Arkiv - 1999-2001
 

03.12.01. De politiske sympatier i Dnipropetrovsk-regionen

03.12.01. 48% ville stemme "ja" til uafhængighed i dag

04.12.01. Medvedtjuk afviser Melnitjenko-forbindelse

04.12.01. Skattechefen om sproget og valget

05.12.01. Kinakh og Lytvyn stiller op for "For et samlet Ukraine"

RCC POLITICAL REVIEW Volume 1, Issue 5 (5) November 29, 2001

07.12.01. Opinion: Much Ado about the Administrative Resource

Broadly speaking, adminresurs refers to the organizational, financial and
psychological levers available through and to the country's executive
branch of government. Those levers were used in past elections to
influence Ukrainian voters, through disinformation campaigns in the
media, to outright purchasing of votes through pre-electoral gifts. And,
for the most part, Ukrainian voters do not seem to mind.

The resource has its origins in the one-party, strongly centralized and
hierarchical system of Soviet times. Today, it is based on the informal ties
that bind the new nomenklatura and the national bureaucracy. The
adminresurs of contemporary Ukraine is composed of two integral parts.
First and foremost, it is the extra-constitutional institution commonly
known as the Presidential Administration (PA). The second but
somewhat less important part is the Cabinet of Ministers' network
throughout the country. The two are interdependent, but the PA enjoys
greater de facto power and influence.

Adminresurs is normally bantered about in conjunction with another
mainstay of the Ukrainian political scene - the "party of power." The
party of power is the political force (party or bloc) that unequivocally
supports the president, and in turn is supported by him. In the 1998
parliamentary elections, that privilege went to the NDP - People's
Democratic Party, led by then-Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoitenko.

During the 1998 parliamentary elections, the NDP was the primary
beneficiary of the administrative resource. In those elections, its party list
received 5.01% of the popular vote giving the party 17 seats in
parliament. That core group was joined by 71 MPs elected in single
mandate, simple majority constituencies. By August 1998, the NDP was
the second largest faction in parliament, with 88 members. Going into
these elections, the NDP faction has dwindled down to the original
number of 17 MPs.

In preparation for the 2002 elections, the NDP, Trudova Ukrayina
(Labour Ukraine), the Party of the Regions and the Agrarian Party
formed an electoral bloc called Za Yedynu Ukrayinu. Journalists
originally christened the bloc with the unflattering TUNDRA moniker (a
compilation of the parties' acronyms). Now, the bloc is popularly known
as ZaYedu.

Funny sounding names aside, this bloc unites some of the country's most
powerful people and institutions into a single political force. The bloc
recently announced its leader will be the current chief of the Presidential
Administration, Volodymyr Lytvyn. In so doing, it received both
nationwide cohesion and the president's blessing. Shortly thereafter,
Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh, who also leads the Ukrainian
Industrialists' & Entrepreneurs' Party (PPPU), announced that his party
will also join ZaYedu. Prior to becoming president, Leonid Kuchma
headed up the forerunner of the PPPU and was also prime minister.

This combination of executive branch resources and parties with
presidential blessings is formidable. For all intents and purposes, it
combines the power of the Presidential Administration, the Cabinet of
Ministers, government procurement and budget allocation, the State Tax
Administration, State Border Committee (now headed by Lytvyn's
brother, Mykola), and the vertical structure of the executive branch from
oblast governors, to regional and village-level appointees. The ZaYedu
bloc includes the financial might of the densely-populated industrial
Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine. Combined with the military, interior
police, state-controlled national and regional media and potential allies in
the clergy, all of these assets can be used to harvest a bumper crop of
votes in 2002. Indeed, insiders have suggested that these forces have
been charged with the task of ensuring that there is a solid,
unconditionally pro-presidential majority in the next parliament.

The clergy and military personnel are important because public opinion
surveys have repeatedly shown that the Church (denomination
undefined) and the Army, are societal institutions that enjoy the highest
"trust rating" in Ukraine. Thus, endorsements from the pulpits and
barracks can be used to direct the undecided vote in the country.

Sounds Sinister? In developed democracies such a heavy-handed
conglomerate would be inconceivable. But this is democracy Ukrainian
style. Ukraine is still reeling from the totalitarian experience of the Soviet
Union, which established a dictatorship of a single individual and a strong
center of command power.

As such, the adminresurs continues to play an important role in defining
the Ukrainian political psyche. In the past, the director of a factory told
the workers to vote for a particular communist from a list of only
communists. In recent elections, factory workers are told by their
director to "vote for Candidate X and Party Y - or else." Today,
however, it is substantially different (and indeed, disturbing) when the
factory worker prefers to be instructed on how to vote.

This is part of the Soviet legacy - choices were made on society's behalf
by a small group of individuals. People grew accustomed to having their
minds made up for them, as long as they were employed, and able to live
reasonably well. The ten year post-Soviet experience has failed to inspire
Ukrainians and instill faith in the political system. On the one hand, some
voters may be simply passive, and prefer to stay in the psychological
comfort zone of not having to take responsibility for their choices. On the
other hand, why participate in a system that has benefited a select few at
its very top?

Ukrainians "have learned how to survive, but haven't learned how to
defend their rights," write the editors of Zerkalo Nedeli, summing up the
past turbulent year of Ukrainian political life. "The mechanisms each
individual uses are not suitable for resolving large-scale conflicts. To find
ways out of them, it's not enough to bribe your communal service
superintendent, to have good relationships with your tax inspector, to get
an influential friend of yours to make the necessary phone call when you
apply for a job. The country does not have effective mechanisms for
protecting citizens' rights at the micro-level. What can you expect at the
macro-level? Nevertheless, the majority of citizens accept this state of
affairs."

Democracy's cheerleaders would do well to bear this in mind when
considering mechanisms for helping to ensure free and democratic
elections. In the past, technical assistance has focused on voter education
intended to "get the vote out" and monitor election-day violations.
Ukrainians have consistently recorded voter turn out rates that stir the
envy of some developed democracies. And the law that sets the rules of
the game for these elections, albeit imperfect, greatly reduces the
opportunities for ballot fraud.

The focus for these elections needs to be voter empowerment.
Ukrainians need help in realizing that their interaction with politicians is
not only limited to the ballot box. In addition to issue awareness and
"how to pick a candidate" campaigns, this election season provides an
opportunity to familiarize Ukrainians with the obligations an MP has
before her and his voters, and what responsibility voters have before
their elected MP. The relationship between MP and voter is spelled out
by provisions in the Law on Peoples' Deputies and by relevant
Constitutional Court rulings. They explain such norms as the minimum
time an MP is required to spend with voters, and how an MP can be
relieved of his or her parliamentary mandate.

Rousseau wrote "Once people are accustomed to masters, they are no
longer in a position to get along without them." In Ukraine, the electorate
has grown accustomed to the administrative resource. The
master-servant relationship developed by the Communist nomenklatura
and Soviet citizens can only be reversed with a fundamental change in the
perception and realities of responsibilities: government as service
provider, citizens as taxpayers whom the government serves. Only after
that shift occurs, will Ukraine be able to boast the birth of a democratic
tradition.
 

07.12.01. Parliament Election Law in Numbers and Dates

The following are highlights and campaign milestones in the coming
campaign and vote. All numbers and dates cite to the Election Law or
Constitution of Ukraine as appropriate. All dates are based on our
calculations. The official dates will be posted with time by the CEC at its
web-site http://www.cvk.ukrpack.net .

Readers searching for in-depth information on this legislation's
compliance with internationally accepted standards for free and
transparent elections should see the Review prepared by the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) at the OSCE and
released in Warsaw on November 26, 2001. ODIHR is located at
http://www.osce.org/odihr/ .

The election process is managed by the Central Electoral Committee.
There will be 225 District Electoral Committees, and more than 32,000
Election Precincts

Numbers

Number of registered voters in Ukraine TBD:
This number will be available following the formation of final voter lists
during the course of the campaign. In the run-up to the 1998 Parliament
election there were 37,540,092 registered voters.

Voting age:
18 years old on Election Day (Article 2.1)

Age to be nominated a candidate for Parliament:
21 years old on Election Day (Article 8.1)

Total Member of Parliament mandates in Parliament:
450 (Constitution of Ukraine, Article 76)

Number of ballots a voter may cast for Parliament:
2 (one in a single-mandate constituency, one for Party/Bloc lists) (Article 3.2)

Cap on individual campaign contributions:
1,000 untaxed minimum monthly incomes (17,000 UAH - $3225)
(Article 36.4)

MPs to be elected via Party/Bloc lists: 225 (Article 1.3.1)

Pledge amount needed to register a Party/Bloc list :
15,000 untaxed minimum monthly incomes (255,000 UAH - $48,387)
(Article 43.1)

Official campaign spending cap for Party/Bloc:
150,000 untaxed minimum monthly incomes (2,550,000 UAH -
$483,870) to be disbursed exclusively from the Party/Bloc's official bank
account) (Article 36.3)

Minimum Party/Bloc airtime on national TV and radio:
30 minutes for each Party/Bloc during prime-time (Between 7 - 10 pm)
(Articles 54.2, 54.5)

(Broadcasters are required to provide this time as a public service. Parties/Blocs
are free to purchase additional airtime within the limits of their official campaign
budgets. Parties/Blocs and District Candidates draw lots at the CEC and/or
District Election Commissions to determine their order of appearance on public
service airtime. Article 54.8)

Minimum Party/Bloc airtime on regional TV and radio:
20 minutes prime time per Party/Bloc in each region (Articles 54.2, 54.5)

Minimum percentage of votes a Party/Bloc must obtain through party list
voting:
4% - In 1998, parties needed to gather roughly 1 million votes to pass
this barrier. (Article 76.2)

Deputies to be elected in (Single-Mandate) Constituencies (Districts):
225 (Article 1.3.2)

Pledge amount needed to register a candidate in a District:
60 untaxed minimum monthly incomes (1,020 UAH - $193.50) (Article 43.2)

Official campaign spending cap for a candidate in a District:
10,000 untaxed minimum monthly incomes (170,000 UAH - $32,258)
(Article 36.3)

Minimum District candidate airtime on regional TV and radio:
10 minutes each prime time (Articles 54.2, 54.6)

Number of District Election Commission Members:
12 - 20 (Article 20.1)

Number of voters in an Election Precinct:
20 - 3,000 (Article 17.6)

Minimum number of Precinct Election Commission Members:
8 (no maximum was set) (Article 21.1)
 
 

Dates and Deadlines

September 1, 2001 (Sept. 1 of Year Preceding Election)

General Voter Lists prepared by local government institutions on the
basis of information available at local departments of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, State Tax Administration and Ministry of Justice. (Article 30.1)

0000 Hours January 1, 2002

Official start of election campaign according to CEC Head Mykhailo
Riabets at a Nov. 20, 2001 press conference

CEC forms 225 Single-Mandate Constituencies (Districts) (Article 16.3)

January 3

Party/Bloc submissions to CEC of their lists of candidates (Article 40.7)

January 5

Start of nomination of candidates in Districts (Article 38.4)

Party/Bloc submissions to CEC of proposed members of District
Election Commission (Article 20.1)

January 10

CEC forms District Election Commissions (Article 20.1)

National Bank of Ukraine, with CEC approval, establishes procedure
for opening and closing bank accounts belonging to Party/Blocs and
District candidates' election bank accounts (Article 34.2)

January 25

End of nomination of candidates in Districts (Article 38.4)

January 30

Deadline for District candidates to submit all required paperwork to
District Election Commissions (Article 46.2)

Five Days after submission of all required paperwork by candidate in
District to the relevant election commission

Relevant District Election Commission registers or furnishes refusal to
register the said candidate. (Article 46.5; See Article 46.6 etc. for
appeal procedure.)

February 9

Last day for creation of Election Precincts by District Election
Commissions per request from local government institutions. (Article 17.7)

Last day to open Party/Bloc and District Candidate election bank
accounts (Article 34.1)

Official start of campaign "agitation" (Article 50.1 See below for
discussion of this term)

February 16

Deadline for Party/bloc/candidates to submit their list of proposed
Election Precinct Commission members to District Election Commissions
(Article 21.5)

February 24

Election Precinct Commissions formed by District Election Commissions
(Article 21.1)

March 1

Local government institutions review General Voter Lists and
prepare/submit Confirmed Voter Lists to Election Precinct Commissions
(Article 30.2)

March 11

Deadline for submission of paperwork of proposed international
observers by foreign states and international organizations (through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or directly to the CEC) (Article 61.1)

March 16

Last day to publish opinion poll results (Article 56.14)

CEC to register international observers (Article 61.2)

March 26

Deadline for CEC to form special Election Precincts at request of
District Election Commissions or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for
voters abroad) (Article 17.7)

2400 Hours March 29

End of pre-election "agitation" (Article 50.2)

March 30

Last day to spend funds in election bank accounts (Article 34.8)

March 31

Election Day (Constitution of Ukraine, Article 77)

0000 Hours April 2

Deadline for submission of complaints regarding Election Day violations
to a superior election commission or court (Article 29.6)

April 15, 2002

Deadline for CEC official announcement of party list voting results (Article 76.1)

+5 Days after CEC official announcement of election results

Deadline for CEC to publish official election results in the "Holos
Ukrayiny" (Parliament) and "Uryadovyi Kuriyer" (Government)
newspapers. The full list of newly-elected deputies is to be published in
alphabetical order. (Article 78.1)

+10 Days after CEC official announcement of election results

Mandate of District Election Commissions and Election Precinct
Commissions terminates (Articles 23.1, 24.1)

+15 Days after official announcement of results in a particular
Constituency (District)

Closure of election bank accounts by the relevant banking institutions
(Article 34.10) A Note on "Pre-election agitation"
 
 

The Election Law permits all types of "agitation" (campaigning) except
activities prohibited by the Constitution. In practical terms, this means
that any citizen of Ukraine may say or do almost anything on behalf of a
particular Party/Bloc or candidate that they may please, apart from
calling for the violent overthrow of the Ukrainian system of governance
or for inter-ethnic warfare, among others. Foreigners and stateless
persons may not campaign for or against any participant in the elections.

The Election Law does not, however, regulate the use of foreign PR or
campaign strategists as long as they keep their comments out of public
sight and sound. The extent to which these non-Ukrainian participants in
the campaign actually remain out of the limelight remains to be seen. And
in any case, they are free to voice their election-related opinions until
January 1, 2002, when the election campaign officially begins.

Old Habits Die Hard?

Ukraine would not be Ukraine if the relative clarity introduced by the
Election Law's adoption was not obfuscated by President Leonid
Kuchma's penning of Decree No. 1022/2001 "On Ensuring the Rights of
Citizens, Principles of a Democratic Society, Openness and
Transparency in the Process of Preparation for and Implementation of
the 2002 Elections" (the "Decree").

The Decree requires national and local- self-government bodies, the
state-owned media, and a range of satellite organizations to do their
utmost to ensure that the run-up to the elections and the vote itself are
conducted in an open, transparent and democratic fashion. The
document makes explicit reference to such bodies as the National Bank
of Ukraine, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education, among
others, and seemingly empowers them to perform specific
election-related tasks, including budgeting and "public education"
activities.

The Decree's appearance was not surprising given Mr. Kuchma's
penchant for issuing such documents as a way of "guiding" events to suit
his political inclinations. As such, it quickly drew fire from many
politicians, who said that the president was trying to legalize the fabled
"administrative resource", which the Election Law had substantially
curbed. Parliament First Deputy Speaker Viktor Medvedchuk (Social
Democratic Party-United) said point-blank that the Decree was a mere
reflection of Mr. Kuchma's wishes.

What effect the Decree will have on compliance with the Election Law
by all the interested parties will become clearer in the months ahead.
Observers should keep a sharp eye out for how effectively official bodies
charged by the Election Law with certain functions, actually execute
those functions. The catch phrase that has emerged in following this
campaign is "Look what they do, not what they say" and compare that
with the Election Law and Constitution of Ukraine.
 

07.12.01. Schröder lover Ukraine støtte i EU-ansøgning

Interview with Leonid Kuchma, President of Ukraine, and wife Lyudmila Kuchma

                          Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and his wife, Lyudmila, answered
                          questions posed by our Trud correspondent.

                          In proclaiming the "Year of Ukraine in Russia" in the State Kremlin
                          Palace, Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma pronounced the words which
                          people have been waiting for 10 years to hear. "Russia greatly values
                          friendship and good neighborly relations with Ukraine, and considers it to
                          be its reliable partner," noted President of Russia Vladimir Putin. "Today,
                          Russia is opening for itself a new Ukraine, and Ukraine--a new Russia.
                          We have many common achievements, and our problems are similar and
                          may be resolved together." "The Year of Ukraine in Russia goes outside
                          the scope of purely cultural measures," emphasized President of Ukraine
                          Leonid Kuchma. "The desire to swing open the doors to our
                          neighbors--that is the result not of official dialogue, but of everyday
                          communication of people. Today, we are sure of each other. We have
                          specific feelings and relations, which are not for years. They are for
                          centuries."

                          [Correspondent] You are present in Moscow on the eve of a symbolic
                          anniversary--the 10th anniversary of the Belovezhskiy Agreements. What
                          thoughts does this event bring to mind for you?

                          [Leonid Kuchma] Today, it is useless to talk about whether it is bad or
                          good. Unfortunately, the time had come for the disintegration of the
                          USSR, and that was as it should be. Today, we must think about not
                          committing new foolish acts 10 years after the Belovezhskiy Agreements,
                          not concluding new agreements over which another re-division of our
                          space will be undertaken. Ten years later, everyone looks at what
                          happened in a different way. The euphoria has passed, and the hope for
                          "help from outside" has passed. Everyone understands that we must count
                          on ourselves, on our own efforts.

                          Today, when the world economy is feverish, relations with Russia take on
                          a vitally important role for Ukraine. I have never concealed, and do not
                          now conceal the fact that, for us, cooperation with Russia is a strategic
                          policy, which is to the benefit of our peoples. Today, we must seek new
                          forms of strengthening cooperation. All of us must finally rid ourselves of
                          totalitarian complexes: On one hand, of imperialist recurrences, and on
                          the other--of the pose of the eternally oppressed and insulted country. We
                          must move away from criminal digging in individual pages of our
                          common history, away from an indiscriminate negation of all that we
                          have lived through and experienced together. We are not forgetting, and
                          never will forget, our common history. Thank God the negative
                          occurrences which marred the past 10 years of our relations are fading
                          away. In a purely human way, we miss each other very much.

                          [Lyudmila Kuchma] I think my reaction to those events is the same as
                          that of many people. We went to bed in one state, which was called the
                          Soviet Union, and woke up in some Commonwealth of Independent
                          States. And we were stunned. We were in shock, one might say. Then we
                          began getting used to the fact that 15 independent states emerged. But in
                          fact, it turned out that we are all very much dependent on one another.
                          Today, all of us should exhibit patience and wisdom, so that there would
                          be normal civilized relations between Russia and Ukraine.

                          [Correspondent] Your words cannot help but prompt the question about
                          the Russian language in Ukraine. Will it be given official status?

                          [Lyudmila Kuchma] In my opinion, we should not emphasize attention
                          on this question. I myself am from the Urals city of Votkinsk by birth,
                          and my parents lived and worked in Moscow, and are buried here in
                          Dolgoprudnenskiy Cemetery. However, I believe that citizens of Ukraine,
                          regardless of nationality, must know the Ukrainian language and read
                          Taras Shevchenko and Lesya Ukrainka in the original. Nevertheless, I
                          said 10 years ago, and I still say now, that a person cannot study the
                          Ukrainian language by government decree. Today, study of the Ukrainian
                          language is mandatory in the schools. This is normal. 10-15 years will go
                          by, and a new generation will grow up, which will speak Ukrainian
                          fluently.

                          It is another matter that the Russian language, which half the country
                          speaks, should in no case be edged out specially, in a purposeful manner.
                          How can we, Slavs, live and raise our children and grandchildren without
                          Pushkin, Tolstoy, Dostoyevskiy, or Chekhov? Without reading them in
                          the original? I can say that there is harmony in our family. We love not
                          Ukraine or Russia separately, but specific people--relatives and friends in
                          one and the other country who are close to our hearts.

                          [Leonid Kuchma] I have always said, and say now, that the Russian
                          language should not feel foreign in Ukraine. Our state language must be
                         Ukrainian, and Russian should be given the status of the official language.
                          But this question depends entirely on the lawmakers.

                          Moscow Trud in Russian - One of Russia's largest-circulation dailies, this centrist
                          newspaper is now owned largely by Gazprom.

10.12.01. Kutjma dementerer sprogcitat

10.12.01. Ukraine one year after "Kuchmagate"

                          By Taras Kuzio

                          Exactly one year ago, on 28 November, Socialist leader and former
                          parliamentary Chairman Oleksandr Moroz released to a stunned
                          parliament tape recordings made illicitly by a former presidential guard,
                          Mykola Melnychenko, within President Leonid Kuchma's office.
                          Melnychenko, an expert in counter-surveillance, had regular access to
                          Kuchma's office over many years.

                          The tapes contain what appear to be discussions of many illegal acts,
                          including undeclared sales of weapons abroad, rigging the October-
                          November 1999 presidential election and April 2000 referendum on
                          reducing powers to parliament, persecution of independent journalists,
                          manipulation of U.S. money-laundering investigations, high-level
                          corruption, and misuse of public funds.

                          What subsequently became the "Kuchmagate" crisis has affected
                          Ukrainian politics in many ways and revealed the stark contradictions
                          between the declared and virtual worlds of Ukrainian politics. Initially the
                          Ukrainian leadership denied that the tapes were authentic. Then after
                          doubts concerning their authenticity were demolished, they changed track
                          and now claim different parts of the tapes were spliced together to provide
                          incriminating quotations out of context. Moroz and Melnychenko both
                          offered to submit to a lie detector test to establish whether they were
                          telling the truth, and the FBI recently administered a lie detector test to
                          Melnychenko, which he passed. The anti-Kuchma opposition has
                          suggested to President Kuchma that the best way to repair his reputation
                          would be for him too to take a lie detector test, but to date he has refused
                          to do so. A poll conducted last month revealed that 86 percent of
                          Ukrainian citizens believe the tapes are authentic.

                          Thrown off balance by the taped revelations, the Ukrainian leadership
                          was at a loss how to react. Criticism from Western governments and
                          media was dismissed as "arm twisting." National Security and Defense
                          Council Secretary Yevhen Marchuk recently told "Nezavisimaya gazeta"
                          that criticism by Western media threatens Ukrainian security. For the first
                          time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service
                          was jammed because it broadcasted extracts from the tapes. In addition,
                          Kuchma condemned as an "anti-Ukrainian action" the threat by the
                          Council of Europe in April 2001 to suspend Ukraine's membership over
                          the matter.

                          Street protests began in December 2000 to demand clarification of the
                          taped revelations. The authorities used every means at their disposal to
                          counter the surge of popular protests triggered by the release of the tapes.
                          Public funds were used to print free, mass- circulation newspapers in
                          support of the president. Journalists were sacked from the media if they
                          published "Kuchmagate" materials. State employees, such as teachers,
                          were forced to demonstrate in support of the "constitutional order" or face
                          dismissal; these demonstrations were then presented as a demonstration of
                          mass support for the president. Soviet-style congresses of mainly oligarch,
                          centrist political parties were held that pledged their allegiance to the
                          president.

                          In a 15 February statement, President Kuchma, Parliamentary Chairman
                          Ivan Plyushch, and Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko accused those
                          demonstrating against the president of posing a threat to "national
                          security" and claimed that their actions could lead to "anarchy." State
                          television poured scorn on the protesters in a manner not seen since the
                          anti-"bourgeois nationalist" campaigns of the Soviet era. President
                          Kuchma resorted to Soviet-era language, describing "Kuchmagate" as a
                          "conscious provocation and clearly planned" campaign led by "pseudo
                          oppositionists" and "professional revolutionaries," whom he compared
                          with a "herd of cattle" and a "circus" that represented unemployed
                          "bomzhyky" [homeless persons] paid by organizations abroad. Their
                          actions, Kuchma continued, were based upon unpatriotic motives and
                          threatened Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity because they
                          are "extremists," "national socialists," and "a brown [fascist] plague."

                          The mass arrests of opposition activists and students after the 9 March
                          anti-Kuchma demonstration, Ukraine's largest ever, were accompanied by
                          beatings and illegal detentions. Students, many of whom were from
                          Western Ukraine and Kyiv, were threatened with expulsion if they
                          continued their antipresidential activities. Opposition to the president was
                          portrayed as opposition to the Ukrainian state. This conflation of state and
                          president reflects a corporatist view where the private and public domains
                          are ill defined and there is a lack of transparency in the political and
                          economic process. On 6 March, a presidential decree demanded that state
                          officials sympathetic to the opposition should resign, a demand that was
                          condemned by the EU as "inconsistent with the principles of human
                          rights and the rule of law." Also in the wake of the 9 March
                          demonstration, state television aired for the first time anti-Western
                          programs alleging that the West was plotting with Melnychenko to install
                          Yushchenko as president in place of Kuchma.

                          The long-term effects of "Kuchmagate" upon Ukrainian politics have
                          been six-fold. First, public trust in Ukrainian institutions and elites has
                          dropped even lower. The Soviet-era elite continues to rule Ukraine, and
                          minimal turnover since 1992 has left in place a deep Soviet mentality that
                          came to the surface during "Kuchmagate." Members of that old Soviet
                          elite, such as Borys Paton, head of the Academy of Sciences since the
                          Brezhnev era, Soviet-era Ukrainian prime ministers, and others were
                          wheeled out to drum up support for the president. Second, over 1,000
                          members of the "Young Ukrainian" intelligentsia signed a damning
                          indictment, itself a reflection of the disillusionment of young people with
                          the regime in Ukraine. Third, the alliance between former national
                          communists turned oligarchs and the national democrats, who led
                          Ukraine to independence, has been irrevocably undermined. Antioligarch
                          national democrats are now grouped within the "Our Ukraine"
                          (Yushchenko) and "Front for National Salvation (Tymoshenko)" blocs
                          formed to contest the March 2002 elections.

                          Fourth, a gulf has emerged between the pro-statehood, anti-Kuchma
                          Socialists and the antistate Communists who came to Kuchma's rescue on
                          many occasions during "Kuchmagate." Yushchenko, the liberal
                          pro-Western reformer, was seen as more of a threat to the Communists
                          than Kuchma.

                          Fifth, plans to implement the April 2000 referendum results to reduce
                          parliamentary powers and increase those of the executive have collapsed
                          because this would require a non-Left parliamentary majority made up of
                          oligarchs and national democrats. Finally, although Kuchma has managed
                          to stay in power, he remains fearful that the parliament elected next year
                          will not grant him a peaceful retirement and immunity from prosecution
                          after his term ends in October 2004.

                         Taras Kuzio is a Research Associate at the Centre for Russian and East European
                         Studies at the University of Toronto.
 

10.12.01. PACE-komite inviterer major Melnitjenko

09.12.01. 57% ville sige "ja" til uafhængighed i dag

12.12.01. PACE: For tidligt at stoppe monitoring

 A new website dedicated to HOLODOMOR.

                       A. How was it possible for a SMALL group of Communists to bring
                       MANY MILLIONS of people to starvation in less than 15 months?

                       B. Why was the Ukrainian nation unable to resist an act of evil on such a
                       colossal scale?

                       If anybody wants to help, I will be more than happy to accept it

             http://www.HOLODOMOR.org
                                                                                  Mykola Ponomarenko
 

13.12.01. Spiller Kreml "det lillerussiske" kort i Ukraine?

14.12.01. Medvedtjuk fældet af uhellig alliance

14.12.01. Medvedtjuk bliver leder af SDPU (o)s valgkampsstab

14.12.01. Statsbudgettet for 2002 godkendt

14.12.01. Behandling af lov om CD'er igen udsat

17.12.01. Medvedtjuks afskedigelse: baggrund og perspektiver

             17.12.01. Ukraine's independence referendum 10 years on

                       RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 5, No. 224, Part II, 28 November 2001

                       On 1 December 1991, the fate of the USSR was sealed when 90.3
                       percent of Ukrainians voted in favor of confirming the declaration of
                       independence from the USSR adopted by the Ukrainian parliament on
                       24 August. The failure of the badly organized hard-line putsch on 19
                       August irrevocably weakened unelected Soviet President Mikhail
                       Gorbachev. At the same time, it bolstered the importance within the
                       collapsing Soviet state of the Russian Federation and its president, Boris
                       Yeltsin.

                       The Russian Federation was the only republic of the USSR that failed to
                       declare independence between August and December 1991. Right up
                       until the fateful meeting at the Belavezha Forest hunting lodge in Belarus
                       on 7-8 December between the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and
                       Belarus, Russia continued to support the transformation of the USSR
                       into a confederate Union of Sovereign States (USS). The meeting at
                       Belavezha Forest led to the creation of the Commonwealth of
                       Independent States (CIS), the jubilee summit of which was celebrated in
                       Moscow last week.

                       As the second-largest Soviet republic, Ukraine's 1 December
                       referendum on independence pushed Russia to reluctantly accept that the
                       "renewed federal" USSR and confederate USS options were dead in the
                       water. Leonid Kravchuk, the wily high-ranking Ukrainian communist
                       who shifted to the national cause in 1990, was elected president on the
                       same day as the referendum. The national democrats and Rukh initially
                       opposed the idea of a referendum because they feared that it would not
                       obtain the constitutionally required two-thirds support, especially in
                       Russified Eastern Ukraine. But the referendum went ahead and obtained
                       majority support in every oblast of Ukraine, even in the Crimea, although
                       there it received its lowest support.

                       The referendum was important psychologically because it annulled the
                       outcome of the March 1991 all-Union referendum on preserving a
                       "renewed federation" and gave legitimacy to the Ukrainian state. The
                       preamble of the June 1996 Ukrainian Constitution refers to the August
                       and December 1991 declaration and referendum as "guiding" the
                       Ukrainian state.

                       On the 10th anniversary of the signing of the declaration of independence
                       on 24 August, 6,000 military and security forces and 300 pieces of
                       military equipment paraded through downtown Kyiv. A giant obelisk
                       bearing the inscription "Glory to Ukraine" was unveiled in the same spot
                       where Kyiv's largest statue of Lenin had stood until 1991. A gala concert
                       and the third World Congress of Ukrainians also took place on the same
                       date.

                       These festivities failed to hide the somber mood on the 10th anniversary,
                       as domestic and foreign commentators discussed the last decade in terms
                       of "lost opportunities." Opinion polls on the anniversary found that
                       two-thirds of Ukrainians would again vote for independence, but that
                       one-third would oppose it. This third of Ukrainians, according to a June
                       poll, would support Ukraine's unification with Russia and are probably
                       the same who in a January poll identified themselves as belonging to the
                       "Soviet people." This two- thirds/one-third division has remained
                       consistent throughout the 1990s.

                       Ukrainian-language use overall has increased over the past decade, not
                       at the expense of Russian, but by Ukrainians becoming more bilingual
                       outside the Donbas and Crimea, where Russian dominates, and Western
                       Ukraine, where Ukrainian does. Russian has been squeezed out only in
                       Galicia. Ukrainian-language education has made tremendous strides
                       outside the Donbas and the Crimea, especially in kindergartens and
                       schools, and less so in higher education. In the print and broadcast media
                       and book publishing though, use of the Ukrainian-language has declined
                       proportionately to Russian. President Leonid Kuchma made clear in his
                       anniversary speech that Ukrainian will remain the only state language.

                       The two-thirds of the Ukrainian population who support independence
                       do not necessarily hold a positive view of what transpired over the last
                       decade, but rather consider that the alternative (a return to the USSR)
                       would be far worse. An August poll found that 69.3 percent of
                       Ukrainians believe the economic situation has worsened in the last
                       decade. The collapse of GDP by one-half until last year's growth, the
                       high rates of hidden unemployment, large wage arrears, and worsening
                       health services have together served to discourage families from having
                       children. Male life expectancy has fallen and the population has
                       plummeted by 3 million. Some 80.5 percent believe crime has increased,
                       and 79.8 that corruption has risen. Annual capital flight is estimated at $3
                       billion.

                       At an gala concert held in commemoration of the anniversary of the 24
                       August confirmation of the declaration of independence, President
                       Kuchma claimed that he has "demonstrated to Ukrainian society and the
                       entire world my dedication to the lawful, generally accepted democratic
                       principles of resolving problems." But the nongovernmental organization
                       Freedom House's authoritative annual "Nations in Transit" survey for
                       2001 shows an alarming trend in Ukraine's democratic regression (and
                       that of other CIS states) since 1997, when the survey began. According
                       to the August poll, 44.1 percent of Ukrainians believe that democracy in
                       Ukraine is even worse than in the former USSR. Only 6.6 percent hold a
                       positive view of the last decade, while a striking 61.4 percent feel a
                       sense of shame for Ukraine.

                       Although Ukraine has many democratic trappings, it still remains very
                       Soviet. Its leaders feel they have no need to take responsibility for their
                       actions or have any duty toward their citizens and electors. A personality
                       cult has steadily grown, in which portraits of President Kuchma adorn
                       every official office, medals and honorary doctorates are handed out to
                       the faithful, books by Kuchma authored by ghost writers are published,
                       and delegates to congresses are hand-picked.

                       These policies have both contributed to, and fail to conceal, Kuchma's
                       growing unpopularity. As he admitted in his anniversary address on 24
                       August: "There is still much to be done to strengthen the public's
                       confidence in the authorities." If this was a difficult task prior to the
                       "Kuchmagate" crisis that erupted in November 2000, it now seems
                       Herculean. When Kuchma told the World Congress of Ukrainians that
                       he had nothing to do with the death of Heorhiy Gongadze, the opposition
                       journalist found dead in November 2000, he was heckled with cries of
                       "Shame!" and "Kuchma Out!" Kuchma left the podium before Levko
                       Lukyanenko, a former dissident who spent three decades in the Gulag
                       and is now a member of the Yuliya Tymoshenko opposition election
                       bloc, gave an impromptu speech that called for the president's
                       resignation.

                       Ten years on, there is no question that Ukraine will remain an
                       independent state. Its borders are recognized by all of its neighbors, a
                       post-Soviet constitution is in place, and the illegality of Soviet passports
                       since 1998 all testify that there is no going back to the USSR. But, if
                       Ukraine is not going backward, it continues to remain unclear where the
                       country is in fact going, both domestically and internationally, or whether
                       it is standing still while others are moving forward.
 

18.12.01. Lytvyns valgdeltagelse blåstemplet

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
                       RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 5, No. 236, Part II, 14 December 2001

                       UKRAINE'S OLIGARCHIC SOCIAL DEMOCRATS SUFFER
                       SETBACK

                       By Taras Kuzio

                       On 13 December, 234 members of the Ukrainian parliament (Rada) voted
                       to dismiss Deputy Chairman Viktor Medvedchuk from his position.
                       Medvedchuk is also the chairman of one of Ukraine's most important, but
                       least liked, oligarchic political parties -- the Social Democratic Party
                       (United) (SDPU-O). Medvedchuk achieved notoriety during the Soviet era
                       when he helped send well-known Ukrainian dissident poet Vasyl Stus to
                       the Gulag, where he died in 1986. In the 1990s, Medvedchuk's rise to fame
                       was meteoric, and he recently set his sights on the post-Kuchma
                       presidency.

                       The factions that gathered the 150 signatures to place the motion of
                       dismissal to a vote came from the two Rukh parties (36 members),
                       Reforms-Congress (14), Yulia Tymoshenko's Fatherland (25), Solidarity
                       (21), and the newly created Unity (15) led by popular Kyiv Mayor
                       Oleksandr Omelchenko. The remaining votes came from the Socialists and
                       Communists, who together command 130 members. Those two factions
                       blame Medvedchuk for the adoption by the Rada last month of the land
                       reform bill.

                       It has been increasingly evident that both the SDPU-O and Oleksandr
                       Volkov's Democratic Union have been out of favor with President Leonid
                       Kuchma. Volkov, a businessman who is reputed to have ties to organized
                       crime and is wanted by Belgian police on money- laundering charges, was
                       presented with a medal by President Kuchma in February in honor of his
                       "selfless work and personal merits in promoting Ukraine's socioeconomic
                       development." But since then his star has also waned.

                       A new party of power, Regions of Ukraine, was created by the head of
                       the State Tax Administration, Mykola Azarov, earlier this year in the
                       Donbas, and many deputies from Volkov's parliament faction joined it. The
                       final indication that Volkov had fallen out of favor with Kuchma and was
                       no longer needed as an "adviser" was his replacement as head of the
                       Democratic Union by Kuchma's long-time personal friend, Volodymyr
                       Horbulin, who was Yevhen Marchuk's predecessor as secretary of the
                       National Security and Defense Council.

                       Four factors have led to Medvedchuk's decline. First, Omelchenko's Unity
                       faction dislikes the SDPU-O because of its control of many of Kyiv's prize
                       assets, including the Dynamo Kyiv soccer team. Azarov's rival Regions of
                       Ukraine has supported recent draft legislation to tax payments made on
                       the transfers of soccer players from which the USDPU inordinately
                       gained. Omelchenko also dislikes Hryhorii Surkis, Medvedchuk's ally and
                       president of Kyiv Dynamo and the Football Federation of Ukraine, who
                       was his rival in the bitterly contested 2000 Kyiv mayoral elections.
                       Omelchenko is the president of the Hockey Federation of Ukraine.

                       Second, the SDPU-O feared that as in the 1998 elections, they would
                       again fail to garner the minimum 4 percent of the vote to secure seats for
                       the candidates on its party list. The SDPU-O needed therefore to gain
                       votes in Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine because its main base of
                       support in Western and Central Ukraine was less reliable. The party
                       sought to capitalize on the language question by collecting 140,000
                       signatures demanding that a new "Law on Languages" be adopted to
                       replace the 1989 law. The new law would elevate Russian to the status of
                       an "official language" while keeping Ukrainian as the "state" language. It is
                       unclear to all concerned what the difference between "official" and "state"
                       languages is, a distinction first introduced by Kuchma during his 1994
                       election campaign but then shelved after his election. On 30 November,
                       the Rada began to debate the replacement of the 1989 law, which ensured
                       that the national democrats would target Medvedchuk as the person
                       behind this move to place it on the Rada agenda only three months before
                       the elections. Rada Chairman Ivan Plyushch has spoken out against
                       discussing the language question on the eve of the elections.

                       Third, the SDPU-O is suspected of being one of the most likely culprits
                       behind security service officer Mykola Melnychenko, whose bugging of
                       Kuchma's office led to the "Kuchmagate" scandal. There are rumors that
                       in mid-2000 the SDPU-O made a proposal to Kuchma that he hand over
                       power to Medvedchuk in a manner similar to the transfer by former
                       Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. But Kuchma refused to
                       do so. The SDPU-O was also angry that Kuchma tolerated Tymoshenko's
                       presence in Yushchenko's government. The SDPU-O argued that
                       Tymoshenko and former Premier Pavlo Lazarenko made a lot of money
                       from insider energy deals and therefore knew how to undercut this source
                       of corrupt funds to the oligarchs. Melnychenko has always spoken highly
                       of Marchuk, his former boss as chairman of the Security Service, and the
                       Melnychenko tapes include no conversations between Kuchma and either
                       Medvedchuk, Surkis, or Marchuk.

                       Finally, the other oligarchic parties could not have abstained in the vote of
                       no confidence to dismiss Medvedchuk without a nod of approval from the
                       presidential administration. Kuchma's blessing for Medvedchuk's fall from
                       grace allows For a United Ukraine to become the main pro-Kuchma
                       election bloc. Led by presidential administration head Volodymyr Lytvyn, a
                       trusted friend and the only surviving member of Kuchma's 1994 election
                       team, it includes five parties of power -- Regions of Ukraine (Donbas),
                       Labor Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk), People's Democrats (Kharkiv and
                       southern Ukraine), Agrarians (Galicia and Volhynia), and Prime Minister
                       Anatoliy Kinakh's Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Each of these
                       can draw upon "administrative resources" in the election campaign in the
                       regions and institutions they control.

                       The rise and fall of the SDPU-O is characteristic of Ukrainian politics
                       insofar as oligarchic parties lack any ideology and exist only at the whim of
                       the executive. Although the oligarchs and the executive need each other,
                       neither side trusts the other.

                       Taras Kuzio is a research associate at the Centre for Russian and East European
                       Studies, University of Toronto.
 

21.12.01. Kutjma afviser beskyldning mod Jusjenko og SDPU (o)

Præsident Leonid Kutjma betragter teorien om, at ex-premierminister Viktor Jusjenko er involveret i "båndskandalen", som absurd. Det sagde præsidenten i torsdags i Kyiv, da han blev bedt om at kommentere de fortolkninger af hans udtalelse forleden, som dukkede op i pressen.
    Præsidenten havde opfordret journalisterne til at "forkaste alle mulige gætterier" om, at Ukraines forenede socialdemokratiske parti var involveret i "båndskandalen".
    "Hvis nogle af journalisterne og politikerne drager konklusionerne, har det ikke noget på sig", - sagde han med hentydning til Jusjenko.
    Ifølge Kutjma er den slags opspind kommet af, at han i sin kommentar fornylig talte om "teknologi". Det han mente med, at "båndskandalen" ikke var i SDPU (o)s interesse var forfatningsbestemmelsen, som bestemmer, at såfremt præsidenten ekstraordinært må træde tilbage, så bliver den til enhver tid værende premierminister (dengang Jusjenko) udøvende præsident. (Jusjenko og SDPU (o) er kendt som indædte modstandere og konkurrenter om vælgere i Ukraines vestlige del, red.)
    Kutjma understregede endnu engang, at det er ordensmyndighederne, der er nødt til at komme med et svar på de spørgsmål. Han påpegede, at de arbejder på sagen, "selvom de i realiteten ikke informerer offentligheden med henvisning til den nye straffelov", citerer Interfaks-Ukrajina præsidenten ifølge UP.
 

21.12.10. Statsbudgettet for 2002 vedtaget

21.12.01. USA giver penge til oplæring af 25.000 valgtilforordnede

24.12.01. USA indfører handelssanktioner fra januar

25.12.01. Kampen om Kiev: Borgmester Omeltjenko mod SDPU (o)

26.12.01. Den administrative ressource i Kherson-regionen

28.12.01. Donetsk-klanen overtager finansministeriet

28.12.01. Jusjenko utilfreds med den administrative ressource

29.12.01. Medvedtjuk om Melnitjenkos valgdeltagelse

31.12.01. Lytvyn indlagt efter trafikulykke lørdag

31.12.01. Forlag nægter at trykke Tymoshenkos aviser