Summary
The United States slapped Ukraine with punitive trade sanctions Dec. 21
over its refusal to crack down on compact disc piracy. The sanctions
represent more than Washington's efforts to protect American economic
interests; they also signal the first reward to Moscow for its new
pro-Western foreign policies.
Analysis
The United States levied trade sanctions against Ukraine on Dec. 21 after
the Parliament, or Rada, failed to pass laws to crack down on compact
disc piracy. Washington estimates the sanctions, which take effect Jan.
23,
will keep $75 million worth of Ukrainian goods out of U.S. markets
annually.
The piracy issue has dogged relations between the two countries for years,
but Ukraine's geopolitical importance vis-à-vis Russia always prevented
Washington from slapping it with sanctions. Coming at this time, the move
is as much a testament to Ukraine's declining importance to U.S. strategy
as it is to warmer U.S.-Russian relations. The sanctions are an indication
to Russia that its new pro-Western stance will indeed be rewarded.
For Ukraine, the move is more than a one-off measure -- it is an
indictment of the government's unwillingness to enforce intellectual
property laws. So long as sanctions remain in place, Ukraine will find
its
long-term goal of joining the World Trade Organization imperiled. U.S.
and
European authorities, meanwhile, are setting up a rapid timetable for
Russian accession to the WTO. Putin's Quest for the West
In the aftermath of Sept. 11, Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking
advantage of shifting political alliances to reposition Russia as a Western
power. To the consternation of many Russian oligarchs, politicians and
bureaucrats, Putin has drastically altered many of the underlying precepts
of Russian foreign policy in recent weeks. Although it appears he is giving
away quite a lot to the West, many so-called concessions can be easily
recouped. Russia will benefit from Putin's quest for Westernization no
matter how the United States fares in its war in Afghanistan.
The end of the year has seen a rise in the political temperature in Ukraine,
as parties, blocs and potential single-mandate candidates gear up for the
official start of the Parliament 2002 election campaign. In the past few
weeks, the Central Election Commission (CEC) officially changed the
campaign start date, and the political horses will now be off at midnight
on
December 31, rather than the January 1, 2002 date announced earlier by
CEC Head Mykhailo Riabets.
On December 13, Parliament approved a Law on Mandatory Television
Debates that would mandate airing of debates by national and
regional/local state and privately owned broadcasters. The law also
requires mandatory participation by all registered parties/blocs and
candidates for Parliament and the Presidency (the text of the Law is
available in Ukrainian at the Ukrainian Parliament's website
www.rada.kiev.ua). Any parties or candidates refusing to participate in
the debates will be de-registered (i.e. excluded) from the relevant race.
Broadcasters will also be required to re-work their schedules to
accommodate prime-time debates. They also have to incur all
debate-related expenses and could lose their licenses for refusing to air
debates.
The bill found broad support on the Left and among segments of the Right
(notably former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko and the Our Ukraine
electoral bloc) that translated into 263 "ayes". However, members of the
executive branch, national television industry executives and centrist
politicians decried the law as unconstitutional and an interference with
private business. Oligarch-affiliated outlets unimpressed with the Law
chimed in as well while opposition media have called for its urgent
enactment. Think tanks are skeptical of whether a mandatory debate law
would enable voters to make an informed choice on Election Day, March
31, 2002. President Leonid Kuchma said he would veto the Law. If the
president delivers his veto, the bill's backers will probably not muster
the
300 votes required to override a presidential veto.
In their rush to guarantee equal access to broadcast media for all
contenders, the Law's supporters missed a number of important
considerations and came up with a bill requiring serious re-working. Only
then would it stand a chance of being enacted by the President and have
an immediate impact on the present election campaign and impending vote.
While some local media have suggested that any debates by state fiat are
an infringement upon accepted business practices, we would argue that
Ukraine's Parliament should push for a mandatory television debate law
that would not interfere with private broadcasters' business practices,
and
would be funded by Ukrainian taxpayers.
In Western democracies, televised political debates are a fundamental
attribute of the electoral process, parliamentary, presidential or other.
In
many cases, such debates are organized by NGOs (such as the League of
Women Voters in the United States), while others are state-organized or
supported. Equal access for all participants is far from guaranteed, but
recognized contenders (both parties and individuals) are generally admitted
to broadcast debates.
Televised parliamentary and presidential debates have proven popular with
Ukrainians since 1991, and the present Ukraine parliamentary campaign is
shaping up as a competitive run between half a dozen to ten political
parties/blocs. The 2004 presidential race will also feature a number of
political heavyweights. Both national and regional debates, whether
conducted by state or private broadcasters could go a long way towards
shaping voters' understanding of party, candidate positions and character
in
both races. These types of debates would also boost Ukraine's
international image as a state respecting and promoting informed voting
and political diversity.
If Parliament is interested in passing a workable debate bill equalizing
access to media for would-be national deputies and presidents of all
stripes, it should require all 27 state-run TV channels (UT-1 National
Channel and 26 regional channels) to design and broadcast a series of
debates featuring those national parties/blocks and single mandate
candidates that wish to participate. On the candidate side of the coin,
any
provision requiring participation under threat of sanction would almost
certainly be deemed unconstitutional. This unfortunately, would yield the
"equal access" moral high-ground to opponents of transparency and free
speech.
A strong argument can be made that televised party and candidate debates
are very much in the public interest and state-run TV should be required
to
broadcast such discussions. Moreover, UT-1 has the broadest national
coverage of any national channel and regional channels expand that
coverage even further. What better vehicle to give Ukrainian voters the
information and tools needed to make an informed choice, and send a
strong signal to the international community about this country's
commitment to free, fair and transparent elections?
However, any provision requiring private broadcasters to air debates,
besides its constitutional weaknesses, could be interpreted as a sign that
proponents of equal access are driven by strictly political as opposed
to
state-building or "patriotic" considerations. Theoretically, broadcast
licensing requirements could be amended to make airing of debates
mandatory for private TV broadcasters seeking to procure a new or
renew existing license. Yet, even this approach would engender
accusations of undue state interference in private business matters. In
the
end, retroactive amendments to existing licenses would bury present
efforts at getting a good debates bill actually signed by the President,
and
could also scare off potential media investors.
While it would be useful for all parties/blocs and individual candidates
to
subject themselves to public scrutiny through TV debates, Parliament
should remain focused at providing a solution at the national level. While
there will be many independent candidates running in single-mandate
constituencies with many interesting things to say, most serious candidates
will be affiliated in one way or another with a party or bloc. In districts
with a dozen or more candidates running for one mandate, logistical
problems could reduce the effectiveness of district debates broadcast on
regional state-run TV. Nonetheless, Parliament could at least attempt to
write a workable bill that would provide for such debates.
Financing debates is a significant issue that needs to be addressed. While
the argument that Ukraine cannot afford to throw money around in
organizing elections due to the difficult condition of state finances does
hold some water, those promoting a mandatory debates bill need to find
a
way to build public and elite support for substantial state budget financing.
It is not a question of infrastructure, and state TV journalists are not
highly
paid, but logistical expenses would nonetheless be considerable. Nothing
good or useful comes cheap or free, and if Parliament is unprepared to
scrounge in the state coffers (i.e. amend the 2002 Budget) then there is
little point in mandating what cannot or will not be paid for.
Finally, any bill mandating debates on state-run TV should contain
enforcement mechanisms that ensure a baseline level of quality and
fairness in the staging of particular discussions. The Presidential Decree
on Elections calling on state institutions to promote and support
transparency and openness in a variety of ways is a step in the right
direction. However, Parliament should find a way of insulating UT-1 and
regional state TV journalists and officials from pressure by specific
parties/blocs or candidates seeking to skew debates in their favor.
There is still time for Parliament to devise and pass a workable and
reasonable TV debate law that puts taxpayer money to work in the public
interest. The keys to passing a good bill are neutrality, focus and smart
negotiations. It could work.
The Ukrainian government has submitted the text of the
inter-governmental agreement "On transportation of Russian gas through
Ukrainian territory" to the Supreme Council, which contains a scheme to
restructure the [national oil and gas] Naftohaz Ukrayiny company's state
debts which accumulated in the last few years and now stand at 1.4bn
dollars. At a news conference organized after the signing of the
agreement, Ukrainian Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh said that Ukraine
recognized Russia as the leading energy supplier to Europe, so it
[Ukraine] has promised to abstain from actions which could pose any
threat to the implementation of this strategy.
Shortly after this, the government issued another resolution dismissing
the
national coordinator of Ukraine's participation in Eurasian transport
corridor and the director of the Druzhba oil pipeline, Lyubomyr Bunyak,
who has been supervising the construction of Odessa-Brody oil pipeline
in the last few years. Bunyak is also an ardent supporter of Ukraine's
commitment to its own transit potential.
Experts started talking about the chances for secret deals between top
officials in Kiev and Kremlin regarding Ukraine's refusal from its
intention to become a key link in the network bringing Asian energy
sources to Europe in exchange for the restructuring of its debts for
Russian gas and access for Ukrainian goods to Russian markets. This
concerned, first and foremost, products manufactured at pipe plants
controlled by Viktor Pinchuk, the common law son-in-law of President
Kuchma.
Our newspaper has asked the head of the parliamentary budget
committee and the deputy chairman of the Motherland Party, Oleksandr
Turchynov, to explain the situation around these issues.
[Journalist] How would you comment on Bunyak's dismissal and the
recent appointment of the head of Ukrtransnafta, Oleksandr Todiychuk,
to his post?
[Oleksandr Turchynov] Ukrtransnafta is a monopoly which is aiming to
collect significant amounts in both national and hard currencies and
control them unilaterally. Traditionally, in our country they create similar
institutions under the supervision of the presidential administration on
the
eve of an election campaign, since it is right before the election that
authorities need huge amounts of money. We remember how Naftohaz
Ukrayiny was created prior to elections, but this institution has been
accused of embezzlement and creating a 1.5bn-dollar-debt to Russia for
gas supplies. The same is happening with Ukrtransnafta now.
[Journalist] Most officials have welcomed the settlement of Ukraine's
gas debts to Russia. In their opinion, it was done by taking into account
Ukraine's national interests. The Russian press has even written that it
capitulated to official Kiev. Does it mean that Moscow really agreed to
significant concessions?
[Turchynov] No way. It would be absolutely uncommon for this
country's ruling elite.
The matter is that on the eve of this winter they, in fact, rescinded all
achievements gained by the Yushchenko government in energy sector,
and when [Yuliya] Tymoshenko was deputy prime minister [for the fuel
and energy sector]. The new government has shown its complete
inability to cope with preparatory works for the sector's performance
during the winter period. As usually happens in such cases, they are
looking for a man who will face these issues. In other words, they have
adopted a strategic decision to build an energy scheme at Russia's
expense, which envisages Ukraine's absolute dependence.
Earlier, after consistent opposition from the Yushchenko government, the
Kinakh government agreed to unite the Ukrainian and Russian energy
systems. Step by step we are losing our energy and economic
independence and turning into an appendage of its northern neighbour.
[Journalist] What is your forecast as to parliament's possible ratification
of the agreement between Russian and Ukrainian governments on the
transportation of Russian gas through our territory and restructuring of
gas debts?
[Turchynov] I hope that the Supreme Council will support the idea of
Ukraine having several sources for its energy supplies. We cannot afford
to be totally dependent on the Kremlin's will. In this case, the
construction of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline and the Odessa oil terminal
lose their sense, as do talks about Ukraine's participation in transporting
Caspian oil to Europe, and gas supplies not only from Russia, but also
from other countries in Central Asia.
The Russian monopoly means our returning to the situation which we
had in Ukraine two or three years ago, before the
Yushchenko-Tymoshenko government came and made serious steps to
diversify energy sources. All of this will be completely undermined with
our return to total energy dependence on Russian Federation, which
would lead not only to economic, but also political dependence.
Source: Vysokyy Zamok, Lviv, in Ukrainian 19 Oct 01, p 4.
"Freedom of information is...the touchstone of all the freedoms." (UN Freedom
of
Information Conference, 1948)
By Taras Kuzio
The rapid growth of the Internet in Ukraine had largely escaped the
authorities' attention until the 6 December presidential decree which finally
sought to rein in one of the country's last remaining independent media
outlets. The Internet had become "the most mobile medium and the least
vulnerable to censorship," according to the prestigious weekly, "Zerkalo
Nedeli/Tserkalo Tyzhnia."
Internet use in Ukraine has increased fivefold since 1999. From 2000 to
2001, it jumped by 30 to 40 percent. In recent years, computer prices have
dropped, since 85 percent of all computers sold in Ukraine are now
assembled domestically. In 2001, 400,000 personal computers were sold
(an annual increase of 22-25 percent) plus 10,000 computer notebooks (an
annual increase of 60 percent). Due to increased competition among
Ukraine's 260 Internet service providers -- which also increased their
revenues through higher volume of Internet advertisements -- the cost of
Internet connection has dropped dramatically. Add to that, cheap pirated
software and cheaper computers. All in all, the Internet is more affordable
and accessible in Ukraine.
Not surprisingly, Internet usage is most frequent in large cities, particularly
Kyiv, which accounts for half of the Internet use, and eastern Ukraine.
Lviv represents the only relatively large Internet use in the western part
of
the country. Rural areas and small towns suffer from more frequent
electricity cuts, fewer computer terminals, and worse telecommunications
infrastructure. Of the 18,301 websites registered in Ukraine as of April
2001, 5,772 were in Kyiv, followed by Odesa (1,309), Dnipropetrovsk
(901), Kharkiv (722), and Donetsk (550).
Ukrainian press reports that the Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) has
recently hired 3,000 computer experts attest to official concern about
the
expansion of a media they do not control. The authorities not only feared
a
new technology they did not fully understand, but also were concerned at
Internet use to promote opposition political parties and to expose official
misdeeds. Students and young people -- among whom English is the most
popular foreign language -- are increasing relying on the Internet to
conduct research as well as to read the Western media.
President Leonid Kuchma was alarmed that during 1999-2001, the Internet
became a key forum for opposition to the executive branch of government.
As independent print outlets were increasingly stifled, the Internet was
"performing the role that samizdat did in the 1960s in the USSR," the
newspaper "Ukrainska moloda" wrote last year. Until the "Kuchmagate"
scandal of November 2000, authorities were unperturbed by the Internet
because its audience was limited -- compared to the broadcast and print
media controlled by them and their oligarch allies. Only in 2001 did the
executive branch of the Ukrainian government establish its own website
(www.kuchma.gov.ua).
The main Internet site to seize on the "Kuchmagate" scandal was
"Ukrainska pravda" -- launched on 17 April 2000 by Hryhoriy Gongadze
and its current editor, Olena Prytula -- five months before Gongadze's
still-unsolved murder. The "Kuchmagate" scandal led to public demands
for prompt and unbiased information. This is reflected in visits to the
"Ukraina pravda" site, which increased from 3,000 per day to 80,000
during the December 2000 parliamentary deliberations over the scandal,
exceeding the circulation figures for the pro-presidential hard-copy
newspapers, such as "Kievskiye vedomosti."
The authorities were also concerned that the Internet allegedly provided
a
negative image of Ukraine to the outside world. During the "Kuchmagate"
scandal, Ukraine's international image indeed drastically worsened. But
the
authorities, by blaming the Internet for highlighting their misdeeds, show
they do not understand the media's role as the "fourth estate" in a
democratic society. For example, President Kuchma recently complained
that the Internet was a "killer" because it was always pouring out "dirt"
through "anonymous information."
Reflecting such official concerns, in 2001 a special Internet Administration
was set up in the State Committee for Information Policy, Television, and
Radio. The SBU is also attempting to take over control of the ".ua" (the
Ukraine Internet country code since 1992) domain-name registration. This
".ua" system is controlled by a San Francisco-based networks
administrator, Dmytro Kohmaniuk, through the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). On 31 October, the National
Security and Defense Council (NSDC) passed a resolution "On Methods
to Improve State Information Policy and Ensure Ukraine's Information
Security." This was followed by a 12 November meeting with Internet
journalists where Yevhun Marchuk, NSDC secretary and former
Ukrainian KGB and SBU chairman, complained that the Internet
constituted a threat to Ukrainian national security due to its large volume
of compromising material. Marchuk said "the state cannot ignore a new
developing phenomenon, to just stand by and have no influence on it." A
presidential decree dated 6 December (1193/2001) implemented the 31
October resolution, which in turn followed an earlier Internet decree dated
31 July 2000 and five previous "information policy" decrees in July 1997;
April, July, and December 2000, and April 2001.
The 6 December 2001 decree ordered the Cabinet of Ministers to
undertake a range of detailed measures within one-, two-, three-, six-
, and
eight-month deadlines. Within one month, the cabinet is to draw up a draft
law on a "National Information Policy Concept and Ukraine's Information
Security." A more detailed licensing procedure for Internet service
providers is to be introduced, requiring that they retain copies of Internet
traffic for six months. It is disturbing to note the SBU role in the licensing
of Internet providers and potential SBU access to Internet traffic in the
"interests of national security." The SBU is also instructed to come up
with
proposals to improve its work against "information aggression and
specialist information-propagandistic operations" undertaken by foreign
intelligence services.
A recent example of how the SBU may deploy the notion that the Internet
constitutes a national security "threat" was its 26 November house search
of Oleh Yeltsov, editor of the "Ukraina Kriminalnaya"
(www.cripo.com.ua) website. The court order which sanctioned the SBU
action alleged that it was being undertaken in order to "prevent the release
of confidential information." After the search, Yeltsov's computer was
disabled. The reason the SBU undertook this action is probably because
Yeltsov's website had recently begun to include translations from the
"RFE/RL Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism Watch." The SBU seems to
be oblivious to the fact that the Internet does not respect state frontiers.
If
the "Kriminalnaya Ukraina" website is shut down, Ukrainian surfers can
simply go to www.rferl.org to obtain the information.
Various Western organizations, such as Freedom House and Reporters
without Borders, have chronicled the deteriorating media situation in
Ukraine since the late 1990s. In 1999 and 2001, the Committee to Protect
Journalists placed President Kuchma among the world's top 10 "Enemies
of the Press." As the authorities attempt to exert control over the Internet,
Ukraine's reputation as a country with a poor record on media freedom is
now likely to worsen even further.
Taras Kuzio is a Research Associate at the Centre for Russian and East
European
Studies, University of Toronto.
1. Volodymyr Lytvyn, partiløs, formand for
Præsidentens Administration
2. Anatolij Kinakh, leder af Industri-og erhvervspartiet,
Ukraines premierminister
3. Kateryna Vasjtjuk, næstformand for Ukraines
Agrarparti (AP), folkedeputeret.
4. Volodymyr Bojko, leder af Mariupols metalfabrik
im. Illitja, medlem af Regionernes Parti (RP)
5. Viktor Skopenko, rektor for Det nationale Taras
Shevtjenko Universitet, medlem af Industri-og erhvervspartiet.
6. Valerij Pustovojtenko, transportminister og formand
for Det folkedemokratiske Part (NDP)i
7. Serhij Tihipko, leder af partiet "Arbejdets Ukraine",
folkedeputeret.
8. Volodymyr Seminozhenko, vice-premierminister
for humanitære anliggender og leder af RP
9. Mykhajlo Hladij, guvernør i Lviv-regionen
og formand for AP
10. Heorhij Kyrpa, første vice-transportminister
og leder af Ukraines Jernbaner
11. Andrij Derkatj, folkedeputeret og medlem af
partiet "Arbejdets Ukraine"
12. Serhij Bubka, medlem af Regionernes Parti og
præsident for "Serhij Bubkas klub"
13. Mykola Onisjtjuk, næstformand i Industri-og
erhvervspartiet og præsident for advokatfirmaet "Juris"
14. Anatolij Tovstoukhov, rådgiver for Ukraines
præsident, medlem af NDP
15. Mykhajlo Zubets, næstformand for Agrarpartiet
og præsident for Ukraines Akademi for landbrugsvidenskab
16. Ivan Kyrylenko, landbrugsminister, medlem af
Agrarpartiet
17. Oleksandr Karpov, formand for NDPs fraktion
i Radaen
18. Vasyl Hurejev, Industriminister og medlem af
Industri-og erhvervspartiet
19. Ivan Kuras, direktør for Institut for
politiske og etnisk-nationale studier udner Ukraines videnskabernes akademi,
medlem af Regionernes Parti.
20. Ihor Sharov, næstformand for "Arbejdets
Ukraine", folkedeputeret
21. Dmytro Tabatjnyk, næstformand for "Arbejdets
Ukraine", folkedeputeret
22. Rafil Safiullin, Præsident for Den professionelle
fodboldliga, medlem af RP
23. Vitalij Majko, medlem af Industri-og erhvervspartiet,
direktør for fabrikken "Burevisnyk"
24. Oleh Zarubinskyj, medlem af NDP, regeringens
repræsentant i Radaen
25. Valerij Samoplavskyj, medlem af AP, formand
for Statskomiteen for skovbrug
26. Valerij Martynovskyj, medlem af AP, folkedeputeret,
næstformand for udvalg i Radaen
27. Serhij Shevtjuk, medlem af NDP, statssekretær
i sundhedsministeriet
28. Tariel Vasadze, medlem af Industri-og erhvervspartiet,
adm. direktør for den tekniske servicestation "AvtoZAZ"
29. Hennadij Samofalov, medlem af RP, formand for
Den Alukrainske borgerorganisation "Anti-korruptions Forum"
30. Larysa Poljakova, partiløs, næstformand
i sekretariatet for unionen af ledere af Ukraines lokale og regionale myndigheder
Den autonome Republik Krim. : Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Volodymyr
Mazurenko, "Arbejdets Ukraine" (AU).
1. kreds, Simferopol: V. Kyrytjenko - SBU-general, partiløs
3. kreds, Dzhankoj: S. Ivanov - folkedeputeret, AU
4. kreds, Jevpatorija: A. Rakhanskyj, folkedeputeret, AU
5. kreds, Kertj: O. Petrotjenkov, formand for bestyrelsen i A/S "Kertjs
metalfabrik"
6. kreds, Feodosija: V. Gorbatov, Krims premierminister, AU
8. kreds, Krasnogvardejskoje: V. Shepel - SBUs repræsentant i
Interpols nationale bureau, partiløs
9. kreds, Krasnoperekopsk: A. Kornijtjuk - præsidentens permanente
repræsentant på Krim, Agrarpartiet (AP)
Vinnytsa-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Serhij Tjornolutskyj,
Det folkedemokratiske Parti (NDP).
11. kreds, Vinnytsa: O. Dombrovskyj - direktør i "Pivdenno-maskinbyggeri",
NDP
13. kreds, Kalynivka: M. Melnyk - direktør i Kozjatynskyj kødfabrik,
AP
14. kreds, Zhmerynka: O. Shpak, folkedeputeret, AU
15. kreds, Illintsi: H. Kaletnyk, formand for regionalradaen, NDP
16. kreds, Tuljtjyn: I. Kalnitjenko, souschef i skattevæsnet,
Regionernes Parti (RP)
17. kreds, Kryzhopil: A. Kulikov, souschef for politiet i Kyiv, partiløs
general
Volyn-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Vitalij Zaremba, som
også er vice-guvernør i regionen.
19. kreds, Volodymyr-Volynskyj: S. Kovaltjuk - leder af firmaet "Ukrapetrol"
20. kreds, Horokhiv: V. Zaremba - vice-guvernør og leder af
AP i Vinnytsa-regionen
21. kreds, Kovel: M. Martynenko - folkedeputeret, NDP
22. kreds, Lutsk: O. Svyryda, folkedeputeret, AU
23. kreds, Manevytji: I. Jeremejev, leder af firmaet "Kontinium", AP
Dnipropetrovsk-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Petro Kravtjenko,
som også er vice-guvernør i regionen, NDP.
24. kreds, Dnipropetrovsk: A. Klymenko, partiløs, souschef i
det regionale skattevæsen
25. kreds, Dnipropetrovsk: S. Bytjkov, AU, souschef i det regionale
skattevæsen
26. kreds, Dnipropetrovsk: V. Pintjuk, folkedeputeret, AU
27. kreds, Dnipropetrovsk: L. Serhijenko, adm. direktør i "Dnipromain",
Industri-og erhvervspartiet (PPPU)
29. kreds, Dniprodzerzhynsk: V. Karpenko, adm. direktør i "Lotsman",
AP
30. kreds, Dniprodzerzhynsk: M. Koljutjyj, fællestillidsmand
på metalfabrik, partiløs
31. kreds, Kryvyj Rih: V. Movtjan, bestyrelsesformand i "Hornyj kombinat",
NDP
32. kreds, Kryvyj Rih: V. Hurov, folkedeputeret, NDP
34. kreds, Zhovti Vody: M. Kolesnik, adm. direktør i "Sevgok",
NDP
35. kreds, Nikopol: V. Dratjevskyj, kriminalinspektør i regionen,
AU
36. kreds, Pavlohrad: L. Derkatj, general i SBU, partiløs (ex-SBU
chef, red.)
37. kreds, Apostolove: Larysa Trofymenko, folkedeputeret, AP
38. kreds, Novomoskovsk: O. Kasianenko, afdelingschef i SBU i regionen,
AU
39. kreds, Pokrovske (Vasylkivske): O. Shevtjenko, vice-guvernør,
AP
40. kreds, Solone: O. Sheveljev - leder af den regionale vandforsyning,
AP
Donetsk-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Serhij Larin, folkedeputeret,
NDP
42. kreds, Donetsk: Tetyana Bakhtejeva, overlæge, Regionernes
Parti (RP)
43. kreds, Donetsk: Ju. Zviahilskyj, folkedeputeret, RP
44. kreds, Donetsk: V. Landyk, adm. direktør for koncernen "Grupa
Nord", RP
45. kreds, Donetsk: V. Rybak, folkedeputeret, RP
46. kreds, Artemivsk: A. Kliujev, souschef i det regionale skattevæsen,
RP
48. kreds, Horlivka: M. Jankovskyj, folkedeputeret, RP
49. kreds, Dobropillja: L. Bajsarov, bestyrelsesformand i A/S "Vuhilna
kompanija shakhta Krasnoarmijska zakhidna nr. 1", RP
51. kreds, Kostiantynivka: leder af skattevæsnet i Kostiantynivka,
RP
52. kreds, Kramatorsk: H. Skudar, bestyrelsesformand i A/S "Mashzavod",
RP
53. kreds, Makijivka: V. Khomutynnyk, formand for byrådet i Makijivka,
RP
54. kreds, Makijivka: V. Avramenko, direktionsformand i firmaet "Plus",
RP
55. kreds, Mariupol: S. Matvijenkov, folkedeputeret, RP
56. kreds, Mariupol: O. Koloniari, vice-direktør for A/S "Azovstal",
RP
57. kreds, Selydove: I. Shkirja, præsident for A/S "Ilitash",
RP
58. kreds, Slovjansk: O. Lesjtjynskyj, folkedeputeret, RP
59. kreds, Snizhne: V. Turmanov, formand for kulminearbejdernes fagforening,
partiløs
60. kreds, Khartsyzsk: V. Zubanov, bestyrelsesformand i A/S "Silur",
NDP
61. kreds, Marjinka: H. Vasyljev, folkedeputeret, AU
62. kreds, Volnovakha: V. Konovaljuk, folkedeputeret, RP
63. kreds, Starobesheve: V. Slauta, souschef i det regionale skattevæsen,
AP
Zhytomyr-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Volodymyr Matjushenko,
der er direktør i INTEI, RP
65. kreds, Berdytjiv: M. Kovalko, folkedeputeret, NDP
66. kreds, Novohrad-Volynskyj: V. Zahryvyj, ansat i udenrigsministeriet,
partiløs
69. kreds, Tjudniv: V. Lukjanenko, direktør i PP "Svitanok",
NDP
Zakarpatska-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Volodymyr Prykhodko,
der er vice-guvernør og fra NDP.
72. kreds, Berehove: M. Kovatj, folkedeputeret, partiløs
74. kreds, Khust: O. Klimpush, Ukraines ambassadør i Ungarn,
partløs
75. kreds, Rakhiv: V. Lintur, souschef i det regionale skattevæsen,
PPPU
Zaporizhzhja-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Borys Petrov,
bestyrelsesformand i A/S "Ukrgrafit", RP
76. kreds, Zaporizhzhja: S. Belikov, Universitetsrektor, NDP
78. kreds, Zaporizhzhja: H. Horlov, ledende ingeniør ved "Zaporizhstal",
RP
79. kreds, Zaporizhzhja: Ja. Sukhyj, folkedeputeret, AU
80. kreds, Berdjansk: I. Bastyha, bestyrelsesformand i A/S "ZALK",
RP
81. kreds, Vasylivka: V. Bronnikov, præsident for atomenergiselskab,
RP
82. kreds, Melitopol: A. Mangul, folkedeputeret, AU
83. kreds, Mykhajlivka: V. Butsanov, souschef i det regionale skattevæsen,
AP
84. kreds, Polohy: O. Peklushenko, formand for den regionale forbrugerunion,
RP
Ivano-Frankivsk-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Bohdan Kostyum,
som også er vice-guvernør, AP
86. kreds, Kalush: I. Zvarytj, souschef i det regionale skattevæsen,
RP
87. kreds, Kolomija: Z. Mytnyk, formand for den regionale rada, partiløs
88. kreds, Halytj: B. Kljuk, vice-statssekretær i energi-og brændselsministeriet
Kyiv-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Ihor Nauda - assistent
for folkedeputeret
91. kreds, Bila Tserkva: I. Tkalenko, folkedeputeret, RP
92. kreds, Volodarka: H. Bondarenko, souschef i skattevæsnet,
RP
93. kreds, Myronivka: V. Sivkovytj, forretningsmand, RP
94. kreds, Obukhiv, Tetyana Zasukha, folkedeputeret, AP
95. kreds, Irpin', P. Melnyk, folkedeputeret, rektor, NDP
96. kreds, Ivanivka, S. Osyka, rådgiver for præsidenten,
partiløs
98. kreds, Perejaslav-Khmelnytskyj: M. Petrenko, præsident for
A/S "Toptrans", partiløs
Kirovohradska-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Inna Krasnosjtjok,
som er leder af NDP i regionen.
101. kreds, Holovanivsk: M. Poplavskyj, rektor ved Det nationale institut
for kultur og kunstarter, AU
102. kreds, Znamjanka: V. Bojko, adm. direktør i "Agrotekh",
AP
103. kreds, Oleksandrija: O. Jedin, folkedeputeret, AU
Luhansk-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Valentyn Don', som
er formand for industri-og erhvervsforbundet i Donbas, PPPU
104. kreds, Luhansk: V. Nadraha, formand for pensionsfonden, NDP
106. kreds, Altjevsk: E. Skitishvili, adm. direktør ved metalfabrik,
AU
108. kreds, Krasnyj Lutj: Ljudmyla Kyrytjenko, direktør i firmaet
"Berehynja", AU
109. kreds, Lysytjansk: V. Poltavets, direktør for "Luhanskvuhillja",
NDP
110. kreds, Antratsyt: V. Budagjants, adm. direktør for Luhansk
sammenslutning for valseproduktion, NDP
111. kreds, Slovjansk: H. Astrov-Shumylov, adm. direktør i DKKh,
PPPU
112. kreds, Severodonetsk: Ju. Joffe, folkedeputeret, AU
113. kreds, Stanitjno-Luhanske, M. Hapotjka, 1.viceformand for statskomiteen
for reserver, AP
114. kreds, Svatove: Kateryna Fomenko, formand for regionalradaens
permanente finans-og budgetkommission
fortsættelse følger
Mykolajiv-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Hennadij Nikonenko,
der er vice-guvernør, RP
128. kreds, Mykolajiv: M. Rykhanskyj, vice-guvernør, NDP
129. kreds, Mykolajiv: O. Kuzmuk, militærmand (tidligere forsvarsminister,
red.), partiløs
130. kreds, Mykolajiv: M. Karpenko, formand for distriktsstatsadministration
131. kreds, Bashtanka: I. Shulha, vice-guvernør, formand for
AP i regionen
132. kreds, Voznesensk: V. Akopjan: folkedeputeret, AP
Odesa-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Mykola Bohojavlenskyj,
der er vice-guvernør, RP
134. kreds, Odesa: O. Kozatjenko, direktør i virksomheden "Pankomjun",
AP
135. kreds, Odesa: Ljudmyla Budjak, direktør for rekreationscenter
for børn, RP
136. kreds, Odesa: M. Pavljuk, Havnechef, NDP
138. kreds, Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyj: M. Shvedenko, formand for statskomiteen
for fiskeriet, AP
139. kreds, Biljajivka: S. Strebko, Chef for havnen i Illitjevsk, Ukraines
helt, PPPU
140. kreds, Bolhrad: Ju. Kruk, folkedeputeret, NDP
141. kreds, Artsyz: A. Kisse, formand for distriktsstatsadministration
i Illitjevsk, formand for Odesas eksekutivkomite, formand for Ukrainsk
bulgarsk samfund, AP
143. kreds: L. Klimov, præsident for finansgruppen "Prymorje",
RP
144. kreds, Rozdilna: V. Kalintjuk, folkedeputeret og leder af APs
regionale organisation
Poltava-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - endnu ikke bekræftet.
146. kreds, Poltava: M. Skrypnikov, rektor for medicinsk akademi, AP
147. kreds, Krementjuk: Olena Sheremetjeva, formand for distriktsstatsadministration,
AP
149. kreds, Myrhorod: H. Rudenko, rådgiver for præsidenten
for selskabet "Ukrhazkontrakt", AP
151. kreds, Karlivka: Svitlana Svysjtjeva, vice-guvernør, NDP
152. kreds, Lokhvytsa: M. Kyrytjenko, folkedeputeret, AU
Rivne-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Vasyl Hlusjtjuk, næstformand
for APs regionale organisation
155. kreds, Dubny: O. Tjupryna, vice-guvernør, AP
157. kreds, Sarny: M. Shershun, adm. direktør i Rivnes statslige
skovbrugssammenslutning "Rivnelis", AP
Sumska-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Volodymyr Hramotin,
der er vice-direktør i "Sumykhimprom", PPPU
158. kreds, Sumy: Je. Lapin, adm. direktør i "Sumykhimprom",
partiløs
159. kreds, Bilopilja: O. Tsarenko, rektor for det natioale landbrugsuniversitet,
formand for APs regionale organisation
160. kreds, Hlukhiv: M. Nosjtjenko, vice-præsident for den ukrainske
velgørende fond for økologi og social sikkerhed "Vores fremtid",
AU
162. kreds, Romny, I. Rishnjak, adm. direktør for statslige
A/S "Ukraines brød", AP
163. kreds, Okhtyrka, H. Dashutin, folkedeputeret, AU
Ternopil-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Stepan Denesiuk, PPPU
164. kreds, Ternopil: R. Jaremtjuk, adm. direktør for "Varta",
partiløs
165. kreds, Kremenets: M. Romaniv, souschef i A/S "Naftohaz Ukrajiny",
pariløs
166. kreds, Butjatj: S. Slobodjan, A/S "Nadra", partiløs
167. kreds, Terebovlja: M. Tsymbaljuk, souschef i det regionale politi,
partiløs
Kharkiv-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Oleksandr Kryvtsov,
der er vice-guvernør, NDP
169. kreds, Kharkiv: L. Isajev, adm. direktør for "Metropoliten",
RP
170. kreds, Kharkiv: S. Kosinov, senior lektor ved juridisk akademi,
NDP
171. kreds, Kharkiv: O. Sydorenko, formand for uddannelsesafdelingen
under Kharkivs statsadministration, NDP
172. kreds, Kharkiv: V. Salygin, folkedeputeret, NDP
173. kreds, Kharkiv: V. Tymosjtjenkov, direktør for fabrikken
"Elektrovantmash", NDP
174. kreds, Kharkiv: O. Feldman, præsident for koncernen "AVEK",
NDP
175. kreds, Derhatji: O. Bandurka, folkedeputeret, NDP
177. kreds, Tjuhujiv: S. Havrysh, folkedeputeret, partiløs
. kreds, Kupjansk: V. Potapov, vice-guvernør,
RP
180. kreds, Lozova: I. Diak, folkedeputeret, NDP
182. kreds, Kharkiv: O. Karatumanov, adm. direktør for virksomheden
"Region" under den ukrainske præsidentadministrations afdeling for
sager, AP
Kherson-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Petro Laznyk, der er
1. souschef for direktoratet for landbrug og fødevarer, AP
183. kreds, Kherson: O. Zhuravko, præsident for Assosiationen
af arbejdsduelige invalider, NDP
184. kreds, Kherson: D. Motornyj, formand for POK "Zorja" i Bilozerskyj
distriktet, to gange det socialistiske arbejdes helt, AP
185. kreds, Nova Kakhovka: V. Omeltjuk, Statsfonden for byggeri til
ungdommen, partiløs
187. kreds, Kakhovka: M. Bahrajev, præsident for den landsdækkende
ukrainske festival "Tavrijski ihry", AU
Khmelnytskyj-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Anatolij Ovtjaruk,
der er vice-guvernør, RP
189. kreds, Volotjynsk: V. Olujko, rektor for institut i Khmelnytskyj,
NDP
190. kreds, Derazhnja: V. Shpak, adm. direktør i de ukrainske
jernbaner, AP
191. kreds, Khmelnytskyj: A. Tjikal, folkedeputeret, AU
192. kreds, Kamjanets-Podilskyj: A. Ovtjaruk, vice-givernør,
RP
Tjerkasy-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Serhij Teresjtjuk,
vice-guvernør, AP
195. kreds, Horodysjtje: Serhij Teresjtjuk, vice-guvernør, AP
196. kreds, Zolotonosha: P. Dushejko, formand for Tjornobajivska distriktsstatsadministrationen,
AP
197. kreds, Smila: Tetyana Kyrytjuk, formand for Tjerkasys regionale
ungdomskomite, NDP
199. kreds, Uman: P. Kuzmenko, adm. direktør for PF "Shans",
NDP
200. kreds, Tjerkasy: B. Rajkov, adm. direktør for "Azot", partiløs
Tjernivtsy-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Jevhen Horda, der
er formand for PPPUs regionale organisation
202. kreds, Tjernivtsi: V. Prjadko, universitetsrektor, NDP
203. kreds, Kitsman: M. Shevtjuk, vice-guvernør, AP
204. kreds, Novoselytsa: M. Bauer, formand for den regionale statsadministrations
uddannelsesdirektorat, AU
205. kreds, Khotyn: L. Kadenjuk, rådgiver for Ukraines præsident,
NDP
Tjernihiv-regionen: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Mykola Litvinov,
der er vice-guvernør
206. kreds, Tjernihiv: Jevhen Ananko, folkedeputeret, RP
207. kreds, Tjernihiv: Petro Ustenko, folkedeputeret, AP
209. kreds, Nizhyn: Ivan Pljusjtj, formand for Verkhovna Rada, folkedeputeret,
NDP
210. kreds, Pryluky: F. Zhpig, folkedeputeret, AU
211. kreds, Sosnytsa: O. Petrov, folkedeputeret, NDP
KYIV: Leder af "ZaJEdU!"s valgstab - Jurij Abakanovytj
213. kreds: I. Palamar, leder af medicinsk sammenslutning, RP
214. kreds: V. Novik, direktoratsformand i Kyivs bystyre
215. kreds: Ja. Kondratjev, rektor ved indenrigsministeriets akademi,
partiløs
216. kreds: V. Khmiljovskyj, institutleder ved Kyivs humanistiske universitet,
NDP
217. kreds: A. Vakulenko, direktør for statslig A/S "Kyiv-fabrikken
"Radar", PPPU
218. kreds: M. Pidmohylnyj, vice-borgmester i Kyiv, NDP
220. kreds: O. Nahorskyj, bestyrelsesformand i kreditsammenslutning,
RP
223. kreds: V. Volkov, adm. direktør i JV "Khitshild-Ukraine",
NDP
SEVASTOPOL
224. kreds: I. Vernydubov, chef for byens skattevæsen, RP
225. kreds: V. Zajtjko, vice-borgmester, NDP
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