Two of the Code's strong points are: 1) it defines the concept of private
agricultural land ownership and, 2) sends a clear signal that serious
domestic and or foreign investments into the Ukrainian agricultural
sector, are now matters of how and when. On the other hand, there are
a number of significant imperfections in the Land Code. Among them is a
ban on the sale of agricultural land until 2005, which many observers
believe will limit the availability of credit as banks stay away from illiquid
holdings despite the mortgage-available property. Likewise, the
100-hectare limit on plots of agricultural land that may be owned by any
one legal entity may actually delay the structural re-organization of rural
Ukraine that is so desperately needed if the Ukrainian village is to
recover from its present state of decay and depopulation. In fairness,
this
delay is meant to prevent the emergence of overly powerful, and often de
facto foreign-owned entities on the land market.
Many provisions in the Code need extensive legislative follow-up. This
is
particularly true for legislation expanding the availability of credit
to
agri-businesses, including the potential establishment of a state-owned
or
operated land bank, as well as laws and regulations ensuring that small
landowners' property rights are fully protected. No less important are
the
public education campaigns that need to be conducted in the coming
months and years to accelerate the Ukrainian people's growing readiness
to literally take charge of their lives through informed private land
ownership and management.
RCC will provide an in-depth look at the Land Code following its
signature and enactment by President Leonid Kuchma.
About RCC Political Review
RCC Political Review is a new information product devoted to reporting
and
analyzing political developments in Ukraine. It is currently distributed
free-of-charge in electronic format as an e-mail message and A-4 format
Word
document. The RCC Political Review is produced on a weekly basis. Materials
published in RCC Political Review may only be reproduced with the consent
of the
Editorial Board. Upon reproduction, citing and crediting RCC is mandatory.
To find out more about RCC's research, analysis, writing and reporting
services,
please contact our new Ukraine office.
To find out how you can put RCC's experience, know-how and resources to
work
for you.
RCC's new Ukraine office
25/40 Ivana Franka, Suite 20
Kyiv, Ukraine, 01030
+ 380 (44) 223-63-63
mail - info@rccpr.com
The Editorial Board - Stephen Bandera, Yarema Bachynsky, Mark Suprun,
Lubomyr Kwasnycia, and Basil Danchuk, produces the RCC Political Review.
Copyright 2001 RCC Political Review
Volume 1, Issue 3 (3) November 7, 2001
Ukraine's use of the Internet pales in comparison. Currently, liberal
estimates put the number of Internet users at 2 million. In a nation of
49
million, the numbers are nowhere near those of developed democracies.
Indeed, the same holds true for Russia. With a general population of
roughly 145 million, Internet penetration estimates hover below 10
million in the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, Russian campaign
managers and their Ukrainian counterparts will ensure that the web plays
an important role in the run-up to the March 31, 2002 elections. A free
round table devoted to the use of the Internet during elections was held
at the Hotel Kyiv on November 6, as part of the ongoing First Tuesday
Kyiv series of new economy seminars.
The presentations and subsequent discussions provided a sneak peek at
some of the Internet strategies and techniques being prepared by parties
with money at their disposal. The speakers, two from Russian outfits and
the Yabluko and Social Democratic (united) parties were careful not to
give away too much information. For the Ukrainian parties, the seminar
provided a forum for some shameless self-promotion. But the devil was
in the details provided by Maryna Lytvynovych, chairperson of the Fund
for Effective Politics (FEP) and Ivan Davydov, director of the
International Institute for the Study of Mass Communications.
Lytvynovych, whose organization was established by Russian president
Vladimir Putin's image-maker Gleb Pavlovsky, spoke about the Internet
campaign techniques FEP has used in the past. FEP operates more than
40 websites in Russia, including the prolific strana.ru group of sites.
More importantly, FEP has some 20 traditional media outlets (radio,
television, newspapers, etc.) on call, according to Lytvynovych. That is
the key to using the Internet in countries where traditional media outlets
are still the primary source of information for voters. Websites can spring
up like mushrooms after a rainfall and disappear just as fast. These sites
contain any information imaginable. Traditional outlets - newspapers,
radio and television shows - can then cite the site, and present it as
a
reliable, independent source.
Disinformation campaigns are leftovers from Soviet times. Davydov
recalled the USSR's last great disinformation effort. The official Soviet
press, referring to an Indian newspaper, reported that the bio-warfare
department of the Pentagon bred AIDS. The "average Ivan," with no
access to the Indian press or knowledge of Hindi, had no way of
verifying the information, and accepted it at face value. Similarly, the
majority of Russian and Ukrainian voters who do not have access to the
Internet have little choice but to believe that talking head on television
reporting on the latest scandalous misadventures of candidate X.
Ukrainian journalists are among those gifted with access to the Internet,
and will consequently deliver news from the Internet to the
web-challenged population.
FEP employed a variant of this technique on behalf of Vladimir Putin in
the 2000 presidential elections.
In the Putin scenario, the problem that required solving was that he was
a
hands-down winner even before the elections started. This was risky,
Lytvynovych explained, because there was a high probability that voter
turnout would be low for an election with no alternatives. So FEP
needed to identify and promote one. The virtual enemy became a
little-known site that recorded a meager 10 hits a day. The simple site
urged voters to check off "none of the above" on the electoral ballot.
FEP vigorously promoted the site in the Russian media via news reports.
Accordingly, the number of visitors rose, and the media continued to
report about the site. A thematically similar site appeared in Ukraine
prior to the 1999 presidential elections.
Another technique used by FEP in the past is developing an imitation site
to combat a particular candidate. The pseudo-official site is registered
with an ostensibly authentic name. It appears and navigates just like the
candidate's genuine site. The difference lies in the content that is critical
of the candidate and his record in office. The site features unflattering
caricatures, and compromising photos with deflating captions.
Lytvynovych refutes charges that these techniques can be described by
the popular term "black PR." She defines "black PR" as publication of
compromising information obtained by illegal means, be it wiretaps, theft,
hidden cameras, etc. Everything else is creativity.
Ukrainian politicians and media outlets have displayed similar creative
savvy in the recent past. Observers can expect to see more during the
elections. For example, the words of "an anonymous source from the
security service" will be presented as hard news, while offering white
lies
and innuendo in its place. The newspaper Den used this tactic to
discredit former Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko and his family earlier
this year, just before his ouster.
Polling results from questionable sources will also be used to boost
popularity ratings. There have already been at least two cases of
manipulation of poll results since October 2001. Alternative vote counts
and exit polls on Election Day may also be used to undermine the validity
of the official results presented by the Central Electoral Committee.
Falsified poll results can be distributed at light speed via the Internet,
followed by allegations of falsification on the part of the CEC. During
the
campaign, unscientific phone-in and Internet polls will also be presented
as accurate measures of voter preference.
Another way to use the Internet, as a disinformation tool is the "guest
book" found on many sites according to Davydov. Here visitors can post
messages, opinions and rumors that have little or no basis in reality.
A
malicious news outlet can then refer to the site's URL as the source of
the information. Use of a similar marketing method propelled the Blair
Witch Project myth in the United States to become one of the largest
grossing motion pictures of all time.
The seminar did address more positive and constructive uses of the
Internet as a means of party consolidation for the elections, as well as
party and on-line community building beyond March 2002. The
paperless web is recognized as a cost-effective way to communicate
with and coordinate party members and sympathizers. One of FEP's
success stories is the recruitment of 6,000 new members for the Soyuz
Pravykh Syl via Sergey Kiriyenko's website during the 1999 elections to
the Russian Duma.
Oleh Medvediev, PR guru for Mykhailo Brodsky and the Yabluko
party, claims to have a long-term, post-elections strategy in place for
the
party's site. SDPU (o) will soon launch a new version of their party's
website, adding the English and Ukrainian languages. The site will focus
on SDPU (o) leader Victor Medvedchuk, presumably to popularize the
deputy chairman of Parliament with a view towards the presidential
elections in 2004.
SDPU (o) and FEP did not deny that they would be working together
during these elections. Both spokespeople were quick to point out
however, that FEP will cultivate "different relations with different forces"
in Ukraine. FEP has done work for President Leonid Kuchma, and has
propagated the theory that U.S. elements were behind the murder of
journalist Heorhiy Gongadze and the ensuing political crisis. Lytvynovych
also announced that 2002 will be the "Year of Ukraine" in Russia, and
anticipates that the Internet will play an important role in promoting
the
365-day Russian tribute to Ukraine. FEP will also officially open its
Ukraine.ru Kyiv office in the near future.
Noticeably absent during the seminar was talk of using new technologies
as the backend for targeted communication efforts, such as direct mail
and telephone pool campaigns - standard fare in election campaigns, and
easily deployable in Ukraine.
Obviously, the campaign strategists would be providing their clients with
a disservice if they revealed all of their innovative plans. Straightforward
falsification of elections results will be very difficult during these
elections,
because most of the stakeholders will have networks of faithful involved
in observing and counting the ballots. In this campaign, violations will
occur before Election Day - primarily through the media. Kuchma has
already publicly stated that these elections will be particularly dirty.
That
may not amount to official support on his part, but it is a signal that
this
will be a "no holds barred" campaign. Even despite the low penetration
rates, the Internet will still play a leading role.
Rukh, the mildly nationalistic, anti-Communist political alternative,
has been a mainstay of independent Ukraine's politics since it was founded
in September, 1989. Similar to the role played by Solidarnosc in Poland,
Rukh was instrumental in creating a grassroots movement that eventually
ended formal Soviet rule in Ukraine. But Rukh's twelve year history
as a major political force might come to an end on March 31, 2002, when
Ukrainians go to the polls to elect their fourth parliament since independence.
Rukh seems poised to lose its stature and influence not to a competing political party, but to changes underway in Ukrainian politics. In previous elections, voters chose between dozens of parties that presented different ideas and platforms for the country's social, economic, and foreign policy development.
In comparison, the trend for the 2002 parliamentary contest is personalities over parties. And Rukh simply does not have a single leader within its ranks, who can compete with the big names in these elections, which currently include Victor Yushchenko, Volodymyr Lytvyn, Yuliya Tymoshenko, Victor Medvedchuk and Serhiy Tyhypko (all likely presidential candidates in 2004).
This development, coupled with the continued saga of infighting that has plagued the party, do not bode well for Rukh's future.
The first signs that all was not well in Rukh came a month before Vyacheslav
Chornovil's car slammed into the side of a peculiarly-positioned trailer
on a dark road outside of Kyiv on March
25, 1999. Earlier that year, the Rukh party and parliamentary faction
split, purportedly because of the late Chornovil's absolutist style of
leadership, and over the choice for Rukh candidate in the 1999
presidential elections.
Chornovil's untimely death (some claim murder) failed to heal the split in Rukh that had emerged between the younger, Kyiv elite (led by Yuri Kostenko), and the older, grassroots structure in the regions (led by Hennadi Udovenko, Chornovil's choice for presidential candidate).
Strategists in both Rukh camps came to appreciate the factor of unity only after humiliating defeats in the last presidential election. In the 1998 parliamentary elections, Rukh was supported by 2.5 million voters. In 1999, two candidates from two different Rukhs vied for electoral support. Combined, Kostenko and Udovenko received just over 890,000 votes. That represented a loss of over 1.5 million Rukh votes in just a year and a half.
Rukh unity finally arrived in the persona of Victor Yushchenko - former Prime Minister and Central Bank Governor, who consistently records the highest popularity ratings of any Ukrainian politician since independence. The two Rukhs stood together in their support for Yushchenko when parliament delivered a no-confidence vote to his government in April, 2001. In June 2001, the two Rukhs announced that they will join forces for 2002, and began working with the Reforms & Order party to secure a place under the Yushchenko sun, in an electoral bloc called Nasha Ukrayina.
Although the Nasha Ukrayina name may still change, the bloc will be associated primarily with Yushchenko. Most members of the newly-reunited Rukh are willing to give up their well-known, though somewhat blemished, political brand name in favor of a spot on the Yushchenko electoral list. They will also support Yushchenko in 2004, if he decides to run in the presidential elections.
True to form, not all Rukh members welcome the move. A small group of Rukh activists are determined to see the Rukh name appear on the ballot on March 31, 2002.
This group is led by Bohdan Boyko, who established Rukh for Unity in November, 2000. Boyko is joined by Serhiy Konyev, from Rukh's Dnipropetrovsk branch, Heorhiy Filipchuk, former Chernivtsi governor and Rukh Press director Dmytro Ponamarchuk, the sole survivor of the car crash that killed Chornovil. They are joined by some lesser known right wing parties.
By their own accounts, these dissidents are motivated by their disdain for Yushchenko. They are also wary about giving up the Rukh political brand that they have worked so hard to establish for over a decade.
These sentiments stem from what they perceive as an ideological sacrifice of their core conservative principles. They see the Yushchenko vehicle driving Rukh too far to the center of the political spectrum, thus transforming the Rukh brand from "national conservative" to "liberal democrat." The pro-Yushchenko Rukh elements have compromised and combined the two terms, calling themselves "national democrats."
Nevertheless, the anti-Yushchenko "third" Rukh force is playing right into the hands of the oligarchs, as they are unlikely to cross the 4% qualifying barrier for a share of seats in parliament. Their chances are further diminished by the appearance of the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc on the right side of the political spectrum.
Rukh for Unity has enjoyed widespread media coverage (bordering on promotion) mostly in outlets influenced by the oligarchs. They have the most to gain in discrediting Rukh while at the same time seeing Rukh appear on the electoral ballot. The oligarch parties are also interested in sowing the seeds of discord in the Yushchenko camp, and splitting the Yushchenko vote.
One oligarch party in particular, the Social Democratic Party (united), will rely heavily on Rukh's electorate in the upcoming elections, particularly in the traditional Rukh stronghold of Western Ukraine. By propagating Rukh's image as a weakened political force, plagued by infighting, SDPU(o) hopes to attract disillusioned voters. Kostenko andUdovenko are successfully being drawn into this trap, which is being widely covered by the media.
The oligarchs are also interested in seeing the Rukh brand name appear on the ballot, because that choice will take votes away from Yushchenko's bloc, and increase their share of seats for parties that score 4% or better. Anti-Yushchenko Rukh candidates will also split the vote in single-mandate constituencies, allowing candidates from other parties to win these "first past the post" races.
It is unclear whether the third Rukh force is genuinely concerned about the "plight of the right", or whether more sinister allegations are true. In the end, however, Rukh for Unity will do a disservice to the legacy of Rukh and Vyacheslav Chornovil. Rather than joining Yushchenko and attempting to influence the policy and platform of a stronger bloc, the third Rukh is bent on creating confusion in the right wing of Ukrainian politics.
With no strong leader and the dissolution of the pro-Yushchenko element in Nasha Ukrayina, the Rukh risks being relegated to the history books, a fate that has befallen Solidarnosc in Poland. After suffering absolute defeat in Poland's recent parliamentary elections, Solidarnosc can barely muster the collective will to return to its trade union roots. Rukh does not even have a trade union history to fall back upon.
A vacuum will appear in the right wing of Ukrainian politics with Rukh's de facto demise after these elections. Pro-Yushchenko forces may fill that vacuum temporarily. As the Yushchenko group strives to appeal to a wider circle of voters, however, and moves towards the centre in its politics, a larger door will open for a different right-wing leader in the presidential elections.
Paying close attention to this trend is dissident oligarch Yuliya Tymoshenko,
who is quietly drumming up support for 2004.
Uddrag af SDPU (o)-lederen Viktor Medvedtjuks bog "I søgen
efter nye grænser".
"Vesten med dets uudtømmelige rigdomme og muligheder har efterhånden
i lang tid været og er fortsat en af hovedaktørerne i vores
ideologiske og politiske mytologi. Vesten føler med os, Vesten vil
hjælpe os med at opbygge en god og godartet kapitalisme, det vil
give alt, hvad der kræves for at modernisere økonomien, det
vil åbne vore døre til verdensmarkederne og slippe os ind
til familien af velstående og florissante europæiske folk.
Nu er ædrueligheden ved at melde sig, og Vesten
er igen for mange ved at blive symbolet på den hjerteløse,
hensynsløse og troløse pragmatisme. Men bør man egentlig
bebrejde det Vesten, der altid er tro mod sig selv, som aldrig har haft
venner, men altid har haft strategiske interesser i alle ender af verden.
Det er ikke Vesten man bør klandre, men vor egen barnligt naive
og umodne geopoliske tænkning. Som det hedder i en sang: "Hvis jeg
har opfundet dig, så skal du blive som jeg vil have det". Man bør
afstå fra at opfinde, så vil skuffelserne også være
mindre.
Hvorfor fortørnes over Vesten, USA, Den internationale
Valutafond, når de stræber efter at svække deres konkurrenter
og kontrollere verdensøkonomien? Vi bliver påny set på
som "verdenskapitalismens svage led", som et stadig mere tilgængeligt
marked for billig arbejdskraft og et omfattende marked for afsætning
af vestlige produkter - kort sagt: som det internationale systems periferi.
IMF giver ikke kreditter for at opbygge en kommende konkurrent.
Disse kreditter gives sammen med en pakke af tiltag,
hvis gennemførelse varsler ny ustabilitet. Måske er det først
nu, at vores politikere - en bitter erfaring rigere - begynder at erkende
vanskeligheden i forholdet til det europæiske samvirke, hvis politik
i forhold til Ukraine præsident Leonid Kutjma på mødet
i Budapest betegnede som "diskriminerende". Ukraine kunne godt tænke
sig at få en status som associeret medlem af EU, men bliver indtil
videre ikke engang budt ind i entreen. Hvad mere er, så lukker særlige
forbudsregler det europæiske marked for de mest konkurrencedygtige
ukrainske brancher og varer. EU kræver lukning af Tjornobyl atomkraftværket
og overlader det til Ukraine selv at løse det globale problem.
I dag er det aldeles indlysende, at den eneste måde
man kan blive en synlig og indflydelsesrig størrelse i vores "vidunderlige
og rasende verden" på er at mobilisere alle kræfter og ressourcer
til fordel for den hurtigst mulige opretning af nationaløkonomien;
ikke importere varer, men derimod indføre kapital og moderne teknologi
og derved tilskynde til produktivitet på verdensniveau. Det er ikke
uden grund, at denne faktor tidligere blev kaldt for "det allervigtigste
og det mest afgørende vilkår". Denne opgave bør klares
gennem den multilaterale udenrigspolitiske kurs, den alsidige orientering
mod markeder der er perspektiv i med en obligatorisk udnyttelse af det
post-sovjetiske økonomiske rum og en genopretning af de afbrudte
gensidigt fordelagtige forbindelser. Desuden bør relationerne til
det fjerne udland opbygges meget afmålt, meget fornuftigt uden at
man samtidig fjerner sig fra det nære udland.
Det er på tide at forlade neoliberalismens
yderligheder og gå tilbage til den sunde fornuft. Man må ikke
gøre IMF, George Soros, Milton Friedman, Jeffrie Sachs eller Zbigniew
Brzezinski til afguder. Man må gå tilbage til Keynes, som det
skete i en for USA kritisk tid under Roosevelt, som uden frygt for at blive
beskyldt for, at hans tiltag var socialistiske i deres væsen, indførte
en hård statslig regulering af blandingsøkonomien og dermed
reddede den amerikanske kapitalisme. Vores nuværende vestlige "lærere"
har glemt historiens lektie og tager selv det mindste forsøg på
den slags regulering i de post-sovjetiske lande til indtægt for en
tilbagevenden til kommunismen. Når vi forsøger på at
finde måder, hvorpå man kan mindske den sociale spænding,
beskylder Vesten i form af sine finansfolk og økonomer os for hengivenhed
overfor traditionelle sovjetiske principper for statslig paternalisme.
Her vil det være på sin plads at minde om, at alle de sociale
landvindinger, som arbejderne i den udviklede kapitalismens lande har opnået,
ikke skyldes fyrsters og oligarkers filantropi, men de historiske lektioner,
som kapitalismen udledte af den russiske revolutions barske og frygtelige
erfaring.
Det kategoriske imperativ og vores specifikke ukrainske
tids påbud er en omlægning af den økonomiske politik,
en flytning af tyngdepunktet fra finansielle valutamanipulationer, fra
opdyrkningen af hjemlige oligarker til skabelsen af retlige og økonomiske
forudsætninger for den industrielle vækst, udvikling af erhvervslivet,
omdannelsen af skattepolitikken fra summen af undertrykkende forholdsregler
til en slagkraftig stimulator for det økonomiske fremskidt.
"Occidenten er Occidenten. Orienten er Orienten,
og de vil aldrig mødes". Den engelske forfatter Rydiard Kipling
var ikke langt fra sandheden med disse ord. Der er alt for meget, som adskiller
disse to globale regioner - historisk, politisk og økonomisk. Det
er meget vanskeligt at forestille sig sådanne reformer, som på
kortest mulig tid kan forvandle lande, som har forladt kommunismen, til
et blomstrende vestligt supermarked. Vi har brug for vestlig teknologi,
vestlig know-how, et ligeværdigt samarbejde med det, men lad os samtidig
være realistiske: vi i de tidligere sovjetrepublikker, som befinder
sig i en dyb systemkrise, har indtil videre ikke styrke til at opbygge
en kapitalisme af vestligt tilsnit med dens utrolige kapitalkoncentration,
ekstremt høje produktionsniveau og produktivivtet, samt en enestående
konkurrencedygtighed. En romance med Vesten er kun mulig i en eneste og
meget hård udgave: indlemmelse i kapitalismens økonomi som
kapitalanbringelsessfære og råstofleverandør."
"Ifølge den fremherskende opfattelse hos begge staters ledelse
har de polsk-ukrainske relationer aldrig været så gunstige
som nu. Personligt mener jeg, at de nok var endnu bedre for en 500 år
siden. Men de er utvivlsomt blevet væsentligt forbedret set i lyset
af det 20. århundredes triste facit. I praksis er der endnu langt
til, at de polsk-ukrainske relationer når op på det niveau,
som de polsk-tyske eller de polsk-danske relationer befinder sig på.
Hvis vi stræber mod en fortsat forbedring
af de polsk-ukrainske relationer, så er det værd at dvæle
lidt ved den asymmetri, som gang på gang kommer til udtryk i disse
relationer. Det første udtryk for denne asymmetri: Polen befinder
sig på nuværende tidspunkt i en meget mere favorabel position
end Ukraine. Vi har i dag en i alle henseender sammentømret stat,
en stabil demokratisk samfundsorden, en langt højere levestandard,
gennemførte markedsreformer, en lovgivning der er bragt i overensstemmelse
med de europæiske krav, en uafbrudt økonomisk vækst
gennem de sidste ni år, samt grænser hvis dragning ingen sætter
spørgsmålstegn ved; dertil kommer, at vi er medlemmer af Den
nordatlantiske Alliance, og inden længe bliver vi også medlemmer
af Den europæiske Union. Ukraine befandt sig også i en betydelig
dårligere situation end os for ti år siden, da landet opnåede
sin selvstændighed.
Det andet udtryk for asymmetrien er, at Polen er
i langt højere grad interesseret i at have forbindelser til Ukraine
end omvendt. Vores fremtid er knyttet til Ukraines fremtid; det er sjældent
man hører ukrainere sige, at deres lands skæbne afhænger
af Polens skæbne. Og det er ikke tilfældigt: for uanset hvilken
styreform vi har i Polen, uanset hvilke internationale fora Polen end måtte
være medlem af - så vil Ukraines vest-grænse forblive
sikker; der udgår ingen trusler fra den kant. For os indebærer
Ukraines uafhængighed derimod afslutningen på den fare, som
udgår fra øst og som skyldes Ruslands imperialistiske ambitioner.
(I den forbindelse har Zbigniew Brzezinski engang skrevet, at Ukraines
uafhængighed er sågar vigtigere for Polen end medlemsskabet
af NATO).
De ukrainske perspektiver er aldeles forskellige.
Ukrainerne mener, at de ikke har nogen grund til at bekymre sig på
Polens vegne, eftersom Polen - sådan som de ser det - har lidt at
skulle have sagt i forhold til deres lands skæbne. Men der er også
en tredje - og den formentlig dybeste og mest iøjnefaldende asymmetri
i vore relationer: nemlig at den polske kultur er langt tættere knyttet
til Ukraine, end den ukrainske er til Polen. Vores åndelige bånd
til de ukrainske (engang "russiske") landområder er langt stærkere
end ukrainernes bånd til det moderne Polens landområder. De
polske hjerter bankede, banker og vil altid banke lidt hurtigere ved lyden
af ordet "Lviv" og stednavne som "Khotin", "Kamenets Podolskyj", "Kremenets"
og "Berdytjev". Polsk litteratur har siden det 16. århundrede været
fyldt med ukrainske motiver; der fandtes "ukrainske skoler" i det 19. og
20. århundredes polske digtning.
Hvis man ser på hele vores litteratur, så
viser billederne af de blodige stridigheder, som er skildret i Henryk Sinkiewiczs
"Trilogi" sig at være i det mindste atypiske: Den nu glemte Teodor
Tomasz Jez, som dog havde en kæmpe indflydelse i forrige århundrede,
og som S. Zeromski betegnede som det polske demokratis "grand old man",
er mere karakteristisk. Uden den åndelige rigdom, som er frugten
af vore folks hundrederårige sameksistens på Ukraines jord,
ville polsk kultur have været fattigere. Den videnskabelige litteratur,
som berører denne tematik, er meget udbredt i Polen og har været
det i årtier. Man kan sige, at vi er "dømt" til at nære
sympati for Ukraine.
Hos ukrainerne er det hele lige omvendt. Ukraine
har utvivlsomt problemer med sin kulturelle identitet; det som er fælles
for os er alene kendetegnende for Vestukraine. De ukrainske hjerter begynder
ikke at banke hurtigere, når de hører navnene på vore
byer. Der er betydelig længere mellem de polske motiver i ukrainsk
litteratur, og de omhandler som regel væbnede sammenstød mellem
os. Man kan levende forestille sig en polak, som nynner ukrainske melodier
eller synger om "længslen efter Ukraine" eller om "fader kosakhøvding";
ukraineren nynner derimod ikke polske sange.
Derfor kan ukrainerne være sikre på,
at Polen altid vil støtte deres uafhængighed og stræbe
mod at styrke det gode naboskab. Det vil blive virkeliggjort såvel
udfra den politiske og praktiske som den kulturelle og åndelige synsvinkel,
som ikke vil forandre sig sålænge polakkerne bevarer deres
nationale kulturs arvefølge.
Desværre kan polakkerne ikke være sikre
på den ukrainske "gensidighed". De venter på venskabelige gestus
ikke alene i form af politiske deklarationer, men først og fremmest
indenfor kultursfæren, d.v.s. der, hvor disse gestus ikke vil føre
materielle omkostninger med sig. De venter hverken støtte på
den politiske arena eller indenfor arbejdsmarkedssfæren med adgang
til arbejdsmarkedet eller penge til beskyttelsen af mindesmærker
over vores fælles fortid. Vi venter på en velvilje overfor
de initiativer, som vi er interesseret i. På trods af de officielle
erklæringer "ovenfra" - venter vi ofte forgæves. Det gælder
den ulyksagelige Lytjakovskyj militærkirkegård (det bør
påpeges, at samtlige de begravede amerikanere og franskmænd
samt flertallet af polakkerne døde i kampen mod bolsjevikkerne og
ikke ukrainerne), J. Slovatskyjs museum i Kremenets og D. Konrads museum
i Berdytjev. Endnu en paradoksal asymmetri.
Indbyggerne i Vestukraine - de territorier, som
i et historisk og kulturelt perspektiv er allermest knyttet til Polen (og
via denne også med Central-og Østeuropa), - forholder sig
tit og ofte med større mistro overfor polakkerne end indbyggerne
i andre regioner. Østukraines befolkning er ikke kendetegnet af
sådanne komplekser, men har til gengæld betydeligt mindre tilfælles
med polakkerne.
I naturen sætter asymmetrier skub i hastige
strømninger; i mellemfolkelige relationer kan asymmetrier også
virke forfriskende. Således revitaliserer de ukrainere, der legalt
eller illegalt får arbejde i Polen, helt automatisk kontakterne mellem
vore folk. Men uligheden kan også føre til spændinger
i stedet for at fremelske en forbedring af vores forhold, og ligefrem skade
det. Man bør sørge for, at den slags asymmetrier ikke finder
sted i samfundet.
Selvom ukrainerne afhænger af os i mindre
grad, end vi afhænhger af dem, bør de forstå, at de
ikke har nogen anden vej til Europa end via Polen. Hvis de træffer
et "europæisk" valg, så bør de ligesom polakkerne i
forhold til tyskerne, tage udgangspunkt i geografi, geopolitik og den åndeligt-kulturelle
arv, som vil sikre dem en velvillig holdning fra polakkernes side.
Min tilpas store erfaring viser, at mange af dem
- også selvom de deklarerer deres proeuropæiske sindelag -
kun nødigt drager den slags slutninger. I løbet af to konferencer
- den ene i Lviv og den anden i Warszawa - svarede de ukrainske diplomater
på mine venskabelige udtalelser om Polens væsentlige betydning
for dem med, at "støtten fra Slovakiets og Ungarns side ikke er
mindre vigtig", samt om forbindelserne til Tjekkiet, som de "aldrig har
haft konflikter med"! Det fremkaldte på sin side ironiske smil hos
de franskmænd og hollændere, der var tilstede.
I den officielle bog i anledning af Ukraines 10-årige
uafhængighed er der praktisk talt ikke et ord om Polen (selvom man
på regeringsniveau gerne benytter lejlighed til at nævne, at
Polen var den første stat, som anerkendte Ukraines selvstændighed.
Tit forekommer det, at de ikke ønsker at stå bare i den mindste
taknemmelighedsgæld til os.
En anden asymmetri kommer til udtryk i form af trafikken
henover grænsen. For hver 20 ukrainere, der krydser grænsen
til Polen, er der kun en polak, der ønsker at rejse østpå.
Her nærmer vi os spørgsmålet, som alleroftest bliver
berørt i vores indbyrdes forhold: udsigten til indførelse
af visumpligt. Polen har forpligtet sig til at indføre visumpligt
ved forhandlingerne om en indtræden i Den europæiske Union.
Der er den kendte sentimentale myte om, at grænsen
for øjeblikket er "åben", men at Polen vil "lukke" den. Et
enkelt blik på denne grænse er nok til at forsikre sig om,
at selvom den ikke bliver bevogtet tilstrækkelig skarpt, så
kan den bestemt ikke kaldes for "åben". Man bør se den forestående
indførelse af visumpligt som en nødvendig regulering af en
bestående tilstand. Og jo senere Polen indfører visumpligten
(i stedet for den for tiden gældende ordning med, at man kan krydse
statsgrænsen i kraft af en invitation eller vaucher), jo længere
vil kontrollen tage ved vore vestlige og sydlige grænser, mens enhver
uklarhed og udsættelse af det spørgsmål truer med at
forsinke vor indtræden i Den europæiske Union.
Sådanne udsættelser vil være i
strid med såvel Polens som Ukraines politiske og økonomiske
interesser. Det er jo klart, at Polen som medlem af EU væsentligt
vil forøge sine muligheder for at øve indflydelse på
de omkringliggende lande - og in casu på EUs østpolitik. Og
det er klart, at netop Polen er det af medlemmerne af Den europæiske
Union, som p.g.a. de allerede anførte kulturelle og geopolitiske
grunde vil være Ukraines allermest sikre allierede. Vores fortid
er bundet sammen for altid, omend asymmetrisk.
Denne forbindelse kan man drage nytte af, eller
man kan forskertse den ligeså letsindigt. Hvorvidt ukrainerne vil
være i stand til at udnytte de polske sympatiers og den polske politiske
beregnings potentiale afhænger af dem selv. Polens fremtid og Ukraines
fremtid er mere afhængige af hinanden end vore østlige brødre
i dag er tilbøjelige til at mene."
Copyright (c) Dansk-Ukrainsk Selskab og Ivan Nester