01.10.02. The Wall Street Journal om Kutjma og våbensalget

    Malev: "Irak har rettet henvendelse til os, de har fundet frem til os via vores jordanske mellemmand vedrørende indkøb af fire "Koltjuga". De har lagt ud med at tilbyde 100 mill. dollars for det med det samme.
    Kutjma: Sørg bare for at den jordaner ikke taler for meget. Godt."

    Kyiv, Ukraine, den 10. juli 2000

Med sådanne venner som ukrainerne, kan mange amerikanske skatteydere kun undre sig over, hvad vi overhovedet behøver fjender for? Det fremgår af den ovennævnte udskrift af samtalen, at Ukraines præsident, Leonid Kutjma, der er modtager af en af de største amerikanske hjælpepakker, har godkendt salget af de moderne radarstation til Irak.
    USAs udenrigsministerium erklærer, at dette uddrag af en båndet samtale mellem hr. Kutjma og lederen af det ukrainske agentur for våbeneksport Valerij Malev, som omkom i en trafikulykke i foråret, er "autentisk"; båndoptagelsen blev lavet hemmeligt, og ført ud af landet af Ukraines præsidents tidligere personlige livvagt. Regeringsembedsmænd i USA siger endvidere, at der er "visse tegn på", at systemet "Koltjuga", som er i stand til at spore kampfly uden selv at blive afsløret, er blevet stillet op i Irak, selvom man ikke kan hævde det med sikkerhed.
    Enhver form for salg er en overtrædelse af den internationale embargo mod våbenleverancer til Irak, som De forenede Nationer har indført. Denne moderne radarstation udgør - hvis den virkelig er blevet stillet op dernede - en alvorlig trussel mod amerikanske og brittiske piloter, som næsten hver eneste dag patruljerer i flyveforbudszonen over Irak, og vil blive udsat for en endnu større fare, hvis de allerede i de kommende måneder indleder kamphandlinger mod Saddam Hussein.
    Hvis hr. Hussein havde modtaget denn nye radarstation fra Nordkorea, ville det have været ret alvorligt. Men Ukraine er ikke en slyngelstat eller Amerikas modstander. Faktisk modtager Kyiv årligt hundreder af millioner dollars fra De forenede Stater, og indtil fornylig var Ukraine den tredjestørste modtager af amerikansk hjælp i verden. I løbet af 1990-erne betød de vestlige fonde og den politiske støtte en garanti for, at denne svage stat med en befolkning på 50 mill. mennesker ikke mistede sin uafhængighed og ikke gik i økonomisk opløsning.
    De nylige begivenheder er ikke blevet en belønning for alle anstrengelserne fra Vestens side. Anatolij Zlenko, Ukraines udenrigsminister, erklærede i sidste uge, at landets præsident, muligvis, havde godkendt denne aftale, men han bestred, at denne radarstation i virkeligheden var blevet sendt til Irak. Våbeninspektører fra USA og FN planlægger at få afklaret det spørgsmål. Vi hører imidlertid klager fra det officielle Washington over, at Kyiv ikke vil samarbejde i denne sag.
    De forenede Stater har ikke nogen grund til at stole på hr. Kutjma. For ikke så længe siden afviste ukrainerne, at de optagelser, som det drejer sig om, var ægte; nu hører vi, at der aldrig er blevet leveret våben. (Den tidligere offentliggjorte mængde af optagelser afslører, at Kutjma har deltaget i mordet på en oppositionel journalist for 2 år siden; noget som udløste en protestbølge i offentligheden.)
    Under alle omstændigheder har hr. Kutjma skuffet De forenede Stater gevaldigt. Præsidenten, som efter at være kommet til magten i 1994, opfordrede til radikale økonomiske reformer og styrkelsen af båndene til Vesten, kom i stedet for til at fremme udbredelsen af korruption og indlede undertrykkelsen af de politiske modstandere. Senere og efter at mistanken om salget af ukrainske våben til Irak var dukket op, indefrøs Washington det amerikanske hjælpeprogram til Ukraine til i alt 55 mill. US$ og begyndte en revision af sin politik overfor Ukraine. Ikke et eneste land, som sælger våben til Irak, kan være Vestens allierede.
    Har al hjælpen til Ukraine i så fald været en fejl? Det tror vi ikke. Til forskel fra andre tidligere sovjetiske republikker, opnåede Ukraine sin uafhængighed uden blodsudgydelser. Kyiv har givet afkald på kernevåben og har ordnet uoverensstemmelserne omkring Krim med Rusland på en fredelig måde. USA spillede i et andet tilfælde en kritisk afgørende rolle ved at indgyde Ukraine sikkerhed nok til at gå på kompromis på et tidspunkt, da mange russiske "høge" gerne ville have det strategisk vigtige land tilbage i sin fold. Og USAs ambassadør i Kyiv igennem de sidste to år, Carlos Pascual, kritiserer denne regering offentligt.
    Den seneste skandale i Ukraine er en god påmindelse om, at den vestlige flanke af det gamle russiske imperium stadig behøver amerikansk opmærksomhed. Hviderusland styres af tyranen Aleksandr Lukashenko, som Washington også mistænker for aftaler med Bagdad. Rusland, den nye forbundsfælle i kampen mod terrorismen, truer Georgien og fører en blodig krig i Tjetjenien. Af de tre østslaviske republikker er det kun Ukraine, der stræber mod at blive medlem af Den nordatlantiske Aftale (NATO) og Den europæiske Union (EU). Hvis man skal dømme udfra, hvordan Ukraine styres i dag, er der meget langt til det endnu.
    Trods det kan Vesten stadig presse Kutjma i retning af respekt for de demokratiske værdier. Oppositionen i landet er fåtallig og splittet - men den fortsætter med at presse præsidenten og hans forbundsfæller. Det er absolut sandsynligt, at hr. Kutjma gerne selv vil udpege en arvtager, som Boris Jeltsin gjorde det i Rusland. Vesten bør støtte oppositionen, som gerne vil forhindre ham i det.
    Men først og fremmest skal regeringen i Kyiv og hr. Kutjma være fuldstændig transparente i forhold til det, som de har haft med Irak. Amerikanerne har fortjent at vide, hvorvidt den amerkanske hjælp støtter en regering, som på sin side bevæbner Amerikas fjender. Hvis aftalen viser sig at være blevet lavet i strid med embargoen, så bør det internationale samfund samt hans egne vælgere drage Kutjma til ansvar.
 

02.10.02. Nyhedsbureau protesterer mod kontrol

03.10.02. Kutjma får pusterum i "Koltjuga"-sagen

04.10.02. Ukraine: An Analysis - Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research

RESEARCH UPDATE Vol. 8, No. 34/282
September 30, 2002
Copyright 2002 by UCIPR Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR)
All rights reserved

Foreword to Iraqgate

The surprise, promised by the Ukrainian opposition to President Leonid Kuchma, was delivered promptly though did not arrive from the opposition. While five dozens of activists of the opposition forces insisted on a dialogue with Kuchma in a rather unusual way -- by announcing a hunger strike in the building of his administration -- the U.S. Administration announced it had decided to suspend assistance to the Ukrainian government and was ready to start adequate action in connection of confirmed possibility that Ukraine might have been involved in supplying air defense radars to Iraq. When U.S. President Bush is preparing to launch an attack on Iraq that aims at destroying the Saddam Hussein regime, such accusations cannot go without foreign policy implications for Ukraine.

Domestic socio-political context

Naturally, Ukrainian leadership took actions to refute the charges. It was officially announced that "Ukraine is interested in the fastest open and objective investigation of groundless charges of violation of sanctions of the UN Security Council, made against it". The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine published information that Minister Anatoly Zlenko had urgently arrived to the UN headquarters in New York and stated to UN Secretary General Kofi Anan that "the international community has no grounds whatsoever to accuse Ukraine of violation of the sanctions of the UN Security Council, including on an issue as sensitive as supply of arms to Iraq". On September 27 Anatoly Zlenko also met acting head of the UN Security Council Stephan Tavrov, head of the UN Security Council in October Martin Belinga-Ebutu, head of the Committee 661 of the UN Security Council for sanctions on Iraq Ole Peter Colby, head of the UN Commission for Monitoring, Control and Inspection Hans Blicks, as well as permanent representatives of the five states -- permanent members of the UN Security Council at the UN. As the MFA site wrote, "all of them treated with understanding Ukraine's position on groundless charges made against it, of allegedly having supplied the Kolchuga radar systems to Iraq, and highly appreciated our state's readiness to cooperate with the UN Security Council and other interested parties in order to thoroughly and objectively consider the aforementioned problem and find the truth". It was also announced that "the Ukrainian party was informed that in response to its request the Security Council intends tomorrow, on September 28, to have consultations on the above issue. Secretary General of the Organization supported Kyiv's initiative for sending independent experts of the UN to Ukraine for complete and final clarification of the situation." Anatoly Zlenko also met NATO Secretary General George Robertson who was quoted earlier as stating that relations between NATO and Ukraine were going through a very difficult period and demanded "answers to very serious questions" on the matter. Meanwhile, it was impossible to limit the information to the diplomatic language only. Speaking to the Associated Press, Minister Zlenko admitted that president Kuchma could have agreed to selling the radars to Iraq, but insisted that no operation that have been violation of the UN sanctions had been done, for "it is impossible to sell arms the way it is said there" (i.e., on the tapes). At about the same time head of the Ukrainian Security Service Volodymyr Radchenko admitted in an interview to the Financial Times that there had been discussions about possible sale of the Kolchugas in 2000, and the operation had been initiated by a "high-ranking Ukrainian official", but the proposal had been rejected. That person was head of the "Ukrspetsexport" Valery Malev, who had offered the plane one week before he had been killed in a car crash. The ranks of "defenders of the international image" were joined by secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Yevhen Marchuk, whose job made it unallowable for him to be unaware of any possible action in the field that is directly related to the current charges. So far not much enthusiasm was a response of the international community to Marchuk's pledge to ensure "unprecedented openness" on the Kolchuga case, the declared readiness to demonstrate to international experts a number of tactical and technical features of the Kolchugas (though "obviously, some things will remain secret"), and the promise to name the country that had purchased the Kolchugas as well as the intermediary firm that too part in the deal.

Problems of Ukraine

The tapes, made by former presidential guard Mykola Melnychenko, that contain a recording of a conversation about possible sale of specific military equipment to Iraq, is difficult to see as new ones: they were first published in the Internet about half a year ago. However, today, when the president and his men are struggling vigorously to protect themselves from the opposition's attacks, the records have received a new significance, particularly when quoted by the U.S. Department of State. The international community, that previously knew Ukraine mainly through Chornobyl and the murder of Georgy Gongadze, received information that would suffice to make Ukraine a pariah state in its eyes. It is hardly possible that the calls of the opposition to the international community not to see the current political regime as identical to the country as a whole and not to punish the country because of Kuchma will produce the desired result. First, an ordinary American or West European can hardly imagine the depth of the growing gap between the state and the society. Hence, in their understanding the people that have elected such a government and have so far not resisted its actions in an active and organized manner also deserves sanctions. By the way, according to a recent opinion poll conducted by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies (the Razumkov Center), 57 percent of their respondents are prepared to live in a totalitarian state that has high standards of living, while only 14.8 percent agree to live in a democracy with lower standards of living. Ukraine's problems have been accumulating for a long time. They are a mixture of various factors that include the crisis of confidence in the government at all levels, particularly to the top leadership, as well as the lack of adequate societal and official reaction to the 2000 "tapegate", the lack of political will on the part of the government to make necessary conclusions, and pathological inability (or fear) to tell the truth. Vigorous denial of charges, not supported by facts and clear answers to definite questions, give reasons for new suspicion and accusations. President Kuchma, by the way, never said recently that his conversation with Malev, proved by American experts to be true and currently used as the main supporting fact for the accusations against Ukraine -- is not true. But it has also never been said what WAS true -- and it is unlikely that it will ever become known.

Problems of the U.S. and the international context in "peaceful time"

Ukraine has not been something of much interest to the contemporary political Washington D.C. Currently -- and there is no much effort to hide that -- there is a chance to make some "educational whipping" so that to show possible implications to other potential offenders of democratic values. Moreover, the "war on terrorism" is currently probably the best way to secure massive public support for actions of the Bush administration. It looks like having pledged a "fast victorious war" on terrorism, the U.S. administration have passed the point at which it could slow down or even U-turn, given the lack of substantial international support for the plans of the strike on Saddam. The international response to the accusations against Ukraine came almost immediately. A couple of days later one of the best-informed about the situation in Ukraine American experts, former Director for Ukraine at the U.S. national Security Council John Tedsrom told Radio Liberty that the U.S. administration had decided that at the time it was practically impossible to cooperate with president Kuchma, for Kuchma had not only done something wrong, but also lied about it. The next day, speaking at a press conference in Kyiv, U.S. Ambassador Carlos Pascual confirmed that the FBI experts had concluded that the fragment of Melnychenko's tape with the dialogue about the Kolchugas was genuine, but clearly stated (and de facto refuted the words said earlier by his deputy) that at present the United States do not have data that would prove the transfer of the Kolchugas by Ukraine to Iraq. Diplomatically noting that the USA welcome Ukraine's efforts aiming at thorough investigation of this case, he added there was a need to form a relevant body within the UN that would act as a framework for an effective investigation. No details have been given as to what sort of structure was meant and what the results of such an "effective investigation" could be. Intergovernmental organizations and alliances also are not inclined to ignore the problem. Direct questions are supposed to be asked at the forthcoming meeting of the State Secretaries of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EC troika in Kyiv on October 11. According to the EC spokesperson, quoted by the Deutche Welle, the U.S.'s statement about possible sale of arms by Ukraine to Iraq has not changed the position of the European Commission to Ukraine. On November 5 the issue will be discussed again at the EU-Ukraine summit in Copenhagen. Meanwhile, Secretary General of the Council of Europe Walter Schwimmer announced that although till then the Council of Europe had not received evidence of Ukraine's violation of sanctions against Iraq, if the charges are proved as true the Council of Europe "will have to take that into account in relations with Ukraine", as "the principles of the Council of Europe are the same as the principles of the EU". It is worth noting the reaction of Polish president Aleksandr Kwasniewski, a long-time special intermediary in Kuchma's relations with the West. At a recent meeting of Defense Ministers of NATO member states he publicly stated Poland's support for the U.S. policy towards possible connections between the Ukrainian leadership and Saddam Hussein, and readiness to review Poland's policy towards Ukraine. Hence, Ukraine's hopes that Poland will be its lobbyist for deepening relations with NATO at the Prague summit, vanish. The Polish-Ukrainian "strategic partnership" that has suffered serious tests recently that have caused complaints and offence in certain Polish circles, to a large extent, depend to support for that partnership by the USA. Russia's silence is also noteworthy -- particularly compared to rather agitated discussion in Ukraine of possible support for president Kuchma that Russia can promise in exchange for Ukraine's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union, signing an agreement about forming the consortium for management of Ukraine's gas transportation system, or extending the term of deployment of the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine. This "quiet" policy of Russia suggests, on the one hand, that it is not going to quarrel with the United States because of Ukraine and that it is aware of its own opportunity to benefit from the situation. At the height of the "tapegate-1" the meeting of Russian president Vladimir Putin and president Leonid Kuchma in Dnipropetrovsk in February 2001 resulted, among other things, in limitation of Ukraine foreign economic freedom. Nowadays, during the even deeper political crisis, Kuchma and Putin are going to meet in Zaporizhya -- officially, to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the famous DniproGES power generating plant. One may only guess what the specific consequences of that meeting will be.

Yugoslav Scenario for Ukraine

In 2000-2001, the situation in Ukraine was often compared to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, when the West's active support helped the substitution of hideous Milosevic with little-known opposition. Then a "Yugoslav scenario" for Ukraine was seen as impossible for Ukraine -- not lastly because the opposition in Ukraine failed to demonstrate that it was united, to produced a single leader, popular enough in the "masses", to show a program of change and commitment to taking the power and responsibility that goes with it. This time, notwithstanding some significant change in the quality of the Ukrainian opposition, domestic conditions for a "Yugoslav scenario" are -- so far -- also missing. However, international circumstances seem to present an opportunity too tempting to miss. A couple of days ago the Ukrainska Pravda wrote about "invitation of Yushchenko incognito to Warsaw", which, "at the background of statements of spokesman of the State Department <S> about "additional proof of Ukraine's involvement in supplying arms to Iraq", repeated in Kyiv by deputy to the U.S. Ambassador <S> is an open evidence [that] the West wants to talk to Ukraine, but without Kuchma". A "Yugoslav scenario" was also mentioned. The analytical weekly "Zerkalo Nedeli" also conveyed a message to its intellectual-elitist audience: "Washington is trying to clearly demonstrate that it differentiates for itself [it] attitude to the President of Ukraine and Ukraine as a country" (Zerkalo Nedeli, #37, September 28, 2002). This opinion is supported by the fact that although the U.S. assistance for the Ukrainian government has been suspended, other aid programs -- for instance, those aiming at support of civil society - have been kept. Yet, there is no guarantee that this differentiation will last forever and will be made by others. There is a very strong chance that isolation of president Kuchma will transform into isolation of Ukraine as a "pariah state", at least at the level of public opinion abroad.

Possible consequences for Ukraine

The U.S. Administration will be inclined to be satisfied with what it gathers through the "unprecedented openness", promised by Yevhen Marchuk, only as long as it corresponds with the general plan of developments in which Ukraine, apparently, is expected to play a role of example to other potential abusers. Although so far there is no reason to expect officially imposed international sanctions on Ukraine, the cold de facto attitude, if not international isolation, of its leadership seems to be a rather realistic prospect. The growing international scandal has an important domestic dimension. The timing of announcement by the U.S. Department of State that the tapes containing the "Kolchuga dialogue" are genuine, the fact that the recognition came now, during the actions of the anti- Kuchma opposition, not only makes the step rather controversial but also opens the chance for the radical part of the anti-Kuchma opposition (as well as, indirectly, for other interested groups, political holdings and "clans") to use it for their political purposes. Those who argue that the American accusations not just coincided in time with the actions of the opposition, but were specially made to strengthen its actions and shake the chair under president Kuchma tend to exaggerate the influence and prominence of the Ukrainian opposition as well as the significance of Ukraine as a whole for the United States. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian president did give the U.S. Administration a good chance to demonstrate the matter of principle and punish a suspected abuser and his country, if not for the violation itself, then for explicit readiness to commit it. True, in a democratic state a politician whose disreputable intentions, even not transformed into practice, become known to public, would hardly remain in his position for so long. Noteworthy, it is the first time that the United States accuse Kuchma exactly for giving approval to illegal actions of his subordinates. Notwithstanding the controversy of the situation, uncertainty of legal and moral aspects of using the taped conversations of Ukrainian top officials as a proof, the scandal that is likely to escalate endangers gains of Ukrainian diplomacy and civil society organizations in the field of promoting the idea of Ukraine's Euro- Atlantic integration. Here are a few most likely consequences of the scandal, not matter what its immediate outcome will be. First, the NATO Prague summit. Unless the international controllers officially clear Ukraine of the accusations before the summit, the presence of the Ukrainian president at the summit in any capacity will look inadequate. Ukraine has been officially invited to participate, and it is unlikely that there will be efforts to disinvite her -- for which agreement of the 19 member states would be needed. Another thing is what kind of the involvement of the Ukrainian delegation that would be, what kind of meetings the president of Ukraine will have, etc. Second, Ukraine may face, at least for a certain period of time, unfavorable trade regimes that are much tougher than the anti-dumping investigations, CD disputes or debates about the intellectual property rights. Third, Ukraine's dependence on Russia will grow. While Putin is unlikely to engage in overt confrontation with The U.S. over Kuchma, he is likely to make an effort to ensure as much control over Kyiv as possible. Therefore, there is a growing challenge of sustainable dependence of the Ukrainian establishment on Russia in foreign as well as domestic issues. Forth, in order to restore Ukraine's image at least to the condition of it before the "Iraqgate" not only substantial effort will be needed, but also real reforms, not the usual "face-lifting". It will also be critical to overcome the present-day "personalization of politics". Presently Ukraine resembles a sick man that needs a surgery, as traditional pills and potions have failed to help. It is critical, though, that the "surgery" is done professional, with proper instrument, and based on the fundamental principle: "do not harm".
 

04.10.02. Journalister protesterer mod voksende censur

1) Der eksisterer en politisk censur i Ukraine, hvis midler er censurering efter et direktiv eller samtykke fra styrets side af programmer i Tv og radio, artikler i pressen, alskens ulovlige former for pres mod journalister og enkelte massemedier, som forsøger at bringe en objektiv belysning af landets samfunds-politiske liv.
2) Den politiske censur er en nedvurdering af journalisterne og Ukraines folk.
3) Den politiske censur er retsstridig: ved at iværksætte politisk censur forsøger styret at begrænse borgernes forfatningssikrede ret til ytringsfrihed, som er fastslået i Ukraines forfatning og love, internationale lovtekster, som Ukraine har ratificeret og som dermed har retskraft på dets territorium. Det er værd af understrege, at retten til ytringsfrihed er umistelig for de ukrainske borgere. Således foregår der en grov overtrædelse af et af de vigtigste grundlæggende principper af en af de vigtigste grundprincipper i Ukraines forfatning. Det forhold, at ingen endnu er blevet draget til ansvar for oprørende eksempler på politisk censur i Ukraine, anser vi for at være en hån mod loven og mod de ukrainske borgeres rettigheder.
4) Vi, Ukraines journalister, er solidariske med vores kollegaers mostand og bifalder tendensen til, at journalisterne går over til kollektive solidariske handlinger, efterhånden som den politiske censur i Ukraine styrkes.
5) Vi, Ukraines journalister, erklærer os rede til en landsdækkende strejke. Der nedsættes en Initiativgruppe med henblik på forberedelsen af strejken og andre solidariske handlinger fra journalisternes side til støtte for deres kollegaer.
6) Vi, Ukraines journalister, vil med alle nødvendige midler støtte vores kollegaer, som er blevet fyret eller bliver forfulgt i forbindelse med deres forsøg på at belyse begivenhederne på en objektiv måde.

Den 3. oktober 2002

Underskrevet af i alt 61 journalister fra et bredt spektrum indenfor de trykte og de elektroniske medier i Ukraine.
 

07.10.02. Ukrainian journalists join ranks against political pressure and censorship

On October 3, participants of the round table Political censorship in Ukraine have signed the Manifesto of Ukraine Journalists on Political Censorship.

Organizers of the round table announced their intention to convene a work group on Saturday, at noon, at the Budynok Kino, to work on specific proposals regarding forms and methods of journalists' counteraction to political pressure.

Only journalists and representatives of non-government organizations who intend to discuss these actions in person are invited to the meeting. Either politicians or journalists just to highlight the meeting are not invited. The meeting will be of purely working nature and not for publicity.

Manifesto of Ukraine journalists on political censorship

We, the journalists of Ukraine, fully realizing the unique role of a truthful word for development and consolidation of our Motherland, realizing our personal responsibility as journalists for giving unbiased information, understanding that fear will impede some of our colleagues to sign the Manifesto, proclaim:

Political censorship does exist in Ukraine and it is realized through orders or upon consent of the Power in regard to television and radio programs, articles in newspapers; through illegal pressure of all kind on journalists and individual mass media that try to highlight social and political life in the country.
Political censorship humiliates journalists and people of Ukraine.
Political censorship is illegal: while exerting political censorship the Power attempts to restrict constitutional right of citizens for freedom of speech, which is stipulated in the Constitution of Ukraine, laws of Ukraine, international legal documents ratified by Ukraine and hence binding on its territory. It is worth stressing that the right for freedom of speech is an integral right of Ukraine citizens. Thus, it is a harsh violation of one of the most important fundamental principles of the Constitution of Ukraine. The fact that with the flagrant examples of political censorship in Ukraine no one has been brought to trial we retain as scoffing the Law and the rights of Ukraine citizens.
We, the journalists of Ukraine, identify ourselves with resistance of our colleagues and greet the tendency when along with intensification of political censorship in Ukraine journalists shift from protests of individuals to mass joint actions.
We, the journalists of Ukraine, proclaim our readiness to an all-Ukraine strike for whose preparation and for preparation of other joint actions of journalists in support of their colleagues the initiative group is being established.
We, the journalists of Ukraine, will look for every means to support our colleagues dismissed from their jobs or persecuted because of their adherence to objective journalism.
October 3, 2002

Ar'yev, Volodymyr, television journalist
Bagashvili, Tamara, TVO "Novyny"
Bogdanova, Lubov, UNIAN
Brovkin, D. "Khortytsia" television company
Varnyts'ky, Victor
Veresen', Mykola
Geraschenko, Inna, Press-Secretary "Nasha Ukraina"
Glibovyts'ky, Yevghen
Gorobtsov, Volodymyr, GO "TretInformSud"
Gorodnia, Ol'ga, "Profspilkovi Visti"
Gryvachevs'ky, Borys, TVO "Novyny"
Gumeniuk, Ludmila, "Telekritika"
Deynychenko, Ruslan
Zhdanov, Igor, "National Security and Defense"
Kapytsia, Oles'
Koval'chuk, Oles'
Kolesnikova, Inna, Center "Liga"
Kononenko, Ludmila, TRK "Kyiv"
Korobova, Tetiana "Granit"
Korol', Iryna
Krechetov, Maksym
Kryschenko, Oleksandr, "Public Radio"
Kulias, Igor, ex- "Novy Kanal"
Ligachova, Natalia, "Telekritika"
Luk'yanenko, Yevghen, NUJU member
Lubchenko, Igor, NUJU Chairman
Lysenko, Oksana, "Telekritika"
Makarchuk, Ol'ga, "InterNews-Ukraine"
Medvedev, Oleg, ex-"Kiyevskiye Vedomosti"
Mokrousov, Andriy, "Kritika" magazine
Moroz, Victor, National radio company
Mostova, Yulia, "Zerkalo Nedeli"
Novikov, Pavlo, "InterNews-Ukraine"
Patsiuk, Serghi
Pashayev, O. "Inter"
Pirozhko, Ol'ga, "Public Radio"
Piddubnyk, Oleksandr, TVO "Novyny" (UT-1)
Pogorelova, Iryna, "Politychni Khroniky"
Prytula, Olena, "Ukrains'ka Pravda"
Rudenko, Larysa
Riaboshapka, Vitaliy, Internet-newspaper FoRum
Sabri, Yulia
Samoilenko, Yevghen, "Interfaks-Ukraina"
Sandul, Yuriy, Internet-newspaper "Krytyka-komentari"
Semeniuk, Valeria, television journalist
Leschenko,Serghiy, "Ukrains'ka Pravda"
Skrypin, Roman
Slitsaruk, Ol'ga, newspaper "VV"
Solomchenko, Oksana, "Internews-Ukraina"
Soroka Viktor, "Fakty", ICTV
Tarasenko, Anatoliy, radio "Golos Kyeva"
Usenko, Yevghenia, TVO "Novyny"
Tsegolko, Sviatoslav
Chaika, Roman
Chemeris Iryna
Chernenko, Oleksandr
Shevchenko, Andriy
Shevchenko, Vitaliy, member of the National Council of Ukraine for Television
Sholokh, Serghiy, radio "Continent"
Yakymovych, Natalia, television journalist
Chernenko, Serghiy, "Telekritika"
(List as of Oct 3, 2002. Now it has been signed by nearly 150 journalits)
 

07.10.02. Journalists With Ukrainian Pravda UT-1, ICTV, and Inter threaten nationwide strike

Journalists with the Inter, UT-1 and ICTV television networks, the Ukrainian Pravda and Telekritika Internet-based newspapers, and others are threatening a nationwide strike, according to the "Manifest of Ukrainian Journalists on Censorship," an open letter published by the journalists.

The open letter was offered to journalists for signing during the roundtable conference entitled "Political Censorship in the Ukrainian Mass Media."

The manifest has been signed by, among others, Yevgeny Glebovitsky (a journalist with the 1+1 television channel), Oles Kovalchuk (the former head of the information and analytical service of the Tonis television channel), Igor Kulyas (a former editor with the Novy Kanal television channel), Andrei Shevchenko (a presenter on Novy Kanal), Roman Skripin (a presenter with the STB television channel), and journalists with the national television company.

The manifest was also signed by representatives of the Internews Ukraine, a public organization, the Ukrainian National Union of Journalists' President Igor Lubchenko, Yelena Pritula (a journalist and editor of Ukrainska Pravda), Natalya Ligacheva (a journalist and editor of Telekritika), journalists with Gromadske Radio, Radio Continent's Director Sergei Sholokh, and the Zerkalo Nedeli newspaper's editor-in-Chief Yuliya Mostovaya.

The others that signed the manifest included Vitaly Shevchenko, a member of the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting, and the Our Ukraine coalition's press secretary Irina Gerashchenko.

In total, 61 people signed the manifest.

The letter speaks of the existence of political censorship in the Ukrainian mass media.

"There exists political censorship in Ukraine, the means of which is censorship - through the directives or by agreement with the authorities - of television and radio programs and newspaper articles and pressure in various illegal forms on journalists and individual mass media attempting to objectively cover the political and public life of the country," the letter stated.

The journalists call the censorship illegal, a violation of civil rights, and derogatory to journalists and Ukrainian citizens.

The journalists also expressed support for collective protests against political censorship.

"We Ukrainian journalists are in solidarity with the resistance of our colleagues and welcome the trend under which individual protests of journalists in an atmosphere of political censorship in Ukraine develop into collective actions," the letter stated.

The letter is open to signing by all journalists.

The signatories to the letter intend to seek legal ways of supporting any journalists dismissed for objective coverage of events.

As Ukrainian News reported, Our Ukraine Parliamentary Deputy Nikolai Tomenko, who heads the Parliamentary Committee for Freedom of Speech and Information, recently accused the Ukrainian Presidential Administration of controlling the mass media.

Earlier, the parliament demanded that the Ukrainian Security Service investigate the administration's orders to mass media on coverage of the country's political events.

At the beginning of September, Our Ukraine deputy Oleg Rybachuk accused the Kuchma Administration of censoring mass media.

The Kuchma Administration denies ordering mass media to report events in a particular way.
 

07.10.02. Medvedtjuks stab i værdiopgør med USAs ambassadør?

08.10.02. Ukraine og Rusland etablerer et gastransport-konsortium

09.10.02. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development approves new strategy for Ukraine

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will try to spur investment in Ukraine by continuing its support for private business, local and foreign-sponsored, while pursuing selective commercialisation of the public sector, according to a new strategy approved by the Bank's Board of Directors. The strategy paper is now available on the EBRD website: http://www.ebrd.com/
Having agreed to invest $1 billion in more than 40 projects over the past nine years, the Bank remains the biggest and most diversified investor in Ukraine. Going forward, the Bank will remain a catalyst for still-cautious foreign investors by offering them a wider range of risk-sharing products. It will also continue to pay special attention to the development of the banking sector as the demand for financial services grows.

The strategy notes that the level of the Bank's future investments will depend on the extent to which Ukraine can improve its investment environment by making progress towards a consistently implemented tax regime, properly managed regulation, and a truly independent judiciary. This includes the implementation of concrete steps to combat corruption, a major deterrent to investment.

The Bank, together with international donor agencies, is keen to continue its dialogue with Ukraine's authorities on energy sector reform and privatisation. The EBRD's approach to this sector has proved successful in recent years, resulting in landmark privatisations of electricity distribution companies and significantly increased cash collections. The Bank will also seek to invest in projects that improve energy efficiency, increasing state and public awareness of the need to relate energy prices to true costs.

Besides the financial and energy sectors, the new strategy envisages active involvement in road, rail and air transportation projects, where the Bank can have an impact on tariffs, procurement practices, sector consolidation and further privatisation. The EBRD will also continue to invest in the municipal services sector. The document outlines the Bank's efforts to encourage municipalities to introduce administrative and tariff reforms with the ultimate goal of providing better services to their citizens.

The Bank will play an active role in Ukraine's other sectors, particularly agribusiness - the country's largest potential comparative advantage - working with strong international and local investors. Following record grain crop yields and recent changes in agribusiness legislation, the Bank intends to introduce seasonal working capital finance for farmers and grain traders through warehouse receipt credits.

Those are only some of the wider range of funding facilities contemplated. In addition to continuing its institution-building work with local banks, the EBRD will also continue its work with the non-bank financial sector with the aim of developing mortgage lending and leasing.

The EBRD will continue its efforts to improve nuclear safety through the Nuclear Safety Account and Chernobyl Shelter Fund. The Ukrainian government withdrew in December 2001 from a final Board decis-ion on the project to complete the nuclear reactors known as K2 and R4. The project awaits an indication from the Ukrainian authorities on whether they will seek financing under the original loan conditions.
 

09.10.02. Ukrainian "Kolchuga" radar sold to Ethiopia via Israeli firm

10.10.02. The Wall Street Journal om Kutjma som USAs problem

De beviser som USAs regering har fået på, at Ukraines præsident, Leonid Kutjma, i strid med FNs sanktioner havde godkendt salget af et luftforsvars-radarsystem til Irak, har grundlæggende ændret Amerikas forhold til Ukraine.
    De langtrækkende følger af FBIs identifikation af båndoptagelserne af de stemmer tilhørende hr. Kutjma og hans chef for våbeneksport, som drøfter planen for denne operation, bestyrkes af det forhold, at et opgør mellem De forenede Stater og Irak er undervejs.
    Hvis De forenede Stater indleder krigen mod Irak, vil hr. Kutjma være skyld i at have forsynet irakerne med dødbringende våbenteknologier, som kan koste amerikanske piloter livet. Hvis det lykkes USA at etablere en streng FN-våbeninspektion, så bør Kutjmas eksempel tjene som en lærestreg for alle andre om, at det er nødvendigt at henholde sig til de internationale sanktioner mod Irak. Uanset hvordan det næste skridt mod Irak bliver, vil Ukraines præsident set udfra et amerikansk synspunkt ikke kunne undgå at betale en dyr pris.
    Selveste USAs præsidents, George Bush Jr.'s, forargelse, kan efter sigende mærkes. Efter den 11. september er den amerikanske præsident nået til den slutning, at han vil se på forholdet til udenlandske ledere entydigt: enten er de en del af løsningen, eller også er de en del af problemet. USAs ledelse giver udtryk for det synspunkt, at præsident Bush Jr. er rasende på hr. Kutjma, som planlagde salget af våben til Irak lige inden topmødet i 2000 (lige efter, red.) med USAs daværende præsident Bill Clinton, hvor det amerikansk-ukrainske "strategisk partnerskab" blev fejret.
    USAs officielle repræsentanter, som har ansvaret for politikken overfor Ukraine, påpeger endvidere, at det ukrainske early warning luftforsvarssystem "Koltjuga", efter deres skøn, er blevet udstationeret i Irak.
    De nye afsløringer, som vedrører Ukraines operation med Irak, kommer med hundredevis af timer af båndoptagelser af hr. Kutjmas samtaler, som en tidligere livvagt for præsidenten i hemmelighed har lavet og derefter smuglet ud af landet. Disse optagelser tegner et billede af en grov og egennyttig leder, som befinder sig i centrum af korruption og kriminalitet.
    Hr. Kutjmas Ukraine er i mellemtiden gået hen og blevet en førende våbensmugler i verden. I strid med FNs embargo blev våben og ammunition af ukrainsk oprindelse beslaglagt i Angola i UNITA- oprørernes lagre. Desuden er der vidt udbredte beskyldninger om, at ukrainske våben i strid med embargoen, som har eksisteret siden 1990-erne, blev leveret til Jugoslavien og hjalp desuden med at bevæbne "Taliban"-bevægelsen i Afghanistan.
    Ukraines officielle repræsentanter har i mange år insisteret på, at de ikke har bedrevet ulovlig våbenhandel. Men båndoptagelserne vidner om, at hvis Ukraine ikke er en slyngel-stat, så er landets præsident uden tvivl en svindler, som bedriver illegal våbenhandel.
    Der findes også en båndoptagelse af hr. Kutjmas samtale med en vis Oleksandr Zhukov, som er en kendt person i forbryderverdenen, der stod i forbindelse med Leonid Minin, som er under mistanke for at være en international våbenhandler.
    USAs tillid til præsident Kutjma er i de seneste måneder blevet fuldstændig undergravet. I sommeren 2001 løg den ukrainske præsident åbenlyst overfor USAs præsidents nationale sikkerhedsrådgiver, Condoleeza Rice, da han forsikrede hende om, at Ukraine støttede "en politisk løsning" af den etniske konflikt i Makedonien, samtidig med, at Ukraine - med hans samtykke - fortsatte med at levere våben til den makedonske regering.
    Efter pres fra De forenede Stater gik de ukrainske parlamentsmedlemmer med til at indlede en efterforskning af operationen med Irak. Men parlamentarikerne - hvor de oppositionelle kræfter er blevet jaget ud af de ledende embeder - afviser at efterforske en hel række af forbrydelser, som præsidenten angiveligt har begået.
    Eftersom det næste ordinære præsidentvalg i Ukraine finder sted om 2 år, er Ukraines - og USAs - bedste håb, at tvinge præsident Kutjma til stille og roligt at abdicere som svar på anmodningen om et ekstraordinært præsidentvalg. Demonstrationerne, som indledtes i sidste måned, og som samlede indtil 100.000 personer over hele landet, bliver genoptaget senere denne måned.
    For at den ukrainske præsident skal forlade sit embede, skal protesterne mod ham udvides. I dag erklærer 71% af de adspurgte, at præsidenten bør træde tilbage. Den tidligere premierminister Viktor Jusjtjenko, som går ind for reformer, bør overbevise de vaklende tilhængere af hr. Kutjma, herunder oligarker og regionale ledere, om, at støtte en magtoverdragelse.
    Den diplomatiske isolation af hr. Kutjma fra Amerikas og Europas side bør være hermetisk og udstrækkes til præsidenten og hans nærmeste kumpaner, men ikke til hele den ukrainske regering eller nation. Dernæst er det nødvendigt at overbevise Ruslands præsident, Vladimir Putin, som støtter hr. Kutjma, om at det er i Ruslands interesse at have en koalitionsregering af reformfolk i Ukraine, hvor de prorussiske østlige regioner af Ukraine er temmelig stærkt repræsenteret.
    Rygternes vindmølle har i efterhånden mange måneder været på overarbejde i Ukraine og udsendt antydninger af, at der forberedes en operation, som vil åbne vejen for et post-Kutjma Ukraine. Et af de mulige kompromisser er, at love hr. Kutjma at forlade ham alle hans tidligere synder, hvis han træder frivilligt tilbage.
    Hvis hr. Kutjma træder tilbage vil det ukrainske "irakgate" have været nyttigt. Hvis ikke, så vil De forenede Stater støde ind i to problemer: den ukrainske præsident bliver et eksempel på, at man kan yde illegal støtte til Irak og komme helskindet ud af det; og den uundgåelige isolation af den ukrainske præsident fra USA og Europa vil tvinge Ukraine, der er et strategisk vigtigt land med 50 mill. indbyggere og er placeret ved NATOs østlige grænse, at gå Ruslands kyniske omfavnelser imøde. Begge muligheder vil blive de vigtigste hovedpiner for Europa og for De forenede Stater.
 

10.10.02. Kendte russisk-venlige ind i vigtig præsidentkommission

10.10.02. Kutjmas parlamentsflertal har op mod 230 deputerede bag sig

10.10.02. Kutjma nedsætter Koltjuga-kommission

11.10.02. USA forventer maksimum åbenhed i "Koltjuga"-spørgsmålet

11.10.02. "Koltjuga" kommer ikke op i FNs sikkerhedsråd

14.10.02. Udenrigsministeriet og Medvedtjuk i opgør med USA

14.10.02. PACE-delegation besøger Ukraine

14.10.02. Stort protestmøde mod Kutjma i Kyiv

14.10.02. Våbeninspektører fra USA og Storbrittanien ankommer til Ukraine

15.10.02. Kinakh melder fra til rundbordssamtaler i Polen

15.10.02. Amerikanske og britiske eksperter vil have tegningerne

15.10.02. Møde mellem PACEs delegation og Kutjmas stabschef