30.04.02. Jusjtjenko kommenterer de fires erklæring

30.04.02. Magtskifte i Krims parlament

30.04.02. Polen vil have EU til at give Ukraine særbehandling

01.05.02. Ukraine kan komme med i ny gasrørledning

01.05.02. USA: ingen klare beviser for salg af ukrainske våben til Irak

State Department Briefing Transcript, 29 april 2002:

QUESTION: Iraq. Has the administration been in contact with Ukraine about allegations that it transferred arms to Iraq?

MR. BOUCHER:  That's something I'd have to look into.  I don't know.

QUESTION:  Could you take that?

MR. BOUCHER:  Yes, I'll look into it.
 

02.05.01. Pentagon kan ikke bekræfte, at der er ukrainske våben i Irak

02.05.02. USA: Ukraine den største producent af piratkopier i verden

02.05.02. Omkring 4.000 til KPUs og PSPUs 1. maj møder i Kyiv

02.05.02. Styrets repræsentanter går forrest i loyale 1. maj møder

Kharkiv
I Kharkiv var der to demonstrationer, den ene "for" og den anden "imod" det nuværende styre. Deltagerne i venstrekræfternes møde i Kharkiv opfordrede til "en afsættelse af det nuværende regime". Lederen af KPUs regionale afdeling, Alla Aleksandrovska, åbnede mødet, der var arrangeret af kommunistene og socialisterne, med sloganet: "Ned med Kutjma som legemliggørelsen af det styre, som forhåner folk!" Talerne opfordrede de fremmødte til at gå sammen i en samlet opposition. Ifølge myndighedernes foreløbige opgørelse deltog henved 1000 mennesker i demonstrationen. Demonstranterne gik under røde faner hen til Lenin-monumentet på den centrale Frihedens Plads.
    100 gange så mange mennesker, nemlig 100.000 var ifølge Kharkivs politi samlet til et 1. maj møde organiseret af de partier, som indgår i blokken "ZaJedU!" - NDP, AU, AP og PPP. Kharkivs guvernør, Jevhen Kushnarjov, sagde i sin tale: "Vi er samlet her for at bevise, at vi er en samlet Kharkiv-familie".
    Han understregede, at det lokale styre ville sørge for, at man allerede i år vil "glemme alt om manglende lønudbetalinger". Et andet af styrets opgaver var ifølge ham at sikre en sådan tilvækst i lønningerne "som overgår inflationen flere gange". Mødet foregik under de blå-gule flag samt symbolerne for de partier, som havde arrangeret mødet. Aktionens gennemgående slogan var "Vi går ind for det europæiske valg og for venskabet med Rusland". Mødet blev holdt på den centrale Svoboda-plads, som ifølge visse opgørelser er den største i Europa.
    Omkring 36.000 af Kharkivs indbyggere deltog i tre forskellige 1. maj-møder arrangeret af fagforeningerne, SDPU (o) og KPU og SPU. Omkring 20.000 fagforeningsmedlemmer, herunder repræsentanter for samtlige regionens distrikter og flertallet af de statslige virksomheder, var mødt op på Kharkovs centrale plads.
    Omkring 1.000 tilhængere af kommunistpartiet og SPU samledes på et andet afsnit af den samme plads - ved Lenin-statuen. Det kom ikke til sammenstød mellem tilhængere af kommunistipartiet, SPU og fagforeningerne. Samtidigt holdt omkring 15.000 tilhængere af SDPU (o) et møde og en demonstration i en anden del af byens centrum, skriver obozrevatel.

Tjerkasy
På 1.maj-mødet i Tjerkasy opfordrede kommunisterne folket til at "tage ved lære af italienerne", som havde gennemført massedemonstrationer i protest mod regeringen. 1. maj demonstrationen og det efterfølgende møde samlede omkring 2.000 deltagere i Tjerkasy. Efter et møde på Bohdan Khmelnytskyj-pladsen gik demonstrationsoptoget i ro og orden og med et orkester i spidsen ned ad byens centrale gade til Lenin-pladsen, hvor de lagde blomster ved statuen af verdensprolitariatets leder og holdt endnu et møde.
    Mødets resolution indeholdt den traditionelle fordømmelse af "det antifolkelige regime" og opfordring til Kutjma om at træde tilbage. Det er dig ikke alene Kutjma, kommunisterne ikke kan lide, men også Jusjtjenko (som "agent for IMF"). En gruppe unge anarkister havde medbragt de velkendte russiske Limonov-slagord (Limonov - russisk national-bolsjevik, red.) som "Kapitalisme er afføring!" og "Ned med burgeoisiet!". Nogle af demonstranterne begyndte at diskutere med anarkisterne om, hvilket sprog deres bannere burde være skrevet på.

Dnipropetrovsk
Guvernør Mykola Shvets og formand for det regionale LO Vasyl Tkatjenko stod i spidsen for en kolonne demonstranter, der gik i optog gennem Dnipropetrovsk. Demonstrationstoget gik ned ad det centrale Karl Marx-prospekt til Lenin-pladsen, hvor der blev holdt møde. Demonstranterne bar flag i mange forskellige farver med slagord som "For fred, retfærdighed og stabilitet". V. Tkatjenko holdt åbningstalen. Han sagde, at fagforeningerne i dag kan mærke en vis forbedring i regionens socio-økonomiske sfære, en stabilitet i virksomhedernes arbejde og stigninger i lønniveauet. Dnipropetrovsk-regionens guvernør understregede i sit indlæg, at landets præsident Leonid Kutjma af al kraft forsøger at bevare freden, roen og enheden i landet. Ifølge guvernøren deltog omkring 20.000 mennesker i demonstrationen. Over 50.000 personer fejrede 1. maj rundt om i millionbyen og omkring 350.000 personer rundt om i regionen, oplyser Interfaks-Ukrajina.
    Efter mødets afslutning gik folk til de traditionelle "majevka'er" - maj fester - med fest og farver i gaderne.
    Dnipropetrovsks kommunister holdt deres manifestation, som samlede omkring 2.000 tilhængere. De gik ned ad Dnipropetrovsks centrale prospekt, lagde blomster ved Lenin-statuen og gennemførte et protestmøde. I sit indlæg erklærede den regionale partichef Viktor Borsjtjevskyj: "Situationen i Verkhovna Rada tegner sig ikke til vores fordel, men vi vil fortsætte kampen for arbejdernes sociale rettigheder og for at gøre økonomien regulerbar, og vi vil kæmpe for at afskaffe præsidentembedet som institution".

Zaporizjzja
Omkring 1.500 tilhængere af kommunistpartiet gik i demonstration og holdt 1. maj møde i Zaporizjzja, oplyser Ukrajinski Novyny. Demonstrationstoget startede ved Lenin-statuen og sluttede på byens centrale plads. Under optoget sluttede indskydere fra den lokale bank "Slavjanskyj" sig til demonstranterne. Deres indlån blev indefrosset, da "Slavjanskyj"-bankens konti blev arresteret.
    Bagefter holdt kommunistpartiets tilhængere et møde, hvor de udsatte styrets og forskellige politiske partiers handlinger for en hård kritik.
    Samme dag kunne Zaporozjzjes styre mønstre et fremmøde på 2.000 personer til den højtidelige indvielse af en ny plads opkaldt efter den 12. april.

Ivano-Frankivsk
I Ivano-Frankivsk regionen blev 1. maj kun fejret ved to lejligheder. Den ene fandt sted i byen Ivano-Frankivsk i Taras Shevtjenko-parken, mens den anden blev holdt i byen Kolomyja på Heltenes plads. Initiativtageren til begge møder var KPUs byorganisation. Der var ingen socialister blandt deltagerne. Der var omkring 100 deltagere i Ivano-Frankivsk og omkring 40 deltagere i Kolomyja.

Tjernivtsi
I Tjernivtsi gennemførte de regionale afdelinger af KPU og SPU et fællesmøde med deltagelse af 200 personer, hvis slogan var "Ned med Kutjma!", "Social sikkerhed for folket". Talerne betegnede parlamentsvalget i marts som "styrets skamfulde nederlag" og fordømte forsøg fra magtblokken "For et samlet Ukraine!"s repræsentanter på at oprette en kunstig massefraktion i Verkhovna Rada og erklære sig som vinder af valgkampen. Efter mødet gik kommunisterne og socialisterne i fælles optog ned gennem Tjernivtsis centrale gade. På den central plads lagde de blomster ned på det sted, hvor Lenin-statuen tidligere stod, samt ved Taras Shevtjenkos statuen, hvor de endvidere læste digte op og sang sange fra Shevtjenkos epos "Kobzar".

oplysningerne stammer fra obozrevatel
 

03.05.02. RCC Political Review - Parliamentary Positioning in Ukraine

Ukraine's fourth Parliament since Independence began preliminary work towards convening in mid-May. Elected MPs from among the recent winners, first met on April 22, to form the "MP Working Group."

The Working Group (WG) decided that Parliament will convene on Tuesday, May 14. Each of the six parties and electoral blocs that won parliamentary representation, have since submitted their "requests for parliamentary seats." Basically, these are estimates on how many seats each party/faction expects to have. The requests were submitted as follows:

ZaYedu 186
Nasha Ukrayina 125
Communists 66
SDPU(o) 34
Tymoshenko Bloc 27
Socialists 24
Total 462

Since parliament is comprised of only 450 MPs, it is obvious that one or more of the successful parties or blocs is submitting inflated numbers. ZaYedu, with only 11.77% of the popular vote, appears set to form the largest parliamentary faction, with over 1/3 of parliamentary seats.

The WG is working on a whole range of organizational matters, including - deciding on the temporary presidium and the formation and registration of parliamentary factions. Until they decide upon the factions, the exact breakdown of MP seats will not be apparent. They will also decide on the list and names of parliamentary committees (in the last parliament there were 23 committees), and establish the ground rules for the "inner" elections: the parliamentary speaker, his (or her) two deputies and who will head which committees.

The dynamics within the WG are interesting. It took the WG two days to elect the temporary WG leadership of 4 MPs. Initially, there were two frontrunners to head the WG - Victor Musiyaka from Nasha Ukrayina, and Oleksander Bandurka from ZaYedu (both are seasoned lawmakers). The issue of who should lead this very pro tempore group showed the following dynamic: Nasha Ukrayina, the Tymoshenko Bloc and the Socialists backed Musiyaka, while ZaYedu, the Communists and SDPU(o)
backed Bandurka. Neither was successful in their bids.

The WG then decided to vote on all four WG leadership positions at once. The result of the successful "combination package" vote:

WG head - Adam Martyniuk, Communist (former first deputy speaker)
Deputy - Victor Musiyaka, Nasha Ukrayina (former deputy speaker)
Deputy - Valeriy Konovaliuk, ZaYedu
Secretary - Stanislav Nikolayenko, Socialist

The numbers in the parliamentary working group seem to give ZaYedu and its allies a distinct advantage in the Working Group. The other parliamentary "big boy," Nasha Ukrayina is the only potential counterweight to ZaYedU. But there are a number of WG MPs, who can potentially act as true "independents" and swing the WG vote, for any close-call decisions. The WG seems to accurately reflect the election results. ZaYedU and Nasha Ukrayina both have the core votes within the WG, to form majorities, either separate, or together. This is a good indicator of how dynamics may work in this parliament.

The Working Group has proven to be an important element in the Ukrainian parliamentary tradition - its members and decisions set many important rules of the game, which will guide legislative activities over the next four years.

                                                            * * *

Proposed parliamentary schedule

The parliamentary preparatory working group is considering the following proposed schedule for parliamentary activities between May 14 and 19, 2003:

May 14 -17 Parliament convenes in plenary session

May 15 Cabinet of Ministers to submit draft 2003 Budget Resolution

May 21 -24 Plenary session (voting)

May 27 - 31 Work in committees and factions (non-voting)

June 4 2003 Budget hearings

June 5 - 7 Plenary session

June 10 - 14 Work in committees and factions

June 11 Government Day Report

June 17 - 21 Plenary session

June 24 - 28 Work in constituencies

July 1 - 5 Plenary session

July 8 - 12 Plenary session

July 9 Government Day Report

July 15 - 19 Work in committees and factions

July 19 - September Summer Recess

Please note that this is only a proposed schedule, and the actual schedule may change. In the last parliament, Thursdays were designated as "voting days," which significantly contributed to introducing order to the legislative process. (with files from Interfax Ukraine and www.hq.org.ua )

                                                * * *
RCC Process in Focus: Parliamentary Positioning or The Switch From Double-speak to Majority-speak (Part I)

As Election Day 2002 passes into history, preparation of the organizational framework for the first plenary session of the Fourth Convocation, due to convene on May 14, or as a few sources would have it, May 15, has begun. A working group of MPs has been charged with setting the ground rules for electing the next Speaker and his or her deputies, determining the number of committees and their staffing levels, and resolving logistics issues as they arise. And despite working group members' reticence to speak about the future Parliament, the debate about what kind of majority (if any) will emerge is taking place right alongside the debate over who will become the next Parliamentary Speaker.

The Fourth Convocation of Parliament is shaping up to be more politically structured than any of its predecessors since independence. A total of six political parties and electoral blocs passed the four percent barrier and will collectively seat 225 MPs out of the 450 available. The remaining 225 MPs, elected in single mandate districts, will, with few exceptions, join one of six caucuses to be formed after Parliament convenes.

And while there may be attempts to form mini-caucuses to spearhead lobbying of specific business groups' interests, the upcoming Presidential Election, scheduled for October 2004, will de facto limit the number of caucuses to be formed in Ukraine's legislature.

That in mind, the formation of a generic and stable majority that would deal primarily in economic reform (and whose intention would be to put political reforms on the back burner) is highly unlikely. The two most logical anchors of such a majority, Our Ukraine and For a United Ukraine (commonly known as "ZaYedu") weigh the significance and substance of political reforms very differently. There is also no guarantee that the composition of the respective majorities will be a reflection of the politics
they intend to pursue. For example, Mr. Yushchenko's bloc is composed of essentially three interest groups -vocal opponents of President Leonid Kuchma, traditional national democrats and free market advocates, and centrist Big Business representatives- yet he has made it clear that election law reform, local government reform, and increased governmental accountability to citizens will be high on the legislative agenda for his bloc and allies. The Zayedu community, headed by current Presidential Administration Head Volodymyr Lytvyn (who will have to give up this post if and when he makes a final decision in favor of Parliament), is overwhelmingly composed of traditional civil servants and captains of industry, with a light sprinkling of progressive financiers and a few bright legislative sparks. Mr. Lytvyn has expressed his inclination to focus on purely economic aspects of reform.

These two front runners also hold diverging views about Ukraine's foreign policy. Our Ukraine is unabashedly pro-Western, and its foreign policy guru Borys Tarasiuk was renowned for his active engagement with all and sundry Euro-Atlantic organizations, including both NATO and the European Union. Most analysts admit, Mr. Tarasiuk was relieved of his position as foreign minister by President Leonid Kuchma to accommodate the Kremlin. Putin has since foisted former Russian Prime Minister and Gazprom Director Viktor Chernomyrdin on Ukraine as the Kremlin's omniscient emissary and gray cardinal in Kyiv.

ZaYedu, on the contrary, advocates a "multi-vectored" foreign policy that gives Russian Big Business privatization preferences, and simultaneously adopts a wait and see outlook on Western strategic investments. This "multi-vectored" foreign policy has become a euphemism for the slogan "Ukraine & Russia--Together to Europe," something Zayedu members advocated during the campaign. Whatever the reason behind such slogans, their use will serve to hinder the functioning, and possibly the creation, of an Our Ukraine-ZaYedu majority in Parliament.

In spite of their differences, the 120 Our Ukraine MPs could probably form a solid majority with Zayedu's 140 MPs to craft and pass a laundry list of laws critical to breathing new life into economic reforms. During the campaign, all sides agreed, in one way or another, that economic reforms have stalled since Mr. Yushchenko's ouster as Prime Minister in April 2001 at the hands of Ukraine's centrist oligarchs. However a unity of spirit in Parliament is not likely due to fiefdom-like "special factors." The most disruptive special factors to economic reform have been in motion since the release of the Melnychenko Tapes and the emergence of the Ukraine Without Kuchma movement in late Fall 2000. Questions like "Who will be Leonid Kuchma's successor?" and "When will Ukraine choose its next president: 2004 or before?" have dominated the debate between and among those who would form a majority, or at the very least, a functioning Parliament. As a result, they are being forced to tailor their grand plans to the reality on the ground.

Both front runners have been testing various hypothetical configurations that might yield a majority. They involve the remaining four parties/blocs that will seat party list MPs in the Fourth Convocation. Very little verifiable information about their machinations is available beyond the innermost circles of Ukrainian politics. Exactly who has made progress in reaching agreements about what with whom, at what price, and how much compromise was or is required to attain even a minimal level of consensus
between who and whom is shrouded in mystery.

In spite of the secrecy, the Fourth Convocation will still be the most politically structured Parliament in Ukraine since the collapse of the single party system. The fact that the Big Six are now positioning for a majority is a sign of Ukraine's emergent political maturity. Economic maturity is an entirely different matter. Witness the following excerpts as examples of majority-speak in Ukraine:

Our Ukraine

"The political process in Ukraine is moving into a 'constructive channel,' but it is nonetheless still far from honest and transparent, and contains many hidden bumps. Under these circumstances we [Our Ukraine] can find a way of avoiding a 'Speakeriad.'" ---Viktor Yushchenko, April 22.

Mr. Yushchenko recently noted that he is generally pleased with the quality of negotiations being conducted by all forces that will seat MPs, and that Our Ukraine will focus on placing "quality individuals" in influential positions in Parliament, the Cabinet and at the local government level.

"If a majority is formed, it will be exclusively based on the parties or blocs that received the majority of votes. Anything else will lead to instability, because it will have meant ignoring the people's will. I am afraid it will [therefore] be impossible to form a permanent majority." ---MP Yuriy Kliuchkovskiy (Rukh-Udovenko), April 22, to Interfax-Ukraine.

Mr. Kliuchkovskiy also noted he would like to see MP Ivan Pliushch (nominally a member of ZaYedu, but a de facto strong supporter of Viktor Yushchenko), continue serving as Parliamentary Speaker.

For a United Ukraine (ZaYedu)

A member of this "core group," long-serving MP Yuliy Yoffe (of the late Labor Ukraine faction), told the press on April 22 that "the coming Parliament's majority will be situational, since there are simply no opportunities for crafting a permanent majority."

Mr. Yoffe believes that a temporary union may be concluded to "divide up the main leadership positions," and he noted that another Velvet Revolution (a cryptic reference to the January 2000 take over of key Parliament positions by a center-right majority that briefly worked together in support
of then Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko's Government) should not be excluded.

Presidential Administration Head and ZaYedu Leader Volodymyr Lytvyn has been largely mum on what kind of majority might take shape in Parliament, noting only that his bloc could form one or another kind of coalition with either the Right or the Left, including the Communist Party of Ukraine.

Current Prime Minister and newly elected MP Anatoliy Kinakh has indicated he would like to remain PM and not become an MP, but he has not stated a preference for specific coalition partners in Parliament. Although, he too has hinted of potential cooperation with the CPU, noting his fondness for Communist policy on social issues.

Communist Party of Ukraine

CPU First Secretary and MP Petro Symonenko insists that no one has invited his party to help form a majority. In particular, Mr. Symonenko has noted a seeming lack of interest on the part of President Leonid Kuchma, but he is not giving up hope. "If an offer is made, we will meet and give our view thereon," he told UNIAN on April 22.

Mr. Symonenko had earlier expressed his dissatisfaction with consultations the CPU conducted with ZaYedu, Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. In particular, he criticized both Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko for not "answering a single question" posed by him during their consultations over the past week.

CPU statesman Heorhiy Kriuchkov was more direct than his comrade and told Interfax-Ukraine that the only way a permanent majority could emerge in Parliament would be "if the leadership of ZaYedu and Our Ukraine were to enter into a conspiracy." Otherwise, according to Mr.Kriuchkov, a "normal situational [i.e. shifting] majority will emerge," in which the CPU could participate, if and when its leading platform issues [such as a review of privatization, much closer political and economic integration with Russia, and limiting Presidential powers] are given consideration.

Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc

Bloc Leader Yulia Tymoshenko, a former vice prime minister in charge of the energy sector and the "Scourge of the Oligarchs", believes that a coalition should be created by Our Ukraine and her bloc, also suggesting that the two groups should coordinate their activities with the Socialist Party of Ukraine and, as she told Interfax-Ukraine on April 21, "move forward to victory [a possible reference to Ms. Tymoshenko's efforts to unseat President Leonid Kuchma and force an early presidential election, which, presumably, would result in a Yushchenko win and potentially a prime ministership for Ms. Tymoshenko].

Ms. Tymoshenko underscored that the longer Our Ukraine, the leader of the popular vote, shies away from her bloc and the SPU, the greater the chance that voters will perceive Mr. Yushchenko as kowtowing to the party of power. At the same time, she acknowledged that consultations continue with Our Ukraine on issues regarding the Parliamentary leadership's composition and priority draft legislation.

Oleksander Turchynov, one of Ms. Tymoshenko's key lieutenants [and chairman of the Budget Committee during the Third Convocation], sounded a more optimistic note, saying that the Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and Moroz forces could realistically lay the foundation for a working majority. Mr. Turchynov, pointing out the obvious, suggested that whatever majority is formed will pick the next Parliamentary Speaker. If no majority is created, then all bets would be off and "almost anyone could become Speaker under the right circumstances."

Socialist Party of Ukraine

SPU Leader and former Parliament Speaker Oleksander Moroz has stated he was satisfied with consultations between the Socialists, Our Ukraine, and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. The SPU is ready to work with these groups as well as with the Communists in crafting and passing laws that would limit the powers of the Presidency, making that institution more accountable to Parliament, and enhancing judicial independence. Mr. Moroz has also reiterated his support for a 100 percent proportional
representation parliamentary election law. He harshly criticized ZaYedu Leader Volodymyr Lytvyn's claim that the latter bloc would have 180 MPs, and suggested that neither Mr. Lytvyn nor his superior, President Kuchma, could expect lasting loyalty from many of the MPs elected under the ZaYedu brand.

Mr. Moroz believes that the mere fact of Mr. Kuchma's direct involvement in attempts to shape Parliament to his will is a sign that he is afraid of allowing the legislature to slip out of his control. In the past, according to Mr. Moroz, Mr. Kuchma would manipulate Parliament through third parties, but this does not appear to have been effective lately.

An influential ally of Mr. Moroz in the SPU, Ivan Bokiy, said last week that an Our Ukraine-ZaYedu majority would not be desirable, because its creation would probably involve a repeat of the questionable Velvet Revolution of January 2000, and would in any case be doomed to failure.
Likewise, it would be inadvisable for either Volodymyr Lytvyn or Viktor Yushchenko to seek the Speaker's seat, since both would be incapable of managing 450 MPs on a day to day basis.

Mr. Bokiy believes Mr. Lytvyn's bureaucratic background, and Mr. Yushchenko's perceived thin skin, would limit their effectiveness as Speaker.

Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United)

After receiving a disappointingly small share of the vote on March 31 (a tad over 6 percent, significantly less than pre-election polls placing them at or above 10 percent), the SDPU(o) has kept a very low profile. While it has delegated representatives to the Parliament's Preparatory Working
Group, its leadership has been reticent to comment on its place in the Fourth Convocation. In the immediate post-election period, SDPU(o) MP and former President Leonid Kravchuk made a series of disparaging remarks concerning Our Ukraine, basically saying that the bloc and Viktor Yushchenko had improperly taken credit for the economic upturn on his watch as Prime Minister in 2000-2001.

In sharp contrast to his previous loquacity, SDPU(o) leader Viktor Medvedchuk has issued no statements on how he sees his team caucusing. During election night, as results were trickling in from
throughout Ukraine, Mr. Medvedchuk said that if his party did not join the majority [whatever form that might take], then it would go into opposition. No further reliable information has become available since then.
 

03.05.02. Ukraine risikerer nye handelssanktioner fra USAs side

03.05.02. 2,3 millioner gik med i loyale 1.maj demonstrationer

06.05.02. Gongadze-sagen rider Ukraines styre som en mare

06.05.02. Melnitjenko skal afsløre statshemmeligheder

06.05.02. Kutjma muligvis i den værste kattepine i sin embedsperiode

07.05.02. Diaspora-leder møder ledere af Verkhovna Radas fraktioner

A memorandum on these issues had been forwarded by the UWC
to each bloc leader on April 10, 2002. Victor Yushchenko,
Volodymyr Lytvyn and Yulia Tymoshenko agreed to act on all
matters while Oleksander Moroz voiced reservations, but expressed
a desire to work with the UWC on certain issues.
 

07.05.02. Hvorfor er der ingen menneskerettighedsbevægelse i Ukraine

"We must...create a life worthy of ourselves and of the goals we only
dimly perceive." (Andrei Sakharov, 1975 Nobel Peace Prize Lecture)

WHY IS THERE NO HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN UKRAINE?

By Taras Kuzio

Ukraine has a poor human rights record, which the attainment of
sovereignty has not resolved. In fact, according to international
organizations, Western NGOs and governments, democratization has
regressed since the late 1990s in many different areas, such as the
media, and oppositionists continue to die in suspicious car accidents.
Why then is there no all-Ukrainian human rights movement to counter
these abuses? Two factors seem to have influenced why post-Soviet
Ukraine has been unable to create a unified and visible human rights
movement.

First, in the Soviet era the human rights movement in Ukraine was
always tied to the national question, as it was in other non-Russian
republics such as the three Baltic states and the Transcaucasus. The
combining of national and democratic demands within one movement
in non-Russian republics such as Ukraine made it very different from
human rights groups in the Russian SFSR that campaigned solely for
democratic rights.

In the late Soviet era, this combination of national and democratic
demands into one movement led to the creation of the Ukrainian
Popular Movement (Rukh) that gradually brought together four groups
-- former prisoners of conscience, the cultural intelligentsia, the
democratic platform of the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) and by
1990-91 "sovereign communists" such as ideological secretary Leonid
Kravchuk. Rukh's ideology rested on the belief that the pursuit of
human rights and democratization was only possible after independent
statehood was achieved, whereby the state would actively revive and
promote Ukrainian language and culture to ensure majority status
within Ukrainian society. Ukraine has been independent for over a
decade and yet in some important respects, human rights are
worsening, not improving.

The continued linking of human and national rights in one movement
is still evident a decade after the disintegration of the USSR. The
Ukrainian Association of Political Prisoners and Repressed, headed by
former prisoner of conscience Yevhen Proniuk, which publishes the
journal "Zona," has always been allied to national democratic groups
such as Rukh. The same is true of the Ukrainian Memorial
organization that sprung up in the late Soviet era dedicated to exposing
Stalinist crimes, which was always more active in western Ukraine
even though most of the crimes it investigated were committed in
eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Legal Foundation (ULF) was founded
in 1992 and is headed by former Rukh activist Serhiy Holovatiy who
was elected to parliament in the March elections within the radical
antipresidential (national democratic) Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. The
ULF published the annual yearbook "Human Rights in Ukraine."

Some NGOs are specifically targeted at single issues such as elections
(e.g. Equal Opportunities and the Voter's Committee) or gender rather
than all human rights as such. They operate independently of each
other because they prefer to obtain access to Western funds for their
own NGOs rather than through an umbrella human rights
organization. Other human rights groups do exist but they are not
homegrown and merely domestic offshoots of international
organizations, such as Ukrainian branches of Amnesty International
and the International Society for Human Rights. Even here, Ukraine's
Amnesty International is headed by former prisoner of conscience
Myroslav Marynowych, vice rector of the Lviv Theological Academy
of the Ukrainian Catholic Uniate Church and director of its Institute of
Religion and Society.

With the recognition of Ukraine's borders by Russia and the absence
of any separatism since the mid-1990s, Ukrainian independent
statehood as such in not in danger. Nevertheless, human rights
activists see the country they propelled to independence as having
been hijacked by "sovereign communists" turned centrist oligarchs
who are supported and sustained by the executive branch of
government. The executive and its allies, who abuse human rights and
support a corporatist-authoritarian state, are also seen to neglect
Ukrainian language and culture and prefer Ukraine to remain within
Russia's sphere of influence. In the eyes of this large body of disparate
human rights NGOs and opposition parties, the state has been
hijacked and Ukraine needs to complete the national and democratic
revolution it began a decade ago.

Centrist parties espouse support for the rule of law, human rights, and
confirming to "European" standards but reality shows this is only at
the level of rhetoric, because of their control by oligarchic groups who
prefer a corporatist-authoritarian state. Oligarchic parties have
constantly, for example, blocked attempts by parliament to investigate
the large number of presidential wrongdoings found on the tapes
illicitly made in President Leonid Kuchma's office. Oligarchic
domination of the political center has meant that those interested in
upholding human rights and opposing Ukraine's democratic decline
have joined the antipresidential national democrats or Oleksandr
Moroz's Socialists.

Second, there is no all-Ukrainian human rights movement because of
low levels of national integration across Ukraine. This prevents the
creation of sufficient levels of trust across different regions to allow for
the creation of a pan-Ukrainian civil society. In the Soviet era, western
and central Ukraine produced the majority of the republic's dissidents
and Rukh was based in these same two regions. Opposition activists
and demonstrators were drawn from the same two regions during
Ukraine's largest demonstrations in early 2001 during the height of the
"Kuchma-gate" scandal. This pattern was repeated in the March
elections when these regions voted for the opposition socialists and
national democrats.

On all three occasions, eastern and southern Ukraine has not become
involved in civil disturbances or supported human rights movements.
A far deeper Soviet legacy and ambivalent national identity has made
these two regions more prone to manipulation into voting for the
"sovereign communist" Kravchuk in December 1991, the
"antinationalist" Kuchma in July 1994 and the pro-Kuchma For a
United Ukraine election bloc or the communists in March 2002.

Thus, despite a poor record in human rights, Ukraine has surprisingly
not produced a mass human rights movement. The main political
group who promote democratic values and human rights are national
democrats and therefore democratization, national revival, and
"returning to Europe" continue to be intimately bound together.
Eastern and southern Ukrainian-based centrist parties do not promote
human rights because they are dominated by oligarchs and the
executive, the very same body that infringes human rights.
 

07.05.02. Orthodox Easter: Ukrainian Rediscovers Easter Egg Art

Inside a ramshackle Soviet-built apartment building not far from Kiev's gold-crested onion dome cathedrals, Galina Ivanets bends over an egg, transforming it into a tiny, brilliant piece of art.

``Pysankarstvo'' -- the art of painting Easter eggs -- has enjoyed a renaissance as part of the religious and cultural awakening in post- Soviet Ukraine following decades of state-sponsored atheism. Although
associated with Easter, which is celebrated on Sunday in mostly Orthodox Christian Ukraine, the eggs are sold year-round.

Back in the Soviet era, Ivanets was an economist working for a huge state enterprise. But she says the Chernobyl disaster 16 years ago robbed her of her health, leaving her unable to work.

But it left her time to rediscover the art, which dates to ancient times when eggs were considered symbols of the origin of life. With the advent of Christianity, the art of making decorated eggs, or pysanky, came to symbolize the spiritual renewal associated with Easter.

``Making pysanky brought sense to my life,'' Ivanets said.

Ukrainian Easter eggs are made by drawing patterns and symbols with beeswax using a wood-handled stylus with a brass tip. Melted wax drips through the tip onto the egg, which is then soaked in bright dyes. The wax-dye process is repeated as many as seven times -- one for each color -- to create a design.

Artists heat the wax over a flame one final time before scraping it away to reveal the brilliant, multicolored egg. They then poke holes at both ends, blow out the egg and thread a string through. The entire process takes anywhere from a few hours to a couple of days, depending on the intricacy of the design.

In some families, the tradition is passed from generation to generation. But Ivanets became a pysanky artist by accident.

After a reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant exploded in April 1986, spewing radiation, she became too sick from diabetes and a nervous disorder to work. In the economic turmoil that followed the 1991 Soviet collapse, she had to find a way to earn money from home to buy insulin.

One day in 1992, when showing an Australian friend around Kiev, Ivanets happened upon a woman demonstrating egg-coloring at the first meeting of pysanky artists since Ukraine's independence.

When Ivanets sat down to try her hand, a television crew filmed her, thinking she was the artist. She ended up on television as a egg artist before she even knew how to color eggs.

``It was a message,'' she said.

Encouraged by her 10-year-old daughter, Olesiya, Ivanets taught herself how to make pysanky from library books showing pictures of regional designs.

``When I started, I didn't know any special designs or symbolism. I just used my imagination,'' Ivanets said with a grin.

A year later, she went to a local boutique and saw eggs she'd sold for $1 going for $5. Today, she is one of Kiev's most sought-after egg artists. Pysanky usually sell for about 25 U.S. cents on the street; her eggs sell for upward of $10.

Ivanets spent three days making a pysanka to be given to Pope John Paul II, a heavenly white goose egg with a gold cross and ribbon motif. Red dots sprinkled throughout the design symbolize Mary's tears during Jesus' crucifixion

``The design came to me as a sudden inspiration,'' she said.

Ivanet's ``workshop'' is the family room and kitchen of her apartment. When she works, even the family cat is sent out.

``I have to work alone,'' Ivanets said. ``If anyone comes in or something disturbs me, it destroys the spirit of the egg and I must throw it away.''
 

08.05.02. Tidligere udenrigsminister Tarasiuk om forholdet til Rusland

by Borys Tarasyuk/i,
director of the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, member of the Our Ukraine parliamentary faction. Ukrayina Moloda, 18 April 2002

[FBIS Translated Text] Several election campaigns in Ukraine and familiarity with a large number of election platforms provide grounds for concluding, among other things, that foreign policy issues rank far from the top of the list in election races in Ukraine. At the beginning of the "great race" of 2002, it looked as if this campaign, too, would not be an exception to the general rule that had formed.

By the end of the campaign, however, this impression disappeared completely. For in the current campaign, foreign policy matters unexpectedly became one of the key issues in the race. Strange as it may seem, they were pushed to the top of the list not by representatives of the Ukrainian political parties that were competing for seats in parliament, but by the representatives of a neighboring state -- Russia. Logically and under the law, these representatives had every right to observe the course of the election campaign in Ukraine, but certainly no right to interfere in the process. Unfortunately, some of them could not resist the temptation to join in "forming" the Ukrainian government and trying to influence the results of the elections. As usual, they chose a very hot issue -- Ukrainian-Russian relations.

The chief target of attacks became Viktor Yushchenko's bloc Our Ukraine. And the agency that began these attacks, strange though it may seem, was the Presidential Administration of Russia. None other than the head of this administration stated back in mid-March: "Russia cooperates constructively with those political forces in Ukraine that support the consolidation of Russian-Ukrainian relations." Among such forces, Mr. Voloshin named the For a United Ukraine [Za Yedynu Ukrayinu] bloc, the SDPU(o) [United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine], and the Communist Party of Ukraine. Furthermore, the chief of the administration of the president of the Russian Federation announced that Russia has no relationship with Viktor Yushchenko's bloc, inasmuch as this bloc includes political forces that advocate "openly anti-Russian" policies.

Following this prelude, which, naturally, needed to be fortified, the methodology of Russian interference became simple and straightforward: to create a false informational pretext, circulate it throughout the country, blame the members of the Our Ukraine bloc for everything, and, to sum up, make the masses believe that Yushchenko's bloc includes solely opponents of the positive development of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

At least that is the impression one gets from the distorted report about the decision of the Ivano-Frankivsk City Council that alleges that the council granted World War II veteran status to former members of the SS Division Halychyna [SS Division Galizien]. The main pretext for the story
was not even the contents of the decision itself, but the fact that the head of the city council, Zinoviy Shkutyak, was (and still is) a representative of the Our Ukraine bloc. All the necessary ingredients for creating an uproar were in place, and the Russian mass media circulated the story widely.

There was an immediate angry response from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which harshly condemned the city council's decision. As it turned out, however, the Russian diplomats made fools of themselves. In actual fact, there was no official decision adopted by the city council. There was only a meeting of the city council, and someone proposed adopting such a decision, but in the end no agreement was reached on the wording of it. In any event, Mayor Shkutyak did not sign any decision, and, thus, no decision exists.

Unfortunately, these details were of no interest to the organizers of this "sensation," either in Russia or in Ukraine. There is no doubt that the two groups coordinated their actions. Apparently, however, something went wrong with the coordination, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted too precipitously to an event that never happened.

The culmination of Russian interference was a film about Viktor Yushchenko, which was shown on the HRT-International channel. The film was obviously meant for the Ukrainian viewer, and it was never shown in Russia. But there is no question that the film was made for the very specific purpose of discrediting Viktor Yushchenko and the bloc he heads.

At the time that Voloshin's statement was published, Viktor Yushchenko's bloc pointed out that in taking such steps, certain representatives of the Russian ruling elite were making a big mistake. As it turned out, this was far from their only mistake.

Immediately after Voloshin's statement, Roman Bezsmertnyy, the political coordinator of the Our Ukraine bloc, noted that that segment of Russia's political elite that actively opposes Yushchenko does not realize that by doing so it is strengthening the patriotic convictions of the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians and thereby forcing them to rally around the national leader.

The second mistake was strategic. When naming the three parties with which Russia would cooperate, the chief of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation could not have been unaware that these parties would not be the only representatives of the Ukrainian people in the future parliament. He also could not have failed to understand that the bloc he was criticizing without any basis could prove to be the winner. Announcing in advance that Moscow will not work with Yushchenko's bloc, Voloshin consciously narrowed the range of the political parties that are ready to
promote the effective development of Ukrainian-Russian relations and thereby potentially made the development of such relations more difficult.

However, despite all the charges described above, Viktor Yushchenko's bloc never changed its fundamental stand on Ukrainian-Russian relations. And that stand is based on the gains made in the Russian sphere by Our Ukraine's leader Viktor Yushchenko while he served as the prime minister
of Ukraine. Recall that throughout Yushchenko's entire term as prime minister, the dominant element in Ukrainian-Russian relations was the economy. Here are but a few figures.

During Valeriy Pustovoytenko's term, the total volume of goods turnover with Russia dropped by 37 percent, and exports of goods to Russia fell even more and at the end of Pustovoytenko's prime-ministerial term amounted to 43 percent of the 1996 level. In contrast, Viktor Yushchenko's government succeeded in halting this negative trend: in just one year, the total foreign trade turnover with Russia rose 12 percent. And exports of goods to Russia during the same period increased by 47
percent. Under the current Cabinet of Ministers, Anatoliy Kinakh's cabinet, the growth of exports has begun to decrease significantly, amounting to only 4 percent at the end of 2001.

Add to that that it was Viktor Yushchenko's government that in April 2000 proposed an effective plan for settling bills for deliveries of Russian gas to Ukraine. Instead of debts, as was the case earlier, Russia began receiving timely payments in real money from Ukraine.

Is it logical in light of the facts cited above, which make up a far from complete list of what Yushchenko managed to accomplish during his term as head of the Cabinet of Ministers, to accuse him of "Russophobia" and of diminishing the importance of the Russian component in the bloc's foreign policy doctrine? Can anyone imagine the absurd situation, in which Viktor Yushchenko, having won the election, will suddenly radically change his stand and become an anti-Russian politician?

Let as also add: on no occasion during the election campaign did Viktor Yushchenko enunciate an anti-Russian policy. Nor will anybody succeed in finding any anti-Russian statements in the election platform of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc. We emphasize: specifically in the platform of Viktor Yushchenko's bloc, inasmuch as he is the leader of the bloc, and he is the only one with the authority to make programmatic statements regarding the policies of the forces that he heads.

Consequently, based on the leader's statements and the bloc's election platform, any logically thinking person will not find it difficult to predict the future position of Our Ukraine on key issues of foreign and domestic policy.

Recall that the bloc's slogan during the election campaign was "Not in word, but in deed!" Applying this slogan to Ukrainian-Russian relations, we see the prospect of concrete actions being taken by the bloc's representatives in the strategically important Ukrainian-Russian sphere. There will be many such actions. First of all, this means continuing the pragmatic policy aimed at developing economic relations with Russia. It is necessary to reverse immediately the current trend that has formed under the existing government, in which the rate of growth of commodity turnover with the Russian Federation lags substantially behind the growth of the total turnover of goods with all other countries. Russia, after all, is our biggest economic and trade partner, and Ukraine, more than anyone else, is interested in this partnership.

The main task in this sphere is to rid our relations of bombastic political statements, filling them with practical deeds instead. The market, and not the political arena, must become the sphere in which our two countries compete. The fairness of this economic competition must be ensured by adherence to world rules governing such competition. Representatives of both countries will be forced to abide by these rules, especially after both countries become members of the World Trade Organization, where these rules are strictly regulated.

The second most important task is to break down old stereotypes, which still hamper the effective development of our bilateral relations. Unfortunately, these stereotypes exist both on the Ukrainian and on the Russian side. Thus, accomplishing this task will require an effort by both sides. Ukrainians have to rid themselves of their inferiority complexes, the provincialism that exists in places, their expectations of free energy resources from Russia. We realize that for some members of the Ukrainian elite some of these tasks are very difficult to accomplish -- recall, for example, the opposition to the actions taken by Prime Minister Yushchenko to establish an effective system of settlements for Russian energy supplies. Members of the Russian elite, for their part, must finally renounce their imperial mentality and recognize that Ukrainian independence is forever, and that accusing Ukrainians of nationalism and Russophobia is nothing less than a distortion of existing reality.

The third most important task is the need for both Ukraine and Russia to recognize their responsibility for the fate of Europe. Ukraine is the largest European state, and Russia is the largest Eurasian state. The security not only of the two states, but of Europe as a whole, and, without exaggeration, of the whole world, depends on the development of a more stable partnership between them.

Both states have armed forces that are among the largest in the world, and Russia also has nuclear weapons. There was a time when some in the world believed that the two countries stood on the verge of a war between them. However, Ukraine and Russia showed the world how the most complicated issues can be resolved in a civilized manner: the fate of nuclear arms, the problem of the Black Sea Fleet. Members of the Our Ukraine bloc will make every effort to ensure that this constructive cooperation continues. We would like to see understanding of our position and corresponding efforts from the Russian side.

Ukraine and Russia will always remain neighbors. They have been destined to be such by God and history. There is no alternative to developing good-neighborly, mutually advantageous relations as between partners, and there can be none. Our peoples are much too closely linked,their fates are much too closely intertwined, their common roots are much too deep.

Those who try to sow discord between our two great peoples is guilty of a great sin. Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc, in seeking to take power, has always been guided by moral and spiritual principles. And no accusations can change the deep belief of every member of this bloc in
these lofty ideals.
 

08.05.02. Vores Ukraine får justitsministerposten

09.05.02. Julia Tymoshenko og hendes mand frikendt

- angående valutasmugling:
"... lederen af efterforskningen i SBU i Zaporizjzja-regionen havde ikke det fornødne grundlag for at rejse en sigtelse mod Julia Tymoshenko for smugling efter straffelovens § 17 og § 70 stk. 2, mens vicechefen for Rigsadvokaturens afdeling for sager af særlig betydning, Korelov V.M., ikke havde det fornødne grundlag for at tiltale Julia Tymoshenko i disse sager.

- angående "gassmugling" og "dokumentfalsk" samt "embedsforfalskning":
"... retten afviser vice-rigsadvokatens og vicechefens beslutning, som er indeholdt i bemyndigelsen til at rejse en straffesag og sætte Julia Tymoshenko under anklage.

På grundlag af de under retsmødet fremkomne beviser anser retten det for godtgjort, at den russiske naturgas i årene 1996-97 blev leveret til Ukraine på et lovligt grundlag og i henhold til aftalerne nr. 4 GU-96 af 29.12.95 og nr. 3 GU-97 af 31.12.96 indgået mellem det russiske aktieselskab "Gazprom" på den ene side og anpartsselskabet med udenlandsk kapital "Den industrielt-finansielle korporation "Ukraines forenede Energisystemer" og firmaet "United energy International" på den anden side.
    De ovennævnte aftaler er indgået på behørig vis, udformet og underskrevet af parternes befuldmægtigede repræsentanter og opfylder gældende ukrainsk lovgivnings krav, som finder anvendelse i disse aftaler samt de internationale retsnormer, herunder FNs Wien-konventions resolution "Om internationale aftaler vedrørende køb og salg af varer" fra 1980 og som i henhold til Ukraines forfatnings § 9 er en del af Ukraines nationale lovgivning.
    De omtalte retsakter udgjorde det juridiske grundlag for transit af russisk naturgas gennem Ukraines toldgrænse.
    Mekanismen i fortoldningen af den russiske naturgas overholdt den ukrainske lovgivning, som var gældende på tidspunktet for toldbehandlingen af de russiske naturgasleverancer i henhold til de omtalte aftaler.
    De trilaterale akter vedrørende modtagelse-transit af den russiske naturgas var blevet udformet på behørig vis af de føromtalte parters befuldmægtigede personer og var således gyldige med henblik på den toldmæssige udformning af naturgasleverancerne.
    Firmaet "United Energy International" blev inddraget i operationen modtagelse-videregivelse på lovlig vis som en solidarisk køber af den russiske naturgas i henhold til de førnævnte indgåede aftaler.
    Ukraines toldvæsen havde ingen indvendinger imod den i henhold til aftalerne gennemførte fortoldning af den russiske naturgas
    I betragtning af, at Julia Tymoshenko ikke har begået noget kriminelt det være sig smugling eller embedsforfalskning, ikke har ført usande oplysninger ind i officielle dokumenter og ikke har gjort sig skyldig i andre forfalskninger af disse dokumenter, finder retten, at der ikke har fundet forhold sted, som kunne danne grundlag for og give anledning til at rejse tiltale mod Julia Tymoshenko for overtrædelse af straffelovens..  §70 og §172 stk. 1, hvorfor tiltalen mod hende efter straffeloven skal frafaldes".

- angående "bestikkelse af Pavlo Lazarenko":
"Der foreligger ikke i resolutionerne om tiltalerejsninger efter § 170 stk. 2 i straffeloven oplysninger om, at Julia Tymoshenko eller Oleksandr Tymoshenko skulle have bestukket Pavlo Lazarenko.
    Det er ikke blevet godtgjort, at Julia Tymoshenko og Oleksandr Tymoshenko personligt eller via mellemmænd har bestukket Pavlo Lazarenko.
    Der har ikke været noget lovligt grundlag for at rejse tiltage mod Julia Tymoshenko og Oleksandr Tymoshenko efter strafferetsplejelovens § 94 for at have bestukket Pavlo Lazarenko.
    Retten mener, at embedsmænds beslutninger om at rejse sigtelser efter straffeloven mod Julia Tymoshenko og Oleksandr Tymoshenko på mistanken om bestikkelse af P. Lazarenko er ulovlige og skal frafaldes. Desuden er kendelserne om at sætte dem under tiltale også ulovlige".

    - angående "særdeles omfattende berigelse af statslig ejendom ("sagen om "Ukragrotekhservis"):
"På dagen for rigsadvokaturens repræsentants tiltalerejsning af den 12.11.97 for tyveri fra koncernen "Ukragrotekhservis" modtog sidstnævnte den fulde betaling for leverede stålvalser i henhold til kontrakt nr. 11-003 af 30.04.93.
    På det foreliggende grundlag havde rigsadvokaturen ikke noget lovligt grundlag for og anledning til at rejse sigtelse mod Oleksandr Tymoshenko på mistanke om særdeles omfattende berigelse af statslig ejendom efter straffelovens § 86-1. Derfor skal beslutningen af den 18.08.00 om at rejse tiltage efter straffeloven frafaldes".
    "Idet retten finder beslutningerne om at rejse sigtelser mod J. Tymoshenko efter straffelovens § 70 og § 172 stk. 1 og O. Tymoshenko efter strafflovens § 86-1 ulovlige, skal beslutningerne om at tiltale dem også frafaldes".
    På grundlag af det anmførte og i henhold til §§ 8, 55, 64 og 124 i Ukraines forfatning har retten afsagt følgende kendelse: beslutningerne truffet af embedsmænd i den indenretlige efterforskning og anklagemyndigheden kendes ulovlige, mens følgende beslutninger er at frafalde:
    forsåvidt angår Julia Volodymyrivna Tymoshenko: Af den 30. marts 1995 om sigtelse efter straffelovens § 17-70 (anklager i forbindelse med "valutasmugling"); af den 5. januar 2001 om sigtelse efter straffelovens § 70 og § 172 stk. 1 (anklager i forbindelse med "bestikkelse af P. Lazarenko"); af den 12. februar 2001 vedrørende tiltale efter straffelovens § 17 stk. 2, § 70, § 172 stk. 1 og § 170 stk. 2;
    forsåvidt angår Oleksandr Hennadijovytj Tymoshenko: Af den 18. august 2000 om sigtelse efter straffeloven på mistanke om overtrædelse af straffelovens § 86-1 ("sagen om "Ukragrotekhservis"); af den 5. januar 2002 om sigtelse efter straffeloven på mistanke om overtrædelse af straffelovens § 170 stk. 2 (anklager i forbindelse med "bestikkelse af P. Lazarenko"); af den 17. september 2001 om tiltale efter straffelovens § 191 stk. 5 og § 369 stk. 2.
    Straffesagerne mod Julia Volodymyrivna Tymoshenko og Oleksandr Hennadijovytj Tymoshenko er lukket.
    Beslutningen om at forbyde J. Tymoshenko og O. Tymoshenko at rejse ud af landet skal annulleres."
 

09.05.02. Europarådsdelegation til Ukraine

Hanne Severinsen, Formand for Den danske delegation i Europarådet, rejser i perioden 9. - 11. maj 2002 til Ukraine for at følge op på det afholdte parlamentsvalg.

Den post-elektionære delegation vil under besøget i Ukraine følge op på uregelmæssigheder i forbindelse med valgets afholdelse.

Delegationen vil desuden have møder med højtstående politikere med henblik på at fastsætte fremtiden for Europarådets monitorering af forholdene i Ukraine. Møderne vil bl.a. foregå med Præsident Leonid Kuchma, Udenrigsminister Zlenko og Højesteretspræsident Boiko.

Især 3 punkter vil fra Hanne Severinsens side blive behandlet under besøget:
Er der fremskridt at spore med hensyn til om parlamentsvalget foregik som et frit valg?
Er løfterne til Europarådet om forbedringer på lovgivningsområdet blevet gennemført?
Er forholdene for pressen blevet forbedret?

Et eventuelt ophør af Europarådets monitorering kræver væsentlige forbedringer på alle 3 nævnte områder. Det kan ikke accepteres, at et land i Europa - og som indenfor en kort tidshorisont vil være nabo til EU - ikke overholder disse grundlæggende forpligtelser, hverken overfor sin egen befolkning eller overfor det internationale samfund. som Ukraine så inderligt ønsker at blive et anerkendt medlem af.
 

09.05.02. Bliver Kutjma Saddams redningsmand eller vice versa?

"... TILFØJELSE,
som føjes ind i listen over udenrigsøkonomiske subjekter, som gives mandat til at kunne gennemføre eksport af varer af militær betydning af hjemlig produktion indenfor rammerne af opfyldelsen af Overenskomsten mellem Ukraines og Den russiske Føderations regering om produktionsmæssig og videnskabelig-teknologisk samarbejde mellem forsvarsindustriens virksomheder af den 18. november 1993 samt de deraf følgende varefortegnelse.."
    A/S Topaz, Donetsk har kode nr. 14310371. Punktet ifølge Regelsættet, som er blevet godkendt af Ukraines regering den 8. december 1997, har nr. 1358 - ML11. Varens TN ZED kode er 8543. Varens betegnelse: "elektroniske radarkomplekser til særlige formål og deres bestanddele". Forordningen tillod desuden A/S Topaz at eksportere detaljer, som er nødvendige for at kunne fremstille disse produkter.
    Selvsamme dag, den 14. juli 2000, udstedte Ukraines præsident dekret nr. 893/2000 om oprettelsen af "En statslig kommission med ansvar for Ukraines forsvars-industrielle kompleks". Kommissionens formål er "at udvikle det internationale forsvars-industrielle og militær-teknologiske samarbejde samt forberedelsen til underskrivelsen af internationale aftaler indenfor dette område...". "...Personsammensætningen af Den statslige kommission bliver stadfæstet af Ukraines præsident". ... "Horbulin Volodymyr Pavlovytj udpeges til formand for Den statslige kommission med ansvar for det forsvars-industrielle kompleks".
    Mindre end to måneder senere, den 9. oktober 2000, undertegnes i Bagdad følgende aftale: "Aftale mellem Ukraines og republikken Iraks regeringer om handelsmæssigt, økonomisk, videnskabeligt og teknisk samarbejde".
    Det hævdes bl.a. i aftalen, at "Aftaleparterne indrømmer hinanden et regime af størst mulig begunstigelse forsåvidt angår regler og procedurer i forbindelse med toldopkrævning og andre skatter og afgifter, som vedrører import og eksport".
    "Aftaleparterne bekræfter indrømmelsen af et regime af størst mulig begunstigelse i forhold til alle operationer, som hænger sammen med transport af varer i henhold til lovgivning og regler, som er gældende i deres stater. Aftaleparterne bistår transitten af varer, som transporteres til tredjelande og varer fra tredjelande, som transporteres til den anden Aftaleparts territorium..."
    "... Aftaleparternes begunstiger i henhold til intern lovgivning fysiske og juridiske enheder, institutioner, organisationer og virksomheder i forhold til etableringen af tætte relationer og realiseringen af projekter indenfor økonomisk og teknisk samarbejde".
    Underskrivernes navne blev ikke trykt i den offentliggjorte aftaletekst.
    Den 14. juli 2001 indleverede regeringen denne forordning til en ratificering i Radaen. Regeringsforordningen er underskrevet af Anatolij Kinakh.
    Den 11. september 2001 ødelægger terrorister World Trade Center og angriber Pentagon.
    Den 13. september 2001 underskriver Radaens formand Ivan Pljustj Verkhovna Radas forordning nr. 2675-III og sætter ratificeringen af denne aftale på parlamentets dagsorden.
    Den 15. november 2001 vedtager Verkhovna Rada i Kyiv med 317 stemmer at ratificere den ukrainsk-irakiske aftale. Denne dag er det Viktor Medvedtjuk, der leder mødet. (Ivan Pljustj har været sygemeldt igennem længere tid, red.)
    Næsten samtlige de tilstedeværende deputerede stemmer denne dag for ratificeringen. Selvsamme dag underskriver Ukraines præsident Leonid Kutjma ratificeringen (Nr. 2794-III).
    Hvorfor?
    For at komme til at fremstå som et pålideligt medlem af NATOs aftale "Parterskab for fred?" For at fremskynde Ukraines indtræden i Europa? Drømmer Ukraines nuværende ledelse fortsat i et væk om at blive indbudt til NATOs topmøde i Prag i november i år? Ved Verkhovna Rada i det hele taget - interesserer den sig for - hvad det er, man ratificerer?
    Hvorfor finder Anatolij Zlenko sig i det? Han er jo den, som taler allermest om Ukraines tilslutning til Europa? Hvorfor kunne Kutjmas rådgiver i moralske anliggender, hr. Orel, eller Vatikanet ikke advare Kutjma om, at det er en idiotisk handling? Hvorfor tav SBU? Forsøgte man at bevare statshemmeligheder? Hvem bestyrer egentlig forretningen, spørger Roman Kupchinsky i UP.
 

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