03.06.02. Ukraine vil gerne være associeret medlem af EU

03.06.02. Har civilsamfund og NATO noget med hinanden at gøre?

04.06.02. Tysk politolog om flertallet i Verkhovna Rada

04.06.02. Kutjma bekymret for højredrejning i EU-landene

04.06.02. Polen vil hjælpe Ukraine ind i EU

06.06.02. Udsigt til kompromis i fordelingen af udvalgsposter

06.06.02. NATO-medlemsskab forudsætter reformer

06.06.02. Får Kutjma-blokken kun 4 udvalg?

07.06.02. Vores Ukraine kræver mere magt til parlamentet

07.06.02. Styrets partier får formandsposten i 5 udvalg

10.06.02. Belarusianization or Europeanization?

The Belarusianization camp seeks to transform Ukraine into a presidential republic along the lines of the majority of CIS states by implementing the internationally unrecognized results of the April 2000 referendum. During the March parliamentary elections the use of "administrative resources" proved impossible in Lviv, while it was completely successful in Donetsk Oblast, which has been redefined as Ukraine's "Belarus" and is the only oblast where For a United Ukraine finished first. In Donetsk, voters were transported on "ecological picnics" to different election districts with absentee ballots in order to swing votes in United Ukraine's favor, while hired thugs from organized-crime groups threatened election officials, the Committee of Voters NGO, and observers.

The Belarusianization United Ukraine camp is composed of conservatives who are attempting to hold the country back without providing any direction in domestic and foreign affairs. United Ukraine was soundly defeated in the elections, finishing third with only 11.98 percent in the half of seats elected proportionately. But by blatantly using "administrative resources" in single-mandate constituencies, United Ukraine was able to greatly better this result. Regional governors were replaced for failing to ensure the necessary United Ukraine vote in Lviv, Vinnytsya, and Sumy, three oblasts that Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine won. The original 120 United Ukraine deputies prior to the opening of the Verkhovna Rada last week was expanded to become the majority Rada faction with 177 deputies through blackmail. Deputies were summoned to the Prosecutor-General's Office and "discreetly warned that they have dossiers on all deputies." In condemning such tactics, Our Ukraine has said it believes this is evidence that "Ukraine is being transformed into a totalitarian state."

Although the Belarusianization camp lacks distinguishing ideological features, its members are nevertheless very Soviet in their political culture. United Ukraine has never ruled out cooperation with the Communist Party (KPU), as was demonstrated by the coalition of pro-presidential parties and the KPU against the Yushchenko government in April 2001. The manner in which both President Leonid Kuchma and United Ukraine have cynically attempted to change the election results in the Verkhovna Rada is another example of their Soviet-style contempt for the will of voters. Forcing the population to demonstrate in support of the authorities is another revival of Soviet political culture, as evidenced on 1 May when 300,000 people were constrained to show their support for President Kuchma and United Ukraine in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhya.

The creation of a mega United Ukraine faction is linked to the attempt to have Volodymyr Lytvyn, the head of the presidential administration and United Ukraine, elected as Rada chairman followed by the installation of the disgraced former head of the Internal Affairs Ministry, Yuriy Kravchenko, to replace him as head of the presidential administration. These three steps are aimed at enabling Kuchma to leave office with immunity in 2004.

Lytvyn's leadership of United Ukraine in the elections and his activities since then in the Verkhovna Rada have led many deputies to view him as an "odious," "suspicious," and "narrow-minded" figure, the newspaper "Zerkalo nedeli/Dzerkalo tyzhnya" observed. "A force that secured 11 percent in the elections does not have the moral right to vie for the leading post in parliament," Our Ukraine leader Yushchenko argued.

If Lytvyn becomes Rada chairman, United Ukraine will simply disintegrate more quickly than it is otherwise expected to do. In the 1998-2002 Verkhovna Rada, the first attempt at creating a "party of power" through the Peoples Democratic Party (NDP) failed. The NDP began with 89 deputies and ended four years later with 14, the minimum required to register a faction. United Ukraine is likely to divide into four of its five constituent parties -- the Party of Regions (60), NDP (58), Labor Ukraine (35), and Agrarians (27), with the remainder as "independents."

The executive and United Ukraine are, however, faced with an increasingly restless business and political elite who believe that Kuchma is holding the country back domestically and internationally. As the 2004 presidential election campaign begins next year, many will desert United Ukraine knowing that this is Kuchma's last term. In a highly critical article last week in "Den," former President Leonid Kravchuk, a leading member of the oligarchic Social Democratic Party Ukraine-united (SDPU-o), argued that Ukraine lacks any domestic or foreign policies and strategic aims and that it is high time the parliament adopted clear policies leading to integration into Europe. According to Kravchuk's argument, Ukraine's pro-European orientation currently exists only "on paper."

Support for Europeanization is led by Our Ukraine, which former Rada Chairman Ivan Plyushch, who has deserted the NDP, sees as the kernel of a future union of patriotic, democratic forces drawn from 33 parties. Our Ukraine has proposed the most far-reaching radical changes as the basis for Ukraine's Europeanization as a "transitional consensus" to the 2004 presidential elections. Titled "On Joint Actions of the Fourth Supreme Rada of Ukraine," it seeks to transform Ukraine from a country where politics are conducted in a Soviet, nontransparent fashion, to one in the open. The Verkhovna Rada would define Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy strategy that the executive would merely manage with purely representational functions. Administrative reform would reduce the number of oblasts and end state (executive) administrations in Kyiv and Sevastopol (for the proposals in full, see http://www.razom.org.ua/news/?news_id=4968 and 4971).

The executive would no longer be able to play off factions in the struggle over Verkhovna Rada positions and other institutions where the Rada allocated members, as these positions would be divided fairly between those factions who signed the agreement. Ukraine would move to a full proportional system of voting so that the composition of the Rada reflected the election result. Not surprisingly after the antics of United Ukraine, all other factions support this change, which would be followed by new laws prohibiting the use of "administrative resources." Local and parliamentary elections would be held at different times, the Rada would have the exclusive authority to form the Central Election Commission, and opposition groups would be guaranteed equal access to the media.

Other envisaged changes would make the Verkhovna Rada responsible for forming a coalition government and for its performance. The Tax Administration and State Customs Committee, hitherto under the executive and a source of both corrupt revenue and intimidation of the opposition, would be brought under the government. (After the elections, "corruption" charges against oppositionist Yuliya Tymoshenko and her husband, imprisoned since August 2000, were dropped.) Regional governors would be elected, rather than being appointed by the executive, a move welcomed by most governors. The Verkhovna Rada would be able to appoint and discharge the chairman of the Security Service and the prosecutor-general. The legal status of the president would be defined with his powers greatly reduced, especially vis-a-vis the government. The most controversial proposal is to establish procedures for impeachment of the president.

These proposals, "Zerkalo nedeli/Dzerkalo tyzhnya" believes, "should lead to the country's internal transition to European values and processes." They will nevertheless be opposed by those seeking to export the Belarusian experiment in Donetsk to the rest of Ukraine.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dr. Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto.
 

10.06.02. Kompromis omkring fordelingen af udvalg i parlamentet

1. Retsudvalget: formand - Vasyl Onopenko (Julia Tymoshenkos blok), 1. næstformand - Mykola Onisjtjuk (Vores Ukraine);
2. Udvalget for statsbygning og lokalt selvstyre: formand - Anatolij Matvijenko (Julia Tymoshenkos blok), 1. næstformand - Viktor Slauta (Jedyna Ukrajina);
3. Social-og arbejdsudvalget: formand - Vasyl Khara (Kommunistpartiet), 1. næstformand - Vjatjeslav Kyrylenko (Vores Ukraine);
4. Udvalget for sundhed, kvinder og børn: formand - Mykola Polisjtjuk (Vores Ukraine), 1. næstformand - Mykhajlo Loboda (Kommunistpartiet);
5. Udvalget for ungdom, idræt, sport og turisme: formand - Kateryna Samojlyk (Kommunistpartiet), 1. næstformand - Ravil Safiullin (Jedyna Ukrajina);
6. Videnskabs-og uddannelsesudvalget: formand - Stanislav Nikolajenko (Socialistpartiet), 1. næstformand - Ihor Jukhnovskyj (Vores Ukraine);
7. Kultur- og åndelighedsudvalget: formand - Les Tanjuk (Vores Ukraine), 1. næstformand - Pavlo Movtjan (Vores Ukraine);
8. Udvalg for økonomisk politik, styringen af folkehusholdningen, ejendom og investeringer: formand - Stanislav Hurenko (Kommunistpartiet), 1. næstformand - Volodymyr Demjokhin (Jedyna Ukrajina);
9. Budgetudvalget: formand - Petro Poroshenko (Vores Ukraine), 1. næstformænd: Valerij Konovaljuk og Ljudmyla Suprun (begge Jedyna Ukrajina);
10. Udvalget for finanser og bankvirksomhed: formand - Serhij Burjak (Jedyna Ukrajina), 1. næstformænd: Viktor Kapustin (Vores Ukraine) og Vasyl Tsushko (Socialistpartiet);
11. Industri- og erhvervsudvalget: formand - Jurij Jekhanurov (Vores Ukraine), 1. næstformand - Vadym Hurov (Jedyna Ukrajina);
12. Energi-, brændsels-, atompolitik-, og atomsikkerhedsudvalget: formand - Andrij Kljujev (Jedyna Ukrajina), 1. næstformand - Mykola Martynenko (Vores Ukraine);
13. Byggeri-, transport- og kommunikationsudvalget: formand - Valerij Pustovojtenko (Jedyna Ukrajina), 1. næstformænd - Anatolij Ljovin (SDPU o) og Stanyslav Dovhyj (Jedyna Ukrajina);
14. Udvalget for landbrugspolitik og jordspørgsmål: formand - Ivan Tomytj (Vores Ukraine), 1. næstformand - Vasyl Kalyntjuk (Jedyna Ukrajina);
15. Udenrigsudvalget: formand - Dmytro Tabatjnyk (Jedyna Ukrajina), 1. næstformand - Oleh Hratjov (Kommunistpartiet);
16. Udvalget for miljø, naturudnyttelse og likvideringen af følgerne af Tjornobyl-katastrofen: formand - Ivan Rizak (SDPU o), 1. næstformand - Ivan Zajats (Vores Ukraine);
17. Udvalget for den lovgivningsmæssige sikring af ordensmagten: formand - Volodymyr Mojsyk (Vores Ukraine), 1. næstformand - Oleksandr Bandurka (Jedyna Ukrajina);
18. Udvalget til bekæmpelse af den organiserede kriminalitet og korruption: formand - Volodymr Stretovytj (Vores Ukraine), 1. næstformand - Ivan Vernidubov (Jedyna Ukrajina);
19. Det nationale sikkerheds- og forsvarsudvalg: formand - Georgij Krjutjkov (Kommunistpartiet), 1. næstformand - Borys Andresiuk (SDPU o);
20. Udvalget for forretningsorden, de deputeredes etik og organiseringen af Verkhovna Radas arbejde: formand - Valentyn Matvejev (Kommunistpartiet), 1. næstformænd - Vasyl Havryljuk (Jedyna Ukrajina) og Serhij Sas (Julia Tymoshenkos blok);
21. Udvalget for ytrings- og informationsfrihed: formand - Mykola Tomenko (Vores Ukraine), 1. næstformand - Serhij Pravdenko (Julia Tymoshenkos blok);
22. Udvalget for menneskerettigheder, nationale mindretal og interetniske relationer: formand - Hennadij Udovenko (Vores Ukraine), 1. næstformand Mykola Shulha (Kommunistpartiet);
23. Udvalget for pensionister, veteraner og vanføre: formand - Petro Tsybenko (Kommunistpartiet), 1. næstformand - Valerij Aljoshin (Vores Ukraine);
24. Udvalget for europæisk integration: formand - Borys Tarasiuk (Vores Ukraine), 1. næstformand - Oleh Zarubinskyj (Jedyna Ukrajina);
25. Valentyna Semenjuk (Socialistpartiet) er valgt til formand for den særlige kommission for kontrol med privatiseringen, mens Ljudmyla Kyrytjenko (Jedyna Ukrajina) er næstformand;
Valentyn Zajtjuk (Jedyna Ukrajina) er valgt til formand for Verkhovna Radas apparat.

Kilde: UP, 7.6.02.
 

10.06.02. Kutjma og Putin underskriver gasaftale

11.06.02. Ukraine vil have status af markedsøkonomi

11.06.02. Ukraine får omlagt halvdelen af sin gæld til USA

THIS COUNTRY CANNOT LIVE ACCORDING TO THE FORMULA, FULL AHEAD, STEER ASTERN. THERE HAS TO BE A STRAIGHT ANSWER TO THE STRAIGHT QUESTION: ARE WE WITH OR UNDER RUSSIA?

By Leonid Kravchuk, Peoples Deputy, Former President of Ukraine

The fourth parliament of independent Ukraine is at work. Already the first plenary sessions are evidence that political rather than legislative issues come first, and that there are more such problems than effective and realistic solutions.

Verkhovna Rada has no operating strategy, living according to the principle that we hear what the cabinet has to offer, and fill the intermissions (often longer than deliberations) with political brawling. There are a number of reasons for all this, the main one being the absence of a national concept of the underlying principles of our domestic and foreign policies. The parliament has since 1993 practically never shown a comprehensive approach to the strategic fundamentals of those policies, just as it has never defined this country’s foreign policy course. Rather than cope with these tasks (as a constitutional obligation and authority vested in parliament), the deputies engage in fruitless discussions, trying to determine who has to do the job, the parliament or president. As a result, Ukraine does not have any clearly formulated and readily available domestic or foreign policy principles allowing for world development forecasts.

At present, Ukraine remains undefined (e.g., incomplete political formulas) with regard to many global problems and this without doubt seriously damages the national interests.

Consider several examples.

We hear from various politicians (depending on the situation) that Ukraine is a neutral country outside any blocs. But please tell me what document is there to this effect? Has Verkhovna Rada passed a single resolution to this effect? No, it has not. Is this Ukrainian stand recognized by the international community? No, it is not. If so, what makes them make such statements?

Likewise, our stand toward the CIS remains to be clearly formulated. Ukraine did not sign the CIS Charter, just as the president did not sign the Minsk Convention on the CIS interparliamentary assembly of May 26, 1995. Nor is Ukraine a member of the CIS defense alliance, even though we are a member of the CIS parliamentary assembly (peremptorily pushed through by a parliament resolution), sign military agreements with Russia, pay CIS membership fees, and so on. Where is the logic here? How can this extremely peculiar Ukrainian stand be understood in the East and West? I think that even our domestic politicians are hard put to understand it. Hence, the first and foremost task of the fourth Ukrainian parliament (in keeping with Article 85 of the Constitution of Ukraine and allowing for the eleven years of experience in building an independent state, new world realities, and changes in the alignment of forces) is to adopt its domestic and foreign policy principles. This document must specify Ukraine’s strategic positions with regard to the market economy (all market economy components), CIS, European structures, and Euro-Atlantic ones. We must clearly define our status: Who are we? A non-bloc neutral country or one aspiring for NATO membership?

This can be defined as a strategic political course, as this country’s prospects for decades of well-planned consistent work by all state agencies, parties, and political organizations. NATO is concerned with defense and security. How can a country truly participate in all-European security arrangements without being a NATO member?

It is time we stopped waffling between East and West, because this moving to and fro will get us nowhere. This country cannot live according to the formula, full ahead, steer astern. If we want to be respected, we must make our stand perfectly clear, we must make the European choice. We must announce that we are determined to join all the European structures, forward the appropriate applications, and adopt an action plan to carry out this historic task.

It is important to emphasize that for the past several years the dynamics of relations with certain partners, particularly in the West, has been declining, as has our rate of approach to the European standards of state building, and as has the integration process. For the most part our stated European choice, slow, but sure movement toward Europe remains on paper. Practical steps in that direction have been replaced by the ambiguous notion of some multivector policy, which mainly implies the equivalence of Ukrainian relationships in the international arena, but actually means running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.

In short, this approach is nothing more than an attempt in the realm of official foreign policy to reconcile two hostile pro-Russian and pro-European camps within the Ukrainian political elite. In reality, such a multivector policy means an equivocal foreign policy, an ambiguous Ukrainian geostrategy, indefinite maneuvering on the continent and elsewhere in the world.

Under the circumstances, Ukraine cannot but fall under some external influence or another, depending on the situation. Yet a policy of balancing between the East and West cannot be an active foreign policy course. It is a time-serving policy with an eye to the world situation but often turning a blind eye to the national interests.

An active foreign strategy means that Ukraine takes a stand on all the key issues of world politics and conducts its own policy concerning neighboring countries; it means taking a stand in time on any local or world military and/or political crisis, and being able to implement this stand.

Thus, as an independent state, Ukraine must define its position along the said lines. There is a fierce struggle among the political parties and in the public domain, between those supporting the Western and Northeast vectors. Determining Ukraine’s national interest here is its strategic choice. Making this decision will determine Ukraine’s destiny for many years. We must finally and unhesitatingly set a political course conforming to our national political interests.

There has been lively debate of late concerning Ukraine’s membership of the Eurasian Economic Community and the to Europe-with-Russia doctrine. Some have even built a Moscow-Brussels-Kyiv bridge. I think this philosophy should be discarded once and for all. Ukraine has been an independent state for over a decade; it cannot be someone else’s playground or training ground. Also, the Europe-with-Russia formula is vague, leaving far more questions than answers.

There are practically no political forces in Ukraine opposing mutually advantageous and pragmatic relations with Russia. On the other hand, the objective need to uphold Ukrainian-Russian cooperation is impeded by the Russian political elite’s claim to hegemony in the post-Soviet region. Contrary to the Russian leadership’s assurances that they allow for the CIS partners’ interests in their foreign policy, particularly those of Ukraine, far from all in Moscow realize the necessity of equal relations with Kyiv. We must give a straight answer to the straight question: Are we with or under Russia? If we are with Russia as an equal partner, this can only be welcomed, for it serves the interests of both nations.

It is a matter of choice, of designating strategic targets. Where are we? In Europe or in Asia? Who is there to say no to trade exchanges with Russia if we have something to sell? Do such exchanges and economic relations necessarily imply political relations? Is it an alliance with Russia or a Eurasian economic one?

Should economic relationships and integration be made dependent on political loyalty and various kinds of alliances, this trend would be of little use to us. I do believe that President Putin’s pragmatic approach will allow Russia and Ukraine to construct their relationship in keeping with international standards.

The European choice does not mean folding up economic, cultural, and political relationships with Russia and the other CIS states. These relations are warranted by economic and political expedience, by the historical past and current realities of both peoples. However, I am convinced that Ukraine and Russia must also think of the future, scientific and technological progress, civilized and democratic living standards. We all know that this standard exists in the West. In other words, setting a foreign policy course means choosing the future for the nation.

The European choice does not mean acting contrary to Russian interests, unless Russia takes a stand against Europe and for a special way of development. Russia has made its European choice. There are nuances, of course, but they are not crucial. Therefore, we must not falter in defending our interests in a civilized manner just because Moscow knits its brow, for if we do we might well come up empty-handed.

As for the West, the most Ukraine can expect to achieve at this stage is gradual integration into West European structures. Such is the current reality, and we must reckon with it. However, this does not mean dim prospects. Ukraine’s future is its European choice. This formula must be superimposed on the action plans of Verkhovna Rada, the president, and government. In the absence of such plans and of foreign and domestic political principles, with foreign political vectors constantly shifting, it makes no sense to discuss our foreign policy course or expect understanding from without. In this situation it is not worth reducing Ukraine’s involvement in the world process to choosing between Russian and Western orientations. In both cases it is necessary first to adequately develop our domestic potential, upholding equal relationships with other countries, based on mutual corporative interests rather than the need to support one side or another.

We must discard the thesis that Europe is waiting for us. No one waits for the weak. No one waits for those who have no sense of self.

Naturally, we must enter Europe strong and economically advanced, which means that the southeast foreign political sector is quite promising in that it contains a sizable market for Ukrainian goods, progressive technologies, and investment; here we can earn enough to buy ourselves a good dinner jacket to feel confident at the European party.

Characteristically, the Ukrainian political community lacks unity and agreement on foreign policy priorities. Practically all political parties formally support Ukraine’s integration into the European and world communities, emphasizing that Ukraine’s national interests are the underlying principle of shaping and implementing its foreign policy.

Simultaneously, none of these parties has it own concept of the national interest and Ukraine’s place and role in the international arena, as evidenced ever so clearly by the party programs concerning NATO and EU membership.

Their stands range from the Communist vociferous condemnation of NATO to the People’s Movement (Rukh) of Ukraine’s demand that Ukraine immediately apply for membership. In fact, even parties of the same election bloc do not show a common stand on the issue.

Unless we all set ourselves the single task of building a strong economy and advanced national culture meeting the European standard, unless we proceed to build all this and secure a political system capable of guiding this society along the democratic road, it is no use to discuss Ukraine’s place in Europe and the rest of the world.

European and Euro-Atlantic integration must be approached as a single package including Ukraine’s involvement in regional, international political, economic, financial, and other organizations and bodies, such as the OSCE, Council of Europe, and European Union. As for the latter, it is clear that there are certain distinctions and specifics on the road to EU and NATO integration.

Within this context, Ukraine must honor its commitments and bring its legislation into conformity with Council of Europe norms and standards as quickly as possible, speeding up its democratic and socioeconomic reforms in all spheres, further integrating the Ukrainian economy into the European and world economic frameworks, securing freedom of expression along with other rights and freedoms for Ukraine’s citizens..

To solve these problems in a timely fashion, it is worth studying the possibility of another agreement at the July Ukrainian-EU summit in Copenhagen, so as to raise the existing accords on associate EU membership. Passively waiting for an EU signal could have a negative effect on the very political idea of Ukraine’s European integration as one of the most important factors of Ukrainian social consolidation.

Time is knocking on the door. Ukraine cannot stand another decade of political waffling. Rather than an independent, prosperous, and democratic country, we will become subordinate to the interests of other states, and they will have corresponding attitudes toward us. We will then have not what we have but what we deserve.
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May 21 2002 «The Day» In using our publications, reference to The Day is mandatory. © The Day
 

'Nationalism in Ukraine. Towards a New theoretical and Comparative Framework', Journal of Political Ideologies, vol.7, no.2 (June 2002), pp.133-162.

Nationalism is a phenomenon that has been with us since at least the late eighteenth century; some scholars would argue that it pre-dates the modern era of industrialisation and urbanisation. Nevertheless, nationalism (and nation) continue to be misused or used in a loose manner by scholars. Barrington defines the misuse of these terms as, used in a way that is completely outside how the term is used by nationalism scholars. A loose use, on the other hand, is one in which the author has captured only part of the concept or has stretched the meaning of the term to an extreme degree. As Motyl points out, The answer to the question "what is nationalism" depends on the definition and, more substantially, on the definer". How it is used and defined is therefore often more a reflection of the ideological and subjective preferences of the scholars themselves than any commonly understood definition of nationalism?. The misuse and loose use of these terms is commonplace in both a narrow and negative manner within contemporary Ukrainian studies. Studies of nationalism in Ukraine are usually area studies accounts and the discussion of nationalism? is therefore usually not placed within a theoretical or comparative perspective.

The assumption that the West is devoid of nationalism while nationalism is common in the East where it has to be by definition bad still has tremendous influence among scholars. This view has its roots in the work of Kohn who contrasted good Western civic with bad Eastern ethnic nationalisms. Since the 1930s-1940s and the rise and fall of Nazism in Germany, nationalism has often been defined – as it was by Soviet ideology and still is today in most writing on Ukraine – as extreme, right-wing and ethnic. Nationalism in the West, in contrast, either is assumed not to exist or is described by the more acceptable form, patriotism. This traditional approach fails to deal adequately with two questions. Firstly, because the nation-state is the forum for electoral politics, the left too aspires to represent the nation. Nationalism also, frames the practice of political democracy. Billig's "banal nationalism" is an everyday nationalism promoted by the state and independent institutions (such as the media) in Western nation-states. Nationalism therefore exists in a Western mature democracy (as in a young nation-state such as Ukraine) through discourse of the national interest, defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity and factors unique to the population that make them different to outsiders.

Secondly, it assumes that a civic nation-state has no ethno-cultural defining attributes. No nation-state exists which does not in some shape or form appeal to, emotional, historical or cultural links. This problem stems from the lack of attention paid to nation building processes by political theorists and scholars of democratisation in their study of transition in former authoritarian states.

This article seeks to critically survey the narrow use of nationalism within contemporary Ukrainian studies and to develop a new framework for understanding this concept within the Ukrainian context by broadening its undestanding. The article is divided into three sections. The first discusses nationalism and nationalism within Ukraine within a theoretical and comparative perspective. The second critically surveys the misuse and loose use of nationalism within contemporary Ukrainian studies. The third section outlines a new framework for understanding nationalism within post-Soviet Ukraine.

View the paper in an Adobe Acrobat format:
Nationalism in Ukraine. Towards a New theoretical and Comparative Framework' - Taras Kuzio
http://www.niagara.com/~blacksea/kuzio.pdf
 

13.06.02. Når det regner på Putin, drypper det på Kutjma

13.06.02. Viktor Medvedtjuk udnævnt til Kutjmas stabchef

14.06.02. Medvedtjuk skal stække aspiranter til præsidentembedet

14.06.02. Er Medvedtjuk tiltænkt rollen som Kutjmas kronprins?