15.04.03. Ukraine arbejder på at blive medlem af WTO før Rusland
15.04.03. Commemorating 1943 events in Volyn
15.04.03. Ukraine cracks down on media
15.04.03. Interview med den nu afdøde journalist Oleksandr Kryvenko
14.04.03. "Vores Ukraine" er imod to-kammer parlament
14.04.03. Azarov: USA har hævet de finansielle sanktioner mod Ukraine
14.04.03. Befolkningen deltager ikke i debatten om Kutjmas politiske reformer
11.04.03. Indenrigsministeriet udelukker politiske motiver i forbindelse med journalists død
11.04.03. Kutjma mener, at irakerne selv skal afgøre det irakiske folks skæbne
11.04.03. Løbesedler fra pseudo-Jusjtjenko: amerikanske landmænd skal lære "dovne ukrainere" at arbejde
11.04.03. Ukraines premierminister: Tyskland er interesseret i olierørledningen "Odesa-Brody"
10.04.03. Jusjtjenko imod at forlænge Kutjmas embedsperiode
10.04.03. Politiet afviser teori om mord på journalist
10.04.03. Moscow reluctant to finalize border agreements with former Soviet republics
10.04.03. Kendt ukrainsk journalist omkommer i bilulykke
09.04.03. Kutjma på besøg i Centralasien
09.04.03. Ukrainsk journalist omkommet under beskydning af hotel i Bagdad
09.04.03. Ukraine vil invitere irakiske børn på rekreation
09.04.03. 100,000-150,000 Ukrainians working illegally in Poland
09.04.03. Anklagemyndigheden vil rejse sager оm bagvaskelse af præsidenten
08.04.03. Folkeafstemning hvis parlamentet ikke går med til Kutjmas reformer?
08.04.03. Jo større uenigheden er mellem USA og Rusland, des bedre er det for det ukrainske styre
07.04.03. Ukrainian sex slaves
07.04.03. Verdensbanken opfordrer Ukraine til at arbejde på WTO-medlemskab
07.04.03. NATO membership for Ukraine not likely before 2012
04.04.03. Jusjtjenko vil ikke udelukke, at Kutjmas administration vil gribe til folkeafstemning
04.04.03. "Koltjuga"-spørgsmålet kan blive løst efter krigen
04.04.03. Europarådet vil se nærmere på Kutjmas forfatningsændringer
03.04.03. Undervisningsminister pålægger lektorer at agitere for Kutjmas reformer?
03.04.03. Anklagemyndigheden har lukket sagen om Kolomijets' død
03.04.03. Will political reform lead Ukraine out of crisis?
03.04.03. Financial Times: Washington brings Ukraine into coalition
02.04.04. Ukraine afviser at have solgt antitank-missiler til Irak
02.04.03. Amerikanerne fremlægger dokumentation for Ukraines deltagelse i koalitionen mod Irak
01.04.03. 78% af ukrainerne går ind for at begrænse antallet af  parlamentsmedlemmer
01.04.03. Ukrainsk våbeneksport halveret efter "Koltjuga"-sagen
01.04.03. Ukraine har mistet 170 mill. $ p.a. Irak-krisen


01.04.03. Ukraine har mistet 170 mill. $ p.a. Irak-krisen

Ukraines økonomiministerium vurderer, at Ukraines tab i løbet af 2002 som følge af den forventede krig mod Irak beløber sig til omtrent 170,4 mill. $, hvilket svarer til faldet i eksporten af ukrainske varer til landet i sammenligning med 2001, oplyser Interfaks-Ukrajina. Eksperter forventer yderligere tab for ukrainsk økonomi i 2003 i forbindelse med krigen i Irak.
    Ministeriets specialister bemærker, at krigen i Irak kan føre til en stigning i oliepriserne i Europa p.a. mangel på olie, Ruslands overførsel af sin olieeksport fra det ukrainske marked til det europæiske marked, hvilket kan føre til et fald i olieforarbejdningen og en stigning i omkostningerne.
    En stigning i prisen på olieprodukter kan føre til en stigning i omkostningerne ved anden industriproduktion og, når man medregner en begrænset størrelse af den købekraftige del af den hjemlige efterspørgsel, vil det føre til et fald i produktionen.
    Økonomiministeriet mener, at hvis oliepriserne stiger, så vil verdensøkonomien blive bremset 1-1,2% og, at det deraf følgende fald i verdensmarkedets efterspørgsel vil føre til, at Ukraine mister 800-850 mill. $ om året.
    "Alene i samhandlen med Irak vil Ukraine miste 300 mill. $", - hedder det i økonomiministeriets materialer.
    Desuden oplyser ministeriet om de indirekte tab som følge af en begrænsning af omfanget af samarbejdet, såfremt krigen trækker ud, med Iraks nabolande: Tyrkiet (fremhævet som strategisk hovedpartner), Saudi-Arabien, Syrien, Iran, Jordan og Kuwait.
    Ifølge økonomiministeriet udgjorde Ukraines samlede handel med disse lande i 2002 næsten 2,2 mia. $, herunder udgjorde eksporten 1,9 mill. $, hvilket svarede til henholdsvis 6,4% og 10,3% i landets samlede udenrigshandel.
    Ministeriet bemærker, at udsvingene i dollarkursen p.a. krigen i Irak reelt ikke vil have nogen betydning for Ukraines valutamarked og fondsmarked. "Her giver vores økonomis svage integration i verdensøkonomien en positiv effekt", - forklarer økonomiministeriet.
    Samtidig vil ministeriet ikke udelukke, at svækkelsen af dollaren på verdens valutamarkeder vil føre til en mindre nominel devaluering af hryvnaen i forhold til dollaren. Korrespondent.net.

01.04.03. Ukrainsk våbeneksport halveret efter "Koltjuga"-sagen

I løbet af det seneste år er der sket næsten en halvering i det statslige selskab "Ukrspetseksport"s kontrakter om eksport af våben og militære teknologier - fra 54 stk. i anden kvartal af 2002 til 28 stk. i første kvartal af 2003, oplyste generaldirektør for "Ukrspetseksport", Valerij Shmarov, til et erhvervsprogram på Ukraines Tv-1 (UT-1).
    Han påpegede, at de politiske grunde, herunder skandalen omkring den påståede eksport af de ukrainske radarsystemer "Koltjuga" til Irak, har haft en indflydelse på faldet i våbeneksporten. Shmarov understregede i den forbindelse, at undersøgelsen havde vist, at Ukraine ikke havde leveret disse anlæg til Irak.
    Samtidig med det sagde Shmarov, at det lykkedes selskabet i slutningen af sidste år at undertegne en række aftaler om levering af disse systemer for passiv radarovervågning. Han ville dog ikke oplyse, hvilke lande kontrakterne var blevet underskrevet med.
    Ifølge generaldirektøren for "Ukrspetseksport" indgik selskabet i 3. kvartal af 2002 aftaler om våbenleverancer og leverancer af militærteknologi og ydelser, og i 4. kvartal af 2002 underskrev man 36 sådanne kontrakter.
    I 2000 udgjorde eksporten af forsvarsministeriets og andre militære formationers ejendom 65% af Ukraines samlede eksport af våben, teknologier og ydelser, 19% udgjordes af eksporten af produktion og ydelser fra virksomheder i det militær-industrielle kompleks og andre institutioner, mens 16% udgjordes af eksport af forsvarsministeriets produkter og ydelser. I 2001 var disse tal henholdsvis 35%, 41% og 24%, og de i 2002: henholdsvis 18%, 60% og 22%.
    Ifølge Center for studier af hæren, produktionsomlægning og afvæbning faldt Ukraines våbeneksport sidste år med 100 mill. $ til 450 mill. $. Interfaks-Ukrajina. UP.

01.04.03. 78% af ukrainerne går ind for at begrænse antallet af  parlamentsmedlemmer

19% af ukrainerne går ind for at begrænse præsidentens beføjelser i overensstemmelse med præsident Leonid Kutjmas forslag, mens henved 25% mener, at "man bør indføre yderligere begrænsninger (udover dem, som præsidenten har foreslået). Ca. 15% mener, at man slet ikke bør begrænse den ukrainske præsidents beføjelser.
    Det er resultatet af en meningsmåling under navnet "Dialog-8", som er blevet gennemført i dagene 20-24 marts af Centret for politiske og sociale studier SOCIS sammen med Kyivs center for politiske studier og konfliktologi (direktør Mykhajlo Pohrebynskyj). 2000 personer deltog i undersøgelsen, og fejlmargenen udgør højst 2,3%.
    Op mod 40% af de adspurgte kunne ikke svare på spørgsmålet: "Hvad mener De om de af Kutjma foreslåede begrænsninger af Ukraines præsidents beføjelser?"
    78% af Ukraines borgere støtter Kutjmas forslag indenfor rammerne af den politiske reform om begrænsningen af antallet af folkedeputerede. Over halvdelen (53%) har ikke noget imod, at en folkeafstemning skal have direkte lovkraft. 59% af de adspurgte støtter præsidentens forslag om, at parlamentet og ikke præsidenten skal udnævne premierministeren og flertallet af regeringen. 14% er imod dette forslag.
    Forslaget "om yderligere adgang for præsidenten til at opløse parlamentet, såfremt det er uarbejdsdygtigt" støttes af 50% af forslagsstillerne, mens 18% er imod.
    Ukrainerne er splittede i holdningen til Kutjmas forslag om, at præsidentens skal udnævne de såkaldte magtministre (33% går ind for forslaget; mens 36% er imod). 35% går ind for forslaget om et tokammer parlament, mens 26% er imod. Hele 39% kunne imidlertid ikke tilkendegive deres holdning til spørgsmålet om et tokammer parlament. Interfaks-Ukrajina. UP.

02.04.03. Amerikanerne fremlægger dokumentation for Ukraines deltagelse i koalitionen mod Irak

"Amerikas forenede Stater er ikke interesseret i at presse et land med henblik på at inkludere det i koalitionen til afvæbningen af Irak. Det er landets eget valg. Hvis Ukraine mener, at der har fundet en misforståelse sted, så burde udenrigsministeriet i det tilfælde have informeret USAs ambassade i Kiev, eller også burde Ukraines ambassade i Washington have informeret USAs udenrigsministerium".
    Således kommenterede USAs ambassadens pressetjeneste i går de ukrainske politikeres afvisning af Ukraines deltagelse i den antiirakiske koalition. Tirsdag havde lederen af udenrigsministeriets pressetjeneste, Markian Lubkyvskyj, endnu en gang sagt, at Ukraine ikke havde anmodet det officielle Washington om at medregne landet til koalitionen.
    Den amerikanske ambassades pressetjeneste oplyser, at USAs ambassade den 25. marts, dagen inden præsident Bush's tale (hvor han for første gang i en offentlig sammenhæng omtalte Ukraine, red.), rettede en forespørgsel til Ukraines ambassade i Washington og præsidentens administration i Kiev om "hvorvidt Ukraine ville have noget imod at blive omtalt i præsident Bush's tale som medlem af den koalition af lande, der går ind for en afvæbning af Irak".
    "Vi lod dem klart forstå, at præsident Bush ville betegne Ukraine som en del af koalitionen, og netop derfor rettede vi forespørgslen. Både Ukraines ambassade i Washington og præsidentens administration i Kiev bekræftede, at præsident Bush gerne måtte omtale Ukraine som en del af koalitionen. Ukraine bad os desuden om, at vi fremhævede, at bataljonen var sendt for at forsvare og ikke var en del af den væbnede konflikt", hedder det i meddelelsen fra USAs ambassades pressetjeneste.
    Efter offentliggørelsen af præsident Bush's tale "fik ambassaden at vide" under et møde i præsidentens administration og i udenrigsministeriet, at "Ukraine var tilfreds med at blive omtalt i præsident Bush's tale, og bekræftede endnu en gang, at staten betragtede sig selv som en del af koalitionen".
    Desuden oplyser ambassadens pressetjeneste, at repræsentanter for USAs diplomatiske repræsentation havde holdt møder i præsidentens administration, i Det nationale sikkerheds-og forsvarsråd, udenrigsministeriet samt med repræsentanter for den ukrainske regering med henblik på at afklare mulighederne for koalitionsmedlemmernes deltagelse i tenderne over underentrepriser.
    "Grundlaget for vores møder var klart. Ikke en eneste af de ukrainske repræsentater afviste ikke en eneste gang, at Ukraine er en del af koalitionen", erklærer USAs ambassades pressetjeneste. UP.  
    Præsidentens repræsentant i parlamentet, Oleksandr Zadorozhnij, havde samme dag udtalt, at Ukraines officielle holdning i forhold til situationen omkring Irak var udtrykt af det ukrainske parlament og vedrører ABC-bataljonens deltagelse i en humanitær mission.
    Han understregede overfor Interfaks-Ukraijna, at der var en juridisk nuance; nemlig forskellen mellem "at betragte" og "at være".
    "Det er forskellige ting, - sagde Zadorozhnij. - Erklæringer fra forskellige staters officielle personer, herunder USA, om at vi bliver betragtet som medlemmer af den anti-irakiske koalition, betyder ikke, at vi er medlemmer af den anti-irakiske koalition".
       

02.04.04. Ukraine afviser at have solgt antitank-missiler til Irak

Ukraine producerer ikke nogen antitank-missiler herunder raketterne af typen "Kornet-E", og desuden er det ikke en del af de ukrainske væbnede styrkers arsenal. Det sagde ifølge Interfaks-Ukraijna en kilde i Komiteen for det militær-teknologiske samarbejdes politik og eksportkontrol ved Ukraines præsident.
    Erlæringen blev givet i forlængelse af en artikel i det amerikanske ugeblad Newsweek om, at Bagdad i januar i år skulle have modtaget omkring 500 "Kornet-E" raketter via ukrainske våbenhandlere.
    Repræsentanten for komiteen understregede, at Ukraine "til punkt og prikke overholder FNs sanktioner i forhold til et forbud mod at levere våben og våbenteknologi til Irak".
    I den forbindelse betegnede kilden beskyldningerne mod ukrainske selskaber for at have leveret antitank-missilet "Kornet-E" til Irak som værende grundløse.  
    USA har udtrykt bekymring for, at de irakiske styrker var fundet i besiddelse af de nyeste antitank-missilier "Kornet" af russiske produktion, ved hjælp af hvilke de allerede har ødelagt to af de tunge "Abrams" kampvogne.
    Man har fra russisk side ligeledes afvist påstandene om en medvirken til leveringen af disse raketter. Korrespondent.net. 

03.04.03. Financial Times: Washington brings Ukraine into coalition

By Tom Warner in Kiev
FT.com site; Apr 01, 2003
 
Only six months after the US accused Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine's president, of approving the sale of high-tech radar systems to Iraq, Ukraine has joined the US-led coalition fighting to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime.

Although Ukraine says it opposes the military effort and is sending only "humanitarian aid", the US is hailing Ukraine's membership as a significant step towards mending relations.

The inclusion of an avowedly pacifist, allegedly embargo-busting country in the coalition shows how eager the US is to portray broad international support for the military campaign. A recent White House press release lists 48 coalition members, ranging from active combat participants to countries with less clear roles, such as Mongolia and Tonga.

Markian Lubkivsky, press service chief at Ukraine's foreign ministry, said his country's sole contribution was a hazardous chemicals clean-up unit stationed in Kuwait, which he said had a "humanitarian" mission and would not enter Iraq.

"We can be regarded as a participant in the coalition only in that [humanitarian] sense," he said at a press conference on Tuesday.

"Ukraine is exclusively for deciding any crisis situation by peaceful means."

But US ambassador Carlos Pascual said his government regarded Ukraine as a backer of the war.

He said: "In saying that they are ready to be considered as part of the coalition to disarm Iraq, we take that as support for our position."

The most immediate benefit of membership is that Ukrainian companies can apply for work as subcontractors to the US firms that will lead the initial phase of Iraq's postwar reconstruction. Mr Pascual said Ukraine had many "competitive" companies, such as the steel pipe producers already involved in the UN's oil-for-food program.

The US still suspects that a plan to smuggle Ukrainian radars into Iraq, allegedly approved by Mr Kuchma in a secretly recorded meeting in 2000, may have been carried out.

At Tuesday's briefing, Mr Lubkivsky denied a fresh report in this week's Newsweek that Ukrainian arms dealers had recently delivered anti-tank weapons to Iraq, in violation of the United Nations arms embargo.

In spite of their differences, Mr Pascual said the US and Ukraine were learning to work together on specific issues.

"I think that more and more Ukrainian figures, both in and out of government, are recognising that isolation is not a good option and that extreme dependence on Russia is not in their interests. And both of those is where they were headed," he said.

Ukraine had been steadily ramping up its relations with Iraq over the past few years. It opened an embassy in Baghdad and an Iraqi embassy was opened in Kiev. There were also plans for a trade mission in Baghdad.
 

03.04.03. Will political reform lead Ukraine out of crisis?

Johnson's Russia List, #7110
RFE/RL Newsline,
March 19, 2003
By Taras Kuzio

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma submitted draft political reforms to the Verkhovna Rada on 6 March, but those proposals are unlikely to overcome Ukraine's profound political crisis.

The need for change was highlighted by the findings of an opinion poll reported by "Ukrayinska pravda" on 11 March, according to which 45 percent of respondents backed radical change, 38 percent supported revolutionary reform, and 11 percent backed revolutionary changes. Only 6 percent believed changes were unnecessary.

That level of discontent notwithstanding, the authorities are continuing to put on a brave face on things. Looking to next year's presidential elections, presidential administration head Viktor Medvedchuk is convinced that "the authorities firmly believe in their victory in the future political battles." Such optimism is largely unfounded. Kuchma's popularity is at an all-time low, hovering at 5-8 percent. In contrast, the presidents of Russia, Moldova, and Belarus enjoy popularity ratings of 72, 67, and 27 percent, respectively. A November-December poll by Democratic Initiatives Fund found that 55 percent of Ukrainians distrust Kuchma, while three-quarters would like to see him step down early.

The political crisis has its roots in the delegitimization of Ukraine's ruling class, the former Communist Party of Ukraine elite who became "sovereign communists" in the late Soviet era and "centrists" after Ukraine won its independence. This delegitimization makes it impossible to arrange a transfer of power similar to the one that occurred in Russia in 1999-2000, when Boris Yeltsin passed the torch to Vladimir Putin. In that Kuchma is widely perceived as "an extremely unpopular and incompetent leader," his endorsement would prove "a heavy weight that could drown" any potential presidential candidate, Razumkov Center President Anatoliy Hrytsenko wrote in the weekly "Zerkalo Nedeli" of 8-14 March.

Pro-presidential leaders are unpopular because of the public perception of the elites as corrupt, amoral, and indifferent to the needs of the population. Not surprisingly, therefore, a Razumkov Center poll found that 81.6 percent are opposed to Kuchma standing for a third term, while a similar figure opposes any potential attempt at granting him immunity from prosecution.

The front-runners from the first round of the 1994 presidential elections who went on to the second round were Leonid Kravchuk (37.27 percent) and Kuchma (31.27 percent), while Kuchma (36.49 percent) and Symonenko (22.24 percent) advanced in the 1999 elections. In opinion surveys, pro-presidential figures poll 5-8 percent, making it difficult to see how they could increase this figure to the more than 20 percent needed to win a place in the second round of the 2004 elections.

By contrast, opinion polls since 2000 have consistently indicated that opposition Our Ukraine leader Viktor Yushchenko wins ratings of 23-30 percent, with Communist leader Piotr Symonenko in second place with 11-16 percent. Yushchenko is also the only candidate with a consistently higher positive than negative rating.

With such public support, Yushchenko would be virtually guaranteed a place in the second round of 2004 elections, where he might face Symonenko, whom he would presumably defeat (as Kuchma did in 1999). As Hrytsenko concluded, "If this leadership carries on with its policies, it is doomed, and none of its candidates will get as far as the second round." Medvedchuk's claim in an interview in the newspaper "2000" that "the authorities are now stronger than ever before" therefore rings hollow.

But despite the clear need for radical reform, the changes that Kuchma has proposed as a means of defusing the crisis are merely a reworking of those put to a referendum in April 2000, the results of which were not recognized by either the Council of Europe or the OSCE. In 2000, voters were asked to approve or reject four proposals: a reduction in the size of parliament from 450 to 300 deputies; the creation of an upper house comprising regional representatives; the president power to dissolve parliament if no majority is formed within a month or no budget is passed within three months; and abolition of deputies' immunity from prosecution. Kuchma's new proposals include the first three of the 2000 proposals, but not the question of deputies' immunity.

In addition to reintroducing three of the four 2000 referendum questions, Kuchma has added fully proportional elections to the lower house. In 1994 and 1998, 50 percent of parliamentary deputies were elected in single-mandate constituencies, while the other 50 percent won seats under a proportional (party-list) system. In 2002, Kuchma opposed holding fully proportional elections, but changed his mind after the elections were over. Under his most recent proposals, elections to the lower house would be conducted under a proportional system.

Kuchma's proposals for a fully proportional election law were discussed in the Verkhovna Rada in February but failed to win the required number of votes for approval. The draft was backed by the ideologically driven left (Communists, Socialists) and the right (Our Ukraine, Tymoshenko). Most of the pro-presidential and ideologically amorphous "centrist" parties voted against the draft -- the one exception being the Social Democratic Party united (SDPUo), which is the only "centrist" party to have invested resources in developing a nationwide party structure, as a result of which it became the only "centrist" party to surmount the 4 percent threshold in the proportional vote in the 2000 elections.

Under Kuchma's proposals, the upper House of the Regions would include three representatives from each of Ukraine's 24 oblasts, the Crimean autonomous republic, and the two cities (Kyiv, Sevastopol) with all-union status, as well as former presidents. This would allow Kuchma to become a senator for two additional years after he leaves the president's office, tiding him over until the next lower-house elections in 2006. When similar proposals were discussed in the 1990s, eastern Ukrainian elites rejected the creation of an upper house, saying it would give the less populous and rural western Ukraine an equal standing with the more populous east. As Kuchma opposes introducing elections for regional governors' posts, the appointed upper house would act as a pro-presidential body -- a counterweight to the lower house. (A similar model is in place in Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia.)

The 2003 proposals thus reintroduce what Kuchma wished to obtain in the 2000 referendum, when Yushchenko was prime minister and there was a non-left majority comprising the "center" and the center-right. This unity was irrevocably destroyed by the so-called Kuchmagate crisis that began eight months later, in November 2000. After the 2002 elections, Kuchma sought to create a majority purely from the "center" to revive the 2000 reforms and ensure his own immunity from prosecution. One factor in the aim to transform Ukraine from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary-presidential republic is ensuring that if elected, Yushchenko would not inherit the extensive powers that Kuchma now wields.

Kuchma's reforms are to be the subject of Soviet-style public discussion throughout the country. As in the Soviet era, the authorities already claim that telegrams have been received from workers' collectives in support of the proposals. But Ukrainian journalists have pointed out that a free discussion is impossible because the media (especially television) are controlled by the state and oligarchs.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto. 

03.04.03. Anklagemyndigheden har lukket sagen om Kolomijets' død

Anklagemyndigheden i Kyiv har afsluttet efterforskningen i sagen om direktør for nyhedsbureauet Ukrajinski Novyny Mykhajlo Kolomijets' død grundet fravær af en kriminel handling, §6 pkt. 1 i Ukraines retsplejelov.
    Vice-statsadvokat for Kyiv by Ivan Derevjanko meddeler, at moderen til den omkomne journalist allerede er gjort bekendt med beslutningen om at lukke sagen, mens enken vil blive underrettet den 2. april.
    Den officielle meddelelse fra Kyiv bys statsadvokat vil blive offentliggjort den 2. april.
    Fra den 21. oktober 2002 ophørte Kolomijets pludselig med at varetage den daglige ledelse af nyhedsbureauet, og den 30. oktober blev Kolomijets' lig fundet hængt i nærheden af Molodetjno i Hviderusland og begravet som uidentificeret.
    Efter ekshumeringen og identifikationen af Kolomijets' lig blev det bragt til Kyiv og begravet.  
    Rigsadvokaturen rejste en sigtelse efter parafgraffen "drevet til selvmord".
    I februar 2003 etablerede eksperterne Kolomijets' dødstidspunkt til at ligge omkring den 28-29. oktober 2002. Den franske (Jean Rivole), den hviderussiske (
Aleksandr Sosonovskij) og de ukrainske eksperter nåede frem til den konklusion, at årsagen til journalistens død var selvmord som følge af hængning.
    Kyiv-anklagemyndighedens pressetjeneste påpegede, at man ikke havde fundet nogen data i forbindelse med en undersøgelse af Kolomijets' lig, som kunne pege i retning af, at udefrakommende personer var medvirkende til hans død. Podrobnosti.
 

03.04.03. Undervisningsminister pålægger lektorer at agitere for Kutjmas reformer?

Onsdag indgik der til parlamentet en deputeret-forespørgsel fra Mykola Tomenko, som påpeger det forfatningsstridige i et dekret fra Ukraines undervisningsminister om oprettelsen af lektor-grupper bestående af undervisere ved de videregående læreanstalter, som skal forklare borgerne de forfatningsændringer, som Ukraines præsident har foreslået.
    Forespørgslen blev bakket op af 160 deputerede og rettet til premierminister Viktor Janukovytj.
    "Over hele Ukraine - hedder det i forespørgslen - opretter de regionale statsadministrationers afdelinger for undervisning lektor-grupper bestående af undervisere ved de højere læreanstalter, som skal forklare befolkningen indholdet af de forfatningsændringer, som Ukraines præsident har foreslået. Desuden oplyser massemedierne, at underviserne ved de højere læreanstalter bliver tvunget ind i disse lektor-grupper og det uden at få ekstra betaling".
    Den 21. marts 2003, citerer pressetjenesten Tomenkos forespørgsel, blev der afholdt et møde i Det nationale Jaroslav Mudryj juridiske akademi for lektor-gruppen i Kharkiv-regionen.
    Repræsentanter for de regionale statsadministationers undervisningsafdelinger forklarer oprettelsen af lektor-grupper med, at der er blevet udstedt et dekret herom fra Ukraines undervisnings- og videnskabsministerium.
    Mykola Tomenko fremhæver, at et sådant dekret er en grov overtrædelse af Ukraines forfatning, de grundliggende menneskerettigheder samt et bevis på, at repræsentanter for den udøvende magt ignorerer lovgivningens normer, og han kræver en omgående undersøgelse af denne information og informere offentligheden om resultatet af den.
    Såfremt et sådant dekret virkelig er blevet udstedt, anmoder Mykola Tomenko premierministeren om at offentliggøre det og reagere i henhold til gældende lovgivning.UP.

04.04.03. Europarådet vil se nærmere på Kutjmas forfatningsændringer

Onsdag rettede Europarådets parlamentariske forsamlings (PACE) Monitoring komite henvendelse til Den venezianske kommission, der er et rådgivende organ ved Europarådet, med henblik på at få en vurdering af den ukrainske præsident Leonid Kutjmas ideer til en forfatningsændring. Dette punkt blev først i sidste øjeblik sat på Monitoring-komiteens dagsorden takket være Leonid Kutjmas og hele hans administrations gamle "veninde" Hanne Severinsen, skriver Serhij Lesjtjenko i UP.
    Hun mener, at Den venezianske kommission allerede nu skal undersøge sagen, fordi hun gerne vil have dens konklusioner inden PACEs juni-session, hvor hun skal aflægge en rapport om Ukraine."Hvis vi skal tale om Ukraine, så ville det være nyttigt at kende Den venezianske kommissions mening, som vil gennemgå de forskellige ændringsforslag til forfatningen og deres overensstemmelse med de europæiske standarder", - påpegede Severinsen.
    Serhij Holovatyj mener, at det ikke er noget problem, at kommissionen kun vil undersøge Kutjmas "forslag" og ikke hans lovforslag. "Det er ideer, og de er formuleret som lovforslag. Kutjma har jo ikke skrevet: jeg formulerer et forslag eller sender en ide. Nej, han har gjort det i form af et lovforslag. Og det hedder "lovforslag". Proceduren blev overtrådt, og der er ikke nogen mening i at sende ideer der er formuleret som et lovforslag til parlamentet. Og eftersom dokumentet har formen som et lovforslag, så kan man også behandle det som et lovforslag", - påpegede Holovatyj. Men alt i alt er det et spørgsmål der vedrører de interne ukrainske normer for lovgivning.
    Ingen af medlemmerne af PACEs Monitoringkomite stemte imod forslaget om at bede Den venezianske kommission om at se på Ukraine. Det ene ukrainske medlem af Holovatyj, mens det andet er Rakhanskyj, som indgår i Kujtmas flertal. Sidstnævnte ville interessant nok ikke overfor UP kommentere komiteens beslutning. "Jeg var der ikke, og jeg har endnu ikke hørt noget om det", - sagde han. Det viser sig at være direkte forkert. Ikke alene var han tilstede under Monitoringkomiteens møde, men han turde ikke som den eneste at stemme imod.
    Den venezianske kommissions beslutninger er ikke bindende i Europarådets medlemslande. Det er en ekspertinstitution, som tager sig af forfatningsmæssige spørgsmål. Dens afgørelse er ikke alene vigtig som en anbefaling for dem, som bliver undersøgt, men også for selve Europarådet. PACE vil udarbejde sin holdning til Ukraine på baggrund af Den venezianske kommissions afgørelse.
    Ifølge Holovatyj, der har været medlem af Den venezianske kommission, består dette organ af professorer i forfatningsret ved fire europæiske universiteter samt tidligere dommere ved højesteret og forfatningsdomstole. Medlemmer af kommissionen er rådgivere for regeringer i Europarådets medlemslande. Ukraine er her repræsenteret af tidligere justitsminister Suzanna Stanik.
    Kutjma har allerede en negativ erfaring med Den venezianske kommission, som i 2000 vendte tommelfingeren nedad for hans første forsøg på at ændre forfatningen (ganske vist var det på det tidspunkt Holovatyj, der var Ukraines medlem af kommissionen). Dengang erklærede Den venezianske kommission, at Kutjmas forslag kunne skabe "alvorlige problemer for demokratiet, rettens overhøjhed og magtbalancens mellem magtens grene". UP.
   

04.04.03. "Koltjuga"-spørgsmålet kan blive løst efter krigen

USA håber at løse spørgsmålet om beskyldningerne mod Ukraine for at have leveret "Koltjuga" (usynlige radarsystemer, red.) til Irak efter afslutningen af den militære operation. "Når kampagnen er slut vil vi nok kunne svare på det spørgsmål", sagde vice-udenrigsminister Steven Pifer, oplyser Ukrajinski Novyny.
    Diplomaten fremhævede, at De forenede Stater og Ukraine forholder sig forskelligt til beskyldningerne om leverancerne af "Koltjuga". Han sagde, at spørgsmålet om leverancerne af "Koltjuga" fra Ukraine til Irak bekymrede USA meget.
    På spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt afsendelsen af den ukrainske bataljon for radioaktiv, kemisk og bakteriologisk afgiftning til Kuwait kan være medvirkende til at fjerne beskyldningerne for leverancerne af "Koltjuga" til Irak, svarede Pifer negativt. "Nej, det ville jeg ikke sige", - understregede han.
    Steven Pifer sagde, at de ukrainske myndigheder ikke fremlagde beviser for fraværet af disse leverancer, da de amerikanske og britiske specialister i oktober 2002 gennemførte en inspektion i Ukraine p.a. "Koltjuga"erne. Efter hans mening var der mange eksempler på, at man fra ukrainsk side veg udenom eksperternes spørgsmål.
    Diplomaten gled af på spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt alle beskyldningerne mod Ukraine ville blive fjernet, hvis USA ikke i finder beviserne på leverancen af "Koltjuga" fra Ukraine i Irak. Han sagde, at dette spørgsmål var meget hypotetisk.

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Efter den undersøgelse, som eksperter fra USA og Storbritannien efter ukrainsk forslag gennemførte i Ukraine i oktober 2002, sagde de, at Ukraine ikke kunne fremlægge troværdige beviser på, at landet ikke havde været med til at sælge "Koltjuga" og sendte yderligere spørgsmål til Ukraine.
    I september meddelte De forenede Stater, at de betragtede den optagelse som den tidligere livvagt for præsidenten Mykola Melnitjenko havde lavet af Kutjma, hvori denne gav sin accept af salget af "Koltjuga" til Irak som værende autentisk og indefrøs hjælpen til Ukraine. Korrespondent.net.

04.04.03. Jusjtjenko vil ikke udelukke, at Kutjmas administration vil gribe til folkeafstemning

Præsident Kutjmas administration "viger ikke tilbage for at gå efter en spaltning af det ukrainske samfund". Det sagde lederen af "Vores Ukraine" Viktor Jusjtjenko, da han af journalister blev spurgt om, hvorvidt det vil blive afholdt endnu en folkeafstemning i Ukraine efter folkets initiativ om de af præsidenten foreslåede forfatningsændringer.
    Jusjtjenko mener, at man ikke kan udelukke, at styret virkelig forbereder sig til at afholde en folkeafstemning. Ifølge ham er målet med denne aktion åbenlys - at ignorere Verkhovna Radas holdning og ændre forfatningen uden parlamentets samtykke.
    Eftersom "det i det nuværende parlament ikke vil være muligt at opnå 300 stemmer for forfatningsændringen", prøver styret gennem en folkeafstemning at skabe et instrument, som kan manipulere med forfatningen.
    "Vores Ukraine" kender til tusinder af eksempler på, at direktører for virksomheder får besked på at underskrive et dokument om afholdelse af en møde for arbejdskollektivet på virksomheden, hvor der bliver givet en enstemmig opbakning til præsidentens initiativer. Vi støtter ikke en sådan pseudodemokratisk måde at drøfte forfatningsændringer på", - citerer "Vores Ukraines" pressetjeneste Jusjtjenko. UP.

07.04.03. NATO membership for Ukraine not likely before 2012

RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 34, Part II, 21
By Taras Kuzio
On 22 January, Ukraine and NATO jointly released the NATO-Ukraine Plan of Action that was adopted at the NATO summit in Prague in November. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma had been diplomatically advised to stay away from the summit because of U.S. allegations two months earlier that Ukraine had supplied a Kolchuga radar system to Iraq in 2000. A meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Committee on the sidelines of the summit was downgraded to the level of foreign ministers. Nevertheless, Kuchma turned up at the summit, thereby demonstrating, according to deputy head of the presidential administration Anatoliy Oryol, his "public success, authority, and prestige."

Although Ukraine was only offered an Action Plan -- not participation in a Membership Action Plan (MAP) -- many Ukrainian officials, including Defense Minister Volodymyr Shkidchenko, have confidently predicted that Ukraine will be invited to join NATO at its next summit in 2007. In reality, NATO membership for Ukraine is impossible before the 2012 summit, U.S. officials told "Financial Times Deutschland" in October. If that prognosis proves correct, in 2012 NATO will for the first time expand onto the territory of the CIS.

The April 1999 NATO summit unveiled MAPs for nine countries -- Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia -- and Croatia was added last year. Of these 10 countries, all but three -- Albania, Croatia, Macedonia -- were invited during the November NATO summit to begin accession talks. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia have a good possibility of being invited at NATO's 2007 summit to begin accession talks. The enlargement of NATO to incorporate these three states will mean that all of Central-Eastern Europe outside the CIS -- except for Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro -- will have joined the alliance.

What then of Ukraine's timetable for membership? Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO and the EU have been totally confusing, making many Western states and international organizations reluctant to take seriously the declarations and rhetoric emanating from Kyiv. Under both Foreign Ministers Hennadiy Udovenko and Borys Tarasiuk (1994-2000), Ukraine's main foreign policy goal was defined as integration into "Euro-Atlantic" structures. However until 2001, Ukraine officially declared only its desire to join the European Union. Last May, Kyiv stated that it will ALSO seek NATO membership. The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan released last month mentions "the long-term goal of membership" only once. Adopting a MAP for Ukraine between May and November 2002 would have been unlikely because the United States had already begun analyzing portions of tapes purportedly made in Kuchma's office that deal with the Kolchuga sales to Iraq, and the results of that analysis were made public in September.

Kuchma's very poor reputation in the West -- he has yet to be invited to meet with the U.S. president -- will ensure that Ukraine will not be able to "upgrade" from its Action Plan to a MAP as long as Kuchma remains president. It seems evident that NATO and the West will not reinvigorate their relationships with Ukraine until after the November 2004 presidential election there. Consequently, Ukraine could only enter the MAP process in 2005. In contrast, other NATO aspirant members such as the three Baltic states began participation in MAPs in 1999.

In the cases of these countries, however, their commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration was heartily backed by virtually the entire domestic political spectrum. Moreover, Ukraine's participation in a MAP in 2005 is contingent on the results of the 2004 presidential poll. Neither of the two likely pro-Kuchma candidates -- presidential administration head Viktor Medvedchuk and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukevych -- supports a NATO-membership bid. In addition, Donbasite Mykola Azarov, who is deputy prime minister with responsibility for Euro-Atlantic integration and the organizer of the European Choice parliamentary faction, "has never been an active Euro-integrator, defense reformer or NATO peacekeeper," "Zerkalo Nedeli" commented earlier this month.

Given Yanukevych's Donbas origins, he is unlikely to show much enthusiasm for the idea of converting the Russian-Ukrainian border into a NATO-Russia one. The establishment of NATO bases in Ukraine would also be problematic, given that Russia has a naval base in Sevastopol until 2017. Joining NATO would create a clear break with Russia, which would be psychologically problematic for eastern Ukrainian oligarchs who support a "Toward Europe with Russia" foreign policy. Russia has never expressed interest in joining NATO, and Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin claims to be unable to comprehend why Ukraine should even need to join NATO.

Meanwhile, official Ukrainian declarations in support of joining NATO remain at the level of mere rhetoric. Razumkov Center President Anatoliy Hrytsenko wrote in "Zerkalo Nedeli" in January that the Action Plan was purely declarative. Jennifer Moroney, a Washington-based expert on NATO-Ukrainian relations, adds that Ukraine was lucky to obtain even the Action Plan in the light of the Kolchuga scandal and that the plan does not fundamentally alter Ukraine's relationship to NATO. Hrytsenko agrees that there is little new in the plan, which includes a "list of declarations" similar to those found in the constitution, laws, decrees, government resolutions, and existing programs. "Yet, none of the above have been duly enforced so far." Why, then, should one expect the Action Plan to be fulfilled?

On 30 January, Kuchma issued a decree establishing a State Council for Euro-Atlantic Integration headed by his longtime ally Volodymyr Horbulin. The purpose of this council is not entirely clear, as it duplicates the National Security and Defense Council whose secretary, Yevhen Marchuk, was absent from the State Council's first meeting. Few believe the new State Council will accelerate Ukraine's "Euro-Atlantic" drive.

No state information campaign is under way to increase public support for NATO membership, which is at an all time low. A February poll by the Razumkov Center registered only 21.9 percent in favor of membership and 37.7 percent opposed. Section 1 of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan is devoted to internal political, economic, and informational issues. In all three areas, Ukraine has severely regressed since the late 1990s, a regression that accelerated after the March 2002 parliamentary election. Western governments and NATO are therefore no longer convinced by mere declarations in support of democratization, such as those made by Kuchma after the Prague summit when he committed Ukraine to "continue market transformations, strengthen democratic principles within the authorities and society, and ensure European standards in the sphere of human rights."

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Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at the University of Toronto's Centre for Russian and East European Studies.

07.04.03. Verdensbanken opfordrer Ukraine til at arbejde på WTO-medlemskab

Direktøren for Verdensbankens repræsentation i Ukraine, Hviderusland og Moldova, Luka Barbonez, er skeptisk overfor ideen om etableringen af en union af de fire stater Kazakhstan, Rusland, Belarus og Ukraine, hvis landes præsidenter har erklæret, at de vil etablere et økonomisk enhedsrum, oplyser Interfaks-Ukrajina.
    Luka Barbonez siger i et interview med ugebladet "Kievskij Telegraf", at "den eksisterende mangel på samordning i disse landes økonomiske og sociale systemer ikke vil medvirke til deres frugtbare samarbejde på det niveau".
    "Jeg tror, at selv Belarus vil tænke en ekstra gang over sin union med Rusland. Selvom der i princippet ikke er noget dårligt i en union, der er rettet mod at stimulere den regionale handel. Men i dag er det allerede evident, at bolden ligger på Den europæiske Unions banehalvdel, og efter Polens indtræden i Eurounionen
aktualiseres spørgsmålet om de nye europæiske naboer", - fremhæver den regionale direktør for Verdensbanken.
    Luka Barbonez mener ikke, at det er nødvendigt for Ukraine at koordinere sine bestræbelser på at træde ind i WTO med Rusland.
    Med hans ord er Ukraine "selv i stand til at klare det". "Disse to staters økonomiske systemer er forskellige, og derfor er det som kan være en fordel for Rusland, overhovedet ikke nødvendigvis vil være det for Ukraine", - siger Verdensbankens direktør.
    Han mener, at et af de alvorlige problemer, som Belarus nu støder ind i, når man drøfter spørgsmålet om en union med Rusland, er spørgsmålet om de ydre tariffer.
    "P.a den alvorlige ubalance i de to landes eksportpotentiale er dette problem meget aktuelt. Hvad angår Ukraine, så ser jeg ikke nogen mening i at koordinere sin vej mod WTO med Rusland.
    På den anden side er selve Rusland nået længere på vej mod WTO end Ukraine.
    Derfor bør den ukrainske regering være mere aktiv og foretage større anstrengelser i den retning, så meget desto mere, at de seneste signaler fra Bruxelles har været positive for Ukraine",  - understregede Luka Barbonez. korrespondent.net.

07.04.03. Ukrainian sex slaves

The number-one shortage in Ukraine today is good jobs. The item at right states that 7 million people have left Ukraine looking for better jobs. The population of Ukraine today has dropped below 48 million and is expected to drop much further. A recent UN report stated the population of Ukraine could drop another 10-15 million if the severe shortage of good jobs continues.
Ukraine needs to set as its first priority the development and expansion of its wealth-creation capacity through implementing the reforms needed to create a viable, strong private market economy that will create the millions of new jobs Ukraine needs in the next few years.
--E. Morgan Williams, Editor, Ukraine Report 2003.

KYIV, 19 March: About 100,000 Ukrainian women have been sold as sex slaves abroad in the past few years. People's deputy Heorhiy Buyko said at a meeting of the Ukrainian parliamentary committee for fighting organized crime and corruption, according to a report published by ITAR-TASS news agency in Moscow in Russian and by the BBC Monitoring Service in English on March 19, 2003.

According to Buyko, Ukraine is Europe's third top supplier of the "live commodity" to world markets. The past few years have seen some 7 million Ukrainian nationals travelling abroad to earn money, about 2 million of them being women aged under 30 stated Buyko.

According to data from the main directorate for fighting organized crime at the Ukrainian Interior Ministry, Ukrainian women are in greatest demand on slave markets in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Germany, Turkey, Italy and the USA. [Passage omitted: world statistics on sex slavery]

07.04.03. Rice arrives in Moscow for talks

From Jill Dougherty
CNN Moscow Bureau
Sunday, April 6, 2003 Posted: 3:08 PM EDT (1908 GMT)

MOSCOW, Russia (CNN) -- U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice arrived Sunday in Moscow for talks with senior Russian officials.

The visit came amid reports that unknown forces attacked a convoy carrying Russian diplomatic personnel and journalists as it was leaving Baghdad, Iraq. The Russian Foreign Ministry said five people suffered minor injuries. (Full story)

U.S. Central Command had been informed of the convoy's departure from Baghdad and the route it planned to follow, officials said. Central Command also said coalition forces were not operating in the area where the attack took place.

Rice is expected to discuss Iraq with Russian officials even as Russian President Vladimir Putin has softened Moscow's criticism of the U.S.-led war.

"We are committed to our long-term strategic partnership with Russia," said White House spokesman Taylor Gross. "We have been through some difficult times, and we look forward to exchanging views with the Russians on how best to move forward."

Relations between Washington and Moscow have been strained over differences on Iraq policy.

Putin did not support the Bush administration's efforts to pass a second U.N. resolution authorizing military action against Iraq, favoring instead containment of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein with U.N. weapons inspectors.

Russian-U.S. relations have become even more raw since the war began, with Bush calling Putin to complain that Russian companies were selling military equipment such as global positioning system scramblers and night-vision goggles to Iraq.

The president called Putin on Saturday morning from the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland before dispatching Rice to Moscow.

Rice, whose trip had not been announced, departed Saturday from Camp David.

Gross said that Rice's schedule had not been finalized but that she was planning to meet with a number of senior Russian officials.

"We have a broad relationship, and we communicate with the Russian government through many channels," Gross said.

Bush returned to the White House from Camp David on Sunday morning after speaking to Rice by phone and attending church.

Rice will rejoin Bush in Northern Ireland, where he is to attend a summit Monday and Tuesday with British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

Rice headed the Russia desk at the National Security Council during the administration of President George H. W. Bush.

08.04.03. Folkeafstemning hvis parlamentet ikke går med til Kutjmas reformer?

Kharkivs guvernør Jevhen Kushnarev (tidligere stabschef for præsident Kutjma, red.) mener, at man vil kunne finde "alternative former" til at gennemføre den politiske reform, som Ukraines præsident har fremlagt, såfremt Verkhovna Rada ikke vil kunne blive enig om reformen.
    "Hvis der ikke bliver noget alvorligt og velunderbygget grundlag for at drage resultatet af den landsdækkende diskussion i tvivl, og man finder en måde på landsplan at stadfæste resultatet af diskussionen på, har jeg svært ved at forestille mig, at parlamentet for anden gang vil ignorere folkets mening. I hvert fald hvad angår selve reformens nødvendighed, for dens indhold vil der ikke være enighed om", - sagde Kushnarev på en pressekonference i Kharkiv.
    Hvis parlamentet "ikke ser sig i stand til at tage hensyn til folkets synspunkt", understregede Kushnarev, opstår spørgsmålet om, "hvorvidt man overhovedet har brug for et sådant parlament, i det mindste til at opfylde denne funktion, på et så skæbnesvangert stade i vores stats tilværelse".
    Derfor mener han, at "alternative former" for at gennemføre en politisk reform "er mulige". Men guvernøren understregede endnu en gang, at det netop drejede sig om en formodning.
    Han fremhævede, at han var "en ubetinget tilhænger" af en politisk reform "p.a. dens ideologi" - overgangen fra en præsidentielt-parlamentarisk til en parlamentarisk- præsidentiel styreform.
    Hvad angår reformens indhold, checks and balances-mekanismen og kompetencefordeling i "magtens trekant", understregede Kushnarev, at han havde sin egen holdning hvad det angår.
    Guvernøren lovede at fremlægge dette synspunkt på det regionale forum, som skal opsummere diskussionen af præsidentens initiativer i regionen en gang i første halvdel af maj. Interfaks-Ukrajina. UP.
    I går gav præsident Kutjma guvernørerne en demonstrativ opsang, fordi de ifølge ham havde fremlagt hans reformforslag til en "en diskussion" i offentligheden ude i regionerne på en sådan måde, at man skulle tro, at det allerede var bestemt, at reformen skal gå igennem uden ændringer.

09.04.03. Anklagemyndigheden vil rejse sager om bagvaskelse af præsidenten

Den ukrainske rigsadvokatur har rejst sigtelse for overtrædelse af straffeloven på baggrund af artikler i massemedierne, som sigtede mod at undergrave præsident Leonid Kutjmas autoritet, forhindre ham i at opfylde sine tjenestlige forpligtelser og er af krænkende og bagvaskende art, oplyser Ukrajinski Novyny med henvisning til Kutjmas pressesekretær, Olena Hromnytska.
    Det oplyses i meddelelsen, at straffesagen er rejst med udgangspunkt i artikler i massemedier, brochurer og andre publikationer. glav.red.info.

09.04.03. 100,000-150,000 Ukrainians working illegally in Poland

"With average monthly pay just $65 in Ukraine and more than $500 in Poland, it is no surprise that many Ukrainians look for work in Poland -- and that Poles gladly hire them to do menial jobs.The migrants include many highly educated people, such as teachers who are unable to support themselves on meager salaries in Ukraine."  Ukraine Report 2003, No. 18

By Nathaniel Espino
Lifestyle - Reuters
Saturday, Mar. 22, 2003
Ukrainian migrants find perils, profits in Poland

RAVA RUSKA, Ukraine (Reuters) - Drivers trying to cross into Poland at this border post face a choice: Pay a $15 bribe, or wait up to 30 hours in a queue they say is created by corrupt border guards. Next year this will be a gateway to the European Union , and in its last progress report the European Commission mentioned border security as an important area of concern, urging Poland to do more to tighten controls. Meanwhile, the estimated 100,000-150,000 Ukrainians working illegally in Poland fear that a visa regime set to begin on July 1 will erect a "new Iron Curtain" cutting them off from their main source of income. Ukrainians complain of being fleeced on their side of the border and fear the visas could lead to worse treatment at the Polish checkpoint in neighboring Hrebenne.

"There's one (Polish) shift that's terrible...they call Ukrainians pigs, or say 'get out of here, you stink'," said Sasha, a Ukrainian who crosses the border frequently.

Spokesmen for the Polish and Ukrainian customs services say they are taking action against corruption.

"The problem of corruption exists, it's known to us, and we're fighting it," said Ukrainian customs spokesman Sergey Gunko, citing the recent sackings of officials and tighter co-operation with the Polish customs service.

Well-read housekeepers

While figures on the number of Ukrainians in Poland are hard to come by, illegal Ukrainian housekeepers and builders in Warsaw are as unremarkable as their Polish counterparts in western Europe.

With average monthly pay just $65 in Ukraine and more than $500 in Poland, it is no surprise that many Ukrainians look for work in Poland -- and that Poles gladly hire them to do menial jobs.

The combination of visa-free travel, short distances -- Warsaw is a five-hour drive from the border -- and the similarity of the Polish and Ukrainian languages also makes things easier.

The migrants include many highly educated people, such as teachers who are unable to support themselves on meager salaries in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet education system.

"It happens quite often that the person cleaning the house has read more books than the owner," said Marek Skorka, a Uniate monk who has contact with several hundred illegal workers through his parish in Warsaw. Skorka, an ethnic Ukrainian who grew up in Poland, says migration also exacerbates social problems in Ukraine itself.

"My parishioners have told me that there are towns where 40 percent of the women are gone -- and sometimes the husbands who stay behind just drink up everything their wives earn."

And while the Polish media have often written about robberies of Ukrainians at train and bus stations, police say the victims are unwilling to file complaints as the thieves check their identity documents and threaten their families in Ukraine.

"If you're working here you're afraid, you can't feel good if you're here illegally -- but back there there's no future, because there's no work," said Oksana, who has worked in Poland since 1998 as a housekeeper and nanny. Oksana hopes to save enough money to move back to Ukraine, buy an apartment and start a family, but she's not optimistic that will happen soon. "Of course there's always hope, but as long as our president (Leonid Kuchma) is in power, I don't see any chance for a change," she said.

Visa regime

While Poland will not immediately enter the EU's Schengen passport-free travel area, the union has required it to introduce visas for Belarus, Russia and Ukraine in preparation for membership. Boguslaw Dubinski, in charge of the visa program for Ukraine, Russia and Belarus at the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw, says Poland will spend about $15 million setting up the system in 2003 and 2004.

"We as Poles have our share of experience with walls. And we don't want to build a wall to keep out people that are historically and culturally close to us," he said.

While visa regimes have yet to be agreed upon with Russia and Belarus, and Russia and Lithuania continue to bicker over travel to and from Russia's Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, Poland's relations with Ukraine look better. Poland has announced that visas will be free of charge for Ukrainian citizens, and for the first time Ukraine has chosen not to impose a retaliatory visa requirement for Poles. Poland and Ukraine share a long but often tortured history, including bloody battles between ethnic Polish and Ukrainian resistance groups during and after World War II.

Already in NATO and heading for EU membership, Poland has said repeatedly that it wants to help Ukraine in its stalled transition from Soviet rule, though as a former imperial master, it must tread carefully to avoid charges of paternalism.

Part of that campaign is making the visa process as painless as possible, and in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv, Polish Consul Krzysztof Sawicki says he plans to put the word of his political bosses into practice. "We will do everything humanly possible to serve Ukrainian citizens competently and respectfully," he said, citing plans to open a new office and renovate the current building.

Sawicki, a fan of rock legend Jimi Hendrix who has brought a stream of Polish jazz musicians to Lviv, says a group of local artists wants to mark July's visa launch with a concert by Polish and Ukrainian rock bands at the border.

"They want to demonstrate the idea that there's no reason to be afraid of the visas, that it shouldn't be seen as something that will divide our two nations," he said.
 

09.04.03. Ukraine vil invitere irakiske børn på rekreation

Ukraine mener, at FN bør deltage ikke alene i overvindelsen af følgerne af krigen i Irak; men også i etableringen af en demokratiske orden i efterkrigstidens land, oplyser Ukrajinski Novyny.
    "At overvinde krigens følger er den primære opgave; mens endemålet er at opbygge en demokratisk stat i Irak. Verdenssamfundet bør hjælpe det irakiske folk i alle faser af denne proces. Efter min mening bør FN finde sin plads og spille sin rolle", - siger lederen af Ukraines udenrigsministeriums pressetjeneste, Markian Lubkivskyj.
    I marts opfordrede Ukraine FN til at blive reformeret, fordi at organisationen ikke havde kunnet forhindre en krig i Irak.
    Talsmanden meddelte iøvrigt, at Ukraine agtede at invitere de tilskadekomne irakiske børn under krigshandlingerne med henblik på rehabilitering ved et af Krims kursteder. Ifølge Lubkivskyj er det i dag nødvendigt først og fremmest at tænke på de civile, som er blevet krigens ofre.
    Talsmanden for Ukraines udenrigsministerium meddelte, at ministeriet og fonden "Ukraine til børnene" (som ledes af præsidentens hustru, red.) samt Ukraines permanente repræsentation ved FN og UNICEF er ved at arbejde på alle tekniske og organisatoriske spørgsmål i denne aktion.
    Tidligere har Odessas borgmesterkontor oplyst, at man var parat til modtage irakiske børn, som er blevet ofre for krigen, og yde dem medicinsk eller psykologisk hjælp.
   
Ukraine har erklæret sig selv som medlem af den anti-irakiske koalition, som stater, der går ind for en omgående afvæbning af Irak, har tilsluttet sig.
    Ukraines præsident Leonid Kutjma understregede, at Ukraine samtidig ikke går ind for, at man bruger militære midler til at løse internationale konflikter og går ind for at løse det irakiske problem ad diplomatiets vej.
    Ukraine har efter anmodning fra USA sendt en bataljon soldater til Kuwait, som skal bekæmpe et evt. angreb med atomare, kemiske eller bakteriologiske våben, hvilket udelukkende er humanitær mission, som ikke vil tage del i kamphandlinger. Den særlige bataljon er sendt for at beskytte Kuwaits civilbefolkning mod anvendelsen af massemødelæggelsesvåben. Korrespondent.net.

09.04.03. Ukrainsk journalist omkommet under beskydning af hotel i Bagdad

En ukrainsk journalist omkom i går i Bagdad. Det drejer sig om kameramanden Taras Protsiuk fra nyhedsbureauet Reuters. Det oplyser UP med henvisning til en "velunderrettet kilde". Samtidig afviste Reuters Kyiv-afdeling ikke i går eftermiddags at give nogen som helst kommentarer, sålænge Reuters ikke selv var kommet med en officiel bekræftelse.
    Taras Protsiuk omkom efter beskydningen af hotel "Palæstina", hvor de udenlandske journalister holdt til.
    USA 3. infanteridivisions ledelse indrømmede tirsdag formiddag, at en amerikansk kampvogn havde beskudt hotellet.
    Ud over den omkomne Taras Protiuk blev tre Reuters journalster kvæstet.
    Taras Protsiuk var ukrainsk statsborger født i Ivano-Frankivsk. De senere år har han været kameramand ved Reuters Warszawa-bureau. Efter de interne regler i Reuters sender man operatører fra flere stater ud til internationale opgaver.
    Taras Protsiuk arbejdede i starten af 1990'erne i kort tid hos CNN, hvorefter han blev ansat hos Reuters. Han var med til at dække de væbnede konflikter i Moskva i 1993 og i Transdniestr og Tjetjenien, hvor han fik et granatchok. UP.

Reuters bekræftede i går oplysningen:
 
Reuters Journalist Killed by U.S. Tank Hit on Hotel
Tue April 8, 2003 07:33 AM ET
 
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - A Reuters journalist was killed and three were wounded in Baghdad on Tuesday when a U.S. tank fired a shell at the media hotel where they were working.
A Spanish journalist was also wounded.

Television cameraman Taras Protsyuk, 35, a Ukrainian national based in Warsaw, died after the blast at the Palestine Hotel, base for much of the foreign media in the Iraqi capital.

Protsyuk had worked for Reuters since 1993 and had reported from conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Kosovo.

Samia Nakhoul, Lebanese-born Gulf bureau chief for Reuters, and Iraqi photographer Faleh Kheiber were both treated in hospital for facial and head wounds and concussion.

Doctors said their injuries were not serious.

Television satellite dish coordinator Paul Pasquale, from Britain, was taken to hospital with leg injuries but doctors said he was not in danger.

The four were part of the 18-member Reuters team in Baghdad.

"We are devastated by the death of Taras, who had distinguished himself with his highly professional coverage in some of the most violent conflicts of the past decade," said Editor-in-Chief Geert Linnebank.

"Taras was one of our most experienced television journalists. He is sorely missed by his colleagues, friends and family."

Linnebank added: "I note that the commander of the U.S. Third Infantry in Baghdad has now said that one of its tanks fired a round at the Palestine Hotel.

"The commander said the tank did this after it came under fire from the hotel. Clearly the war, and all its confusion, have come to the heart of Baghdad, but the incident nonetheless raises questions about the judgment of the advancing U.S. troops who have known all along that this hotel is the main base for almost all foreign journalists in Baghdad.

"Taras's death, and the injuries sustained by the others, were so unnecessary, " Linnebank said.

Protsyuk leaves a widow, Lidia, and an 8-year-old son, Denis.
 

09.04.03. Kutjma på besøg i Centralasien

Den 8-11. april skal Ukraines præsident Leonid Kutjma besøge Tadzhikistan, Kyrzyzstan og Uzbekistan med henblik på at føre forhandlinger på at etablere en frihandelszone indenfor SNGs rammer, oplyser Ukrajinski Novyny.
    Præsidentens pressetjeneste oplyser, at Leonid Kutjma i sin egenskab af formand for SNGs råd vil drøfte etableringen af en frihandelszone indenfor SNG med Tadzhikistans præsident Emonali Rakhmonov, Kyryzstans præsident Askar Akajev og Uzbekistans præsident Islam Karimov.
    I løbet af sit besøg i Tadzhikistan planlægger præsidenten at drøfte samarbejde indenfor energisfæren, herunder Ukraines deltagelse i ombygningen af de tadzhikiske vandværker, indenfor landbruget (leverancerne af ukrainske landbrugmaskiner) samt metalindustrien (først og fremmest indenfor alluminiumsindustrien).
    Desuden planlægger Kutjma under sit besøg i Tadzhikistan at udvide den aftale-juridiske base for de bilaterale relationer, først og fremmest indenfor ordenshåndhævelsen, finanssektoren, undervisningssektoren og sundhedssektoren
    Som udløber af besøget planlægger man at underskrive en række bilaterale regeringsaftaler: om samarbejde i bekæmpelse af narkohandel, gensidig beskyttelse af hemmelige informationer, samarbejde indenfor undervisningssfæren, samarbejde indenfor sundhedssektorens udvikling, farmacien, den medicinske teknologi og videnskaben samt uddannelse af specialister.  
    Man planlægger endvidere at underskrive en aftale mellem Ukraines nationalbank og Tadzhikistans nationalbank om gensidige clearinger samt et protokol om udvekslingen af ratifikationsdokumenter vedrørende Aftalen af den 6. juli 2001 mellem Ukraine og Tadzhikistan om et forenklet regelsæt for indfødsretsskifte for ukrainske borgere bosat i Tadzhikistan og tadzhikiske borgere bosat i Ukraine.
    Leonid Kutjma skal efter planen også mødes med formanden for det tadzhikiske parlaments overhus og underhus, Makhmadsaid Ubajdullojev og Sajdullo Khajrullojev.
    Torsdag den 10. april indledes Kutjmas et-dages besøg i Kyrgizistan, hvor præsidenten vil drøfte, hvordan man kan aktivisere det bilaterale økonomiske samkvem, som er blevet tilrettelagt i slutningen af marts på mødet i den bilaterale ukrainsk-kirgiziske regeringskommission for økonomisk samarbejde.
    De to landes statsoverhoveder skal efter planen drøfte samarbejdet indenfor maskinindustrien og landbruget, samt den videre udvikling af relationerne indenfor rammerne af de internationale organisationer.
    Samme dag drager Leonid Kutjma afsted på et to-dages besøg i Uzbekistan, hvor han skal mødes med dette lands præsident, Islan Karimov, for at drøfte hvordan man kan overvinde nedgangen i samhandlen og få gang i samarbejdet indenfor transport,- energi- og landbrugssfæren. Korrespondent.net.

10.04.03. Kendt ukrainsk journalist omkommer i bilulykke

Natten til onsdag omkom en af de kendteste ukrainske journalister, præsidenten for radiostationen "Hromadske radio", Oleksandr Kryvenko, i en bilulykke.
    Tragedien fandt sted kl. 2.20 om natten på strækningen Kyiv-Tjernihiv, 39 kilometer fra Kyiv.
    Grundet endnu ukendte årsager kørte den VW-Golf, som Kryvenko befandt sig i, ud i vejkanten og brasede ind i et træ. hvorefter både føreren og passageren i bilen blev dræbt.
    Føreren og indehaveren af bilen var Gizo Grdzelidze. I OSCEs kontor i Ukraine oplyste man i går, at Grdzelidze var ansat i Georgiens udenrigsministerium. Han har i et års tid været ansat som fungerende leder OSCEs projektkoordination i Ukraine.
    Indenrigsministeriets pressesekretær Oleksandr Zarubytskyj oplyste, at den strækning, hvor bilulykken fandt sted, ikke er belyst, selvom selve kørebanen er uden deffekter. Lige nu arbejder teknikere på ulykkesstedet. Bilen var på vej mod Kyiv.
    Taras Kuzjmov, som var Oleksandrs ven og kollega, fortalte UP, at politiets foreløbige teori er, at føreren mistede styringen af bilen, kørte væk fra vejen og brasede ind i et træ. "Vejrforholdene var ikke de bedste, og han mistede kontrollen med bilen i en eller anden manøvre", - påpegede Kuzjmov, som begav sig ud til ulykkesstedet. Ifølge ham kender man i øjeblikket ikke den fart, som bilen havde på ulykkestidspunktet.
    Lederen af trafikpolitiet i Kyiv-regionen, Oleksij Kalynskyj, fremsatte i et interview med "Hromadske radio" en række teorier om Oleksandr Kryvenkos og Gizo Grdzelidzes død:
    "Foreløbig kan jeg sige følgende: Ved to-tiden om natten blev den bil med diplomatnummerplader, som Oleksandr Kryvenko og Gizo Grdzelidze kørte i, standset af trafikpolitiets medarbejdere for at køre for stærkt. Gizo Vakhtangovytj Grdzelidze, som sad bag rettet, rullede vinduet ned og foreviste sine dokumenter. Vi advarede chaufføren om, at vejen ikke var særlig god og at man burde overholde fartgrænserne. Indtil videre kan jeg ikke hævde, at der var alkohol i førerens organisme, fordi det er noget retsmedicinerne vil fastlægge.
    15-20 minutter senere kom der en information fra den tankstation, som befinder sig i landsbyen Skiba i Brovary-distriktet, om at der var sket en bilulykke. Vores medarbejdere kørte straks derud. Den bil, som Gizo Vakhtangovytj Grdzelidze førte, havde kørt ned i vejgrøften og ind i et træ.
    Foreløbigt kan jeg sige, at vejen var lige og tør, og at bilens nedkørsel i vejgrøften har været meget jævn. Lige nu er der flere teorier om årsagen til tragedien: enten mistede føreren koncentrationen eller faldt i søvn bag rettet eller fik et ildebefindende. Jeg kan ikke tale om andre teorier. Man bør afvente lægernes konklusioner. Her vil man blandt andet tage blodprøver fra begge to med henblik på at undersøge det for alkohol. Efterforskningen bør drage den endegyldige konklusion".

Fra juni 2001 var Oleksandr (Sashko) Kryvenko præsident for borgerorganisationen "Charter 4". Siden marts 2001 havde han været fungerende direktør for den ukrainsk-polske journalist-klub "Uden fordomme". Han var medlem af præsidiet i borgerkomiteen "For sandheden" samt vice-præsident for Ukrainske forfatteres association.
    Oleksandr Kryvenko blev født den 13. maj 1963 i byen Lviv og var etninsk ukrainer. I 1987 blev han uddannet fra Lvivs Ivan-Franko Universitets filologiske fakultet og arbejdede som lektor i ukrainsk litteratur. Kryvenko var med til at stifte og var aktiv i selskabet "Lev" (løven, red.). Den 3. april 1989 stiftede han som redaktør avisen "Postup". Han var også medstifter af "Memorial", "Rukh" og TUM. Var med ved "Rukh"s stiftende kongres i efteråret 1989.
    I 1990-91 arbejdede Oleksandr som korrespondent for tidsskriftet "Ukraines mindesmærker" i Vestukraine. I 1990-94 var han deputeret ved Lvivs regionale Rada af folkedeputerede og var formand for udvalget for ungdomsspørgsmål. Fra juli 1991 til april 1995 var Kryvenko chefredaktør for Lviv-avisen "Post-Postup".
    Maj-november 1995 arbejdede han som chefredaktør for informationsprogrammerne "Vikna" og "Vikna v svit" det internationale mediecenter "Internews", og i 1996 blev han chefredaktør for Tv-nyhedsbureauet "Vikna".
    I 1996 var Kryvenko medlem af ekspertudvalget under Ukraines premierminister og rådgiver for premierministeren. I 1996-97 var han stedfortræder for lederen af Ukraines regerings pressetjeneste. Samme periode var Kryvenko medlem af det politiske råd i Ukraines folkedemokratiske parti (NDP).
    Fra februar 1998 til juni 1999 arbejdede Oleksandr som chefredaktør for nyhedsprogrammet på kanalen "1+1". I marts 1999 blev han chefredaktør for tidsskriftet "Politika i Kultura"; men forlod bladet i december 2000.
    Han var i løbet af nogle måneder af 2002 fungerende pressesekretær for sammenslutningen af oppositionelle politikere "Forum for national frelse".
    Han var medlem af sammenslutningen "Ny litteratur", Ukrainske forfatteres association og det nationale journalistforbund. Han var medforfatter til bogen "Vores ukrainekundskabs encyklopædi".
    Oleksandr efterlader sig fire døtre - Oksana - 17 år og de 12-årige Solomia-Vaylyna, Anastasja-Maria og Orysia-Domna. UP.

10.04.03. Moscow reluctant to finalize border agreements with former Soviet republics

"More than a decade has passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. But so far, Lithuania and Ukraine are the only former Soviet republics to sign border treaties with Russia, and Moscow has yet to ratify either one. Analysts say there are several explanations for Russia's reluctance to formalize border arrangements with its post-Soviet neighbors." Johnson's Russia List, #7120
3 April 2003
By Valentinas Mite
Prague, 2 April 2003 (RFE/RL) -- This January, Ukraine signed a border treaty with Russia, becoming only the second former Soviet republic to procure such an agreement. The first was Lithuania, which signed a border treaty with Russia in 1997.

Neither treaty is ratified, and in the case of Ukraine, the border has yet to be fully delimited. But both agreements mark the first step in the process of finalizing the borders between the former republics of the Soviet Union.

Oleksandr Sushko is an analyst with the Center for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy, a Kyiv-based think tank. He said he believes the Russian-Ukrainian border will remain relatively open and uncontrolled despite the recent treaty.

But the Baltic states are in a different position. With Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia all poised to join the European Union and NATO next year, they are slated to become the eastern frontier of those organizations and must bring their control of the borders in line with Western standards. But Russia appears determined to challenge the Baltics' border control. The Russian State Duma has made no moves to ratify the Lithuanian border treaty, although Vilnius itself ratified the agreement three years ago. Boris Makarenko is deputy director of the Center for Political Technologies, a think tank in Moscow. He told RFE/RL that the Russian State Duma is delaying its ratification of the treaty in order to pressure Vilnius on the Kaliningrad issue. The Russian exclave is due to be surrounded by EU territory once Poland and Lithuania join the bloc next year, and the issue of transit to and from the rest of Russia through Lithuania has proved bitterly divisive. "The border agreement with Lithuania is signed but not ratified because the left-wing majority in the former [Russian] parliament did not go through with it [in 1999, when Lithuania ratified the agreement]. Now this treaty is getting mixed up in all the Kaliningrad [transit] problems. However, I still think Lithuania will be [the first post-Soviet country] with which Russia will have a legitimate border treaty," Makarenko said.

Makarenko said Moscow has yet to sign border treaties with either Latvia or Estonia. He said the Kremlin remains concerned over the status of Russian speakers in those two states and angry that Latvia and Estonia made territorial claims against Russia at the beginning of their independence. "These countries had territorial claims against Russia and abandoned them only several years ago, when the claims became an obstacle to their membership in the EU and NATO. In this case, Russia is punishing these countries for their foolishness during their first years of independence," Makarenko said.

But Makarenko said that ultimately, Moscow will have no choice but to sign the treaties with Latvia and Estonia in order to maintain cordial relations with both the EU and NATO.

For the 12 former Soviet republics making up the Commonwealth of Independent States, the issue of border agreements is a different matter. Makarenko said Russia is decidedly reluctant to formalize its borders with the former Soviet republics because of the sensitivity many Russians feel about the issue. "To sign such treaties, even symbolically, is a little bit too painful for Russians, who are nostalgic [for the Soviet Union]. The public would take is as a move to build even higher fences between brotherly peoples and a severing of ties with their compatriots who live in these countries," Makarenko said.

Nikolai Petrov, a political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center, said economic problems also stand in the way of border delimitation and treaties. Neither Russia nor the other CIS countries have sufficient funds to undertake a massive border enterprise, he said, adding that the Baltics were able to press ahead only with help from the EU.

Petrov said delimitation and demarcation are particularly important to Russia's three largest neighbors: Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. "Concerning Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, they are in a different situation [from the Baltic states]. The problem with Kazakhstan is that there is no such thing as a [clear] border between Russia and Kazakhstan. It is clear why [the border never existed before]. The border with Ukraine exists and always existed as a border between regions. Now, it is formally a border -- border posts are set on the roads between Russia and Ukraine -- but it is not a border in the strict sense of the word," Petrov said. Petrov added that there are almost no roads through the steppe that holds the Russian-Kazakh border and that large chunks of territory have been arbitrarily claimed by Russia or Kazakhstan as their own. "Russia needs not only political will but also a huge amount of money just to tackle this problem in Kazakhstan alone," Petrov said.

On the other hand, Petrov said, all of Russia's post-Soviet neighbors -- with the exception of the Baltic states -- are members of the CIS. The current informality of the border arrangements, he said, reflects the close economic ties that remain between the states. "The present situation and border regime reflect the level of relations [among the CIS countries]. I don't think that any serious moves [to formalize Russia's border arrangements], except those dictated by temporary need, will occur with either Belarus or Ukraine in the near future," Petrov said.

Makarenko said that for all CIS countries, the "minuses of border treaties for the economy are evident. And there are almost no pluses."

10.04.03. Politiet afviser teori om mord på journalist

Ordensmyndighederne er ved at undersøge årsagerne til den bilulykke, som kostede præsidenten for "Hromadske radio", Oleksandr Kryvenko og senior projektmedarbejder ved OSCE i Ukraine, Gizo Grdzelidze, livet.
    Pressesekretær ved Kyivs regionale politi Mykola Zhukovytj oplyste overfor UNIAN, at den bil, som de to kørte i, kørte af vejen i høj fart og ind i et træ i vejkanten.
    "Det er fastslået, at der ikke er bremsespor på vejen", - påpegede Zhukovytj. Ifølge ham var vejbanen tør, og efter alt at dømme var der ikke nogen modkørende biler. Motoren røg som følge af ulykken ind i selve kabinen, hvilket vidner om den fart, som bilen havde.
    Man har endnu ikke fastslået årsagen til bilulykken. Politiet ser på en teori om tekniske fejl i bilen eller førerens mulige ildebefindende på ulykkestidspunktet.
    Zhukovhytj påpegede, at man i dette tilfælde efter alt at dømme ikke burde overveje at se på sagen som et overlagt mord.
    Alligevel er der rejst en sigtelse efter straffelovens § 286 stk. 3 på baggrund af Oleksandr Kryvenkos og Gizo Grdzelidzes død, fortalte Zhukovytj.
    Det handler bl.a. om overtrædelsen af færdselsloven eller reglerne om brug af bilen af en person, som fører den, hvilket har ført til flere personers død, påpegede Zhukovytj.
    Ifølge ham rejser man automatisk en sigtelse efter straffeloven, når der sker bilulykker med dødelig udgang eller svære kvæstelser.
    Ifølge Zhikovytj kan årsagen til tragedien efter de foreløbige undersøgelser være, enten at føreren faldt i søvn bag rettet eller, at han fik et ildebefindende. Derom vidner blandt andet bilens "jævne" nedkørsel i vejgrøften, eftersom at nedkørslen havde været "brat", hvis bilen pludselig var gået i stykker.
    Ifølge ham ville man foretage en række undersøgelser herunder en retsmedicinsk.
    Alle dokumenter i sagen befinder sig i øjeblikket i Brovarys politidistrikt.
    UNIAN har erfaret, at flere journalister herunder Mykola Veresen', Taras Kuzjmov og Igor Soldatenko var taget ud til ulykkesstedet. UP.

10.04.03. Jusjtjenko imod at forlænge Kutjmas embedsperiode

Lederen af partiblokken "Vores Ukraine", Viktor Jusjtjenko, går ind for at ændre det nuværende styre fremfor at indføre forfatningsændringer med henblik på at gennemføre en politisk reform. Det sagde Jusjtjenko under en høring i parlamentet.
    "Har vi brug for at ændre Ukraines forfatning? Nej. Vi har brug for at ændre styret!", - sagde Jusjtjenko. - Nu må det være slut med at holde befolkningen for nar".
    Ifølge Jusjtjenko er hovedformålet med præsident Leonid Kutjmas forslag til forfatningsændringer at forlænge sin embedsperiode. "Målet med præsidentens forslag til forfatningsændringer er at forlænge sine magtbeføjelser på ulovlig vis. Det er vi helt bestemt imod", - sagde lederen af "Vores Ukraine".
    Ifølge ham har Ukraine brug for et styre, som kan garantere overholdelsen af forfatningens garantier herunder garantien for borgernes rettigheder og friheder. Ifølge Jusjtjenko har den gældende forfatningen endnu ikke udtømt sig selv. Desuden går han ind for, at parlamentet skal vælges ved forholdstalsvalg.

11.04.03. Ukraines premierminister: Tyskland er interesseret i olierørledningen "Odesa-Brody"

Ukraines premierminister, Viktor Janukovytj, siger, at Tyskland er interesseret at transportere den kaspiske olie ad rørledningen "Odesa-Brody" til havnen Wilhelmshafen i det nordlige Tyskland, oplyser Ukrajinski Novyny.
    "Vi har indledt konsultationer og ser store perspektiver i forlængelsen af denne olierørledning ("Odesa-Brody") gennem tysk territorium imod perspektivrige dybvandshavne", - meddelte Janukovytj på en pressekonference i Hannover under sit officielle besøg i Tyskland.
    Pressesekretær i selskabet "Ukrtransnafta" Oskana Baliun sagde til journalister, at erhvervskredse fra den tyske olieforarbejdningssektor havde bekræftet deres interesse i transporten af den kaspiske olie gennem rørledningen "Odesa-Brody" og videre via Slovakiet og Tjekkiet til Tyskland til havnen Wilhelmshafen.
    Baliun kunne dog ikke sige, hvilke selskaber man konkret havde forhandlet med.
    Hun fremhævede, at Ukraine så på denne transportvej for den kaspiske olie sideløbende med projektet om at transportere olien til Europa gennem Polens territorium , som i øjeblikket ser på projektet til færdigbyggelsen af afsnittet "Brody-Plock-Gdansk".
    Olierørledningen "Odesa-Brody" er 674 kilometer lang og blev bygget for at kunne transportere den kaspiske olie fra Odesa til Brody (i Lviv-regionen), hvorfra den skulle føres videre til Europa gennem rørledningen "Druzhba".
    Ukraine har nu i en årrække ført forhandlinger om transporten af den kaspiske olie ad "Odesa-Brody" olierørledningen samt etableringen et internationalt konsortium til administrationen af olierørledningen og dens afslutning, så den ender i Gdansk i Polen.
    Indtil videre er det kun lykkedes "Ukrtransnafta" at påbegynde transporten af olie fra Rusland til olieterminalen "Juzhnyj" i nærheden af Odesa ad det 52-kilometer lange afsnit af olierørledningen "Odesa-Brody", altså i den modsat retning af det ønskede.
    Kapaciteten af den første gren af rørledningen "Odesa-Brody", som blev afsluttet i slutningen af 2001 udgør 9 mill. tons olie om året, og efter planen skal rørledningens kapacitet efter afslutningen af byggeriet nå op på 45 mill. tons olie om året. glav.red.info.
 

11.04.03. Løbesedler fra pseudo-Jusjtjenko: amerikanske landmænd skal lære "dovne ukrainere" at arbejde

Det ukrainske folkepartis (tidligere UNR, red.) organisation i byen Nizhyn i Tjernihiv-regionen har indgivet en anmeldelse til byens anklagemyndighed og politiet af falske løbesedler fra lederen af "Vores Ukraine", Viktor Jusjtjenko, som dukkede op i Nizhyn i begyndelsen af ugen. (Selvsamme løbesedler er på det seneste dukket op i Poltava-regionen og i Kirovohrad-regionen i distrikter, hvor "Vores Ukraine" klarede sig forholdsvis godt ved parlamentsvalget,red.).
    UNPs pressetjeneste oplyser torsdag, at løbesedlerne består af en henvendelse fra "pseudo-Jusjtjenko til landmændene om, at nu bør man fortsætte landbrugsreformerne og inddrage de jordstykker, som ligger klods op ad husene (dvs.: disse jordstykker, der selv under kommunismen var landmændenes private ejendom, skal nu udstykkes og sælges, red.)
    Desuden lover pseudo-Jusjtjenko ifølge UNPs pressetjeneste landmændene, at når han bliver præsident, så vil han hente titusinder af amerikanere til Ukraine, som skal lære de dovne ukrainske bønder at arbejde.
    Nyzhuns afdeling af UNP kræver at finde frem til producenterne og uddelerne af de falske løbesedler. UP.

11.04.03. Kutjma mener, at irakerne selv skal afgøre det irakiske folks skæbne

Ukraine ser fremtidens Irak som en stabil demokratisk stat, som bygger på respekt for menneskerettighederne, de internationale retsnormers og princippers overhøjhed og støtter gode relationer til nabolandene, siger Ukraines præsident Leonid Kutjma.
    I en kommentar, som blev offentliggjort torsdag af præsidentens pressetjeneste, påpeger Kutjma, at der onsdag i Bagdad "fandt de vigtigste begivenheder sted siden starten af den militære kampagne". "Der er sket det, som ingen kunne være i tvivl om: koalitionsstyrkernes sejr er allerede reelt en kendsgerning", - understreger han.
    Ifølge den ukrainske leder rejser den nuværende situation i Irak spørgsmålet om løsningen af akutte og påtrængende problemer. "Først og fremmest er det nødvendigt for koalitionsstyrkerne at sikre en stabilisering af situationen i landet og undgå en humanitær krise. Nu er det vigtigt, at det er irakerne selv, der afgør det irakiske folks skæbne, og at en overgangsperiode på vej mod etableringen af en demokratisk styreform blev afsluttet så hurtigt som muligt", - siger Kutjma.
    Han påpeger, at Ukraine lige fra starten har klart fastlagt sin holdning og grad af deltagelse i løsningen af det irakiske problem. "Tilstedeværelsen af en ukrainsk ABC-bataljon i Kuwait, dens indlemmelse i koalitionen i den del, som vedrører humanitære aspekter, fratager det ikke opgaver og forpligtelser også efter afslutningen af den militære operation", - siger præsidenten.
    "Vi vil fortsat koordinere vores handlinger med koalitionens styrker og samarbejde på en måde, som er passende i situationen", - tilføjer han.
    Kutjma understreger, at Ukraine er parat til at tage "mest aktivt del i genopbygningen af Iraks økonomi, landets ødelagte infrastruktur, yde humanitær hjælp, lægehjælp og rekreation af irakiske børn".
    Han påpeger, at det er vigtigt at sikre en styrket rolle til FN og andre internationale organisationer i løsningen af spørgsmålet om stabiliseringen af situationen og efterkrigstidens opbygning af Irak. Interfaks-Ukrajina. UP.

11.04.03. Indenrigsministeriet udelukker politiske motiver i forbindelse med journalists død

1. vicestatssekretær i indenrigsministeriet Mykhajlo Kornijenko mener, at teorien om at der skulle være politiske årsager til præsidenten for "Hromadske Radio", Oleksandr Kryvenkos, død er indholdsløs.
    "Jeg kan entydigt hævde, at der er tale om en ulykke", - understregede Kornijenko i løbet af en rundbordskonference i går i Kiev.
    "Der er ikke nogen politiske motiver i Kryvenkos dødsfald, og denne teori har ingen ret til at eksistere", - sagde Kornijenko. Han pegede desuden på, at
den diplomat, som sad bag rettet, var 64 år gammel, og derfor "kunne være faldet i søvn, eller også kunne han have fået et ildebefindende".
    "Der var intet, der forstyrrede transportmidlets bevægelse", - mindede Kornijenko om, og fremhævede samtidig, at det er nødvendigt at afvente resultatet af undersøgelsen af transportmidlet, eftersom bilen, muligvis, kan være gået i stykker.
    Kyiv-regionens trafikpolitis hovedafdeling for efterforskning, som undersøger sagen, oplyser overfor Interfaks-Ukrajina, at man i øjeblikket er i gang med en retsmedicinsk og kemisk undersøgelse, som vil være færdig om ca. to uger. UP.

14.04.03. Befolkningen deltager ikke i debatten om Kutjmas politiske reformer

92,4% af ukrainerne siger, at de ikke har deltaget i den landsdækkende debat om de politiske reformer, som præsident Leonid Kutjma søsatte i straten af marts, oplyser Ukrajinski Novyny.
    Ifølge en meningsmåling foretaget af det ukrainske center for økonomiske og politiske studier opkaldt efter Oleksandr Razumkov, som blev præsenteret af centrets præsident Anatolij Hrytsenko og direktøren for de politisk-juridiske programmer Ihor Zhdanov, har 7,6% af befolkningen deltaget i drøftelsen. 3% af befolkningen siger, at de er blevet tvunget til at underskrive breve, henvendelser og protokoller til støtte for reformen, 2,1% af de adspurgte vil ikke svare, mens 94,9% ikke har sat sin underskrift under disse dokumenter.
    På baggrund af de indsamlede data konkluderer centret, at den politiske reform ikke så meget bliver debatteret som godkendt under tvang.
    Samtidig viser undersøgelser, at flertallet af borgerne - 61,8% - kender til Kutjmas initiativ til politiske reformer, mens 38,2% siger, at de ikke har hørt om reformerne.
    42,8% har kendskab til, at Kutjmas forslag bliver debatteret, mens 16,7% ikke har hørt om debatten.
    Undersøgelsen viser, at 34,3% af borgerne kender til reformernes indhold, mens 22,7% siger, at de ikke ved, hvad deres indhold går ud på.
    Undersøgelsen er gennemført af Razumkov-centrets sociologiske tjeneste i dagene fra den 2. til den 7. april.
    2013 personer over 18 år fra 121 steder i landet deltog i undersøgelsen.
    Meningsmålingens fejlmargen er på 2,3%.

14.04.03. Azarov: USA har hævet de finansielle sanktioner mod Ukraine

De forenede Stater har hævet de sanktioner mod Ukraine, som var blevet indført efter anbefaling af FATF. Ifølge Interfaks-Ukrajina kom meddelelsen herom lørdag fra Ukraines 1. vice-premierminister og finansminister, Mykola Azarov, som i øjeblikket er på besøg i Washington.
    Det amerikanske finansministeriums beslutning om at afskaffe sanktionerne vil træde i kraft, i det øjeblik beslutningen bliver offentliggjort i den officielle avis Federal Register, som forventes at udkomme i løbet af to uger.
    Mykola Azarov, som er leder af den ukrainske delegation ved det halvårlige møde i Verdensbanken og Den internationale Valutafond, har holdt møder med ledelsen af det amerikanske finansministerium om bekæmpelsen af finansielle forbrydelser (finansiel efterretning).
    Han fortalte om de fremskridt, som Ukraine havde gjort i sikringen af bekæmpelsen af hvidvask af penge og de praktiske skridt henimod skabelsen af et effektivt system for finansiel overvågning og tilsyn.
    Den ukrainske vice-premierminister og finansminister berettede endvidere om, at regeringen havde sat sig som mål at sikre Ukraines udelukkelse fra "den sorte liste" af lande, som ikke støtter den internationale kamp mod hvidvask af penge inden udgangen af 2003.
    "Desuden vil vi i den nærmeste fremtid tilslutte os Egmont-gruppen", - sagde Mykola Azarov.
   
Som tidligere nævnt har Den internationale organisation til bekæmpelse af hvidvask af kriminelle penge (FATF) anbefalet at ophæve sanktionerne mod Ukraine, som blev indført den 19. december 2002.
    Denne beslutning blev truffet på det møde i FATF, som sluttede den 14. februar. Flertallet af FATFs medlemslande har allerede rettet sig efter disse anbefalinger.
    Ukraine forbliver på "den sorte liste" over lande, sålænge den nye lovgivning om bekæmpelse af hvidvask af kriminelle penge ikke er begyndt at virke i realiteten.
FATF planlægger at gennemføre en revision af "den sorte liste" på sit næste plenarmøde den 18-20 juni.
    Ukraine er på den sorte liste hos FATF, fordi man bliver betragtet som et land, der ikke medvirker til at bekæmpe hvidvask af sorte penge. Den 19. december 2002 anbefalede FATF medlemslandene at indføre sanktioner mod Ukraine i forbindelse med landets mangelfulde bekæmpelse af hvidvask af sorte, kriminelle eller lyssky penge. Korrespondent.net.

14.04.03. "Vores Ukraine" er imod to-kammer parlament

Fraktionen "Vores Ukraine" går imod præsident Leonid Kutjmas forslag om at indføre et to-kammer parlament. Det sagde "Vores Ukraine"s leder, Viktor Jusjtjenko, i sit indlæg i går på en kongres i "Kongressen af ukrainske nationalister". "Vi er imod et to-kammer parlament", - sagde han.
    Ifølge Jusjtjenko vil overhuset - regionskammeret - såfremt Kutjmas forslag bliver godkendt, aldrig blive valgt af folket, men blive udpeget af præsidenten.
    "Det er ikke nødvendigt at oprette et "House of Lords", som aldrig bliver valgt, men bliver udnævnt (af Kutjma)", - sagde han. I den forbindelse betegnede han hele Kutjmas forslag til politiske reformer som et forsøg på at afskaffe det parlamentariske system.
    "Målet med disse midler (Kutjmas forslag) er en gang for alle at gøre det af med parlamentarismen", - sagde Jusjtjenko.
    I begyndelsen af marts foreslog Kutjma blandt andet at indføre et to-kammer parlament og afholde parlamentsvalg og præsidentvalg samme år med en embedsperiode på 5 år til begge disse organer.
    Præsidenten foreslog desuden Radaen at begrænse hans ret til at udpege ministre til kun at omfatte indenrigsministeren, udenrigsministeren, forsvarsministeren og katastrofe/Tjornobyl-ulykke ministeren.
    "Vores Ukraine", Det kommunistiske parti, Det socialistiske parti samt Julia Tymoshenkos blok er gået imod Kutjmas forslag til politisk reform.
    Efter deres opfattelse sigter Kutjmas forslag på at styrke hans beføjelser og er desuden et forsøg på at forlænge hans embedsperiode til 2006. Kutjma afviser disse beskyldninger og opfordrer befolkningen og politikerne til at tilkendegive deres mening om den politiske reform uden skelen til evt. personlige sympatier eller antipatier for ham. Podrobnosti.

15.04.03. Interview med den nu afdøde journalist Oleksandr Kryvenko

OLEKSANDR KRYVENKO - PRESIDENT OF HROMADSKE/PUBLIC RADIO, KYIV - TALKS TO ROMAN REVKNIV JAN 05 2003

Until now there has been no such project as Public Radio (PR) in Ukraine. Unique through and through PR has undertaken a commitment to report on what is going on and offers its studios to everyone who wants to have his or her say; it speaks to its listeners, but does not brainwash them; it is funded by Western donors but it is not vulnerable to any administrative and financial pressure from the Ukrainian government or corrupt business clans, and seeks support only from its listeners. With such a turn of events it became the first talk radio Internet project in Ukraine.

This interview with PR president Oleksandr Kryvenko will throw more light on the project's present and future develpments.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oleksandr, let me ask you pointblank: why was it necessary to create Public Radio in Ukraine?

Because a great number of Ukrainian radio stations are just playing pop music alternating it with entertaining contests. There are very few radio stations that are really mainstream and can boast their own style, and informative ones just don't exist. There are two reasons for it: firstly, it is much more expensive to produce talk-show radio than to just program a computer that will churn out music round-the-clock. Incidentally, I used to know a radio station director who claimed he could stay away from the office for two weeks as the automated system did all the work.

The other reason is that many media managers want to avoid any conflicts with the authorities. By merely reporting on the news or inviting someone to the radio studios you run the risk of touching on something that will not sit right with local government officials or their brethren in the capital Kyiv. And you don't necessarily have to take potshots at the authorities - it would be sufficient to cover the topics which are considered taboo by those in power, for instance, protest actions by the opposition. If you are reporting for the state-run radio, you will soon be reminded of who rules the roost. If you own a radio station, officials will be quick to warn you of the risks to which your business is exposed.

That is why an unbiased and impartial radio station cannot be created in Ukraine for the money provided by the state or corrupt pro-regime Ukrainian business entities. Such a radio station must also produce non-commercial educational programs aimed to benefit its listeners. Such a radio must be easily available so that all the parties to a political conflict can have an equal opportunity to have their say, with listeners able to make calls and put their questions.

Who's funding the project, and how much time has passed since the original concept to PR's first broadcast?

Our first and main donor is the Soros Foundation that responded favorably to a proposal by a group of influential Ukrainian journalists and allocated $180,000. It took four months to release the funds. This done, we began purchasing equipment, setting up our studios, creating the Public Radio website and training our staff. We first went on the air on May 13, 2002, broadcasting round-the-clock over the Internet.

In the About Us section of your website you mention some conflicts that Public Radio has with the authorities. Could you be more specific as to where you disagree with the regime?

We disagree on one major point: journalists should not help the regime to implement its policy. We keep saying, " We don't like you officials and we don't like like your critics. We have not been created to love or hate you, but to keep our listeners informed." It's precisely this concept that does not go down well with the Ukrainian officials."

Why was it so difficult to get your license? Is there a risk that Public Radio may be closed some day?

For exactly the same reason which I have just mentioned. It made the officials see red to know that we have received a huge $180,000 grant funding from (according to their unshakeable convictions) the enemy of the Ukrainian president without slipping a cent into these official's bottomless pockets (which, in their view, is sheer impudence). I told them at once that the grant does not provide for any bribes or kick-backs. It is next to impossible to get a license in Ukraine without bribing the officials.

What are the feelings and emotions behind the PR team's Ukrainian reporting? How might this be different from that of their Western colleagues?

Public Radio is staffed with young people who are patriotic Ukrainians. They know well the standards of Western journalism and many have worked for Western radio stations in the past. I believe, they are fully aware of their basic commitment as journalists: to keep the public informed, not brainwashed. It is the prerogative of the listeners to draw conclusions based on the information they receive from us.

How large is PR's staff in Kyiv and the regions?

Our staff in Kyiv numbers 20 plus ten correspondents in Ukraine's larger cities. In 2003 the team will grow as we are on track to significantly increase the number of programs.

Oleksandr, what is your role in the project?

I guess, I'm like a talisman for the project. I deal with financial donors, both current and potential, act as a broker offering our programs and news releases to Kyiv-based and regional radio stations, as well as help shape up the Public Radio team and train my younger colleagues to become first-class professionals.

With several million Ukrainians listening in to your news bulletins and talk shows, Public Radio's focus is definitely on covering political goings-on. Is such an amount of political material a legacy of the Gorbachev Perestroika era that triggered a tidal wave of political discussions?

There is a huge demand for political information in Ukraine, and to have access to daily coverage of political goings-on is far more important for Ukrainians than for the nationals of Western countries. Meanwhile, you can hardly expect the state-run or pro-presidential media to arrange and cover free political debates. The existence of political censorship in Ukraine gives a greater role to Public Radio and vests PR journalists with additional responsibility.

How can PR's editorial policy contribute to enhancing Ukraine's image? Would it not also be good to expose your audience to past Western experience of resolving the same social problems which are currently faced by Ukraine?

We have embarked on a cooperation program with several partner organizations to make the relevant Western experience available to Ukrainian listeners, primarily, in the area of self-government. We plan to expand such cooperation. We are well aware of the huge chunk of work facing those who, as you put it, want to enhance Ukraine's image. This objective will take a lot of work and sweat to reach, and it cannot be achieved by the efforts of Public Radio alone, but we will try our best.

How consistent is your drive to ukrainianize Ukraine? How successful are you in demonstrating to the world that Ukraine can exist separately from Russia, and as a country of wide ethnic diversities?

I have made it clear to my staff that our contribution to ukrainianizing the country must not be reduced to sending appeals via our transmitters to speak only Ukrainian but to try to reach out to a wider audience. If in a number of years our project becomes self-supporting, and we will be able to do without Western grants, it will be the best demonstration that we can do it on our own and exist as an independent political entity. …With regard to ethnic versatility, Ukraine can become a good example of interethnic peace. I can't wait to see programs on the Public Radio in Gypsy, Yiddish, Bulgarian, Polish and other languages of the ethnic minorities living in Ukraine.

Are you going to expand coverage of Ukrainian art and social issues?

Yes, of course. In February we will considerably increase our broadcasting time, raising it to nine hours daily within several months, with art and social programs making the bulk of new programs.

Public Radio has an impressive website with Internet audio broadcasting equipment. Given Ukraine's present conditions, how could you cope with most of the problems which other Ukrainian websites cannot solve even now?

As the authorities denied us access to [conventional] radio broadcasting we had no other option but to become the first Ukrainian Internet radio. We were faced with a hard alternative: either to return the grant money to the donor saying "Sorry, we cannot operate in such a country" or to keep on pushing hard. We offered our political, sport, cultural and educational programs to local radio stations - and found a lot of happy clients. Six months later, we had twenty partner stations all over Ukraine using PR-generated materials on a daily basis!

However, only by running a website could we put all our materials on the air. Thanks to the Transparent Technologies team we have developed a website where people in Ukraine and on more distant shores can read and listen in to Public Radio bulletins and talk shows. We have applied for financial assistance to the Embassy of the United States, and could thus set up an impressive Internet resource that puts us in the top thirty among some three hundred Ukrainian Internet sites. Currently, we are involved in negotiating a deal with a United Kingdom company to purchase software that will considerably upgrade the reliability of our Internet transmissions.

What are your strategic objectives? What future do you visualize for Public Radio?

Any radio station must have access to radio frequencies. Since late August 2002 we have gone on the air live with our information programs and talk shows in the capital Kyiv on Radio Kontinent, a real thorn in the regime's side. But this is a mere three hours of broadcasting, while the European Union grant makes it possible for us to enlarge our broadcasting time. Top on my 2003 list of priorities is to put the PR on a 24-hour work schedule in Kyiv and gradually expand broadcasting in other cities.

With regard to even farther goals, our objective is to become a national broadcaster. We know what must be done to achieve this objective, and we are aware that we will have to put in a lot of work. In a year's time I promise I'll be able to say something more definate.

15.04.03. Ukraine cracks down on media

FINANCIAL TMES
By Tom Warner
April 9 2003 5:00

Ukraine's presidential administration yesterday announced a crackdown on opposition media, signalling that journalists who criticise Leonid Kuchma, the president, could be jailed for "hindering the fulfilment of the duties of the president".

The statement confirms reports by a journalist rights group that prosecutors had started interrogating journalists under a statute that defines "interference in the activities of a state official" as a crime punishable by up to three years in prison. Tom Warner, Kiev

Kyiv (Interfax-Ukraine) - The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office has opened a criminal case against a number of media outlets regarding the publication of certain articles criticizing the president. Presidential press secretary Olena Hromnitskaya said on Tuesday that "these insulting and defamatory materials are aimed at creating obstacles to the president's execution of his duties and at undermining the president's reputation."

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Mass Media Institute said earlier that the Prosecutor General's Office opened a criminal case against Tamara Prosyanik, editor-in-chief of the Infomatsionny Byulleten (Information Bulletin) opposition daily, concerning the December 5, 2002 publication of an article entitled "One Million Dollars for the Head of Giya Gongadze."

15.04.03. Commemorating 1943 events in Volyn

"Not surprisingly therefore, the attempt by the Polish side to isolate this event out of context and place total blame on Ukrainian nationalists (OUN and UPA) is rejected out of hand by most shades of Ukrainian political opinion. The 1943 tragic events in Volhynia should be commemorated. But, the manner in which the Polish authorities are undertaking the commemoration reflects traditional stereotypes of Ukrainians, which will serve to undo the tremendous progress in the reconciliation of both nations since 1945."
April 10, 2003
Kyiv Post Op ed
By Taras Kuzio
www.kyivpost.com/opinion/oped/15173/

Commemorating 1943 events in Volyn

The recent friendly relations between Ukraine and Poland are nothing new, having been developing for some years in spite of the historically troubled relations between the two countries. However, the upcoming commemorations of the events generally referred to as the massacres of Poles in Volhynia in 1943 may put Ukrainian-Polish relations under considerable strain. Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation has been promoted since 1945. The most influential Polish emigre journal Kultura published in Paris from the late 1940's always championed reconciliation with Ukrainians. This view was unpopular among Polish emigrés but found resonance within the Solidarity movement in the 1980's.

By the late 1980's when Solidarity and the opposition movement emerged from the underground to sit at a roundtable with the Communists, their views on Ukrainians were completely at odds to those that I had grown up with among emigré Poles in the U.K. Solidarity activists, such as Jacek Kuron, reiterated that "Without a free Ukraine there cannot be a free Poland!" and attended the founding congress of Rukh in 1989. With funds from Prolog Research, publishers of the Ukrainian equivalent of Kultura--Suchasnist-- Solidarity groups printed and smuggled literature to Rukh and I helped edit two special Polish-language issues of Suchasnist for the Polish opposition. The fruits of this reconciliation are evident in the breakthrough in Polish-Ukrainian relations in the 1990s. Poland is, and hopefully will remain, one of Ukraine's main allies in its drive for Euro-Atlantic integration. The crowning success of this reconciliation could be seen in the pope's visit to Ukraine in June 2001. Dealing with the troubled past should not harm this tremendous progress, which is decades ahead that of the "normalization" of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

Placing the Volhynia massacres in context

Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation is well developed at the elite levels only. Polish opinion polls regularly find that the public image of Ukrainians is very low and a recent poll found that only Romanians and Gypsies have more negative stereotypes. A Ukrainian shuttle trader to Poland recently told Reuters that at the border Ukrainians are treated terribly. "There's one (Polish) shift that's terrible...they call Ukrainians pigs, or say "Get out of here, you stink." As Professor Piotr Wrobel, chair of Polish History at the University of Toronto, confessed to me, it's fine for his fellow Polish academics to be "anti-Ukrainian" but not "anti-Semitic." Nevertheless, 300,000 Ukrainians are working inside Poland.

Historians, writers, religious leaders and political parties have nourished the Polish negative stereotype of Ukrainians for more than a century. This was even the case in Communist Poland when criticism of Russians was not permitted. However, at the same time the Communist authorities published countless books with mass circulation, films, and even school instructional materials that inculcated a stereotype of genocidal anti-Polish Ukrainians. Such views were also common in Polish Diaspora newspapers. Books and other media articles propagating these stereotypes about Ukrainians did not suddenly cease after the Communists left office. This would have been difficult as these stereotypes had grown deep roots in Polish society and former Communists, such as President Alexander Kwasniewski, were in power. Only Gazeta Wyborcza, edited by Kuron's Solidarity ally Adam Michnik, is critical of the plans for the 1943 commemoration.

Sadly therefore, the planned commemoration of the Volhynia massacres takes the entire subject out of context. Ukrainian-Polish relations were poor a long time prior to 1943. Polish repression of Ukrainians and other minorities in the 1930s led to the rise of extreme right-wing groups. According to the Canadian expert on the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), Professor Emiterus Petro Potichnyj, various attempts by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and UPA to contact the Polish-government-in-exile in London during world War II were rebuffed.

After World War II, the Poles claimed that they were the only nation in Nazi-occupied Europe not to collaborate with the Nazis. This myth ignores an important factor in the Volhynian conflict when Ukrainian policemen who fled to the UPA were replaced by the Nazis with local Poles. Some Poles also collaborated with the Soviet forces, the arch-enemy of the UPA.

Inflated numbers

A March University of Toronto talk by University of Alberta doctoral student Krzystof Lada claimed that 390,000 Poles lived in 1,150 settlements in Volhynia. Of the 390,000 Poles in Volhynia, Lada calculated that 33,000 died in 1943, some 8.5 percent.

To claim that this was a "planned genocide," as Lada and Polish officials are doing, is therefore a gross exaggeration. Of the Polish inhabitants of Volhynia, 357,000 or 91.5 percent were not physically harmed. Lada said that 142,000 of the Poles (or around half) still lived in Volhynia in 1944 when the Soviet army arrived.

Lada's figure of 33,000 Polish deaths is nearly half the 60,000 claimed by the Polish government. A major problem is that the necessary research to ascertain the correct figure is still lacking, especially in Ukraine where even the UPA is not officially rehabilitated. Lada's figure of 33,000 should be placed alongside 15,000 Ukrainians who also died at the same time in Volhynia.

Potichnyj, who has long edited UPA documents, concluded that "there is no document that I know of showing that the Ukrainian underground ordered wholesale slaughter." In areas of Western Ukraine where there was no Polish military activity against Ukrainians, no actions by UPA against Poles were taken.

Another aspect of the commemorations which has been ignored is the forcible expulsion of 500,000 Ukrainians to Poland in 1944-1946. President Kwasniewski (but not his prime minister or lower house of parliament) has only atoned for the 1947 ethnic cleansing of 250,000 Ukrainians at Akcja Wisla, not the far larger expulsions of Ukrainians that occurred earlier. The murder of Ukrainians by Polish units other than the government-in-exile's AK (such as the extreme right NSZ) and the destruction of Ukrainian Orthodox churches in Kholm and Pidlachia has also been ignored. The involvement of Nazi and Soviet forces in encouraging the Volhynia conflict is also ignored. The Volhynia city of Rivne was the headquarters of Reichskommissar Erich Koch and therefore included a large concentration of German units. The destruction of Polish settlements and killing of Poles by the Soviets a year later is ignored in this year¹s commemoration. The words "Gestapo" and "NKVD" were removed from a monument erected in Wroclaw in 1997 while "OUN-UPA" was maintained.

The Volhynia conflict was not only purely ethnic [Volhynia is an Orthodox region]. Social problems also played a role. The forcible taking of land by poor Ukrainian peasants drew on a long tradition of Cossack revolts going back hundreds of years. In the inter-war period the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) was very active in Volhynia.

Reactions to Polish demands

The language used in the long list of Polish demands presented by the Polish National Security Bureau (BBN) to the Ukrainian presidential administration in February uses language reminiscent of the Soviet era when Polish and Soviet Communist publications dealt with "Ukrainian nationalist bands." The language is in the form of a diktat by a stronger country, perhaps taking advantage of Kuchma's weakness at home and abroad.

Marek Siwiec, head of the BBN, insists that Ukraine recognize the Volhynia massacres as "genocide." The monument to be erected in July in Warsaw will claim the far-higher figure of 60,000 Poles murdered by "OUN-UPA" as "genocide" and part of a planned "Polish holocaust."

Although the monument is not meant to be anti-Ukrainian, the result will be to reinforce the images long cultivated in Poland of genocidal, anti-Ukrainian Poles. The BBN also wants to take this further by exhuming graves in Ukraine, renovating Polish military graves and researching in archives with a view to launching future prosecutions for "war crimes." No similar steps are to be taken against Polish members of NSZ guilty of massacres of Ukrainians in Kholm and Pidlachia or Polish Communist and Soviet (NKVD units who organized the 1944-1946 expulsions of Ukrainians to Poland and Akcja Wisla's ethnic cleansing. Polish approaches to this question suggest they believe that only Ukrainians are allegedly guilty of crimes against humanity, but not Poles and Soviets as well.

Not surprisingly therefore, the attempt by the Polish side to isolate this event out of context and place total blame on Ukrainian nationalists (OUN and UPA) is rejected out of hand by most shades of Ukrainian political opinion.

The 1943 tragic events in Volhynia should be commemorated. But, the manner in which the Polish authorities are undertaking the commemoration reflects traditional stereotypes of Ukrainians, which will serve to undo the tremendous progress in the reconciliation of both nations since 1945.

15.04.03. Ukraine arbejder på at blive medlem af WTO før Rusland

Kommentar: Ukraine har udnyttet den seneste tids forværring af forholdet mellem USA og Rusland til at intensivere bestræbelserne henimod et medlemskab af frihandelsorganisationen WTO og bevæge sig væk fra aftalen om det økonomiske enhedsrum, som Kutjma var med til at underskrive den 23. februar. Hermed ser Rusland ud til at have udtømt sit arsenal af integrationspolitiske bestræbelser i forhold til Ukraine og vil formentlig være henvist til at gå over til en eller anden form for mere kontant omend skjult pression, fordi enhver åben konfrontation med Ukraines regering vil være ensbetydende med en falliterklæring for Putins Ukraine-politik. Økonomiminster Valerij Khoroshkovskyj, der hidtil har talt for en "synkron" bevægelse henimod et WTO-medlemskab med Rusland, kom i sidste uge med en erklæring om, at WTO-medlemskabet nu var blevet en absolut topprioritet for Ukraine, og at der ikke kunne blive tale om en koordination af denne bestræbelse med andre lande, hvis det var i strid med Ukraines nationale interesser. WTO er også blevet mere tillokkende for Ukraine, efter at den handlingsplan for Ukraine, som NATO har udstukket, har sat et medlemskab af frihandelsorganisationen som en af forudsætningerne for en tilnærmelse til den nordatlantiske alliance. Ukraine er også blevet opmuntret af USAs ambassadør i Ukraine, som har udtalt, at USA gerne vil hjælpe Ukraine med at blive medlemmer af frihandelsorganisationen. WTO ser ud til at blive Ukraines økonomiske pendant til EU og NATO som et alternativ til de russiske integrationsbestræbelser indenfor rammerne af SNG.
 
Den 16. april afholdes i Moskva det tredje møde på højt niveau i den arbejdsgruppe, som skal drøfte problemet omkring oprettelsen af et økonomisk enhedsrum mellem de fire lande: Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Hviderusland og Rusland. Ifølge den russiske vice-premierminister Viktor Hristenko vil man netop efter dette møde kunne tale om indledningen af reelle forhandlinger om oprettelsen af denne internationale økonomiske organisation. Ifølge ham har alle de forudgående møder og samtaler ikke været andet end diskussioner. Den hårdeste meningsudveksling vil efter alt at dømme dreje sig om koordineringen af de fire landes respektive bestræbelser på at blive medlemmer af WTO.
    Den 23. februar underskrev de fire landes præsidenter en aftale om oprettelsen af et økonomisk enhedsrum med deltagelse af Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Hviderusland og Rusland. Samtidig pålagde præsidenterne deres regeringer inden efteråret at udarbejde en aftaletekst. Ideen var, at den nye organisation ikke alene skulle blive et internationalt organ; men en overnational organisation, som har reelle magtbeføjelser. Dens hovedkvarter skulle ligge i Kiev, mens en kazakhisk statsborger skulle stå i spidsen for den. Denne konstruktion skulle udelukke enhver mistanke om, at Rusland ønskede igen at blive "storebror" indenfor SNG. Men nu ser det endnu engang ud til, at det hele at ved at gå i hårdknude.
    Ifølge Viktor Hrystenko vil man inden den 16. april have udarbejdet et koncept for det økonomiske enhedsrum, som man så skal forhandle om. Vice-premierministeren indrømmede, at der var en hel del diskussion omkring dokumentet. Først og fremmest drejer det sig om en klar definition af begrebet Økonomisk enhedsrum. Rusland insisterer på, at der hermed menes en fri bevægelse af ikke alene kapital men også varer og arbejdskraft. Visse forhandlingspartnere foreslår imidlertid, at man ikke åbner markederne parallelt, men efterhånden, skridt for skridt. Viktor Hristenko mener imidlertid, at de konsekvente bevægelser i denne retning allerede gang på gang har undladt at føre til mærkbare resultater, hvorfor problemerne omkring tarifreguleringen, koordinationen af penge- og kreditpolitikken o.s.v. skal løses parallelt.
    Hovedproblemet for den økonomiske integration ligger imidlertid ikke i SNG, men udenfor SNG; nemlig i verdens frihandelsorganisation - WTO. Tirsdag i sidste uge indrømmede Viktor Hristenko overfor Strana.ru, at parterne indtil videre ikke har formået at blive enige om en synkron tilslutning til WTO, for slet ikke at tale om ens vilkår for et medlemskab af organisationen. "Hvis det ikke lykkes, vil hele ideen med Det økonomiske enhedsrum ikke blive til noget, - mener en af lederne af den russiske regering , - vi bør forstå, at hvem denne banket så vil betale for".
    Det drejer sig om et temmelig kompliceret problem. Ifølge Strana.ru har Ukraine under sine forhandlinger om en tilslutning til WTO allerede underskrevet bilaterale aftaler med en række lande. Desuden indrømmede et af medlemmerne af den ukrainske deletagion overfor Strana.ru, at en sådan protokol var blevet underskrevet med Den europæiske Union. Men fra ukrainsk side er man ikke meget for at offentliggøre de underskrevne dokumenter. Efter alt at dømme har Moskva i hvert fald ikke nogen klare informationer endnu. Præsidenterne for de fire lande har indtil videre pålagt eksperterne at studere forbindelsen mellem en tilslutning til WTO og udformningen af det økonomiske enhedsrum rapportere om forslag til en synkronisering af forhandlingerne. I mellemtiden er der opstået rygter om, at Ukraine i sin aftale med EU ikke alene er gået med til en minimal importafgift på enkelte varetyper; men også har tilsluttet sig aftalen "Om handel med civil luftfartsteknologi", som ikke er obligatorisk for WTO. Hvis det er tilfældet, så er Rusland tvunget til at vælge imellem, om man enten skal etablere et økonomisk enhedsrum og miste hele sin flyindustri eller opføre toldbarrierer på grænsen til Ukraine.
    Desuden har Ukraines premierminister Viktor Janukovytj fornylg sagt, at man i den nærmeste fremtid vil underskrive en tilsvarende aftale med USA. Rusland ved også meget lidt om de vilkår, som dette dokument består af.
    Den sparsomme information fra Kiev om de aftaler man underskriver og som har en indflydelse på de fælles planer for etableringen af Det økonomiske enhedsrum, ser mistænkelig ud. Viktor Hristenko bemærkede, at denne diskussion havde varet halvanden indenfor rammerne af Den euroasiatiske økonomiske Union. Og kun efter hårde forhandlinger var det lykkedes medlemslandenes ledere at underskrive et dokument, som fastlagde de fælles principper for forhandlingerne med WTO. Men i modsætning til Hviderusland og Kazakhstan er Ukraine ikke medlem af Den euroasiatiske økonomiske Union. Derfor ser de kommende forhandlinger i Moskva ud til at blive afgørende. Enten vil alle medlemmerne af processen blive enige om at spille med åbne kort, eller også vil processen trække i langdrag. Ukraine.ru.

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