde sidste år. Præsident Leonid Kutjmas negative tillidssaldo er faldet fra - 33% i januar 2002 til - 48% i januar 2003. De tilsvarende tal for De væbnede Styrker er fra + 10% til - 1% og parlamentets - fra - 44% til - 54%.
    Samtidig er Julia Tymoshenkos negative saldo skrumpet væsentligt ind - fra - 56% til -32%. Det samme gælder socialisternes leder Oleksandr Moroz, som er gået fra -39% til -27%.
    Ifølge meningsmålingerne kan man konstatere en vis forværring i tilliden til sikkerhedstjenesten SBU (fra + 6% til 0%), massemedierne (fra + 6% til 0%) samt de vestlige massemedier (fra 0% til - 5%).
    Ifølge videnskabelig leder af fonden "Demokratiske initiativer", Iryna Bekeshkina, hænger faldet i tilliden til landets øverste ledelse med en række skandaler, som den sættes i forbindelse med.
    Meningsmålingen blev gennemført af fonden "Demokratiske initiativer" mellem den 27.12.2002 og 05.01.2003. 1200 personer fra samtlige ukrainske regioner tog del i meningsmålingen. Fejlmargenen er højst 3%. Interfaks-Ukrajina. UP.

22.01.03. Vestlige lande fortsætter med at indføre sanktioner mod Ukraine

Tyrkiet og Finland har truffet modforholdsregler overfor Ukraine for at forhindre hvidvask af penge, mens Japan og Danmark endnu ikke har truffet en sådan beslutning, oplyste lederen af det ukrainske udenrigsministeriums pressetjeneste, Serhij Borodenkov, tirsdag.
    Borodenkov oplyste, at "Danmark indenfor den nærmeste fremtid også planlægger at indføre en procedure for styrket kontrol med finansielle operationer, som ukrainske personer og juridiske entiteter står for".
    Samtidig sagde Danmarks repræsentanter ifølge ham, at de i betragtning af de informationer, som den stedlige ukrainske ambassade havde givet dem omkring de forholdsregler, som Ukraines regering træffer for at få løftet FATFs beslutning om at indføre sanktioner, vil disse modforholdsregler ikke vare længe, og vil ikke have nogen negative følger for Ukraine.
    "Efter af Finland havde modtaget udførlig information fra vores lokale ambassade om Ukraines regerings skridt i retning af en ophævelse af sanktionerne, udtrykte Finland håb om, at Ukraine inden det næste møde i FATF i februar vil rette op på manglerne i sin lovgivning omkring hvidvask af penge og vil fastlægge, hvilke forholdsregler, der bliver truffet i en monitoreringsperiode", - sagde Borodenkov.
    Samtidig sagde han, at "Japan endnu ikke har truffet nogen konkret beslutning, men at holdningen hos dette lands ledelse vil basere sig på FATFs europæiske kontrolgruppes anbefalinger", mens "Tyrkiet har oplyst, at landet ikke kan undlade at opfylde FATFs beslutninger som et medlem af denne organisation, men at Tyrkiet ikke vil indføre total monitorering af ukrainske deltagere i finansielle operationer".
    Borodekov oplyste endvidere, at "Tyskland i løbet af konsultationerne understregede, at man ikke havde regnet med vedtagelsen af en så hård beslutning fra FATFs side, som anbefalede at der indføres sanktioner mod Ukraine".
    Som tidligere oplyst vil Den europæiske gruppe indenfor rammerne af Den internationale gruppe til modvirken af hvidvask af kriminelle indtægter (FATF - Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering) den 12. februar i Paris bestemme, hvorvidt Ukraine har rettet op på manglerne i sin lovgivning omkring bekæmpelsen af hvidvask af "sorte" penge til at det kan begrunde en ophævelse af de sanktioner, som blev anbefalet i slutningen af sidste år.
    USA, Storbritannien, Tyskland og Canada har allerede bekræftet, at de indfører sanktioner. Interfaks-Ukrajina. UP.

22.01.03. FATF har kun hørt om sanktioner fra USA og Canada

FATF har kun modtaget bekræftelser på indførelse af sanktioner mod Ukraine fra USAs og Canadas side. Det sagde repræsentant for FATFs presseafdeling, Helen Fischer, i en interview med Hromadske Radio.
    "Desværre har FATF truffet en beslutning om at kontrollere alle finansielle transaktioner med Ukraine. Men jeg har kun kendskab til, at FATFs medlemslande lige er på nippet til at gøre det. Jeg ved intet om Tyskland og Danmark", - kommenterede Fischer informationerne om disse landes beslutninger om at træffe modforholdsregler overfor Ukraine for at forhindre hvidvask af penge.
    Omvendt anser Fischer de nylige oplysninger om indførelse af sanktioner mod Ukraine fra FATF-landenes side for at være helt naturlige. Ifølge hende bør medlemsorganisationerne gøre det efter, at FATF har anbefalet af indføre sanktioner mod Ukraine fra den 20. december 2002. UP.

23.01.03. Lettere fald i ukrainernes tillid til NATO

Tilliden til NATO er faldet fra 39% i juni 2002 til 28% i november 2002. Det er resultatet af en meningsmåling gennemført af centret "Socialnyj monitoring" og Ukraines institut for meningsmålinger (UISD).
    Resultatet af undersøgelsen blev fremlagt onsdag på en pressekonference i Kyiv af lederen af UISD, Oleksandr Jeremenko. Ifølge ham havde 34% af ukrainerne ingen tillid til NATO i juni sidste år. Dette tal var i november samme år steget til 44%. Ifølge meningsmålingen udgøres størstedelen af dem, som ikke har tillid til Alliancen, af respondenter i alderen 50+ år (50%), mens den aldersgruppe, hvor mistilliden til NATO er mindst, udgøres af de unge mellem 18 og 28 år. Samtidig har hver tredje unge ukrainer ifølge Jeremenko ikke besluttet sig, hvad de skal mene i denne sag.
    Ifølge undersøgelsen er situationen i Ukraines vestlige regioner den, at her dominerer de respondenter, der stoler på blokken, mens Krims indbyggere med 55% og borgerne i Ukraines østlige og centrale del (henholdsvis 48% og 47%) har mindst tillid til NATO.
    Jaremenko forklarer dette fald i tilliden til NATO på et halvt år blandt andet med, at der opstod problemer omkring Ukraines præsident Leonid Kutjmas rejse til Alliancens topmøde, som fandt sted i Prag i november sidste år. På trods af Ukraines præsidents Kutjmas ret lave popularitet hos Ukraines befolkning, forbinder man ikke desto mindre statens image med Kutjma, og heraf følger, at befolkningen ret ofte opfatter en negativ holdning til statsoverhovedet på internationalt niveau som en negativ holdning til selve Ukraine, siger Jaremenko.
    Adspurgt om, hvad NATO er for noget (respondenterne havde højst tre mulige svar), svarede 29% (mod 26% i juni 2002), at NATO er den stærkeste og mest indflydelsesrige militær-politiske struktur i verden i dag; 22% (mod 20% i juni 2002) sagde, at NATO er en aggressiv militær-politisk blok, 22% (mod 17% i juni 2002) sagde, at NATO er "en verdens gendarm, som beskytter de rigeste vestlige landes interesser"; 18% (mod 19% i juni 2002) sagde, at NATO er en forsvarsunion, mens 17% (mod 20% i juni 2002) sagde, at NATO er en fredsskabende (fredsbevarende, red.) organisation.
    Samtidig påpeger Jaremenko, at undersøgelsens resultat viser, at den positive holdning til Ukraines indtræden i NATO ikke er ændret væsentligt. I juni gik 39% af de adspurgte ind for Ukraines indtræden i NATO, mens tallet i november var 37%. Andelen af de respondenter, som støtter ideen om en indtræden i blokken, er større i næsten alle regioner, og kun på Krim er der en betydelig og i Kyiv er der en mindre betydelig overvægt af dem, som mener, at Ukraine ikke bør træde ind i NATO.
    På spørgsmålet om, hvornår Ukraine kan blive medlem af NATO svarede 40% (ved ikke), 16% (som ifølge Jaremenko kan betegnes som "ukvalificerede optimister") svarede, at Ukraine bliver medlem af NATO i løbet af 5 år, 17% svarede, at det vil ske i løbet af 6-10 år, 8% svarede, at det ville tage mellem 11 og 15 år, mens 6% svarede - over 20 år. 9% af de adspurgte mener, at Ukraine aldrig bliver medlem af NATO. UNIAN, UP.

23.01.03. Hver anden ukrainer vil gerne være en del af EU

Over halvdelen af Ukraines borgere mener, at landet bør stræbe mod at blive medlem af Den europæiske Union. Herom vidner resultatet af en meningsmåling, som Centret "Socialnyj monitoryng" og Ukraines institut for sociale studier (UISD) med støtte fra FNs udviklingsprogram i Ukraine har gennemført.
    Ifølge undersøgelsen er 59% af de adspurgte i større eller mindre grad enige i påstanden om, at "det ville være bedst for Ukraine at være medlem af EU". Kun 10% af ukrainerne er aldeles imod et medlemsskab af EU.
    Et ukrainsk medlemsskab af EU opnår allermest støtte i regionerne Ternopil (82%), Tjernivtsi (81%), Kherson (80%), Vinnytsa (79%), Zakarpatska (77%), Ivano-Frankivska (76%) og Kirovohrad (70%).
    Det er aldersgruppen mellem 25 og 28 år der rummer det største antal tilhængere af et EU-medlemsskab (70%), derefter kommer personer med en videregående uddannelse (68%), personer der er velstående (72%) samt personer, som forventer, at det vil betyde forbedringer (71%).
    Meningsmålingen blev gennemført i november-december 2002 af Centret "Socialnyj monitoryng" og UISD med støtte fra FNs udviklingsprogram i Ukraine. Undersøgelsens resultat blev præsenteret onsdag i Kyiv. 3063 personer fra alle ukrainske regioner deltog i undersøgelsen. Fejlmargenen var på højst 2%. Interfaks-Ukrajina. UP.

23.01.03. Serhij Naboka Dead, Contract Killing Alleged

maidan.org.ua
January 18, 2003
http://maidan.org.ua/n/news/1042901612

On Saturday morning, about 5 a.m., journalists Okhrymovich and Sherstiuk of Radio Liberty found their colleague, a prominent Ukrainian journalist on human rights and democracy, Serhiy Naboka, dead on government premises of a penentiary institution in Vinnycia. He was one in a group of journalist investigators who were engaged in making of a series of radio broadcasts about life conditions for prisoners in Ukraine's penentiary institutions in Vinnycia and Poltava. Mr. Naboka was in his 40s.

Mr. Naboka was a prisoner of consience during the rule of communists in Ukraine. He was also an active member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, a Ukrainian human rights protection group in 1980s and 1990s.

The "hotel" of the Vinnycia penentiary institution in about 20 kilometers away from the City of Vinnycia, without a permanent telephone or cell connection. According to the government's milicia investigators who search the place, Mr. Naboka dies because of "heart insufficiency".

Mr. Naboka was a prominent journalist who reported on human rights abuses and democracy in Ukraine. He was also a founder of UNIAR information agency. He was a frequent guest on TV and radio. He was a manager of a cultural project called Babuin. Serhij Naboka was reportedly a healthy person.

Sources: CupolNews, Mig-News.

24.01.03. Uddrag af Ukraine-NATO handlingsplan minder om memorandum fra Europarådet

Denne plan blev udarbejdet i henhold til en beslutning truffet af kommissionen Ukraine-NATO med henblik på at udbygge og udvide relationerne Ukraine-NATO; den afspejler strategien i Ukraines relationer til Den Nordatlantiske Aftaleorganisation. Den baserer sig på Charteret om det særlige partnerskab, som blev underskrevet i Madrid den 9. juli 1997, og som fortsat er grundlaget for relationerne mellem Ukraine og NATO.
    Formålet med handlingsplanen er at få en klar fastlæggelse af Ukraines strategiske mål og prioriteringer for at opnå dets mål om en fuld integration i de euroatlantiske sikkerhedsstrukturer og for at skabe strategiske rammer for det eksisterende og kommende samarbejde mellem Ukraine og NATO i henhold til Charteret. I denne kontekst vil den blive løbende revideret.
    Handlingsplanen indeholder fælles afstemte principper og mål. Med henblik på at sikre en opnåelse af disse mål og principper i overensstemmelse med Afsnit V vil der blive udarbejdet Årlige Målplaner, som vil indbefatte Ukraines konkrete interne aktiviteter og relevante fælles aktiviteter mellem Ukraine og NATO.
   
Afsnit 1
De indenrigspolitiske spørgsmål
Principper

Med henblik på en tættere euroatlantisk integration fortsætter Ukraine med at gennemføre en indenrigspolitik, som baserer sig på styrkelsen af demokratiet og retsstaten, respekten for menneskerettigheder, princippet om magtens deling og dommernes uafhængighed, demokratiske valg i henhold til OSCEs normer, politisk pluralisme, ytringsfrihed, respekten for nationale og etniske mindretals rettigheder og fravær af diskrimination udfra politiske, religiøse eller etniske kendetegn. Det indbefatter sikringen af tilpasningen af gældende lovgivning til implementeringen af den anførte politik.
    I betragtning af Ukraines udenrigspolitiske orientering henimod den europæiske og euroatlantiske integration, herunder landets fremtidige mål om at blive medlem af NATO, vil Ukraine fortsætte udviklingen af lovgivning, som baserer sig på de almindelige principper for demokrati og folkeretten.
    En vigtig del af reformeringen af retssystemet er deltagelsen i Europarådets konventer, som fastlægger fælles standarder for europæiske lande. Bestræbelserne bør rettes mod en reformering af de rets-og ordenshåndhævende strukturer, forbedringen af de mekanismer som skal sikre, at alle statslige og civile strukturer overholder og eksekverer princippet om rettens overhøjhed og styrkelsen af de strukturer, som beskytter civile borgerrettigheder.

Mål:
І.1.А.1 styrkelsen af demokratiske institutioner og valginstitutioner;
І.1.А.2 styrkelsen af den dømmende magts beføjelser og uafhængighed;
І.1.А.3 medvirken til en vedvarende udvikling og styrkelse af det civile samfund, rettens overhøjhed, beskyttelsen af de grundlæggende menneskerettigheder og borgerlige frihedsrettigheder;
І.1.А.4 sikringen af religionsfriheden;
І.1.А.5 sikringen af forsamlingsfriheden;
І.1.А.6 afslutningen af den administrative reform;
І.1.А.7 styrkelsen af den civile demokratiske kontrol med De væbnede Styrker og sikkerhedssektoren som helhed;
І.1.А.8 bekæmpelse af korruption, hvidvask af penge og ulovlig økonomisk virksomhed gennem økonomiske, retslige, organisatoriske og retshåndhævende tiltag;
gennemførelsen af nødvendige tiltag for at blive strøget fra FATFs liste, herunder vedtagelsen og implementeringen af en lov, som svarer til FATFs standarder;
І.1.А.9 sikringen af en balance mellem de tre magtgrene - den lovgivende, udøvende og dømmende magt - via forfatningsmæssige og administrative reformer og sikringen af deres effektive samarbejde.
 

24.01.03. Draft law making Russian second state language

The bill was sponsored by Leonid Hrach,leader of Crimea's communists, the Communist Party, and the three main oligarchic groups - Labour Ukraine, Regions of Ukraine, and Viktor Medvedchuk-Leonid Kravchuk's Social Democratic Party united.
The 235 pro-Kuchma Rada majority could be joined by the 80 CPU and SPU deputies to ensure a 300+ majority to change Ukraine's constitution. The Rada pro-Kuchma majority have sufficient votes to change the 1989 law on languages which made Ukrainian sole state language (226+).

24.01.03. Politolog forudser hård kamp i Kutjmas inderkreds om at blive præsidentkandidat

"Hovedintrigen i den kommende præsidentvalgkamp i Ukraine bliver Leonid Kutjmas valg af en samlet kandidat fra styrets side", - sagde lederen af parlamentets udvalg for ytrings- og informationsfrihed, Mykola Tomenko, på en pressekonference i Tjernivtsi i går.
    Ifølge ham vil der foregå en "alvorlig kamp" i præsidentens inderkreds. Efter politologens opfattelse vil hovedkonkurrenterne om Kutjmas gunst være den nuværende stabschef for præsidenten Viktor Medvedtjuk og premierminister Viktor Janukovytj. Ifølge Tomenko vil tvekampen mellem Medvedtjuk og Janukovytj få en afgørende betydning for præsidentens valg.
    Den folkedeputerede er overbevist om, at SDPU (o)s fraktion i parlamentet af samme grund vil gøre alt for at forhindre, at Janukovytj-regeringens arbejdsprogram bliver godkendt i Verkhovna Rada, eftersom Medvedtjuk, "som helt sikkert vil tage del i valgkampen", ikke er interesseret i en styrkelse af den nuværende premierministers positioner.
    Tomenko mener desuden, at "præsidentens stabschef er meget foruroliget over, at han på trods af at have brugt et svimlende beløb på at gøre sit navn populært, ikke har mere end 5% af befolkningens tillid, mens Janukovytj, som kun lige er kommet i regering, allerede har 3,5-4% af befolkningens tillid".
    I en kommentar til Verkhovna Radas formands, Volodymyr Lytvyns, udmelding om de kommende kandidater til præsidentposten, sagde Tomenko, at man udover Janukovytj og Medvedtjuk heller ikke bør stryge fra listen personer som Nationalbankens formand, Serhij Tihipko, og Lytvyn selv, hvis inderkreds ifølge politologen "seriøst regner på den mulighed, at han deltager i valget". UNIAN, UP.

27.01.03. Tidligere udenrigsminister kommenterer NATO-Ukraine handlingsplan

    "Handlingsplanen Ukraine-NATO er et positivt skridt i relationerne mellem Ukraine og Den nordatlantiske Alliance, - mener formanden for parlamentets udvalg for Europæisk integration og tidligere udenrigsminister Borys Tarasyuk.
    "Efter min mening blev vedtagelsen af denne plan sammen med Målplanen for 2003 en af de få udenrigspolitiske succeser for Ukraine i den seneste tid. At man fra ukrainsk side var tilbageholdende med hensyn til at offentliggøre dokumentet har kun været med til at øge spændingen omkring dets indhold. I virkeligheden var der ikke noget at skjule", - sagde den folkedeputerede.
    Han mener, at frygten fra den udøvende magts side øjensynligt blev begrundet med "det manglende ønske om at fortælle offentligheden om de forpligtelser, som det ukrainske styre har påtaget sig overfor NATOs medlemslande".
    "Der er tale om løsningen af Ukraines interne problemer, som er en hindring for virkeliggørelsen af Handlingsplanen fra ukrainsk side. Det er spørgsmål som økonomiens åbenhed i henhold til WTOs standarder og kravene for at træde, beskyttelse af ophavsretten, energisikkerhed, ytringsfrihed, fri udbredelse af information, styrkelse af demokratiet, retsstaten, princippet om en deling af magten, dommernes uafhængighed, demokratiske valg, ytringsfrihed", - understregede Tarasyuk.
    Efter hans mening er det de problemer, som er "helt centrale i opståelsen og fortsættelsen af den nuværende indenrigspolitiske krise i det ukrainske samfund". Samtidig understregede Tarasyuk, at "man i dag desværre ikke kan konstatere, at Ukraine opfylder alle de forpligtelser, som man har påtaget sig".
    Ifølge ham springer det i øjnene, at "Ukraine på trods af den praksis der eksisterer for udarbejdelsen af de såkaldte Medlemskabsplaner for kandidatlande til NATO kun har fået tilbudt en kvasi-plan for medlemskab, som har fået betegnelsen Handlingsplan".  
    "Det er sådan set det, der kendetegner det særlige i relationerne mellem Ukraine og NATO, i modsætning til relationerne med andre lande. Alt i alt er handlingsplanen et positivt dokument, som skal stimulere det ukrainske styre til ikke blot at forbedre den militære sektor, men først og fremmest at forbedre sig i den politiske og økonomiske sektor", - sagde Borys Tarasyuk. "Vores Ukraines" pressetjeneste, UP.

27.01.03. Is Ukraine a member of the CIS?

RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 11, Part I
RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
17 January 2003
By Taras Kuzio
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma offered a novel response to a question posed to him at a 28 December press conference in Chernihiv, a town located near the Belarus-Russian border. Eleven years after the CIS was created by the three eastern Slavic states to replace the USSR, Kuchma disagreed with the description of Ukraine as merely an "associate member" of the CIS. Throughout the 1990s, Ukrainian diplomats and officials had routinely employed that formulation to demonstrate that Ukraine was opposed to the integration within the CIS that then Russian President Boris Yeltsin assiduously promoted. The logic of the Ukrainian argument was based on the assumption that, as the Ukrainian parliament had never ratified the 1994 CIS Charter, Ukraine was not a full member of the CIS. It was therefore only an "associate member." The only problem, as Kuchma has now finally pointed out, is that the CIS Charter makes no mention of any "associate member" status with respect to the CIS.

Unfortunately, Kuchma failed to bring his point to its logical conclusion -- namely, how could a nonmember (Ukraine) have participated in so many CIS institutions and signed countless CIS documents? At the November CIS summit in Chisinau, Russian President Vladimir Putin even proposed that this nonmember head the CIS Heads of State Council. Luckily, the proposal was opposed by three other CIS states and therefore failed to pass.

At the upcoming CIS summit on 28 January, Ukraine will again be proposed for that position. But as Ukraine's Hromadske Radio pointed out on 15 January, Ukraine's "bid for chairmanship is legally vulnerable." Ukraine's de jure nonmembership of the CIS reflects three factors. First, there is the general widespread legal nihilism that pervades the CIS. It has long been pointed out that documents signed by CIS members (and "nonmembers" like Ukraine) are rarely implemented. A legal, contractual, and political culture that would guarantee the implementation of interstate documents, whether signed within the CIS or internationally in general, is simply absent within CIS states.

The same is true of the yawning gap between domestic legislation and government-executive policies. Second, there is the very nature of the CIS. The CIS is often criticized for being a moribund and ineffective structure. Why then does it still exist, when it was created in December 1991, according to then Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, for the sole purpose of facilitating a "civilized divorce" among the then-Soviet republics?

One answer to that question was given by two Russian authors writing in "Izvestiya" in November 2000 on the ninth anniversary of the formation of the CIS. CIS members and nonmembers "are not so much friends as compelled to co-exist with one another, like divorced spouses who cannot make the final break." "The CIS is a communal apartment for people who are tired of one another, who no longer live together, but do not yet live apart," the authors continued. For most CIS states, neither option -- living within the CIS or outside it -- is preferable.

At the same time, living together in the CIS "communal apartment" provides psychological support to CIS leaders, most of whom hail from the same Communist Party or KGB background and have similar political cultures and understandings of the outside world. Although the phrase "near abroad," used by Russia to denote the CIS as distinct from the "far abroad," has fallen into disuse, it still reflects the general tendency to view the CIS as a family club. This shared perception can become vitally important during periods of international isolation, such as that Ukraine has experienced since late 2000, when the "Kuchmagate" crisis began. At such times, Russia and the CIS become vitally important to Kuchma's survival. Russian State Duma Speaker Gennadii Seleznev said on a visit to Ukraine last month, "Ukraine has realized that the West is not going to open its embrace. There is a far more reliable partner and ally it should stay side by side with [i.e. Russia]."

Russia has preferred not to formalize its Soviet-era frontiers with neighboring CIS states, agreeing only to delimit them on maps but not to demarcate them. The Antiterrorist Center of the CIS, established in June 2000, is headed by Major General Boris Mylnikov, who served in the KGB from 1975-91 and was the first deputy head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) department responsible for the "protection of constitutional order and the struggle against terrorism." Pointedly, the center is headed and staffed by the FSB, Russia's internal intelligence agency, not the external intelligence body, the Foreign-Intelligence Service (SVR).

During his December visit to Ukraine, Seleznev contrasted the actions of the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Carlos Pascual, with those of Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin. When Pascual (or the U.S. Congress, as in the March 2002 elections) talks about democratization, human rights, free elections, and reform in Ukraine, this is understood by Ukraine and Russia as "interference" (just as in the Soviet era). When Chernomyrdin tells Ukrainians whom not to vote for and demands the upgrading of Russian to a second state language, this is seen as brotherly advice, Seleznev claimed. Third, Ukraine's multivector foreign policy is a reflection of the country's history and competing identities. Ukraine has jealously guarded its sovereignty since the disintegration of the USSR. It has therefore declined to join Russian-led supranational institutions, such as the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), which Ukrainian leaders believe could undermine its sovereignty. By contrast, it was a founding member in 1997 of the GUAM alignment, which also includes Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova but not Russia.

Similarly, Ukraine never acceded to the CIS Collective Security Treaty (signed in Tashkent in June 1992), although even before 11 September 2001, full membership of the CIS Antiterrorist Center was deemed compatible with Ukraine's sovereignty. Ukraine's involvement in the various CIS sub-organizations is as confusing and selective as is its membership (or nonmembership) of that structure. In 1995, Ukraine joined the CIS Air Defense Agreement as an "associate member," even though no such status formally exists and no other CIS state has claimed it. In 1998, Ukraine joined the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, which seeks to harmonize legislation across the CIS. (It remains unclear why membership of this body does not conflict with membership of the Council of Europe.) While refusing to join the EEC, Ukraine has also agreed to"observer" status in that body. Ukrainian officials argue that full membership of the EEC conflicts with Ukraine's steps toward Euro-Atlantic integration. Chernomyrdin, however, disagrees because he knows full well that none of the six members of the EEC seeks EU membership. Meanwhile, the EU has not voiced any opinion, as Ukraine's hypothetical future membership of the EU is not in the cards.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies and adjunct professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto. 

27.01.03. High-level Ukrainian economic and finance delegation in Washington -- Jan. 29

ArtUkraine.com Information Service
Washington, D.C.
January 24, 2003
By E. Morgan Williams
Washington, D.C..January 24, 2003 -- First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Ukraine Mykola Azarov will lead a high level Ukrainian economic and finance delegation in Washington, D.C. next week for a series of very important meetings with the U.S. government, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other Washington based governmental and international institutions.

The Ukrainian delegation is reported by several organizations in Washington to include, in addition to VPM Azarov, Valery Khoroshkovsky, Minister of Economics and European Integration Issues; Serhiy Yermilov, Minister of Energy; Yuri Luzan, First Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Agricultural Policy; Serhiy Tyhypko, newly appointed Governor of the Central Bank; Anatoly Matsiuta, State Secretary, Ministry of Finance; Andriy Goncharuk, State Secretary for Trade, Ministry of Finance; Mrs. Oleksandra Kuzhel, Chair, State Committee of Ukraine; and Andriy Gurzhiy, First Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Science.

In addition to the many official meetings VPM Azarov will be the featured speaker at a private breakfast meeting on Wednesday, January 29, hosted by Anders Aslund, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP). The Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States, Kostyantyn Gryshchenko, is hosting a private reception in honor of the Ukraine government team, at the historic Embassy of Ukraine building in Georgetown on Wednesday evening.

On Thursday morning Kempton Jenkins, President of the Ukraine-U.S. Business Council, is hosting the entire delegation at a private working breakfast with the members of the Business Council. Topics to be discussed at the Council's breakfast include money laundering legislation, intellectual property rights, investment procedures and regulation, tax policy including VAT tax developments, the recently passed Civil and Economic Codes, agricultural developments and energy policy. Gary Litman, Vice President for Europe and Eurasia, at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce will host a private Roundtable Discussion with VPM Azarov and the other top Ukrainian officials at the U.S. Chambers headquarters in Washington on Thursday, January 30, starting at 4:00 p.m.

According to the announcement from the U.S. Chamber the officials will be available to answer specific questions on a wide range of issues, including Ukraine's WTO accession efforts, the development of a commercially-based agricultural market and credit system, the transit of energy resources across Ukrainian territory, tax policy initiatives related to VAT and customs duties, and the outcome of the latest CIS summit on energy, transportation, and agriculture. VPM Azarov has long been one of Ukraine's leading politicians and parliamentarians. He has served as Chairman of the State Tax Administration. In November of 2002 he became the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance.

27.01.03. 1.vice-premierminister aflyser tur til USA p.a. akut sygdom

Ukraines 1. vice-premierminister og finansminister, Mykola Azarov, måtte i går aflyse sit officielle besøg i USA grundet sygdom, oplyste hans kontor i går til nyhedsbureauet Interfaks-Ukrajina.
    Efter planen skulle den ukrainske delegation på officielt besøg i USA den 27. januar - 3. februar udover Azarov bestå af næstformand for Nationalbanken Oleksandr Shlapak, økonomiminister Valerij Khoroshkovskyj samt energi- og brændselsminister, Serhij Jermylov.
    De skulle efter planen deltage i den ukrainsk-amerikanske komites møde vedrørende det økonomiske samarbejde og føre forhandlinger i Verdensbanken og Den internationale Valutafond.
    Azarov har tidligere sagt, at den ukrainske delegations hovedopgave ved de kommende forhandlinger med Den internationale Valutafond og Verdensbanken ville være at overbevise dem om, at den nye regering vil være konsekvent i sit arbejde for at fremskynde markedsreformerne og fremme demokratiseringsprocessen i landet. UP.

29.01.03. Official status for foreign-based Ukrainians

From: ArtUkraine Information Service <ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net>
PUBLIC RADIO Online
Kyiv, Ukraine
17 January 2003, Fri, 12:47
Verkhovna Rada is on track for awarding official status to 12 million Ukrainians, nationals of other countries, with the appropriate bill slated for approval Thursday. In addition, VR will allow free entry in Ukraine to ethnic Ukrainians. The bill provides for identity cards for "foreign-based Ukrainians" to be issued by Ukraine's consular offices, following applications and submission of documents confirming the Ukrainian origin of applicants. Identity cards will be valid for 10 years.

Foreign-based Ukrainians will be able to enter and stay in Ukraine for four months without written invitations and visas. There will be other benefits. Our Ukraine representative Taras Chornovil says the bill, when enacted, will facilitate links between Ukraine and diaspora. "Establishing the status for foreign-based Ukrainians will make it possible to influence the states where the rights of such Ukrainians have been infringed," he believes. Meanwhile, some politicians are skeptical about this initiative.

Deputy head of the non-governmental association "The Road of the Orthodox" and former VR deputy Yury Boldyriev says that a clear definition of a Ukrainian citizen is first needed.
-

29.01.03. Macroeconomic report on Ukraine: Year end 2002

Key Achievements and Shortfalls in 2002
SigmaBleyzer, Investment Bankers
Kyiv Office
By Dr. Edilberto L. Segura, Chief Economist and Director
Manager of the UGF/Ukrainian Growth Funds

Kyiv, Ukraine, January 15, 2003

In year 2002, Ukraine had both negative as well as positive results. In particular, negative political developments overshadowed relatively good economic performance. From the economic point of view, the economy performed better than anticipated by most analysts. Although the pace of GDP growth slowed down from the high level of 9.1% achieved in 2001, at about 4.2% for the year, GDP growth would be better than the rates achieved by most countries of the world, which are still facing economic slow-down. On the other hand, negative political news during the year affected business confidence and led a number of international rating agencies to express doubts on the future economic situation of the country. These negative political developments included international issues, in particular the accusations that Ukraine sold illegal advanced radar systems to Iraq. This issue led the US to suspend a portion of its financial assistance to Ukraine. But in addition, there were also domestic political uncertainties, such as the dismissal of the Cabinet, the dismissal of the President of the NBU, and the lack of a clear and solid working majority in Parliament.

Following the dismissal of the Cabinet and the Chairman of the NBU, the President appointed a new Cabinet (led by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovitch) and a new NBU Chairman (Mr. Sergey Tygypko). As noted in a previous issue, the ultimate performance of the new Government will depend less on the qualifications of its individual members and much more on its ability to work effectively with a majority in Parliament and secure approval of key pending legislation. In fact, over the last two years, very important pieces of key economic legislation have been drafted, with the assistance of international agencies. If this legislation were to be enacted now, it would yield a remarkable improvement in Ukraine's business environment. [..]

Economic Growth

GDP growth in 2002 is likely to reach about 4.2%. In November 2002 the pace of GDP growth accelerated to a rate of 4.6% compared to November last year, bringing GDP growth for the eleven month period to about 4.1%. The economy activity of the country continues to be driven by the growth of domestic demand, particularly wholesale and retail trade (which increased by 9.6% in the last eleven months compared to last year), by the processing industry (which increased by 8.1% during the same period), and by agriculture (which increased by 3.9%). [..] As noted earlier, for year 2003, most economic agencies anticipate that GDP growth in 2003 would range between 3.5% (ICPS) to 5.0% (IMF). EBRD forecasts a GDP growth rate of 4.5% for 2003. The Government's own "conservative" GDP forecast for the 2003 fiscal budget is 4%.


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Dr. Segura is the Director and Chief Economist of the Office of SigmaBleyzer in Kiev and the Chairman of the Advisory Board of The Bleyzer Foundation. He is also a Fellow and Visiting Professor at the Said Business School of the University of Oxford in the UK, where he lectures on Emerging Capital Markets. Before joining SigmaBleyzer, for 27 years Dr. Segura worked at the World Bank, where he became the Country Director for Mexico, Central America, Venezuela and part of the Caribbean. Before retiring from the World Bank in 1998, for three years he was the Head of the World Bank's Office in Kyiv, Ukraine.

Dr. Segura holds a PhD degree (Finance and Economic) and an MA degree (Economics) from Columbia University in New York; an MBA degree from Stanford University in California, and an Industrial Engineering degree from Peru. He also attended the Advanced Management Program of Harvard University.

To read the full report, click on the PDF file:
Ukraine: Macroeconomic Situation

Dr. Edilberto L. Segura
Chief Economist and Director Kyiv Office
SigmaBleyzer
21, Pushkinskaya Street
Suite 40
Kyiv 01004, Ukraine

Tel: (380-44) 244-9487
Fax: (380-44) 244-9488
esegura@sigmableyzer.com

29.01.03. How Ukrainians view their own history: results of latest poll

 According to the results of a sociological survey carried out late last year to determine whether Ukraine is a nation with values and symbols that truly unite the country, Bohdan Khmelnytsky is the greatest political figure of all time, named by 26.7% of respondents. The hetman is also the most popular (almost 83%). The second most popular historical figure is...Tsar Peter the Great. Hetman Ivan Mazepa was named by 45% of respondents, followed by Vladimir Lenin (40%). Ukraine is symbolized best by its state symbols (flag, hymn), with bread and wheat taking second place. The most popular cultural figure of Ukraine is Taras Shevchenko (42.2%). Ukrainians' views on their country's historical destiny are interesting: 40% of the population of Ukraine still identifies with the Soviet Union, while less than half of all respondents (47.7%) identify with Ukraine.
Read the full story (carried by Ukrainska Pravda) at:
www.pravda.com.ua/archive/2003/january/14/2.shtml

29.01.03. Rusland og Ukraine underskriver en række vigtige dokumenter

Ukraine og Rusland bekræftede i går officielt, at de ikke har nogen territoriale krav mod hinanden og agter at bygge deres relationer på grundlag af partnerskab og ligeberettigelse. De to staters ledere underskrev i går i Kyiv en aftale om fastlandsgrænsen. Den russiske Statsduma har allerede lovet at ratificere denne aftale uden forsinkelser. Verkhovna Rada vil næppe heller stå i vejen for aftalen.
    Af andre vigtige dokumenter underskrevet under topmødet i går var de, som tillader russiske statsborgere at modtage ukrainske diplomer og omvendt. Eksamensbeviser fra videregående uddannelser, som allerede er udstedt, vil herefter blive anerkendt i begge stater.
    Præsidenterne glemte heller ikke de projekter, som i den nærmeste fremtid vil regulere de økonomiske relationer mellem Kyiv og Moskva. Som f.eks. dokumentet om gastransport-konsortiet.
    Moskva og Kyiv, som også gerne vil inddrage Tyskland i konsortiet, har allerede etableret fælles virksomheder. De vil indgå i en bredere struktur, som vil beskæftige sig med leverancer af brændsel fra Sibirien og Centralasien til Europa. Og nu skal man ikke tænke så meget over løsningen af organisatoriske spørgsmål som om at finansiere moderniseringen af infrastrukturen. Et særlig vigtigt spørgsmål er i den forbindelse nedlæggelsen af toldgrænser, men det vil man først kunne løse efter etableringen af en frihandels-zone. Anstødstenen for etableringen af en sådan frihandels-zone i hele SNG er en uenighed mellem Kyiv og Moskva om, hvorvidt momsen på gastransitten skal havne i Kyiv eller i Moskva. Rusland er desuden betænkelig ved at blive oversvømmet af de billige og relativt gode ukrainske industriprodukter. Men alle disse afsavn vil Rusland gerne acceptere, hvis bare Ukraine går med til at blive fuldgyldigt medlem af Den euroasiatiske Økonomiske Union (EAES) i stedet for kun at være observatør. podrobnosti, reporter.

30.01.03. The killing of a journalist: new book on Heorhii Gongadze

Beheaded
The Killing of a Journalist
by JV Koshiw
www.artemiapress.co.uk/
Introduction to the Preface from the book Beheaded by JV Koshiw

The headless body of the Ukrainian journalist Georgi Gongadze was discovered in the year 2000. The chief suspect for the crime turned out to be President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine, who was secretly recorded by his guard, Mykola Melnychenko, ordering the interior minister Yuri Kravchenko to have Gongadze kidnapped by criminals and taken to Chechnya.

The book Beheadedby JV Koshiw examines the evidence that the president was responsible for Gongadze's killing. The author carried out his own investigation in Ukraine for a period of eight months, interviewing some of the key witnesses.

This is the third current affairs book by JV Koshiw, a former deputy editor of Kyiv Post.

PREFACE
Why I wrote the book.

On the eve of the year 2000, pundits predicted doomsday scenarios for much of the world especially Ukraine. Millions of old computer chips that could not read 2000 would cause planes to fall from the sky and nuclear power stations to shut down, or even worse. Nothing like that happened in Ukraine.

But something awful did happen in Ukraine in the year 2000 to a bright, young, energetic and relatively prominent broadcasting journalist. Georgi Gongadze disappeared on September 16 and was found beheaded on November 3.

Soon afterwards recordings appeared implicating the president of Ukraine in ordering Gongadze's kidnapping. One of his guards had secretly recorded the president saying this, before fleeing the country on November 25, first to Europe and then to America.

Since his departure, the whistle blower Mykola Melnychenko has drip-fed excerpts from his vast collection of recordings to the internet. They showed the president, Leonid Kuchma, issuing orders to punish his critics - journalists, politicians, and businessmen - with imprisonments, beatings and kidnappings. They revealed the spying by his security service on everyone of interest to him - from political allies to opponents. His international reputation slid even further when a recording showed him approving the sale of military radar to Iraq in violation of UN embargoes.

Despite this mountain of evidence, no legal measures have been taken against Kuchma. He simply denies the crimes and claims the recordings have been fabricated. Furthermore, he doesn't allow a credible investigation to take place and instead has created a cover-up where every tiny event has multiple explanations, like a gigantic hall of mirrors. The only institution empowered by Ukraine's constitution to investigate him - parliament - is under his control. Demonstrations, some violent, have failed to dislodge him.

The purpose of this book is to present the evidence in the disappearence and murder of Gongadze in order that justice may be done. I have chosen first to introduce the three key individuals involved - Gongadze, Kuchma and Melnychenko - and then to present in chronological order the evidence and analysis.

Gongadze was not the first politically motivated disappearance. In my many trips to Ukraine, I had met two people who had also disappeared for similar reasons.

I first met Mykhaylo Boychyshyn in August 1989. He was a leading activist of Rukh (Movement for the reconstruction of Ukraine), then involved in transforming Ukraine from a Soviet republic to an independent state. I saw him again in 1991, when he was managing the presidential campaign for the former Soviet political prisoner Vyacheslav Chornovil, and I joined them in a mini-van on their campaign trail across Ukraine. On a shoestring budget, Boychyshyn took on the might of the former Soviet state machine, which was batting for the former communist party ideologue, Leonid Kravchuk. The excommunist boss won, but Chornovil came second with 26 per cent of the vote.

In 1994 Boychyshyn disappeared from the center of Kyiv. Despite what the government claimed was its biggest ever man hunt, he was never found. In 1999, Chornovil died in an accident that his supporters alleged was organized by a government death squad. In February 1998, Ihor Svoboda - whom Boychyshyn had introduced me to - was seized by armed men and never seen again. He was an assistant to Odesa's mayor, Edward Hurvits, whom Kuchma ousted from office later that year.

After Gongadze disappeared, I decided to write a book, as this time there was evidence of who was behind this ghastly crime. I did not know Gongadze personally, but I knew about him, as did most people who followed closely the 1999 presidential elections.

Readers will have to decide for themselves whether the book does justice to Gongadze as well as to Kuchma.

JV Koshiw, November 2002

30.01.03. Kutjma valgt til formand for rådet for SNG-landenes statsoverhoveder

Ukraines præsident, Leonid Kutjma, blev i går valgt til formand for SNGs statsråd - et forum der samler SNG-landenes statsoverhoveder - oplyste Ruslands præsident, Volodymyr Putin, på en pressekonference.
    På en pressekonference efter afslutningen af mødet for SNGs statsoverhoveder i Kyiv onsdag oplyste Putin, at Kutjma er blevet enstemmigt valgt på et møde mellem statsoverhovederne i SNG.
    Putin oplyste overfor journalisterne, at initiativet til valget af Kutjma udgik fra den russiske delegation. Den russiske leder forklarede sit lands forslag om at vælge Kutjma med, at det havde han foreslået at gøre tilbage i oktober, under topmødet i Kishinau, men at ikke alle på det tidspunkt var enige.
    "For det første fremsatte jeg dette forslag uden at have afstemt det med andre statsoverhoveder, og de var bange for, at dette skridt ville føre til en svækkelse af SNG. Jeg har en anden logik. Ukraine er en stor stat i SNG med den næststørste økonomi. Desuden er der indskrevet et rotationsprincip i statuterne. Det skete ikke, og det var en fejl fra Ruslands side. Hvis vi ønsker, at alle SNG-landene skal føle et medansvar, så bør de også se muligheden for en direkte og effektiv indflydelse",  - sagde Ruslands præsident.
    Inden valget af Kutjma til formand for SNG-statsrådet har kun Ruslands to præsidenter - først Boris Jeltsin og siden Vladimir Putin - været formænd.
    Ukraines præsident, Leonid Kutjma, oplyste, at han takkede for valget og sagde, at han "ville forholde sig ansvarligt overfor sine forpligtelser som formand for SNG-rådet".
    Ifølge den ukrainske leder hænger hans valg sammen med, at han under det forrige SNG-topmøde i Kishinau "havde fremsat en række principielle forslag med hensyn til at reformere den økonomiske bestanddel af samarbejdet" indenfor rammerne af SNG-samkvemmet.
    Mødet i SNG-rådet varede i næsten 2 timer over den afsatte time. UP.

30.01.03. Kutjma: SNG-landene vil oprette en frihandelszone til september

Sammenslutningen af Uafhængige Stater (SNG) planlægger at etablere en frihandelszone i september 2003. "Alle var enige i planen for afslutningen af arbejdet med at  skabe en frihandelszone. Vi bør have en fuldstændig afstemt beslutning ved det næste topmøde i Jalta til september, som vi bør underskrive", - sagde Ukraines præsident, Leonid Kutjma, oplyser Ukrajinski Novyny.
    Den ukrainske leder fremhævede, at man under SNG-topmødet havde drøftet spørgsmål, der vedrørte det økonomiske samarbejde. Her betegnede Leonid Kutjma brændsels-og energikomplekset og transportbranchen som de vigtigste prioriteter i organisationens arbejde.
    Ukraines præsident talte om nødvendigheden af at skabe transnationale korporationer for de højst prioriterede samarbejdsområder mellem de lande, som indgår i SNG.
    Leonid Kutjma betegnede topmødet i Kyiv som en fortsættelse af drøftelsen af spørgsmål, som blev behandlet under topmødet i Kishinau i oktober 2002.
    "Dette topmøde var fortsættelsen af de problemer, som vi drøftede i Kishinau", - sagde han.
    Det uofficielle topmøde for SNG-landenes statsoverhoveder fandt sted i Kyiv fra tirsdag den 28. januar.
    Ukraine har under hvert eneste af møderne i SNG søgt at få truffet en beslutning om indførelsen af en frihandelszone. 
    Under det seneste SNG-topmøde i Kishinau, som fandt sted i oktober 2002, underskrev Ukraine og Rusland en aftale om fælles administration af Ukraines gastransportsystem.

31.01.03. Ukraine får stillet betingelser for at ophæve FATFs sanktioner

En af de de vigtige betingelser for at ophæve FATFs sanktioner mod Ukraine er, at Ukraines Finanstilsyn er fuldstændigt apolitisk i sit arbejde.
    Denne holdning blev formuleret fra amerikansk side under et møde i Washington i den ukrainsk-amerikanske Komite for økonomisk samarbejde, oplyser Ukraines ministerium for økonomi og europæisk integration.
    Andre betingelser for at amerikanerne vil medvirke til at hæve sanktionerne mod Ukraine er ifølge USA, at man ændrer Straffeloven (loven er allerede vedtaget, men endnu ikke underskrevet af præsidenten), loven om bankvirksomhed (lovforslaget er vedtaget i 1. behandling) samt sænkningen af loftet for størrelsen af bankoperationer, som ikke er underlagt kontrol.
    Ifølge økonomiministeriet oplyste næstformanden for Nationalbankens bestyrelse, Oleksandr Shlapak, at banken er i gang med at udarbejde et forslag om at mindske dette loft (100.000 UAH for kontante operationer og 300.000 UAH for ikke-kontante operationer) til en tredjedel af det nuværende.
    "Opfyldelsen af disse betingelser vil gøre det muligt for Ukraine at standse FATFs sanktioner i løbet af meget kort tid. Det er endnu ikke en garanti mod, at Ukraine bliver lukket ude af FATFs "sorte liste", men ophævelsen af sanktionerne vil være en stor succes", - citerer økonomiministeriet det amerikanske justitsministeriums særlige rådgiver, Theodor Greenberg.
    De ukrainske bankfolk har tidligere udtrykt bekymring for, at der i Finanstilsynet er blevet ansat to souschefer (herunder en 1. souschef), der er ledere af skattepolitiet (den tidligere skattechef Azarov er i dag Ukraines finansminister, red.). Idet de henviser til uofficielle informationer oplyser repræsentanterne for de ukrainske banker, at FATF er utilfreds med, at man har fjernet Oleksij Berezhnyj fra posten som leder af Finanstilsynet. Berezhnyj var tidligere diplomat uden nogen forbindelse til rets-og ordensmyndighederne.
    Den internationale gruppe til modvirken af hvidvask af kriminelle indtægter (FATF) har anbefalet sine medlemmer at træffe modforholdsregler overfor Ukraine fra den 20.12.2002 for at sikre beskyttelsen af denne organisations medlemsstaters finanssystemer mod risikoen for hvidvask af "sorte" penge.
    Den 12. februar vil FATF beslutte sig for, hvorvidt Ukraine har fjernet manglerne i sin lovgivning omkring bekæmpelsen af hvidvask af "sorte" penge i den grad, at de sanktioner, som blev anbefalet sidst på året, kan ophæves. Interfaks-Ukrajina. UP.

31.01.03. Polakkerne kan godt lide Ukraine, men ikke ukrainerne

80% af Polens indbyggere støtter det politiske og økonomiske samarbejde mellem Warszawa og Kyiv. 57% af polakkerne ville støtte Ukraines indtræden i NATO, og 53% ville støtte Ukraines indtræden i Den europæiske Union. 40% af polakkerne er kategorisk imod en sammenslutning af Ukraine, Rusland og Hviderusland.
    Det er resultatet af en meningsmåling omkring polakkernes holdning til ukrainerne, som er blevet offentliggjort i Polen. Undersøgelsen blev lavet i starten af december af Warszawas center for undersøgelse af den offentlige mening og var bestilt af Batory-fonden, som er en polsk afdeling af Soros-fonden.
    Stemningen i Polen er imidlertid helt anderledes, når man spørger til holdningen overfor nabostatens konkrete borgere. Halvdelen af de adspurgte sagde, at indførelsen af visumpligt for ukrainske borgere ville være nyttigt for Polen og polakkerne. Desuden er hele 40% tilhængere af visa bliver dyre og vanskeligt tilgængelige for ukrainerne.
    Flertallet af de polske aviskommentatorer betegnede resultatet af denne undersøgelse som i det mindste mangetydigt. Således kommenterede den mangeårige Ukraine-kommentator i avisen "Rzeczpospolita", Piotr Koscinski, undersøgelsesresultatet overfor Radio Liberty:
    "Konklusionerne er ret lige til. For det første kender polakkerne næsten ikke noget til ukrainerne. For hvis de kender konkrete mennesker, så har de en god opfattelse af dem. De, som derimod ikke kender dem, baserer deres opfattelser på nogle historiske stereotyper, der er langt overvejende negative. Derfor kan man generelt sige, at vi i Polen ikke kan lide ukrainerne", sagde Koscinski.
    Journalisten føjede desuden til, at polakkerne støtter "Ukraine som stat". "Vi støtter den først og fremmest med udgangspunkt i Polens interesser. Vi vil altså gerne se Ukraine i NATO og EU, men vi ønsker ikke, at Ukraine slutter sig til Rusland og Hviderusland. Derfor er polakkernes syn på Ukraine og ukrainerne forskelligt. Vi ser følelsesladet på ukrainerne, men ser rationelt på Ukraine med udgangspunkt i polske interesser", påpeger han.
    Et positivt moment i undersøgelsesresultatet er forøgelsen af antallet af de polakker, som mener, at den polsk-ukrainske forening er mulig. Hvor under halvdelen af polakkerne havde den opfattelse i 1998, og næsten 60% i 2001, så er tallet nu steget til 70% af de adspurgte, hvilket viser en positiv tendens. UP.



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